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The supply of munitions from Great Britain to the Soviet Union 
is a remarkable episode in the history of World War II. The two 
countries concerned had been estranged for much of the inter-war 
period, but when in 1941 the German armed forces attacked the Soviet 
Union, Britain made an immediate response. Her own military weakness 
was great, and the objections of her Service departments to offering 
supplies were loud; but despite this the government limited Britain's 
offensive power for the sake of Soviet resistance. Even more remark- 
ably it continued with this policy after the Japanese attacked with 
humiliating results for the British empire in the Far East. The 
strategic situation had changed - and was to change even more with 
Soviet recovery in 1943 - but the supply of munitions continued. At 
no time were the Russians asked to justify their demands, and until 
the war in Europe ended the British delivered supplies to the limit 
of their ability. 
This unusual situation arose because Soviet belligerence was 
central to Britain's strategy for defeating Germany. Even in 1941, 
when the Red Army suffered huge losses, the Eastern campaign offered 
strategic advantages to the British. They had at all costs to supp- 
ort the resistance the Red Army offered. But such was British weak- 
ness at this time that they could not offer aid by invading the 
continent of Europe. They had instead to offer supplies, and, given 
the importance of boosting Russian morale and dulling Soviet suspic- 
ions of the West, offer them uncritically. 
Later, when military circumstances had changed, political consid- 
erations ensured the programme continued in this form. Britain's 
ability to offer munitions was much reduced in later years of the 
war; and her efforts were almost totally eclipsed by those of the 
United States of America. But the termination of British aid to the 
Soviet Union was not considered. Such an action would have dimini- 
shed British standing in the three-Power alliance, since the United 
States continued to provide supplies uncritically. It would also 
have jeopardized the association with Moscow which was vital to the 
defeat of Germany and the construction of a lasting peace. Britain, 
therefore, strained by manpower shortages and financial difficulties, 
continued the programme of supply which had been created to meet a 
vastly different military situation. 
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On 22 June 1941 Adolf Hitler, Führer'and Chancellor of the 
German Reich, attacked the Soviet Union with the mightiest 
military force concentrated on a single theatre of war in 
history. 1 This was the consummation of his political career. 
From his earliest days in public life he, had declared his 
intention to be 'the destroyer of Marxism'2 and the conqueror 
of Lebensraum for the German nation in the East. 
3 
'Nationalism, 
anti-Bolshevism, and anti- Semitism ... formed the pillars of 
his world views 
4 
and Moscow, centre of Bolshevism and of the 
Jewish world conspiracy, remained his ultimate goal. Faced with 
British support for Poland in 1939 he was obliged to seek a 
tactical alliance with the Kremlin, but he saw this as 'a breach 
with my whole background, 'my views, and my former obligations'. 
5 
'The conflict with Bolshevism' remained his 'great and proper 
task'. 
6 
Attacking the Soviet Union in 1941, however, involved Hitler 
in a war on two fronts, the incubus of German strategy. The 
British nation would not admit defeat, despite the fall of its 
ally, France, in June 1940. Hitler had therefore to justify 
his attack on the Soviet Union as a means of weakening England 
further. He told his generals on 31 July 1940, 
England's hope is Russia and America. If the hope of 
Russia is eliminated, America is eliminated also, because 
the elimination of Russia will be followed by an enormous 
increase in the importance of Japan in the Far East ... 
if Russia is smashed, England's last hope is wiped out. 
Then Germany is master of Europe and of the Balkans.? 
Almost certainly, given Hitl'er's ideological obsessions, 
these words were 'mere strategic rationalizations'8 intended 
I J. C. Fest, Hitler (London, 1973), p. 648. 
2 A. Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 
1971), P. 117. 
3 Bullock, p. 316-7- 
4 Fest, p. 206. ' 
5 Ibid, p. 647. 
6 Ibid, p. 641. 
7 Ibid. 
8 B. A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia 1939-1941 (Oxford, 
1973), p. 84. 
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to calm apprehensive generals. Indeed, if Hitler had meant them 
seriously, he was to be bitterly disappointed. For his attack 
on the Soviet Union did not eliminate with one blow Britain's 
'last hope' for resistance. On the contrary it involved the 
German nation in a protracted war of attrition, and provoked the 
alliance between East and West which Germany had always feared. 
For the Wehrmacht, though crowned with the triumphs of Blitzkrieg 
in Europe, did not destroy the Red Army in a matter of weeks; and 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union, faced with a common threat to 
'their survival, embraced each other. In one of the most ironic 
volte-faces of modern politics the British Prime Minister, Winston 
Churchill, offered support to the Russians. Without hesitation 
he extended to them economic and military assistance, though his 
own country's forces were desperately short of munitions. Char- 
acteristically he ignored the pessimism of his generals who, like 
their German counterparts, scorned the Red Army's fighting ability. 
He surmounted his old antipathy to Communism and led Great Britain 
into an alliance of Powers which, with the support of the United 
States of America, ensured the ultimate destruction of Hitler's 
Reich. 
In the circumstances of 1941 such an(alliance was not unexpected 
- each country's need of that other was so great as to make tact- 
ical co-operation at least a necessity. Nonetheless the whole- 
heartedness with which Britain supported the Soviet Union straight 
after the German attack is'remarkable; for Anglo-Soviet relations 
in the past - as Hitler had known to his advantage - had not 
been 
characterized by generosity and sacrifice. Rather they had been 
marred by recrimination, misunderstanding and mistrust. Britain 
had sought to destroy the Communist state in its infancy by supp- 
orting those anti-Bolshevik forces which it hoped would bring 
Russia back into the First World War. In 1918 British troops had 
occupied the Caucasian oil fields and the Northern ports of 
Murmansk and Archangel, and Britain had led the Allied Governments 
in supplying aid to White Russian forces. 
1 This created a legacy 
of suspicion which the Russians for their part did little to 
dispel in the following years. Their habit in the early 1920s of 
viewing the Communist International as their main instrument of 
diplomacy disturbed the British, particularly when its activities 
1 S. Shapiro, 'Intervention in Russia (1918-1919)' in U. S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. XCIX, no. 4 (1973), PP- 52-61. 
10 
extended to China and the traditional areas of Anglo-Russian 
rivalry, India, Afghanistan and Persia. 
1 
Hence, though a trade agreement was negotiated between the two 
countries in 1921, relations remained cool, especially while Lord 
Curzon, with the sensitivity to Russian threats of an ex-Viceroy 
of India, remained at the Foreign Office. 
2 Not until 1924, with 
the election of the first Labour government, did Britain accord 
de lure recognition to the Soviet government. Then the rapproche- 
ment was shortlived, for the publication of the 'Zinoviev letter' 
in late 1924 swept another Conservative government into power. 
3 
Although the Russians insisted that this letter from the Comintern 
urging the British Communist party to 'paralyse all the military 
preparations of the bourgeoisie 
" 
was a forgery, Stanley Baldwin's 
government refused to ratify the agreement negotiated by Ramsay 
MacDonald for a loan to the Soviet Union. The strained relations 
which resulted were finally broken in 1927 when the British high- 
handedly raided the premises of the Soviet trading organization 
in London, and claimed to find there documents proving-Soviet 
intrigues against the British Empire. 
5 Once again, it was not 
until a Labour government came to power, in 1929, that diplomatic 
relations were re-established. Five more years passed before 
trading relations were consolidated in, an agreement involving 
mutual tariff reductions and undertakings to purchase. 
These formal links notwithstanding, Britain and the Soviet 
Union remained estranged for much of the 1930s. This was because 
they failed to reach agreement on how they, as countries on the 
borders of Europe, should respond to the growing power and agg- 
ression of Germany. The Russians, who had been linked to Germany 
in the 1920s by the shared sense of exclusion from the European 
community, were quick to sense the menace of Nazism. Hitler's 
rise to power wrought radical changes in their foreign policy, 
I E. H. Carr, International Relations between the two World 
Wars (Hong Kong, 1967), pp. 7*, 157- 
2 For Curzon's 'ultimatum' to the Soviet government over-their 
activities in Persia, Afghanistan and India see L. -Fischer, 
The Soviets in World Affairs, vol. 1 (London, 1930), pP" 
435-509 
3 D. Thomson, Europe since Napoleon (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 
1966), 
p. 667- 
4 Fischer, vol. II9 (1930), p. 493- 
5 Ibid, pp. 688-9. 
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forcing them to make non-aggression pacts with their neighbours, 
1 
espouse collective security thtough the League of Nations and 
seek rapport with France. From Britain, however, they were prog- 
ressively alienated by her attempts to find her own modus vivendi 
with Germany. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, limiting 
German naval strength to 35 per cent of that of Britain, 'intensely 
disturbed' the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov. He saw it 
as an attempt by the British 'blacklegs' to break the chain of 
armed states which he believed could alone contain Germany. 
2 He 
was no more impressed with later British responses to Fascist 
breaches of the peace - their espousal of the doctrine of non- 
intervention during the Spanish Civil War, the abortive Hoare- 
Laval Pact surrendering large parts of Abyssinia to the Italian 
aggressor, and the failure to act when the Germans reoccupied the 
Rhineland in 1936. For their part the British were suspicious of 
Soviet intentions, 3 particularly in arming the Republicans in 
Spain, but the Kremlin apparently concluded that London would tol- 
erate German growth so long as it did not challenge British inter- 
ests. Increasingly, it seems, Moscow came to suspect that, rather 
than oppose the dictators with force, the British would deflect 
their ambitions to the east. 
The events of 1938 did little to blunt this suspicion. After 
the incorporation of Austria into the German Reich, the Soviet 4 
government proposed measures 'for the collective saving of peace,; 
but the British and French governments remained cautious. 
5 They 
had been repelled by the ferocity df the purge which Stalin had 
launched in 1936, and believed that the elimination of between 
one quarter and one half of the officers of the Soviet armed 
forces, 
6 
including the brilliant chief of the general staff, 
Marshal Tukhachevsky, had made the Soviet Union useless as an 
ally. They therefore excluded the Russians from the negotiations 
about Czechoslovakia which culminated in the cession to-Germany 
of the Sudetenland in the Munich agreement of 29 September 
1938. 
1 J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (London, 
1948), pp. 273-4. 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, I (Washington, 
1953), p" 168. 
3 A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), pp. 1-61-2- 
4 Taylor, p. 196. 
5 M. Gilbert, The European Powers 1900-k5 (London, 1965), p. 131. 
6 J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command 1918-1941 (London, 1962), 
p" 506. 
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This exclusion mortified the Russians. They claimed, apparently 
in all sincerity, 
1 
that, had France honoured her obligations to 
the Czechs, they too would have met their commitments under the 
associated Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance of 1935" Whether they 
would have done so, or whether they would have even acted alone 
without the French, is impossible to say. 
2 
There are several 
reasons to think not - the Polish and Romanian governments' 
refusal to allow the Red Army transit through their territory, 3 
the reluctance of the Czechs to appeal to the Russians alone, 
4 
and the understandable fear on the Russians' part that they and 
the Czechs might face Germany unaided. Nonetheless, the delib- 
erate exclusion of the Russians from the negotiations with Hitler, 
and in particular the failure by the French to respond to the 
Russian suggestion of staff talks, 
5 
aggravated Soviet suspicions 
of the West. 'One might think, ' Stalin said a few months later, 
'that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as 
the prize for her undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union. ' 
The harvest of these suspicions was reaped by the British in 
1939" When, after the Wehrmacht invaded Bohemia and Moravia on 
15 March, and the British approached the Russians on the question 
of assisting Romania, 
7 
supposedly the next victims 
$ 
their approach 
foundered on misunderstanding and mistrust. The Russians suggested 
a six-power conference including France, Britain, themselves and 
1 W. V. Wallace, 'New Documents on the History of Munich' in 
International Affairs, vol. 35 (October, 1959), pp. 453" 
Wallace quotes a dispatch from the Czechoslovak Ambassador to 
Moscow of 17 Sept. 1938, declaring his conviction of Soviet 
sincerity. 
2 K. Robbins, Munich 1938 (London, 1968). In footnote no. 419 
Robbins concludes that until Soviet archives are open the 
question of Soviet intentions is insoluble. 
3 F. Vnuk, 'Munich and the Soviet Union' in Journal of Central 
European Affairs vol. 21 (October, 1961), p. 2 89. 
4. D. Vital, 'Czechoslovakia and the Powers' in Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol. 1 (October, 1966), p. 39- 
5 Wallace, p. 453. 
6 I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (Harmondsworth: 
Pelican, 1970), pp. 417-18. 
7 Sir W. Seeds (Moscow) to Lord Halifax, 18 Mar. 1939 in E. L. 
Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds), Documents on British Foreign. 
Policy 1919-1939 (hereafter DBFP), third series, vol. IV, 
(London, 1951)., no. 403- 
8 The reliability of the information the Foreign office received 
from the Romanian Minister in London about a German economic 
ultimatum to Romania has since been seriously questioned. 
Nonetheless, the British did have military reports suggesting 
an offensive German concentration against Romania. S. Aster, 
1939: The Making of the Second World-War (London, 1973), 
9 -74. 
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the lesser powers, Turkey, Romania and Poland, 
1 but the British 
thought this premature. 
2 They in turn proposed a four-power 
declaration - excluding Turkey and Romania - of their intention 
to enter conversations on steps required to meet the threat to 
the peace of Europe. 
3 They later dropped this, however, in defer- 
ence to Polish objections to being associated with the Russians 
and the hostility of other countries, among them Japan, Spain, 
Portugal, and Canada. 
4 
A month passed, during which the British 
guaranteed the independence of Poland, Romania and Greece, before 
the Russians swept aside a suggestion that they unilaterally guar- 
antee any Eastern European state that wished assistance, 
5 
and sugg- 
ested instead a triple alliance of mutual assistance against 
aggression. 
6 
Again the British raised objections. Both the Prime Minister, 
Neville Chamberlain, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Lord Halifax, distrusted Russian motives,? and they had been 
advised by their Chiefs of Staff that 'any substantial Russian 
military support to Poland is out of the question'. 
8 
It was there- 
fore not until 24 May, almost five weeks after the Russian offer, 
that the Cabinet, confronted with rumours of German-Soviet negot- 
iations, agreed to an alliance with the Russians. 
9 By this time 
their dilatoriness had apparently raised doubts in Moscow about 
their sincerity, and these doubts were enhanced in June by the 
British failure to send a high-ranking minister to continue the 
discussions in Moscow and by the lack of urgency in the despatch 
of British and French military missions in July- 
10 When the 
1 Seeds to Halifax, 19 Mar. 1939, DBFP, IV, no. 421. 
2 Halifax to Seeds, 19 Mar. 1939, DBFP, IV, no. 433- 
3 Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris), Sir W. Seeds (Moscow) and Sir 
H. Kennard (Warsaw), 20 Mar. 1939, DBFP, IV, no. 446. 
4 Halifax to Kennard, 24 Mar. 1939, DBFP, IV, no. 518; Aster, p. 157. 
5 Halifax to Seeds, 14 Apr. 1939, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy 1919-1939, third series, V, (London, 1952), no. lbb. 
6 Seeds to Halifax, 18 Apr. 1939, DBFP, V, no. 201. 
7 K. H. Failing, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), 
p. 403; and J. Harvey (ed. ), The Diaries of Oliver Harvey 
1937-1940 (London, 1970), pp. 2ö9-90. 
8 CP 95(39), Mar. 1939, CAB 24/285- 
9 Cabinet 30(39), 24 May 1939, CAB 23/99. 
10 Harvey, pp. 295-6. For discussion of British reasons for send- 
ing Mr. Strang, head of the Central department of the Foreign 
Office, to Moscow räther than Anthony Eden or, as the Russians 
suggested, Halifax, see Aster, op. cit., pp. 264-6. For dis- 
cussion of the composition and method of travel of the military 
mission, Aster, pp. 290-6. 
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Germans, encouraged by the dismissal in May of Litvinov, the 
advocate of collective security, approached the Kremlin on 14 
August with a definite proposal, the Russians responded. On 23 
August they signed a pact of non-aggression with Nazi Germany, 
and the British hopes of containing Hitler with the threat of a 
two-front war were dashed. 
The fault for this was not entirely their own. They were in 
the invidious position of finding their political and military 
objectives irreconcilably opposed. Initially they had aimed only 
at creating a bloc of Eastern European states threatened by Nazism, 
but, for geographical reasons these states could be protected only 
by the Soviet Union whom they feared almost as much as Germany. 
Britain had therefore the choice of maintaining guarantees with 
little military value, or of riskiig the alienation of the very 
states she was trying to protect by agreeing to the Russians' 
guaranteeing them against their will. Since in July the new Soviet 
Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, insisted on extending the 
circumstances in which this guarantee would apply to cases of 
'indirect aggression'1or 'an internal coup d'etat or reversal of 
policy in the interests of the aggressor', 
2 
the British dilemma 
was particularly acute. All moral considerations aside, they 
feared enhancing German claims to protect Europe from Communism, 
claims which had some appeal as the Baltic States showed when they 
signed non-aggression pacts with Germany in June. 
Nonetheless, British policy from March to August 1939 was 
characterized by the same half-hearted interest in Russian inten- 
tions as had operated in the crises of previous years. The Cabinet 
for instance, guaranteed Poland, whose military value it rated 
more highly than the Soviet Union's, 
3 
with no more than formal 
consultation with the Soviet ambassador, I. Maisky, and this only 
two hours before the public announcement of the guarantee. 
4 
Litvinov was 'outraged' by this, 
5 
and he may well be excused for 
doubting the English desire for co-operation. Certainly the sense 
1 Seeds to Halifax, 1 July 1939, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy 1919-1939, third series, VI (London, 1953), no. 207. 
2 Seeds to Halifax, quoted. in Lord Strang: Home and Abroad 
(London, 1956), p. 179. 
3 Aster, p. 94. 
4 E. H. J. N. Dalton, The Fateful Years: memoirs, 1931-1945 
(London, 1957), p. 241. 
5 Harvey, p. 272. 
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of their irrelevance to British planning must have influenced the 
Russians in their decision to opt not for collective security 
against Germany but for the more Machiavellian association with the 
Reich and the territorial advantages this conferred. 
Whatever the exonerating circumstances on either side, however, 
the Russian pact with Germany was something the British found hard 
to'forgive. It rankled with politicians and military leaders 
alike, long after they were united with the Soviet Union in a com- 
mon struggle against Germany. The British, naturally enough, att- 
ributed the outbreak of war to Russian perfidy, and the distaste 
they then felt for the Kremlin was in no way diminished by Russian 
actions after the German attack on Poland. On 17 September 1939, 
when the Wehrmacht had trapped the bulk of Polish forces west of 
the Vistula, the Red Army invaded eastern Poland. Under the terms 
of the pact with Germany the Soviet Union was allotted Polish 
territory up to the approximate line of the rivers Narev, Vistula 
and San, 
1 but publicly they justified their action with the claim 
that the Polish government had 'disintegrated'. 
2 
This argument 
did not convince the British that Poland had not been ruthlessly 
partitioned, but since their guarantee of Poland applied only to 
a German attack, and since a declaration of war against the 
Soviet Union would have contributed little to the defeat of 
Germany, they confined themselves to a public statement of ci 
disapproval .3 
In the following weeks they watched while the Soviet govern- 
ment capitalized further on its pact with-the Nazis. With 
the 
Baltic states recognized to be in their sphere of influence, 
4 
the Russians secured from Estonia on 28 September the right to 
lease naval bases in Baltic ports and on the islands of Osel and 
Dago. In the next two weeks they negotiated similar agreements 
with Latvia and Lithuania allowing them to maintain 
land and air 
forces on these territories. Then they turned to-Finland. In 
October the Soviet government presented claims for frontier ad- 
justments and military concessions and, when the Finns declared 
them unacceptable, attacked with the Red Army's troops and air- 
craft on 30 November. 
1 Documents on German Foreign policy 1918-1945, series D, 
vol. VII (London, 1956), pp. 246-7. 
2 Sir L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World 
War, vol. I(London, 1970), P. 10- 
3 Woodward, pp. 11-12. 
4 G. L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941 (Leiden, 
1954), pp. 47-8. The Soviet government, however, recognized 
the German claim to the Vilna area of Lithuania. 
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This dashed the hopes the British had had in October of improv- 
ing relations through a trade agreement with the Kremlin, 
1 for 
there was a-surge of public indignation throughout the Western 
world. This in itself was enough to strain Anglo-Soviet rel- 
ations severely, but to add to it, the British Cabinet was ent- 
iced by the new strategic opportunities, to plan military advent- 
ures which threatened war with the Soviet Union. These reckless 
ideas were entertained because intervention in Scandinavia offered 
the British and French many advantages other than simply helping 
the Finns. It allowed them to take the initiative by using their 
sea power, to divert German attention away from the Western front, 
to curry favour with the pro Finn Italians, 
2 
and to intensify the 
economic blockade against Germany. Even before the Russo-Finnish 
war the British, at the instigation of Churchill, had been consid- 
ering stopping the traffic in Swedish iron ore from the Norwegian 
port of Narvik. 
3 
Now Finland's plight offered them the opport- 
unity to completely cut the flow of ore to Germany by occupying 
the iron-ore fields at Gallivare. 
The possibility that war with the Soviet Union might result 
from such intervention was a considerable objection to the plan, 
but the Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept this by the end 
of December, believing that the severing of the iron-ore supply 
would bring about the early defeat of Germany. 
' 
Fortunately, 
though, they were prevented from provoking the Russians by the 
refusal of the Norwegian and Swedish governments to co-operate 
as planned. The Scandinavians remained implacably opposed to 
any action which might involve them in war with Germany and gave 
permission only for Allied volunteers in civilian dress to pass 
through their territory. 
5 Without greater rights of transit 
Allied plans were paralysed, and the Finns, realizing this and 
the inevitability of Russian success in the spring, began in 
late February to negotiate for peace. They did still ask for 
Allied troops and aircraft, which the British and, more 
1 Woodward, pp. 33-4 describes British approaches to Maisky 
on this question. 
2 Weinberg, pp. 91-2. 
3 Woodward, pp. 43-4. 
4 WP(39)179,31 Dec. 1939, CAB 66/4. See also The Ironside 
Diaries. 1937-191+0, ed, by R. Macleod and D. Kelly 
(London, 1962), p. 212. 
5 Woodward, p. 72. 
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enthusiastically, the French considered giving; 
1 but there were 
indications that the Finns wished this help more as a bargaining 
counter in their negotiations rather than as a means of prolong- 
ing their struggle. 
2 
On 12 March in fact they signed an armis- 
tice with the Soviet government, bringing to an end an unedify- 
ing episode of British vacillation and indecision. 
3 
Its only 
achievements, both negative, were to encourage Hitler to invade 
Norway against his better judgement, 
4 
and to provide the Russians 
with further cause later for suspecting British intentions. 
For, while contemplating hostilities against the Soviet Union 
over Finland, the British and French had also considered extend- 
ing the conflict by-bombing the oil fields in the Caucasus and 
sending submarines into the Black Sea. 
5 Enticed by the prospect 
of eliminating 80 per cent of Russian oil production6 and cutting 
off German supplies, they ignored temporarily the formidable 
obstacles confronting these plans - the need for Turkish or 
Iranian co-operation, the diversion of scarce bombers from 
Britain's own defences or the air forces for France, 
7 
and the 
likelihood that Russian defences, poor though they might be, 
would inflict heavy casualties on the attacking force. The plan 
to attack the Caucasus was particularly unreal, as an anonymous 
member of the Air Ministry realized. 
It's jolly to look at the map 
And finish the foe in a day. 
It's not easy to get at the chap; 
These neutrals are so in the way. 
But if you say "What would you do 
To fill the aggressor with gloom? " 
Well, we might drop a bomb on Baku, 
Or what about bombs on Batum? 
Other methods, of course, may be found. 
We might send a fleet up the Inn: 
We might burrow far underground 
And come up in the heart of Berlin. 
But I think a more promising clue 
To the totalitarian gloom 
Is the dropping of bombs on Baku, 
And perhaps a few bombs on Batum. 
1 Woodward, pp. 92-9. 
2 R. Parkinson, Peace for our time (London, 1971), pp. 
305-6. 
3 Woodward, p. 58- 
4 B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War 
(London: 
Pan, 1973), pp. 55-62. " 
5 Woodward, pp. 111-13. 
6 WP(40)91,8 Mar. 1940, CAB 66/6. 
7 COS(40)279 (meeting between COS and French High Command), 
27 Mar. 1940, CAB 80/9. 
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The scale of the map should be small 
If you're winning the war in a day. 
It mustn't show mountains at all, 
For mountains may be in the way. 
But, taking a statesmanlike view, 
And sitting at home in a room, 
I'm all for some bombs on Baku 
And, of course, a few bombs on Batum. 
Sometimes I invade the dear Dutch, 
Sometimes I descend on the Danes; 
They oughtn't to mind very much, 
And they don't seem to have any planes; 
I slip through the Swiss and say "Boot" 
I pop over the Alps and say "Boom! ' 
But I still drop a bomb on Baku, 
And I always drop bombs on Batum. 
Vladivostock is not very far; 
Sometimes I attack him from there. 
With the troops in a rather fast car 
I am on him before he's aware. 
And then, it's so hard to say who 
Is fighting, precisely, with whom, 
That-I'm keen about bombing Baku, 
I insist upon bombing Batum. l 
Admittedly the British were far less enthusiastic about this 
and other plans for provoking the Russians than were the French. 
For one thing they were not under such public pressure at home 
to help the Finns, 
2 
and their military leaders did not share 
the French Commander-in-Chief, General Maurice Gamelin's, 
confidence that the Germans could not hope for success against 
the Maginot Line. 
3 
They were also more sensitive to Russian 
encroachment and propaganda in the Near East and Asia4 and were 
therefore unwilling to entertain the French proposal late in 
January of a landing at Petsamo. This, the British thought, 
might provide some encouragement to the Finns, but it would 
only provoke the Russians without the compensating gain of 
the 
iron mines at Gallivare. 
5 
Nevertheless, despite their reserv- 
ations, the British were implicated in these plans to attack the 
Soviet Union. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(C. I. G. S. ), 
General Edmund Ironside, had written on 24 January 1940 in a 
strategical appreciation, 'in my opinion the most effective aid 
that we can give to Finland will be by attacking Russia at as 
1 AIR 9/138. 
2 WNoodward, p. 100. 
3 Anglo-French meeting of 31 Jan. 1940, COS(40)228(S), CAB 
80/104" 
4 vip(40)91,8 Mar. 1940, CAB 66/6. 
5 Woodward, p. 78. 
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many points as possible and especially, by interfering with the 
output of her oil from Baku. 
" When news of these plans later 
became public, 
2 
the British responsibility was as great as the 
French and the Russians suspected them as much - as became clear 
when in 1941 the British offered to send oil demolition experts 
to the Caucasus to hinder the German advance. 
In fact thanks to British support for Finland, Anglo-Soviet 
relations during the period December 1939 to March 1940 reached 
their nadir. The British ambassador to Moscow, Sir William 
Seeds, left his post late in December and was not replaced until 
six months later. The Russians interpreted his leaving as being 
'unfriendly' to them and insisted, moreover, that Britain and 
France had been responsible for their expulsion from the League 
of Nations on 14 December 1939.3 In these circumstances contacts 
between British and Soviet representatives were reduced to a 
minimum. Russo-German relations in contrast enjoyed one of their 
least troubled periods, the Germans intervening to prevent Italian 
help for the Finns, 5 and negotiating railway, air and trade agree- 
ments with the Russians. 
6 
In the most significant of these, the 
Commercial Agreement of 11 February 1940, the Germans offered the 
Russians coal, naval and military equipment in return for large 
quantities of oil and other raw materials and the right of transit 
for German supplies from the Middle and Far East. 
7 
This agreement impeded Anglo-Soviet rapprochement even after 
the war with Finland had ended, removing the major source of 
friction between them. On 27 March Maisky told Halifax that his 
government was willing to enter a trade agreement with Britain, 
but the British insisted on a guarantee that goods they supplied 
should not be re-exported to Germany. Since the Russians were 
scrupulously meeting their commitments to Germany at this time8 
(and effectively undermining the British blockade in doing so), 
this guarantee was not provided. 
9 
Anglo-Soviet relations in 
1 COS(40)216(S): CAB 80/104. 
2 Parliamentary question, 11 July 19k0, FO 371 24850 N5967/96/38. 
3 Woodward, p. 107- 
4 Ibid., p. 107. 
5 Weinberg, p. 88. 
6 Ibid, p. 
69. 
7 Ibid., p. 71. 
8 Ibid., p. 72. 
9 Woodward, pp. 455-6. 
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consequence soon reached an impasse. 
However, new opportunities presented themselves with the 
Germans' spectacular victory over the British and French armies 
in May 1940. The Kremlin was apparently uneasy at the rapid 
elimination of France and the freedom Hitler had thus gained to 
direct his attention to the east. The British therefore decided 
in June to send Sir Stafford Cripps, long an admirer of Soviet 
Russia, to Moscow to continue the trade discussions. The Kremlin, 
however, would not accept Cripps in the capacity of special and 
extraordinary plenipotentiary. It apparently still resented 
Seeds' withdrawal, for a Tass communique of 30 May said, 
If the English Government really wishes to conduct negotiat- 
ions on trade, and not simply to confine itself to talks 
about some non-existent turn in the relations between 
England and the U. S. S. R., it can do this through its ambass- 
ador in Moscow, Seeds, or some other person occupying the 
post of ambassador in Moscow should Seeds be replaced ... 
In view of this, the British government appointed Cripps ambassador 
to Moscow. 
1 
Unfortunately Cripps' arrival in the Soviet Union on 12 June 
1940 coincided with the Kremlin's ultimatum to the Baltic states. 
In an effort to reinforce itself against an immensely strengthened 
Germany, the Soviet government demanded from Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia the reform of their governments and the right of free pass- 
age for Soviet troops. A few days later the Red Army occupied 
these countries and on 21 July held elections in which the 
three 
states voted to incorporate themselves in the Soviet Union. 
Mean- 
while on 27 June the Kremlin demanded from Romania the cession of 
Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, the latter of which 
Romania had 
gained at Russia's expense after World War I. 
Although these actions had the value of exacerbating 
Russo- 
German differences - part of Lithuania had 
been allotted to 
Germany's sphere of influence in the secret protocol of 
19392 and 
the Germans had recognized Russia's right to Bessarabia 
but not 
Bukovina3 - they proved the 
'main stumbling block'4 to the success 
of Cripps' mission. The British would not recognize 
the legit- 




and, conscious of American disapproval if 
1 Woodward, pp. 459-61. 
2 Weinberg, p. 99. 
3 DGFP, VII, pp. 246-7- 
4 Woodward, p. 61o. 
5 Ibid., p. 475. 
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they went further, 
' 
would grant only de facto not de lure recog- 
nition to Russian sovereignty there. As well, when their assets 
in the Baltic states, amounting to somej5,500,0002 were national- 
ized without compensation, they refused to surrender to the Soviet 
government Baltic gold deposited in the Bank of England and Baltic 
ships in British ports. 
3 
The annoyance this caused the Russians 
combined with their fear of antagonizing the Germans and their 
continuing suspicion of Britain4 to make Cripps' first year in 
Moscow particularly sterile. 
In an effort to improve the situation the British on 22 Oct- 
ober 1940 proposed a new political agreement to the Soviet Union. 
In this they offered de facto recognition of Soviet sovereignty 
in the Baltic states, East Poland, Bessarabia and Northern 
Bukovina; assistance for Soviet defence against any future attack 
by her neighbours; immunity from attack by the United Kingdom or 
by her existing or future allies by way of Turkey or Iran; consul- 
tation regarding the post-war settlement in Europe and Asia; and 
an assurance that Britain would not enter any anti-Soviet alliance 
after the war as long as the Soviet government abstained from any 
hostile action against Britain's interest. In return the British 
government asked from the Soviet Union that it should treat the 
United Ringdom, Turkey and Iran with benevolent neutrality, con- 
tinue assistance to China, and, should a trade agreement be neg- 
otiated between the two countries, conclude a non-aggression pact 
with Britain. Initially the Soviet government attached 'the 
greatest importance' to these proposals, but its interest soon 
died. On 10 November the imminent visit of Molotov to Berlin was 
announced. Although the Soviet deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Andrei Vyshinsky, assured Cripps that this visit was not 
an unfriendly act towards His Majesty's Government, the Kremlin 
made no further reference to the British proposals. Cripps 
bel- 
ieved that the Russians had decided 'to go with the Axis' as the 
safest policy for themselves, 
5 
and indeed the British ambassador 
was not granted an audience with Molotov from October 
1940 to 
1 Ibid., p. 476. 
2 D. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (New Haven, 
Connecticut, 1942), P. 323- 
3 Woodward, pp. 476-9. 4 Letter from Cripps to Halifax, 10 Oct. 1940, FO 371 24848 
N7323/40/38. 
5 Woodward, pp. 492-6. 
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February 1941. Even when he was finally allowed to see the Soviet 
Foreign Minister, this was, it seems, only because Anthony Eden, 
appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 22 December 
1940, had specifically protested to Maisky on Cripps' behalf. 
1 
Consequently, as Russo-German relations deteriorated for all 
their public affirmations of amity in the second year of their 
alliance, there was no corresponding improvement in relations 
between London and Moscow. The Soviet and German governments 
disagreed on many issues - German support for Finland during a 
new crisis with the Soviet Union in August 19402 and German pene- 
tration of the Balkans, 
3 to name but the most serious. Nonethe- 
less Anglo-Soviet relations remained cool, exacerbated by the 
British persuading the United States government to curtail 
exports to the Soviet Union. 
4 
This estrangement between London 
and Moscow continued even when, from January 1941 onwards, there 
were signs of a German military concentration against the Soviet 
Union. The British warned the Soviet authorities of this mili- 
tary build-up, though they thought it might be nothing more than 
a German 'war of nerves' to extort complete co-operation from the 
Russians. 5 Churchill, struck by the change of German dispositions 
before the attack on Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 even sent a per- 
sonal, if somewiat conspiratorial, message direct to Stalin. 
6 
Nonetheless the Soviet government in a last desperate effort 
to deprive the Germans of any casus belli redoubled its efforts 
at co-operation. Pravda publicly denied that the Russo-Japanese 
pact of 13 April 1941 was directed against Germany, 
7 
and Russian 
deliveries of supplies to the Reich, down in January and February, 
rose substantially in March. 
8 
On 9 May, after Stalin had assumed 
full responsibility for government as President of the Council of 
People's Commissars, the Norwegian, Belgian and Yugoslav embassies 
in Moscow were closed down, 'owing to their countries' loss of 
sovereignty'. 
9 A few days later the Soviet government established 
1 Ibid., p. 597- 
2 A. Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-45 (London, 1971), p" 12. 
3 Weinberg, pp. 130--1, -154. 
4 Woodward, pp. 602-3n. 
5 Woodward, p. 594. 
6 Sir Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. III (Sydney, 
1950), p. 320- 
7 Woodward, p. 595. 
8 Weinberg, p. 161. 
9 Woodward, p. 595. 
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diplomatic relations with Iraq, even though its leader was the 
pro-Fascist Rashid Ali, against whom British troops were then 
contending. 
In the face of such determined appeasement the British were 
powerless. All they could do was assure Maisky, when the Joint 
Intelligence Committee declared that the latter half of June 
would see 'either war or agreement'1 between Germany and the 
Soviet Union, of their support for his government. On 13 June 
the ambassador was promised economic assistance and a military 
mission in event of war, but he assured Eden that Britain 'had 
exaggerated the German concentrations and that Germany was not 
intending to attack Russia ... The Soviet Government would 
react more favourably if our (the British) message were accom- 
panied by action on our (Britain's) part showing that we desired 
more friendly relations'. 
2 On the same day the Soviet newspaper 
Izvestia declared that 'rumours of Germany's intention to break 
the pact and open an attack on the USSR are devoid of all found- 
ation ... rumours that the USSR is preparing for war with 
Germany are lies and provocations. '3 
Thus when the Wehrmacht attacked at 3.15 a. m. on 22 June 1941, 
it met an army whose orders were ambiguous and defensive. Relat- 
ions between the Kremlin and Britain, now its ally of necessity, 
were still strained; and, though the British had indicated frequ- 
ently in the last year their desire to work with the Soviet Union 
towards the defeat of Germany, there was little indication of 
the 
generosity and whole-heartedness with which they would soon 
take 
up the Russian cause as their own. 
1 JIC(41)247,10 June 1941, CAB 79/12. 
2 Woodward, p. 621. 
3 J. Degras (ed. ), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. III, 
1933-1941 (Oxford, 1953), p. 489. 
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2 
When the German armed forces attacked the Soviet Union, the 
British government's reaction was immediate and swift. Despite 
the issues separating the two countries the Prime Minister with- 
out hesitation offered the Russians the United Kingdom's support. 
In a radio broadcast on the night of 22 June he told the world: 
Any man or state who fights on against Nazism will have our 
aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe 
... It. follows therefore that we shall give whatever 
help we can to Russia and the Russian people. We shall 
appeal to all our friends and allies in every part of the 
world to take the same course and pursue it1 as we shall 
faithfully and steadfastly to the end ... 
As was said later in parliament, this was 'a decisive act of lead- 
ership at'a critical moment' in the war. 
2 It created the assoc- 
iation between Britain and the Soviet Union which had proved so 
elusive in the 1930s and it laid the foundations of the alliance 
which was to destroy German hegemony in Europe. Nonetheless in 
the short term the Soviet Union's belligerence was a mixed bless- 
ing for the British. It offered them considerable strategic adv- 
antages, but it put them under moral and military pressure to 
take action beyond their capabilities. The Red Army, suffering 
appalling losses of men and material in the months immediately 
following the 'Barbarossa' attack, appealed for diversionary 
action in Europe. This the British could not undertake, and their 
resulting embarrassment forced them to resort to offers of milit- 
ary and civil supplies. These their own Services desperately 
needed, with the result that by October 1941 Britain found itself 
in the paradoxical position of weakening its own offensive power 
in the hope of strengthening Soviet resistance. 
This situation developed only slowly during the months of July, 
August and September 1941. In June, the British commitmenttdes- 
pite the generous tone of Churchill's broadcast, was far more 
cautious and guarded. The Cabinet decided some days before 
'Barbarossa' that, should the Soviet Union be attacked, it would 
take the line in public that Germany was an insatiable tyrant 
1 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. III, pp" 332-3- 
2 Parliamentary Debates, vol. 372, col. 977: Speaker, 
Mr. Lees-Smith, member for Keighley. 
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that had attacked Russia in order to obtain material for carry- 
ing on the war. 
1 
On the practical side, air action over Aorth- 
west France would be intensified and, as mentioned earlier, econ- 
omic assistance and a military mission were offered to Maisky. 
2 
There was little enthusiasm in government circles for going beyond 
such gestures. The three Service departments in particular were 
strongly opposed to either supplying the Soviet Union with munit- 
ions or taking diversionary action to draw German forces away 
from the East. This was not simply because they were acutely 
conscious of Britain's military weakness but because they dis- 
trusted the Soviet Union and believed its resistance would soon 
collapse. 
Together with most other authorities in the West, Britain's 
military leaders assumed that the Red Army was a blunted weapon, 
strong in numbers but little else. They believed that any milit- 
ary advances which it had made since Russia's ignominious with- 
drawal from World War I and the ravages of the civil war had been 
negated by the Stalinist purges. 
3 In 1936 British officers had 
observed the Red Army in manoeuvres near Minsk, and had been 
impressed by Soviet technical equipment, mechanical forces and 
tanks; but they had doubts about its tactical ability and leader- 
ship. These were the flaws the purges accentuated. Proportion- 
ately more officers were eliminated the higher the command level, 
and 90 per cent of Army commanders Class I and II5 and 100 per 
cent of the fleet 6-1, admirals6 - to name only two categories - 
were removed. Virtually all experienced leadership was gone and 
this, combined with administrative inefficiency-and the appalling 
state of Soviet communications, the Chiefs of Staff believed in 
1939, made the Red Army an unreliable force. In fact in March of 
that year the Chiefs of Staff estimated that within two to three 
weeks of the start of hostilities the Soviet Union would be 
for- 
ced to suspend mobilization 'to avoid a complete breakdown 
in 
1 WM(41)61st concl., 19 June 1941, CAB 65/18. 
2 The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning 
(London, 1965), p. 268. 
3 See, for example, The Memoirs of General the Lord 
Isms K. G., 
P. C., G. C. B. C. H. D. S. O. (London, 1960), p. 224. 
(Ismay was 
Deputy-Secretary (Military), War Cabinet. ) 
4 Report of the visit of the British Military Mission 
to Moscow, 
report by Major-General Wavell, AIR 2/1911. 
5 Erickson, The Soviet High command, p" 507- 
6 R. Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties 
(London, 1968), p. 857 
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industry and national life'. 3: 
Later events in 1939 confirmed the British in this opinion of 
Soviet military capacity. The Red Army's performance in Poland 
and the Baltic states did not seem impressive. In the former 
case, although the equipment of the first-line divisions seemed 
good, that of the reserve arms was reported as 'pitiful' and the 
cavalry and infantry, 'an undisciplined rabble'. 
2 In Estonia, 
despite the large number and efficiency of tanks, there were 
many breakdowns of mechanical transport, shortages of petrol and 
supply delays. 
3 
Then came the war against Finland. Perhaps no single event so 
misled British military leaders in their opinion of the Soviet 
Army. The fact that it took 1,200,000 Russians, 1,500 tanks and 
3,000 aircraft, three and a half months to defeat 210,000 poorly 
equipped Finns4 outweighed all evidence - then and later - in the 
Red Army's favour. The initial debacle of the Soviet forces, 
their unsophisticated tactics and the poor co-operation between 
the arms of their Services5 eclipsed the fact that they soon 
recovered and learnt from their mistakes. Even when it became 
clear, as it did in January 1940, that Soviet weaknesses had been 
overestimated and the difficulties of the terrain underestimated, 
6 
the War Office remained scornful. A report based on the interr- 
ogation of Soviet prisoners-of-war said in February 1940, 
The average present-day Russian is nearer a dirty, but 
semi-intelligent animal than he has been for centuries 
past. All ambition has been smothered, all initiative 
repressed ... 
The average Red Army soldier is incredibly ignorant ...? 
This prejudice - by no means limited to junior officers - 
encouraged the British to underestimate the Red Army throughout 
1940. Little weight was given to the fact that after the fail- 
ures of Finland, the Soviet forces were extensively reformed. 
1 CP 95, Mar. 1939, CAB 24/285. 
2 Weekly resume, 5 Oct. 1939, CAB 80/1. 
3 WP(39)101,28 Oct. 1939, CAB 66/3; see also report by mili- 
tary attache, Riga, 28 Oct. 1939, FO 371 23690 N5997/518/38. 4 B. C. U. Cuthbertson, Arctic and Subarctic Operations, 
(unpublished manual for Canadian Armed Forces, 1970) p" 
2-28. 
5 See Erickson, p" 544. 
6 WP(40)22,20 Jan. 1940, CAB 66/5. 
7 Report by Major R. 0. A. Gathouse and Capt. C. H. Tamplin, 22 
Feb. 1940, FO 371 24850 N3288/132/38" For a similar disparag- 
ing account, this time of the Soviet Air Force in Finland, see 
the Journal of the Roval United Services Institute, May 1940. 
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The already large defence budget was increased by 40 per cent in 
April, 1 and in May, Marshal Timoshenko replaced Marshal Voroshilov 
as Commissar of Defence. Under his direction measures were taken 
to improve discipline; 2 new armoured formations began to be formed 
on the German panzer model, and re-equipment with more modern tanks 
and aircraft was accelerated. 
3 
These and other changes, which were 
admittedly uncompleted by mid-1941, attracted little attention in 
the West. With their Service attaches almost continually ignored 
in Moscow, 
4 
the British continued to notice the flaws of the past, 
and ignored those indefinable qualities of morale, courage and imp- 
rovisation which in 1941 were to prove the Russians' salvation. 
When the day of the German invasion came, the British C. I. G. S., 
General John Dill, expected the Russians to 'be rounded up in 
horde8'. 5 The, Joint Intelligence Committee predicted the Red Army 
would lose the Ukraine and Moscow in a minimum of three to four 
weeks or a maximum of 'six weeks (or more)'. 
6 
The Joint Planners 
also, working on the Intelligence estimate that the German armoured 
divisions had proved themselves capable of advancing twenty-five 
miles a day for a fortnight, 
7 
estimated that Russian resistance 
could not last for more than a few weeks. 
$ 
Eighty per cent of the 
War Office put it even lower; the Parliamentary Under Secretary 
for War, Edward Grigg, told Harold Nicolson on 24 June that the 
War Office expected the Eastern campaign to last ten days. 'They 
are not all pleased by this new war, which will give great triumphs 
to Hitler and leave him free to fling his whole force against us'. 
9 
Possibly Britain's military leaders persisted in such gloomy 
estimates of the Red Army's capacity because they resented Soviet 
actions in 1939 and 1940. Dill certainly disliked the Russians 
intensely, finding any idea of associating with them, even after 
the German attack, foul - 'a lot of pigstickers', he dubbed the 
1 Analysts from British embassy, Moscow, Apr. 1940, FO 371 24850 
N5254/132/38" 
2 Erickson, p. 555. 
3 Seaton, The Russo-German War, pp. 92-3. 
4 See, for example, Letter Sir William Seeds to Sir. L. Oliphant, 
., 4 Mar. 1939. FO 371 23677 N1895/57/38; minute by Mr. Maclean, 
16 Oct. 1940, FO 371 24848 N6884/40/38- 
5. Quoted by Ismay in a letter to all ouis Mountbatten, Sept. 
1964, Ismay papers, IV/MOB/1249ACentre for Military Archives. 
6 JIC(41)234(Revise), 14 June 1941, CAB 79/12. 
7 M. i. 14/DR/58/4l, 23 June 1941, WO 193/644. 
8 JP(41)473(S)(draft), 22 June 1941, CAB 84/32. 
9 N. Nicolson (ed. ), Harold Nicolson: Diaries .. =& Letters, 1939- 
(Bungay, Suffolk: Fontana Books, 1970), pp. 173-4. 
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members of the Soviet Military Mission which arrived early in 
July. 
1 His feelings were shared by the Vice-Chief of the Imper- 
ial General Staff, Lieut. -General Henry Pownall; he wrote in his 
diary on 29 June 1941, 
I avoid the expression 'Allies' for the Russians are a 
dirty lot of murdering thieves themselves, and double 
crossers of the deepest dye. It is good to see the two 
biggest cut-throats in Europe, Hitler and Stalin going for 
each other, (sic) I only hope Stalin will make a deep gash 
in Hitler's throat. With a bit of luck he will. It's 
impossible to say how long Russian resistance will last - 
three weeks or three months? 2 
In defence of the military it must be stressed that many others, 
some of them more sympathetic to the Soviet Union, shared the 
Services' pessimism. Hitler and his generals were the outstand- 
ing example, believing as they did that the campaign in the East 
would be short and swift. On the Allies'aide, Eden admitted that 
he was sceptical when the Soviet ambassador assured him on 2 June 
1941 that ten German armoured divisions would meet fifteen Russ- 
iany3 Cripps also, recently back from Moscow, predicted to the 
Cabinet on the 16th June that Stalin would capitulate to Hitler, ' 
either politically in an effort to avoid hostilities, or milit- 
arily after a short campaign. 
4 
In the United States too, the 
Chiefs of Staff, influenced by the unmitigated gloom of their 
military attache' in, Moscow, did not hope for a campaign lasting 
more than three months. The Secretary of State for War, Henry 
Stimson, advised President Roosevelt on the General Staff's auth- 
ority that 'Germany will be thoroughly occupied in beating Russia 
for a minimum of one month and a possible maximum of three months'. 
5 
Professor M. Postan, therefore, is not strictly correct when he 
states in his history of British war production that 'There was no 
hesitation in welcoming Russia's accession to the Allied ranks ... 
It was taken for granted from the very outset 
that this country 
would have to do'its utmost to sustain 
Russia in her military 
struggles'. 
6 
In reality the Service departments were preoccupied 
1 Sir John Kennedy, The Business of War: The War Narrative of 
Major-General Sir J. -Kennedy 
(London, 1957), pP. 147+ 149" 
For Ismay's agreement, see Ismay, pp. 
223-4. 
2 Pownall papers. 
3 The Reckoning, p. 267. 
4 WM(41)6Oth concl., min. 1, confidential annex, 
16 June 1941, 
CAB 65/22: see also J. Leasor, War at the Töp 
(London, 1959), 
P. 155. 
5 R. E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, 
vol. 1 (London, -1948), pp. 303-4" 
6 M. M. Postau, British War Production (HMSO, 1952), p. 118. 
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with the fear that the Red Army would soon collapse, leaving Brit- 
ain all the more vulnerable; they were obsessed, especially in the 
case of the War Office, with the prejudices of the past, and they 
feared putting further strain on Britain's scarce resources. For 
the last of these reasons the Chiefs of Staff resisted the untir4 
ing efforts of Churchill and the Soviet government throughout 
June and July to get them to take the offensive in Europe or nor- 
thern Russia. 
The Prime Minister first suggested this on the day after the 
German attack on the Soviet Union. With his indomitable optimism, 
his passion for taking the offensive, his facility for ignoring 
uncomfortable facts and his scorn for his advisers' pessimism, 
Churchill saw the chance to 'make hell while the sun shines'. He 
suggested a raid of 25,000 - 30,000 men on northern Europe. 
I' The 
Service departments, however, urged caution. Although they saw 
the need to capitalize on the Soviet Union's belligerence - as 
the Director of Military Operations, Major-General John Kennedy 
said in his diary, 'The thieves have fallen out. This Russian 
business may stretch the Boche and help us. We shall have to try 
to keep it going'. 
2 
- they were conscious of the dangers of precip- 
itate action. The security of the United Kingdom was still finely 
balanced. In mid-1941 it had finally begun to possess 'something 
like an adequate land-force' with which to meet the threat of 
invasion; and in June there were at last signs that the command of 
the air 'had passed or was passing into Allied hands'. 
3 Set again- 
st this, however, were the facts that in the previous months ship- 
ping losses had been prohibitive and the demands of the 
Middle 
Eastern theatre were unceasing. In March, April and May 
1,728,649 
tons of shipping had been lost, 
4 
and the combined production of 
the Commonwealth did not exceed 1 million tons of new shipping a 
year. 
5 The Middle East meanwhile had absorbed all the resources 
the Home Forces could reasonably spare by early 1941,6 yet 
its 
needs continued to expand. Wavell's offensive in 
June came to an 
inconclusive end; the fighting in Crete and Greece took a 
heavy 
toll, and the commitment to Syria and Iraq demanded 
further 
1 cos(41)116(0), 23 June 1941, CAB 80/58. 
2 Kennedy, p. 147- 
3 J. M. A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, vol. III, June 1941-August 
1942 (London: HMSO, 1964), p" 3- 
4 Ibid., p. 9. 
5 Ibid., p. 11. 
6 Postan, p. 130. 
T 
30 
reinforcements. Britain's strategy in June 1941 was therefore 
defensive. It stressed the protection of the United Kingdom and 
of the communications in the Atlantic, and it limited offensive 
action to the nebulous foursome, bombing, blockade, propaganda 
and subversion. 
1 
Undoubtedly Britain's prospects improved with the diversion of 
German forces to the East. The threat of invasion was eased. 
Some respite was offered in the Middle East. 
2 
German naval vess- 
els were diverted to the protection of communications in northern 
Norway; and the prospects for the bombing offensive improved while 
the Luftwaffe was engaged in the East. 
3 Nonetheless the Planners 
saw little encouragement in these changes to recommend offensive 
action in Europe. They assumed the respite for Britain would be 
brief and that-with the collapse of Soviet resistance new dangers 
would emerge. They believed the Caucasus would be threatened 
within one month of the end of the Russian campaign, 
4 
and that 
the Germans could eliminate the Red Army and attempt an invasion 
of the British Isles before the end of the autumn-5 A further 
fear, expressed by the C. I. G. S., was that Soviet belligerence 
6 
would encourage the Japanese to extend their advance southwards. 
Consequently even before they had considered Churchill's prop- 
osal for an attack on Europe the Planners had ruled out the des- 
patch of troops overseas. 
7 They recommended on 23 June that the 
only action which should be taken in response to the Russo-German 
conflict was the bombing of German transportation systems, raids 
on the Norwegian and French coasts, and the interception of all 
Russian merchantmen at sea, if Russian defeat were imminent. 
8 
An operation of the size Churchill suggested they deemed complete- 
ly impracticable. It ignored the paralysing shortage of shipping 
made particularly acute at this time by plans to occupy the Atlan- 
tic islands. (These operations were given high priority because 
of the importance of the Atlantic communications and the fear that, 
after victory in the Soviet Union, Germany would turn to the 
1 JP(41)444,14 June 1941, CAB 79/12. 
2 JIC(41)234 (Revise), 14 June 1941, CAB 79/12. 
3 S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. I (London: HMSO, 1954), 
pp. 483-5- 
4 JP(41)650,10 Aug. 1941, CAB 84/33- 
5 JP(41)478,23 June 1941, CAB 79/12. 
6 COS(41)401,28 June 1941, CAB 80/29. 
7 Gwyer, p. 12. 
8 JP(41)478, loc. cit. 
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invasion of Spain. ) 
1 
Although the number of troops involved in 
'Puma', 'Thruster' and 'Springboard' was not great, the drain on 
landing craft was; and while these operations were planned only 
a brigade group (5,000-6,000 men) at most could be committed to 
Europe. So the Joint Planners stated on 25 June. 
2 Four days 
later they decided that even this was excessive and recommended 
only a small räid of 2,000 men without tanks or guns; 
3 
and on a 
further day's reflection, they reduced this even more. The prop- 
osal submitted to the Defence Committee by the Director of Comb- 
ined Operations on If July was for a raid by 320 men and 6 tanks. 
4 
Churchill was infuriated by this suggestion. Believing the 
Planners to be 'the whole machinery of negation', 
5 he declared 
the proposed operation to be 'most inadequate and out of all 
proportion in the general war situation'. The world would ridi- 
cule 'the feeble efforts' that were all Britain could do to help 
the Russians. The Defence Committee agreed - far better to remain 
inactive than to make such an inadequate gesture. 
The focus of attention therefore turned to other operations; 
but the Service departments resisted these also. Late in June, 
Soviet representatives in London and Moscow pressed for air action 
over Europe7and for combined Anglo-Soviet operations against Pet- 
samo in northern Finland. 
8 
The purpose of the latter suggestion, 
which originated from a luncheon between Maisky and the Minister 
for Supply, Lord Beaverbrook, 
9 
was the protection of the route to 
Murmansk, the only ice-free port in northern Russia. According 
to the 
soviet Military Mission to London, German air forces in the area 
would be neutralized, making German naval vessels more vulnerable, 
while operations on land would foil the enemy advance to Murmansk. 
10 
1 Gwyer, pp. 94-5- 
2 Ibid., pp. 8,94; JP(41)485,25 June 1941, CAB 84/32- 
3 JP(41)494(E), 29 June 1941, CAB 84/32. 
4 JP(41)500,30 June 1941, CAB 84/32; DO(41)45th mtg., min. 5" 
D0(41)46th mtg., min. 1, CAB 
69/2. 
5 Lieut-General Sir Ian Jacob (Military Assistant Secretary to 
War Cabinet) in Sir John Wheeler-Bennett (ed. ), Action This 
Day: Working with Churchill 
(London, 1968), p. i 6. 
6 DO(41)46th mtg., loc. cit., 
7 WM(41)64th concl., CAB 65/18. 
8 FO survey of Exchanges between His Majesty's Government and 
the. 
Soviet Government on the subject of British military assistance 
to Russia, 19 Nov. 1941, F0 371 29471 N6654/3/38" 
9 WM(41)64th concl., CAB 65/18. 
10 Account of meeting at Admiralty with Soviet representatives 
in 
Do(41)50th mtg,, min. 2,10 July 1941, CAB 69/2" 
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The Service departments, however, doubted the feasibility of the 
plan. Britain was not to provide any troops but it was to supply 
two or three cruisers, light naval craft and some two to three 
hundred aircraft, 
1 
and the First Sea Lord, Admiral A. Dudley P. R. 
Pound, doubted the Russians' ability to provide the essential pro- 
tection from shore-based aircraft. 
2 He advocated only the sending 
of two Royal Navy aircraft carriers to the area to harass German 
shipping. 
3 
The War Office meanwhile was even less forthcoming. 
It thought the whole operation would be a costly waste of scarce 
resources in a futile 'gesture to the Bolsheviks'. 
4 
Its senior 
officers advised the C. I. G. S. on 10 July in a mystifying burst. of 
self-confidence, 
We are doing quite nicely against Germany, particularly in 
view of ever increasing American aid and the practical cer- 
tainty that U. S. A. will sooner or later come into the war. 
All our forces are now being devoted to the accomplishment 
of a definite strategy for winning the war without having 
allowed for Russian aid. If we are going to divert forces 
from this major strategy in order to give Russia direct 
assistance, then we must be quite sure that these forces 
are not going to be wasted. In other words we want more 
than assurances that Russia will not be rapidly defeated 
by Germany: we want concrete evidence. If we get this evi- 
dence, then we can plan accordingly. 5 
Events on the Eastern front did not provide their evidence. On 
the contrary throughout June and July the Soviet forces, though 
resisting stubbornly, 
6 
suffered appalling losses of men, equipment 
and territory to the invading troops. According to a British 
Intelligence Staff estimate, by early July the Red Army had lost 
89 of its 164 infantry and 20 of its. 29 armoured divisions; it 
could no longer, the report said, hold a continuous front. 
7 
At 
the same time the British received gloomy reports about the state 
of Soviet defences in the Arctic. Two officers returning from 
Murmansk and Archangel declared that Russian naval efficiency in 
the area was 'low', the anti-aircraft defences 'poor', the war- 
ning system ; practically non-existent' and the fighter aircraft 
1 Ibid. 
2 COS(41)239th mtg., min. 6,10 July 1941, WO 193/666. 
3 DO(41)45th mtg., min. 2,3 July 1941, CAB 69/2. 
4 Note for War Cabinet meeting, 4 July 1941, WO 193/666. 
5 Minute by Lieut-Colonel Sugden, on which Brigadier Playfair 
(MOI), Brigadier Mallaby (Deputy Director of Military Opera- 
tions) and Kennedy had all written their agreement, 10 July 
1941, WO 193/666. 
6 WP(41)160, lo July 1941, wp(41)166,17 July 1941, CAB 66/17- 
7 Gwyer, p. 93. 
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mostly obsolescent. 
1 This confirmed the Chiefs'of Staff doubts. 
Already anxious about the dangers posed by the unending Arctic 
daylight, on 21 July they 'strongly deprecate(d)' the sending of 
a British force to north Russia. 
2 They recommended instead that 
a naval force be established off Spitzbergen and that one or two 
submarines operate off Murmansk. 
3 
Consequently while the Russians lost over a half a million men 
in little more than a month, the British found their support limi- 
ted to naval action in the Arctic and air action over Europe. 
They sent two aircraft carriers to attack enemy installations in 
northern Norway, two submarines to operate with the Soviet Nor- 
thern Fleet, and a small force to the island of Spitzbergen. 
These operations had mixed success. The aircraft from the car- 
riers suffered heavy losses over one port, Kirkenes, and found no 
shipping at the other target, Petsamo. The operation's achieve- 
ment consisted more in the accompanying of a mine-sweeper to 
Archangel for which, according to Vice-Admiral John Tovey of the 
Home Fleet, the Russians were most appreciative. 
4 
The two Bri- 
tish submarines meanwhile helped eleven Soviet submarines to 
disrupt German supply lines to northern Finland. This, on the 
Germans'"own admission, provided great relief to the Soviet for- 
ces contending with the Wehrmacht in the area. 
5 The Spitzbergen 
operation was also successful within its own terms. It removed 
the Norwegian and Soviet coal miners from the island and destroyed 
the mining installations there. 
6 
Soviet representatives, however, 
had wished the island to be occupied7and were disappointed when 
the British thought this was unnecessary strategically. 
None of these operations, either singly or together, was enough 
to satisfy the Soviet government's demand for diversionary action. 
Indeed, by late July and early August, when these attacks were 
mounted, they had been eclipsed 
by greater Russian demands for aid 
- particularly 
for a second front in Europe and for supplies of 
munitions. On 12 July the 
British and Soviet governments signed 
1 COS(41)145(0), 21 July 1941, CAB 80/58. 
2 Ibid., According to Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian 
and Soviet Sea Power (London, 1974), p. 
422, the Russians did 
launch an amphibious landing themselves. 
3 COS(41)145(0), loc. cit. 
4 Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. 1, pp. 
485-6. 
5 Ibid., p" 493" 
6 Gwyer, p. 198. 
7 Moscow tel. no. 802,15 July 1941, quoted in FO survey of 
exchanges. FO 371 29471 N6654/3/38" 8 DO(41)55th mtg., min. 2,7 Aug. 1941, CAB 69/2. 
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in Moscow an agreement of mutual assistance. In this they promi- 
sed not only that the signatories would consult each other before 
signing a peace, but that they would 'render to each other assis- 
tance of all kinds in (the) present war against Hitlerite Germany'. 
l 
Four days after this Maisky asked Eden for a cross-Channel opera- 
tion by British armoured divisions. TheSavi'st government, he 
said, in view of the withdrawal of German armoured units to the 
East, expected 'an important land invasion' in France by the 
British. 2 The head of the new military mission in Moscow, General 
Noel Mason-Macfarlane, confirmed that Russian resentment at Bri- 
tain's inactivity was growing. 
3 
Naturally the Chiefs of Staff resisted these demands for cross- 
Channel operations. All the factors which had made Churchill's 
proposal for a raid impracticable - the shortage of shipping, the 
strength of German forces on the near coast of France, the lack of 
air cover further afield, and the need to conserve the anti- 
invasion force - applied equally now. Furthermore the Chiefs of 
Staff scorned the Russians' claim for sacrifices from Britain. 
They answered Macfarlane with self-righteous indignation: 
Fact is that-our present difficulties are largely due to 
Russian action in 1939 and for the last 12 months we have 
been fighting alone against heavy odds ... Our main 
strategy i. e. to'weaken Germany by air, naval and economic 
action and to maintain our position in Middle and Far East 
obviously helps Russia indirectly very greatly. Direct 
aid is a different question. As you know we are considering 
certain diversions. But from the purely military point of 
view no action beyond what we are doing now can materially 
affect the operations of the main Russian Armies and 
Air 
Forces. They must save themselves just as we saved 9 ur- 
selves in the Battle of Britain and in the Atlantic. 
Within a week, however, the detachment of the Chiefs of 
Staff was 
shattered. On 19 July Marshal Stalin himself 
joined Maisky in 
requesting a second front in France; he broke 
the diplomatic 
silence he had maintained since the German attack a month ear- 
lier to say: 
the position of the Soviet forces at the front remains 
tense ... It is easy 
to imagine that the position of the 
German forces would have been many times more favourable 
had 
the Soviet troops had to face the attack'of the German 
for- 
ces not in the regions of Kishinev, Lwow, Brest, 
Kaunas, and 
1 Quoted in N6654/3/38, loc. cit. 
2 FO despatch, no. -123--to Moscow, ibid. 
3 Annex to COS(41)244th mtg., 14 July 1941, CAB 79/12. 
4 Annex to COS(41)244th mtg., 14 July 1941, CAB 79/12. 
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Viborg, but in the region of Odessa, Kamanets Podolski, Minsk, 
and the environs of Leningrad. 
It seems to me therefore that the military situation of 
the Soviet Union, as well as of Great Britain, would be con- 
siderably improved if there could be established a front 
against Hitler in the West - Northern Franck, and in the 
North - the Arbtic. 
.I fully realise the difficulties in the establish- 
ment of such a front. I believe however that in spite of 1 the difficulties it should be formed ... 
This was an appeal which could not be ignored, not simply because 
it was the Soviet head of state who made it, after leaving unans- 
wered two personal messages from Churchill. It was a genuine 
cri de coeur, as Stalin's uncharacteristic admission of weakness 
and apologetic reference to Soviet actions of the past showed. 
But the British could'not respond. The prejudices of the mili- 
tary might be overcome but the obstacles in the way of landing in 
Europe could not. At this stage of the war action in northern 
France was beyond Britain's capabilities. Even Churchill realised 
this now, and regretfully he answered Stalin on 20 July: 
The Germans have forty divisions in France alone, and the 
whole coast has been fortified with German diligence for 
more than a year ... The only part where we could have 
even temporary air superiority and air fighter protection 
is from Dunkirk to Boulogne. This is one mass of forti- 
fications ... There is less than five hours' 
darkness, 
, and even then the whole area is 
illuminated by search 
lights. To attempt a landing in force would be to encoun- 
ter a bloody repulse, and petty raids would only lead to 
fiascos doing far more harm than good to both of us. It 
would all be over without their having to move or before 
they could move a single unit from your front. 
He had no option, he explained, but to veto plans for a landing 
in France. The Arctic, however, was a different matter. He 
told Stalin of the planned naval operations and that Britain was 
examining the possibility of basing R. A. F. squadrons at 
Murmansk. 
2 
This was a significant moment in British policy towards 
the 
Soviet Union. It was the first time the government admitted 
its 
almost total inability to take diversionary action 
in Europe, 
and from this time onwards its embarrassment at 
its inactivity 
grew. Although the Kremlin received Churchill's message 
with 
apparently good grace - Stalin telling Cripps that 
he understood 
1 Churchill, III, pp- 342-3- 
2 Churchill, III9 pp. 344-5. 
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the difficulties and had no questions or reproaches'1 - increa- 
singly the British searched for alternative methods of aid. In 
the following months they resorted to offering military and civil 
supplies to compensate the Soviet Union for their lack of offen- 
sive action. 
This was a development which the Service departments resisted, 
just as they had opposed efforts to force them to take precipitate 
action. A few weeks earlier, at the end of June, they had been 
presented with a staggering list of military and civil require- 
ments by the Soviet government. This included 3,000 fighters, 
3,000 bombers, 20,000 light anti-aircraft guns, incendiaries, 
bombs, flame-throwers, submarine detecting devices, magnetic 
mines, machine tools, raw materials, wheat, sugar, meat and mis- 
cellaneous army supplies such as 3 million pairs of boots and 10 
million metres of woollen cloth. 
2 
The Service departments had 
rejected most of these requests out of hand. Britain's own for- 
ces were desperately short of modern and reliable weapons. They 
were suffering the consequences of the stop-gap policies of the 
previous year when, in the critical days after Dunkirk, tank 
production had been subordinated to aircraft production3 and 
quantity rather than quality of all munitions had been emphasised 
Modern tanks and heavy bombers were in particularly short supply. 
The army's need of the former had changed and relentlessly expan- 
ded5at the very time that the nation's war production was nearing 
the limit of its capacity. 
6 
Bomber Command meanwhile had so few 
heavy bombers that in May 1941 its total striking force was only 
half that of Germany.? Fighter production was also lagging at 
levels which the Chiefs of Staff considered inadequate to provide 
for wastage and re-equipment. Early in July they calculated that 
simply to keep the necessary reserves at home, they would have to 
reduce shipments of fighters to the Middle East to the minimum in 
the period till 1 September. 
8 
All the Service departments looked 
1 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second 
World War (Concise) (London: HMSO, 1962), p. 153- 
2 Sir. S. Cripps, no. 663,29 June 1941, CAB 105/35; Sir S. Cripps 
to MEW, no. 77 ARFAR, 29 June 1941, FO 371 29566 N4074/3084/38. 
3 Postan, p. 160. 4 Ibid., p. 192" 
5 See Postan, pp. 127-31,185-91for an account of the increasing 
armoured component in the British army and of the changing 
demand for tanks. 
6 Gwyer, p. 139. 
7 H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: HMSO, 1955), p" 307 8 C0S(41)125(0), 2 July 1941, CAB 80/58. 
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to the United States for ultimate relief; but in mid-1941 the 
effects of the Lend-Lease legislation of March 1941 had yet to 
be felt. l U. S. production was to take many months - if not years 
- to reach the levels the British considered adequate. 
2 
Consequently, on receiving Russian requests for aid, the War 
Office advised the Chiefs of Staff that: 
The Army requirements demanded are clearly incapable of 
being supplied. As regards supply of equipment, it is not 
unlikely that the problem will be solved in a very short 
time by the fact that there will be no seaport by which it 
could be sent into Russia even were the equipment available. 
It would therefore seem best as a matter of tactics for 
Mason-Macfarlane to temporise on this subject. 3 
The Chiefs of Staff agreed, 
4and 
told Macfarlane on 3 July to inform 
the Soviet government that 'We cannot provide modern fighter and 
bomber aircraft as requested as the intensive operations in prog- 
ress are at present absorbing our full output'. They offered 
only, as a specimen, one Hurricane fighter and possibly some 
1,000 lb bombs, should these prove suitable for Soviet bomb car- 
riers and stowage; 4,000 lb bombs, anti-aircraft guns and flame- 
throwers, however, they refused to supply. 
5 
The Ministry of 
Economic Warfare also was cautious in its response. It told 
Cripps on 4 July that Soviet demands for raw materials exceeded 
British estimates of immediate Russian needs; and that though 
some products, for example, jute, lead, shellac and boots, could 
be provided, machine tools and aluminium could not. The shortage 
of these in Britain and the United States was such that it already 
impeded vital war production. 
6 
Within the next two weeks, however, the government departments 
were obliged to change their minds. As the extent of the Russian 
catastrophe emerged and the limits of British offensive power 
became clear, the political and military pressure to provide supp- 
lies for the Russians grew. On 18 July the Soviet ambassador 
extracted from the Secretary of State for Air, Archibald Sinclair, 
an admission that it might be possible to spare some fighter 
1 H. 'Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley, Studies of Overseas Supply 
(London: HMSO, 1956), pp. 19,25- 
2 See, for example, Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 308. 
3 Note on telegrams from Macfarlane for COS mtg., WO 193/655- 
4 COS(41)229th mtg., min. 4,30 June 1941, CAB 79/12. 
5 FO to Moscow, no. 710, CAB 105/35- 
6 MEW to Sir S. Cripps, no. T31/68 MOSSY, F0 3.7.1.29566 N4704/3084/38. 
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aircraft from the United States; l and on the following day, 
Maisky appealed also to Eden for some quota of U. S. aircraft 
for the RedArmy. 2 On 20 July, therefore, the day Churchill's 
message was sent to Stalin, the Air Ministry met to consider 
what aircraft it could spare for the hard-pressed Russians. 
It was an agonizing meeting. 
3 At first it seemed Chiefs of 
Staff were right in saying that Britain had no aircraft to spare. 
Bombers, even Maisky seemed to agree, had to remain in the United 
Kingdom where they could be used most effectively in the air 
offensive against Germany. Fighters, on the other hand, were in 
desperate shortage still. The Vice-Chief of Air Staff told the 
meeting that there would be no surplus of fighter aircraft until 
mid-1942 and that in terms of reserves the position at the end of 
1941 would be even worse than at the end of 1940. Both the Middle 
East and the air forces at home were dependent on American supp- 
lies of Kittyhawks (P-40), Lightnings (P-38) and Mustangs (P-5l). 
Airacobras (P-39) were not expected to be available until April 
1942; there was not a large enough reserve of Spitfires for these 
to be given to the Russians; Defiants could be spared only at the 
expense of future training, and Vultee aircraft were already pro- 
mised to the Chinese. The choice was thus excruciatingly narrowed 
down to Hurricanes and Tomahawks (an earlier model of the P-40). 
There was the necessary 85 per cent reserve of Hurricane Its, but 
the Secretary of State did not think the Russians would want this 
aircraft. It was obsolescent, and even during the Battle of 
Britain had been inferior in speed to the Messerschmitt 109E. 
4 
Production of Hurricane II's on the other hand was 300 a month, 
when wastage was 100 a month and the allocation to the Middle East 
70 a month; but the Air Ministry was loath to part with this air- 
craft. It chose instead to send the Russians 200 Tomahawks. This 
'plane had several points to recommend it. Not only would it be 
surplus to requirements by November 1941, but it was soon to be 
phased out of the Middle East. 
5 Furthermore it was American. 
1 Note by Sinclair on meeting with Maisky and Admiral KYiarmalov, 
head of the Soviet Military and Naval Mission, 18 July 1941, 
AIR 20/3910- 
2 Eden to Cripps, no. 131,19 July 1941, FO 371 29562 N3927/3014/38. 
3 The description of this meeting is contained in AIR 2/5333" Unless 
otherwise stated, information in the following paragraph is taken 
from this account. 
4 K. Munson, Aircraft of World War II (Shepperton, Surrey, 1972), 
p. 90. 
5 Major-General T. S. 0. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle 
East, volume III (September 1941 toSeptember 1942 ) (London: 
HMSO, 1 
, . p. 205. 
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This meant, the British argued, that the responsibility for spare 
parts and ground equipment would not be theirs. To some degree, 
therefore, the loss to the Middle East and Army Co-operation squad- 
rons which offering the Russians the aircraft involved, would be 
offset. 
The offer, however, would still be costly; 180 of the planes 
had been destined for the Middle East, 1 and should the Russians 
collapse, the United Kingdom would be unable to spare Hurricanes 
to make up the Middle East's loss. 
2 Similarly, if the invasion 
threat became imminent again, the twenty Tomahawks taken from the 
Army Co-operation reserve would be sorely missed. 
3 Nonetheless, 
the Cabinet, after consultation with President Roosevelt's confi- 
dant, Harry Hopkins, who was then in London, agreed to take the 
gamble, 'not withstanding the risks involved'. It argued that 
'It was of the utmost importance to make a ready and early res- 
ponse to the Russian demands, even though we were without know- 
ledge of their own resources!. 
5 In the circumstances the propo- 
sal to send the Tomahawks seemed the most suitable arrangement. 
Unfortunately neither the Russians nor the Americans agreed. 
After an initial burst of gratitude, 
6the 
Red Army found much to 
criticize in the Tomahawks, as will be seen later. The Ameri- 
cans also found much to criticize, particularly in the assump- 
tion that they would bear the burden of maintaining the aircraft 
in the Soviet Union. To the dismay dfý-the British, although 
Roosevelt agreed to the allocation, 
7the War Department insisted 
that it had no ammunition, spare parts or ground equipment which 
could be given to the Russians. It could probably provide tech- 
nicians to train the Russians in the use of the aircraft, it 
said, but that was all. 
8 
After a week's argument the Americans 
relented slightly and offered to provide equipment for the 59 
Tomahawks still in the United States awaiting shipment, but they 
1 Meeting in AM, AIR 2/5333- 
2 Draft memorandum by SOS Air for Cabinet, 24 July 1941, AIR 
2/5333- 
3 Mtg in AM, ibid. 
4 Air Whit to Britman (British representative in Washington), 
X"353,2 Aug. 1941, AIR 2/5333- 
5 WM(41)74th concl. min. 3,24 July 1941, CAB 
65/19- 
6 Meetings with Maisky, 24,25 July 1941, AIR 2/5333- 
7 R. C. Lukas, Air Force Aspects of American Aid to the Soviet 
Union: the crucial years, 1941-1942(Ph. D., The Florida 
State 
University, 1963), p. 35. Lukas also gives a detailed account 
of the shortage of aircraft spare parts in the United States 
(pp. 42-5). 
8 Viscount Halifax (ambassador to W'ton), no. 505 PURSA, 30 July 
1941, AIR 2/5333" 
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continued to view the 140 from the United Kingdom as a British 
responsibility in all ways. 
1 Even more they expected the British 
to provide . 50 inch ammunition for all 200 Tomahawks. 
2 
Since the 
R. A. F. shared the Americans' 'desperate shortage'3of ammunition, 
and since it had received only one third of its own air frame and 
engine spare-part requirements so far, 
4the 
American attitude put 
the whole Tomahawk project in jeopardy. As the Air Ministry saw 
it, the offer had been conditional on the Americans filling the 
role assigned to them and 'clearly if the United States is not 
ready to provide spares etc. delivery will have to be stopped'. 
5 
However, Churchill had already told Stalin on 25 July that 
Britain would provide 200 Tomahawks. 
6 
Furthermore, on the same 
day he had given instructions in London that 'the question of 
assisting the Russians should be regarded as most urgent and 
should be handled in a sympathetic spirit by the Service Depart- 
ments'. 
7 In these circumstances the Air Ministry had little 
option but to accept the American attitude and to further deprive 
the Middle East. 
8 
Portal grudgingly told the U. S. ambassador to 
London, John Winant, on 11 August that: 
The Air Ministry have been compelled reluctantly to agree 
to the release of the necessary equipment and munition if 
the American administration has said its last word ... 
this release of equipment has been made at the expense of 
urgent Middle East requirements and I am afraid that 
Middle East operations will be seriously affected by it. 
He agreed, he said, to send enough supplies to-allow the air- 
craft to operate on their arrival and to maintain them for two 
months, but he would be 'deeply grateful' if anything could be 
done to make the U. S. Army Air Corps (U. S. A. A. F. ) change its 
mind. 
9 In fact later in the month the War Department, under 
pressure from Roosevelt, agreed to the shipment of as many spare 
parts as possible; 
10 but the issue remained a contentious one 
between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union for many 
months to come. 
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2 Ibid. 
3 Air Whit to Britman, WEBBER WX. 726,8 Aug. 1941, AIR 
8/1000. 
4 CAESAR 365, loc. cit. 
5 Air Whit to Britman, X. 353,2 Aug. 1941, AIR 2/5333- 
6 Churchill, III, p. 345- 
7 COS(41)259th mtg., min. 1,25 July 1941, WO 193/666. 
8 D0(41)57th mtg., min. 2,11 Aug. 1941, CAB 69/2. 
9 AIR 8/1000. 
10 Lukas, pp. 43-4. 
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This misunderstanding had arisen because the British had assu- 
med that the American Armed Forces were prepared to make sacrifi- 
ces on the Soviet Union's behalf. They did this because Roosevelt's 
public statements in June and July had indicated his support for 
British policy towards the Soviet Union and Hopkins had encouraged 
London to expect Washington's support. As the Air Ministry told 
its representative in the U. S. capital on 2 August, 'War Cabinet 
took this decision in consultation with Hopkins and in conformity 
with (the) President's initiative in proposing full assistance to 
Russia from both U. S. A. and ourselves'. 
1 Indeed Roosevelt did 
support the Cabinet's decision, but the British had reckoned without 
the divisions within the American administration. They had under- 
estimated the resentment amongst the U. S. Armed Services at their 
continual loss of munitions to Great Britain, and had not realized 
the extent to which military authorities in Washington shared their 
own departments' reservations about supplying the Soviet Union. 
For reaction in the United States to the Soviet Union's invol- 
vement in the war had been similar to that in Britain. The Ser- 
vice departments there had shared the British scepticism about 
the Red Army's potential2 and had feared also the effect that 
Soviet demands might have on their own equipment position. Some 
amongst them, most notably the Secretary of State for 
War, Henry 
Stimson, the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, and Admiral H. R. 
Stark, saw in Soviet belligerence a unique opportunity 
for action. 
They favoured intervention in the Atlantic3and escorting convoys 
to Britain. 
4 
The country at large, however, was far more cau- 
tious. A public opinion poll on 24 June showed that 
54 per cent 
of the nation opposed sending the Russians munitions, 
35 per cent 
favoured such gestures and 11 per cent were undecided. 
5 The 
isolationists meanwhile saw in the Russo-German conflict 
further 
confirmation of their belief that the war was 
a godless struggle 
from which they were better clear. 
Roosevelt had the difficult task of picking his way 
between 
1 Air Whit to Britman, X. 353, AIR 2/5333- 
2 See Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, 1944), pp. 325-6. 
3 W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 
(London, 1953), P" 537. 
4 Ibid. 
5 H. Cantril (ed. ), Public Opinion 1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951), 
p. 411.1941: 
6-R.. H. Dawson, The Decision to Aid Russ a ores n Policy and 
Domestic Politics (University of Carolin Press, 1959), P" 80. 
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these conflicting reactions. The State Department advised him to 
remember the differences of the past, to treat Russian approaches 
with reserve and to shun concessions of principle made simply to 
improve relations. 
1 The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, however, 
advised Roosevelt to give Russia 'all aid to the hilt'2and senior 
members of the Admiralty advocated exploitation of the situation. 
These were the counsels Roosevelt heeded, and he quickly moved to 
the support of the Soviet Union. In a manner later described as 
'sympathetic, expedient, and cautious', 
3he 
told the Press on 23 
July that: 
In the opinion of this Government. .. any defense against Hitlerism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, 
from whatever source these forces spring, will hasten the 
eventual downfall of the present German leaders, and will 
therefore redound to the benefit of our own defense and 
security. 
Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the 
Americas. 4 
This public statement was soon followed by gestures of practical 
support. On 26 June it was announced that the Neutrality Law 
would not be invoked, 'a most effective piece of inaction 
5 
which 
ensured that Vladivostock would remain open to American shipping. 
At the same time it was revealed that $40 million worth of Soviet 
assets in the United States would be unfrozen. 
6 
The Under Secre- 
tary of State, Sumner Welles, meanwhile on the same day, 26 July, 
told the Soviet ambassador, Constantine Oumansky, that requests 
for assistance would receive as prompt and favourable considera- 
tion as possible. Within four days the ambassador had responded 
with requests for huge quantities of military and industrial 
items, including some 3,000 fighters and 3,000 bombers.? An 
interdepartmental committee was set up within the State Depart- 
ment to deal with those requests for aid other than military 
items. 
8 
Roosevelt made it clear that the administration's approach was 
to be generous. On 9 July he directed Welles that substantial aid 
must be sent to the Soviet Union before 1 October, 
9 
and he confirmed 
1 Ibid., p. 60. See also Langer and Gleason, p. 531- 
2 Quoted in Dawson, p. 116. 
3 J. M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York, 1970), 
p. 103- 
4 Langer and Gleason, p. 541. 
5 Burns, p. 103. 
6 Langer and Gleason, p. 541; Dawson, p. 122. 
7 Lukas, pp. 26-7- 
8 Dawson, p. 129. 
9 Ibid., p. 142. 
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this with the Soviet ambassador on the following day. 
1 Fighter 
aircraft, he said to Oumansky, should be able to be delivered 
rapidly. 
2 Soon the question of aid to the Russians had graduated 
to the Division of Defence Aid Reports, responsible for the admini- 
stration of Lend-Lease, and a special section there was established 
under a former military attache to the Soviet Union, Colonel Philip 
R. Faymonville. 3 
By the time the British decided to send the Russians Tomahawks, 
therefore, the outlines of U. S. policy were clear. Roosevelt, 
though acting cautiously in view of his country's neutrality and 
some public hostility to communism, 
4was 
determined to support Soviet 
resistance. However, the War Department was far from reconciled to 
this, and offered 'considerable resistance' to the moves made by 
the executive early in July. 
5 
The General Staff of the U. S. army 
was deeply concerned at its own shortage of munitions. Its equip- 
ment programme was already one year behind schedule, 
6and 
it feared 
that British and Lend-Lease contracts for munitions would put the 
programme even further into arrears. In July more aircraft from 
U. S. production were to go to Britain than to the U. S. A. A. F. it- 
self. 
7 Moreover, the forces which in the ABC talks with the Bri- 
tish in January 1941 had been predicted for completion by 1 Sep- 
tember were now to be ready only in March 1942.8 To meet even 
this deadline, the Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, had 
decided on 1 July that only 20 per cent of U. S. production should 
be allocated to Defence Aid until all equipment necessary for 
the 
Protective Mobilisation Plan and one month's combat maintenance 
were in the hands of U. S. troops. 
9 The idea of diverting any muni- 
tions to the Red Army was therefore strongly resisted. Stimson 
complained in his diary about those people who were 
'just hellbent 
to satisfy a passing impulse or emotion to help out some other 
nation that is fighting on our side', and who 
had 'no resporisi- 
bility over whether or not our own army and our own 
forces are 
1 Lukas, p. 28. 
2 Viscount Halifax to F0, no. 3956,10 July 1941, WO 193/655. 
3 Dawson, p. 151; Lukas, p. 29. 
4 For discussion of the Catholic attitude, see Dawson, particul- 
arly pp. 92-5. 
5 Ibid., p. 154. 
6 R. M. Leighton and R. W. Coakley, Global Logistics and 
Strategy, 
1940-1943 (Washington, 1955), P" 70. 
7 Lukas, p. 32- 
8 Leighton and Coakley, P. 73- 
9 Ibid., p. 93" 
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going to be left unarmed or not'. 
' 
Marshall meanwhile told the 
Chief of the Army Air Forces, Major-General H. H. Arnold, on 16 
July that he was: 
... unalterably opposed to the release of any U. S. pursuit 
planes and light and medium bombers until we have first esta- 
blished units of these types in the Philippines for the sedu- 
rity of the Fleet Anchorage, and the defense of the Islands. 
.. At the present moment, with Japan's known preparations 
to move South, the Philippines become of great strategic 2 importance ... 
When on the following day Marshall learnt that the President had 
'ordered' a token release of P-40 fighters and some light bombers 
to the Soviet-Union, he complained bitterly: 'are we to risk the 
Philippine situation or the Brazilian situation, or the clamor of 
the press in this country or the purely military requirements of 
training our own field forces in this country? '3 
Roosevelt soon gave him an- answer. The War Department recommen- 
ded on 21 July that the United States should supply the Russians 
with only a few fighters, no bombers, a small quantity of anti- 
aircraft guns, some aeroplane gasoline and lubricants, as well as 
one-third-of the requested raw materials and almost one-half of 
the industrial plants the Russians wanted for the production of 
munitions. 
4 
But three days later, on the President's authority, 
the Under Secretary of State told Oumansky that 'a number' of 
Lockheed-Hudson bombers and 'at least a squadron' of P-40s would 
be supplied to the Soviet Union; 
5and 
on 31 July Roosevelt himself 
confirmed with Soviet representatives the British offer of 200 
Tomahawks. 
6 
The following day he told his Cabinet, 'Get 'em 
(planes), even if it is necessary to take them from (U. S. ) troops', 
7 
and on 2 August, notes were formally exchanged with the U. S. S. R. 
to the effect that the United States 'has decided to give all 
economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening 
$ 
the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression'. 
1 F. C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope (New York, 
1966), p. 73- 
2 Lukas, p. 31- 
3 Ibid., p. 32. Marshall thought it a definite possibility that 
the United States might be forced to occupy Colombia, Venezuela 
and Brazil in the event of a pro-Nazi coup in Brazil (Gwyer, p. 127). 
4 Precis of telegram from W'ton to U. S. embassy, London, AIR 2/5333- 
5 Lukas, p. 34. 
6 Ibid., p. 35. 
7 Langer and Gleason, p. 561. 
8 Dawson, p. 160. 
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By early August, therefore, the governments of the United 
States and Great Britain were converging on the question of aid 
to the Soviet Union. The differences over the supply of spare 
parts for the 200 Tomahawks at this time sprang not from any 
dispute between Roosevelt and Churchill but from the struggle 
between the War Department and the President. For this reason 
it was significant that at the end of July the President's 
adviser, Hopkins, made an impromptu visit to the Soviet Union. 
The frank admission of need which Stalin made during this mee- 
ting, as well as his willingness to divulge some details of 
Soviet production and resources, made the military's opposition 
in the West seem less reasonable. Moreover it strengthened 
Roosevelt's - and Churchill's - hand against the complaints of 
the Service departments that not enough was known about Soviet 
potential to justify sending munitions. Stimson, for one in the 
United States, had used this argument. He had warned Oumansky 
several times of the dangers of ignoring the Service attaches in 
Moscow and of refusing to take them into the Red Army's confidence: 
'You have taken away my eyes and until I get my eyes back, I can- 
not take the responsibility of recommending giving away our wea- 
pons', he said to the ambassador on 29 July. 
1 In London, too, 
the Secretary of State for Air told Maisky on 26 July, 
The Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee would not ... 
be able to consider the release of any further aircraft unless 
the Soviet Government were prepared to provide the fullest 
possible information of their air strength and production in 
order that our relative needs might be compared. 
Sinclair himself was acting on assurances from the Director of 
Plans at the Air Ministry that 
the release of 200 Tomahawks has already cost us more than 
we can rightly afford and that there is no chance of our 
being able to consider further supplies of aircraft at a 
later date unless the Russians confide in us complete infor- 
mation as to their present strength, reserves and potential. 
In welcoming Hopkins, therefore, the Russians for once struck 
exactly the right note. Stalin's openness, the enthusiasm of 
the 
Russian press and the lavishness of the reception all convinced 
f 
Hopkins - and with him Roosevelt and 
Churchill - of the Soviet 
1 Dawson, p. 137- 
2 Mtg between SOS Air and Maisky, 26 July 1941, AIR 2/5333. 
3 29 July 1941, AIR 2/5333. 
4 Langer and Gleason, p. 564. 
46 
Unions need for assistance and of its determination to resist. 
Stalin was convincingly realistic, admitting weakness but not 
succumbing to despair, asking for immediate assistance but com- 
bining this with long-term demands which showed a healthy inten- 
tion to maintain resistance. 
1 
On the positive side, Stalin claim- 
ed that the Red Army had been underestimated by the Wehrmacht; at 
the outbreak of war, he said, it had had 180 divisions to 175 
German and now the ratio was 240 Russian to 232 German. Admit- 
tedly, Stalin went on, many of the Soviet divisions had been 
deployed too far back but thisýhe said, forgetting his telegram 
to Churchill on 19 July, was advantage: the line which the Red 
Army now held was more propitious than that it might have taken 
up if better prepared. A further factor in the Red Army's favour 
was the primitive state of Russian transportation. The Wehrmacht 
would find, after its initial successes, that Russian terrain was 
difficult, the roads and bridges too'weak to bear its 70-ton tanks, 
and the problems of fuel supply acute. 
However, Stalin admitted, there were many problems confronting 
the Red Army too. The chief of these was its shortage of modern 
equipment. At the outbreak of war, he said, the Germans had had 
30,000 tanks compared to 24,000 Russian, and tank losses on both 
sides since then had been large. Soviet production at present 
stood at 1,000 tanks a month, equally divided between heavy and 
medium tanks on the one hand and light on the other; but in the 
coming winter Germany would be able to outproduce the Soviet 
Union. The help of the United States, therefore, both in supplying 
steel and manufacturing tanks, was essential. He would like, 
Stalin said, to give his tank designs and send a tank expert to 
the United States. 
This was a new emphasis on tanks. Previously Soviet requests 
had stressed the need for aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons; 
but 
doubtless the battle then raging around Smälensk had claimed a 
heavy toll of Soviet armour. At the time the Russians admitted 
to 
losing some 685 tanks, but the Germans claimed 3,000 destroyed, 
2 
3 
a figure shown by post-war analysis to be more accurate. 
1A full description of this meeting is found in Sherwood, PP- 
335-43. The following description is based on this, unless 
otherwise stated. 
2 Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945 (London: Pan Books 
Ltd, 1965), pp. 174-5- 
3 Seaton, The Russo-German War, p. 130. 
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The new emphasis on tanks, however, did not mean a decline in 
Russian demands for aircraft. Stalin continued to press for these, 
virtually admitting the Soviet Air Force's inferiority to the Luft- 
waffe. He would not divulge, to Hopkins, Russia's losses since 
22 June, but he confessed the Germans had more aircraft; and 
though many of these were obsolescent, some, the Junker 88 in par- 
ticular, outclassed anything the Russians Possessed. The Soviet 
Air Force in fact was mostly obsolescent: of the new fighters, the 
M. I. G. 3, the L. A. G. 3 and the J. K. l, details of which Stalin revealed, 
the air force had only 2,000. Its main holding, 7,000-8,000 aero- 
planes, was of the older types. In bombers also, Stalin admitted, 
there was a shortage: of the three types of medium bombers, only 
one was just coming into production in any quantity, while hold- 
ings of long-range bombers stood at six hundred. Total production 
of aircraft was 1,800 machines a month, and Stalin expected this 
to rise to 2,500 by 1 January 1942 in the ratio of 40 per cent 
bombers, 60 per cent fighters. What the Soviet Union needed from 
the West he said, was anti-aircraft guns, machine-guns for city 
defence, rifles, high octane gasoline and aluminium for aircraft 
production. 'Give us the anti-aircraft guns and the aluminium', 
Stalin said, 'and we can fight for three to four years'. 
Hopkins stressed to the Soviet leader that before these demands- 
could be met, the United States and the United Kingdom would have 
to be informed about the military situation-in the Soviet Union. 
They would have to know the type, number and quality of Russian 
weapons, their raw material resources and their factory capacity. 
He suggested that a conference be held at the end of September or 
early in October to discuss these questions when the Soviet front 
had stabilized. To this Stalin readily agreed. He promised not 
only the information Hopkins requested, but. even designs of 
Soviet planes, tanks and guns. What is more, he said, he would 
welcome any operational assistance the West could give, be it 
British bombers operating against Romanian oil fields, or Ameri- 
can troops operating 'under the complete command of the American 
army'. The impression Hopkins left Moscow with was of a govern- 
ment which had the determination and capacity to resist and which 
would prove reasonable and co-operative if treated in like manner. 
This impression he took straight to the meeting between Churchill 
and Roosevelt at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. There in early 
August the policies of the two governments on aid to Russia con- 
verged and a long-term policy of supply emerged. 
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According to Roosevelt's son, who was at the Atlantic meeting, 
this happened only because of American determination. Writing 
after the war, 
1he 
insisted that throughout this conference the 
British opposed the sending of munitions to the Red Army, There 
is ample evidence, however, that this was not the case. All 
contemporary records show that Churchill and his advisers came 
to Newfoundland convinced that aid to the Russians must be con- 
tinued and increased. Whatever reservations the Chiefs of Staff 
had felt had been silenced - apparently by the events of the 
preceding week. For by early August it was clear that the Russians 
were not collapsing. On the contrary, though losing heavily, they 
were 'resisting strongly' and clearly disrupting the Wehrmacht's 
time-table for conquest. 
2 Their claim on Allied help grew more 
deserving and insistent with every day that passed. However, at 
this very time the chances Britain had of offering the Soviet for- 
ces operational relief grew more remote. On 1 August the Commander- 
in-Chief, Middle East, General Claude Auchinleck, convinced the 
Defence Committee after many weeks of argument that no offensive 
could be launched in the Middle East before the month of November. 
3 
Then the Chief of Air Staff rejected Stalin's plea for action 
against Romanian oil. Since the bombers were needed to disrupt 
enemy supply lines in the Middle East, since no force could be 
operational before the winter, and since Russian information 
about their aerodromes was scarce, Air Marshal C. F. A. Portal 
vetoed the operation without hesitation. 
4 
Britain was left 
again with bombing, blockade and subversion as their weapons of 
offence. Their review of strategy for the Atlantic meeting 
acknowledged their dependence on both the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 
The strength and duration of Russian resistance still remain 
in doubt. While we do not believe that a successful contin- 
uance of the resistance changes our fundamental strategy, it 
will have a profound effect on our immediate prospects. .. 
The intervention of the United States would revolutionise 
the whole situation ... United States intervention would 
not only make victory certain, but might also make it swift. 
5 
This is the key to the British attitude at the Atlantic con- 
ference. They recognized that Russian resistance was valuable 
1 E. Roosevelt, As he saw it (New York, 1946). 
2 WP(41)179,24 July 1941, WP(41)189,7 Aug. 1941, CAB 66/18. 
3 For a full discussion of this debate see Gwyer, pp. 176-82. 
4 COS(41)488,13 Aug. 1941, CAB 80/29. 
5 COS(41)155(0), 31 July 1941, CAB 80/59. 
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and worthy of their aid; but they acknowledged they could offer 
help only with American support. Without-U. S. production iic- 
tory was remote, and without it also, the supply programme to 
the Soviet Union could not advance beyond the allocations of 
raw materials and quarter-master supplies already made in July. 
l 
Therefore, despite Elliot Roosevelt's assertions, the British 
were not 'hard at it' throughout the conference 'trying to con- 
vince (the Americans) to divert more and more and more Lend- 
Lease supplies to the United Kingdom and less and less and less 
to the Soviet Union'. 2 Dill, Pound and Freeman3did not hammer 
'at the idea that war material to the Soviets was destined to be 
just war material captured by the Nazis, and that American self- 
interest dictated a channeling of the bulk of the supplies into 
England'. 
4 
If anything the situation was the opposite. It was 
the British who urged the extension of aid to the Russians and 
the Americans who opposed such a course. 
Admittedly the C. I. G. S. did suggest at the first military 
meeting of the conference that anything the Allies could spare 
the Russians would be but a drop in the ocean, given the scale 
of Soviet tank production. 
5 
But Marshall and Arnold surpassed 
Dill in urging caution. Their first concern was with the U. S. 
armoured forces and the defence of the Philippines. Marshall 
told the meeting that of the four U. S. armoured divisions two 
had 80 per cent equipment and the other two only forty tanks for 
25,000 men. Furthermore, two armoured divisions were due to be 
formed in October, and the Philippines had no tanks at all. The 
shortage of aircraft there was also acute, while many of the 
service units had no aeroplanes to fly. Only in recent months 
had it proved possible to send any modern aircraft to Hawaii, 
Panama or the Philippines. Marshall's caution was echoed by 
Arnold. He thought that only 25 per cent of any aircraft des- 
patched to the Soviet Union were likely to reach the Russian 
front, 
6and 
if Stalin boasted to Hopkins a production of 1,800 
aircraft a month and an air force of 9,000 planes, then 'We 
1 See Churchill, III, pp. 345-6. 
2 Roosevelt, pp- 33-4. As T. A. Wilson has observed in The 
First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941 
(Boston, 1969) this is inaccurate even in the minor point 
that the Soviet Union was not eligible for Lend-Lease supplies 
until 7 November 1941 (p" 140). 
3 Vice-Chief of Air Staff. 
4 Roosevelt, loc. cit. 
5 Mtg of 9 Aug. 1941 in COS(41)504, CAB 80/30- 
6 Ibid. 
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should ask them for help'. 1 It was a Briton, Freeman, who defen- 
ded the Russians against this attack. The moral effect of grant- 
ing aircraft, he suggested, would be great, and for this reason 
the British had sacrificed the two hundred Tomahawks. 'It was 
all very well to let the Russians have a token supply of aircraft', 
Marshall replied, 'but that same number would be a godsend in the 
Philippines'. 2 
To the Americans, it seems, the answer to this scarcity of muni- 
tions lay in a reduction of British demands. They agreed to pro- 
vide 1,460 tanks for Britain before the end of the year, 
3but it 
was clear they questioned the sending of these to the Middle East. 
As had emerged during Hopkins's talks in London, they questioned 
the strategic value of this theatre, 
4and 
Marshall now said that, 
considering Russian demands were likely to be great, 'the loss 
and wastage of the Middle East could not be borne for long'. 
Admiral Stark supported him, arguing that a complete re-evaluation 
of priorities was needed. 
5 
Roosevelt, however, supported the British. Not only did he 
share their belief in the value of the Middle East, as shown by 
the financial support he gave to the development of an air ferry- 
ing route through west Africa, 
6but 
he wished to assist the Russ- 
ians. His military advisers had therefore to defer. At a meet- 
ing on 10 August, Marshall and Stark agreed with Dill and Pound 
that if Russia held out her demands would necessitate an increase 
in American production - although, they added, the amount of aid 
given to the Soviet Union would be limited by the difficulties 
of transporting it there.? Roosevelt and Churchill seized on 
this concession. On 11 August the Prime Minister drafted instruc- 
tions for Beaverbrook (due to arrive in north America that day) 
to stay in Washington, 'to spur and enlarge the whole scale of 
American production'. 
8 
.., the arrival of Russia as an active partner against 
Hitler will require not only certain readjustments of 
British orders, original and supplementary, but also a 
very considerable expansion of plants and installations 
1 Wilson, p. 140. 
2 Mtg of 9 Aug., loc. cit. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Langer and Gleason, pp. 563,591. 
5 Wilson, pp. 147-8. 
6 Langer and Gleason, p. 590. 
7 Cos(41)5o4, CAB 80/30- 
8 Churchill, III, gip. 396x, ". 
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for the longer-term policy. ... It would seem indispen- 
sable that the re-equipment of the Russian armies should 
be studied at once upon the grand scale. .. 
On the following day he cabled the Lord Privy Seal, Clement Attlee, 
Arrival of Russia as a welcome guest at hungry table and 
need of large supplementary programmes both for ourselves 
and the United States (sic) forces makes review and expan- 
sion of United States (sic) production imperative. 2 
Roosevelt agreed, and together he and Churchill sent a decisive 
message to Stalin on 12 August. 
We are at the moment co-operating to provide you with the 
very maximum of supplies that'you most urgently need. 
... In order that all of us may be in a position to 
arrive at speedy decisions as to the apportionment of our 
joint resources we suggest that we prepare for a meeting 
to be held in Moscow ... we want you to know that, pend- 
ing the decisions of that conference, we shall continue to 
send supplies and materials as rapidly as possible. 
We realise fully how vitally important to the defeat of 
Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the 
Soviet Union, and we feel therefore that we must not in 
any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in 
this matter of planning the programme for the future allo- 
cation of our joint resources. 3 
With this message, which was made public, 
4the 
British and the 
United States governments were committed to supplying the Soviet 
Union. However, the controversy surrounding the question was far 
from over. The details of the commitment, like many other ques- 
tions of strategy, were left undecided at-the Atlantic conference, 
and it was to take two more months of bitter argument before these 
details were hammered out. 
One of the problems confronting the Allies was the lack of 
information about Soviet resources. After Stalin's well-timed 
admissions to Hopkins, the flow of information from Moscow shrank 
to a trickle. The one and only meeting of a three-man committee 
set up in Washington early in August to discuss Soviet require- 
ments was not constructive. Oumansky, representing the Soviet 
Union, demanded statistics of British and American production, 
but also insisted that 'each country's requirements as stated 
1 Churchill, III, pp. 762-3- 
2 Ibid., P. 397- 
3 Ibid., pp" 394,396. 




must be accepted by the others'. 
1 
The implication was that the 
United States and Great Britain should not delve too deeply into 
questions of Soviet resources and losses. The British military 
mission in Moscow certainly met great difficulties when it tried 
to obtain such information. Thhoughout June and July Macfarlane 
and his colleagues had to rely on official communiques for all 
information about the fighting on the Eastern Front, and these 
reports were always vague and optimistic, despite the critical 
situation in the Ukraine. 2 Macfarlane did get on 20 August the 
visit to the front which Stalin had promised him at the signing 
of the Anglo-Soviet treaty early in July; 
3 
but though the British 
general gained a favourable impression, he acquired no information 
about Soviet reserves or production. 
4 
He pointed out to the Russ- 
ians the 'stupidity' of their withholding 'information required to 
help the forthcoming Moscow Conference in its work until the con- 
ference actually meets'; 
5but 
the Soviet government remained un- 
communicative. 
To this problem-was added the ill-preparedness of the American 
administration. This had been disorganized since the sudden demands 
of the Lend-Lease legislation in March and was not yet mobilized 
either to assess Russian needs or to accurately determine its own.. 
The President had ordered on 9 July that a study of the United 
States' requirements for eventual victory over 'its potential enemies' 
- the 'Victory Programme' - should be prepared, but this complex task 
was not completed until 25 September.? Lacking this information, the 
Americans feared at one stage that they would not be ready for the 
conference in Moscow until mid-October. 
8 
Such a date, however, was politically unacceptable. Maisky, 
soon after the Atlantic conference, pressed for an earlier date 
at the end of August, 
9and 
there was considerable public pressure 
for immediate and visible action. A public opinion survey tajen 
1 MISC(41)1/l, 4 Aug. 1941, CAB 78/1. The British themselves 
would not delegate responsibility to their representative on 
the committee. (See Gwyer, p. 149). 
2 War diary of no. 30 Military Mission, June, July 1941,90 178/25- 
3 Ibid. 
4 WP(41)204, CAB 66/18. 
5 Macfarlane to COS, MIL 819,16 Sept. 1941, VO 193/664. Macfar- 
lane had spoken to the Soviet liaison officer to this effect 
at least once before this. 
6 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 78-80. 
7 Langer and Gleason, pp. 737-8- 
8 VIM(41)87th concl., 28 Aug. 1941, FO 371 29572 N4920/3084/38- 
9 Minute Eden to PM, 22 Aug. 1941, FO 371 29571 N4781/3084/38. 
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over a large London sample from 27 July to 4 August, for instance, 
showed that as many as four in every ten persons believed that the 
government was not doing enough to support the Soviet Union (the 
number varying according to the fluctuations in Soviet fortunes). l 
Public demonstrations of enthusiasm for the Russian cause were 
also becoming common. As a correspondent told Joseph Davies, the 
ex-U. S. -ambassador to the Soviet Union: 
For many months past we have been hoping and anticipating 
the entry of the United States into the war. Now I fear 
it is a case of 'hope deferred maketh the heart sick'. .. 
only a few days ago a Member of Parliament told me that he 
had tried deliberately to evoke cheers for the U. S. with 
little or no response, but that when he alluded to Russia 
there was an immediate reaction which almost took the roof 
off the building. 2 
In these circumstances the British urged the Americans to agree 
to an earlier meeting in Moscow. The Foreign Secretary, with the 
Cabinet's approval, suggested to Winant late in August that the 
date of the conference should beset at 15 September. 
3 
As Eden 
explained elsewhere, he believed that a long delay would 'only 
give the Russians the impression that we are not confident of 
their ability to hold and are watching and waiting to see their 
fate. This is surely the last impression that we want to con- 
4 
vey'. The 15 September, however, proved impracticable; the date 
finally chosen had to be a compromise, 28 September, as originally 
mooted during Hopkins' visit to Moscow. 
The British found the delay increasingly embarrassing, The 
Soviet government was obviously disappointed at the postponement 
of the conference, 
5and 
by the end of August rumours were circula- 
ting in Moscow that the meeting had been put off. 
6 
Maisky mean- 
while pressed in London for immediate supplies of armaments, say- 
ing bluntly that Britain had done 'very little' for 'the general 
? 
cause'. The British government, therefore, agreed to further 
1 T. Harrison, "Public opinion about Russia', Political Quarterly, 
vol. XII (1941), p. 362. 
2 From the Davies papers, quoted in Wilson, p. 29. 
3 Sir Llewell'n Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second 
World War, vol. II, (London: HMSO, 1971), p. 35. 
4 Minute to PM, 28 Aug. 1941, FO 371 29572 N4920/3084/38. 
5 Sir S. Cripps, no. 1108,7 Sept. 1941, FO 371 29573 N5114/3084/38. 
Cripps was a strong advocate of an early conference as a morale 
booster in Moscow (Sir S. Cripps, no. 1026,23 Aug. 1941, FO 371 
29571 N4766/3084/38. 
6 Sir S. Cripps, no. 1037,27 Aug. 1941, N4852/3084/38, ibid. 
7 26 Aug. 1941, quoted in FO survey of Anglo-Soviet exchanges,.. 
F0 371 29471, N6654/3/38. 
54 
stop-gap measures. Even though committed to offering supplies at 
the forthcoming conference, Churchill asked the Chiefs of Staff 
in the last week of August to part with a further 200 fighters, 
this time Hurricanes. The military's reaction was cautious. 
They admitted that the offer would not seriously deplete the 
supply of aircraft at home, but their sense of military economy 
rebelled against it. 
... the direct military value to us of Russia having these 
aircraft is not high. 
It is not possible to assess the indirect military value 
to us ... but clearly if their arrival puts heart into 
Russians and keeps them fighting the Germans a little longer 
we benefit. 
On purely-military grounds, however, the Chiefs of Staff 
consider that these aircraft would pay a better dividend if 
sent to the Far East or Middle East and/or Turkey. 
They concluded, however, with the admission that the Chiefs of 
Staff realized that political considerations might be overriding. 
1 
They were. Churchill decided, nowithstanding military reser- 
vations, that the Hurricanes should be offered to the Red Army. 
He told Stalin so on 29 August in a message which promised also 
two R. A. F. squadrons (of 40 Hurricanes) in Murmansk by 6 Septem- 
ber. 2 This was another politically motivated offer to which the 
Chiefs of Staff had agreed just as reluctantly some weeks earlier. 
The squadrons were intended to assist in the defence of Murmansk 
and co-operate with Soviet forces in the Murmansk area, although 
their military value was expected to be 'low' owing to the lack 
of a stable line of communications with Britain. 
3 
These offers did little to ease the Soviet pressure for help. 
In his reply on 3 September Stalin thanked Churchill for the 
offer 'to sell' the Soviet Union the Hurricanes, but he stressed 
that these aircraft would not bring about 'serious changes' on 
the Eastern front. The scale of the war was too large for this, 
and only 'a continuous supply of a large quantity of aeroplanes' 
could offer real relief. Yet, he admitted, in the last few 
months the Soviet Union had lost much of its potential to produce 
these aircraft - the Krivoi Rog iron basin, metallurgical works 
in the Ukraine, one aluminium works on the Dnieper River, one at 
Tikhvin, two aircraft works in the Ukraine and two at Leningrad. 
1 Draft minute to PM, COS(41)301st mtg, 27 Aug. 1941, CAB 79/14" 
These objections were raised at COS(41)29th mtg 
(0), 28 Aug. 
1941, CAB 79/55. 
2 Churchill, III, pp. 403-4. 
3 Air Ministry to 30 MM, X. 462,4 Aug. 1941, CAB 
79/13" 
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These losses, he said, were the result of the Wehrmacht's freedom 
to reinforce its troops in the Soviet Union from those in the West 
where the threat of invasion was merely 'a bluff'. 
I think that there is only one means of egress from this 
situation - to establish in the present year a second front 
somewhere in the Balkans or France. .. and at the same time 
of ensuring to the Soviet Union 30,000 tons of aluminium by 
the beginning of October next and a monthly minimum of aid 
amounting to 400 aircraft and 500 tanks (of small or medium 
size). l 
For once it was Churchill's turn to be unsympathetic. Stalin's 
reply angered him, particularly as it was delivered by Maisky who 
claimed that Russia had been fighting 'virtually alone' for the 
last eleven weeks. 
2 His old distrust of the Soviet government 
welled up in Churchill again, and he said to the ambassador: 
'Remember that only four months ago we in this island did not know 
whether you were not coming in against us on the German side. In- 
deed, we thought it quite likely that you would ... Whatever 
happens and whatever you do, you of all people have no right to 
make reproaches to us'. 
3 In his annoyance the Prime Minister 
drafted an answer to Stalin stating plainly that the military 
operations the Russians proposed were out of the question; that 
although Britain would do her best as regards supplies, the actual 
amount of aid reaching the Soviet Union in time to influence 
current operations would be small; and that it was only in 1942 
that substantial assistance, either operationally or in supplies, 
could be expected. 
4 
In the Cabinet meeting the next day, however, Churchill relen- 
ted. It was clear the Red Army's position was critical. Stalin 
himself had referred in his message to 'a mortal menace' to his 
state, 
5and intelligence estimates confirmed that Soviet losses of 
industrial potential had been crippling. 
6 
Furthermore British 
representatives in Moscow fully supported the Soviet leader's pleas 
for help. Macfarlane had warned the C. I. G. S. only a few days ear- 
lier that 
to the Russians it must appear that we are concerned only 
with helping them with intelligence and munitions. And 
that we are still largely content to leave the operational 
initiative to the Germans ... Our alliance with Russia 
may be fortuitous but we cannot hope to beat the Germans 
1 Churchill, III, pp. 405-6. 
2 Ibid., p. 406. 
3. Ibid., p. 407. 
4 Gwyer, p. 147. 
5 Churchill, III, p. 405. 
6 FO to W'ton, no. 4862,22 Aug. 1941, F0 371 29571 N4707/3084/38; 
FO to W'ton, no. 4801,30 Aug. 1941, FO 371.29572 N4903/3084/38. 
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if we go on fighting separate wars. ' 
Grippe wrote in a similar vein on the day of Stalin's telegram. 
A week before he had thought 'there is no question of the Russians 
giving in', 
2but 
now he said: 
We have unfortunately considered the war here as no direct 
responsibility of ours, but merely as a war which we desired to assist in any way that we could, without unduly endanger- ing our own position ... I fear it is now almost too late 
unless we are prepared to throw everything in, in an effort to save this front. 3 
The Cabinet knew, hb, over,, that the evidence against any co-ordinated 
military effort was overwhelming. Every conceivable operation on 
the Continent had been rejected by the Chiefs of Staff on the 23 
August - Kirkenes to Murmansk; Northern and Southern Norway; 
Holland; France, from the River Scheldt to the River Somme, from 
the Somme to the Seine, the Cherbourg Peninsula, the Channel Islands, 
Brittany and-the Bay of Biscay coast. 'No operation which we can 
stage with the forces and equipment now available', they had con- 
cluded, 'will make the Germans withdraw from the East'9 
4 
Even 
Churchill had come to accept that this was so, and the Cabinet ag- 
reed at this meeting on 5 September that there was no escape from 
the Chiefs'of Staff conclusions. 
Predictably it then resorted to greater and more spectacular 
offers of munitions. At Beaverbrook's suggestion the Cabinet deci- 
ded to offer immediately half of the 400 aircraft and 500 tanks 
that Stalin had requested each month. The other half, it trusted, 
the United States would provide. 
5 Without heeding the Air Mini- 
stry's anxieties, without considering the War office's reservations, 
the Cabinet incorporated this offer into Churchill's reply to 
Stalin. It emphasised that little could be hoped for militarily 
from Britain until 1942 when some forces might assist the southern 
Russian flank; but in the meantime the promised supplies would be 
1 MIL 580,31 Aug. 1941, Wo 178/25. 
2 Cripps to FO, no. 145,29 Aug. 1941, Wo 193/649. He had been 
profoundly 'influenced at that time by the destruction of the 
Dnieprostroi Dam, which indicated a ruthless implementation of 
the scorched earth policy. 
3 Moscow to F0, no. 1090,4 Sept. 1941, CAB 105/35. 
4 JP(41)691, COS(41)299th mtg, min. 2, CAB 79/13- 
5 WM(41)90th concl., min. 3, confidential annex, 5 Sept. 1941, 
CAB 65/23- 
6 Wo brief on Availability and Requirements of Armoured Formations, 
5 Nov. 1941, WO 193/580. The Minister for War, David Margesson, 
and the C. I. G. S., however, were present at this meeting, as were Portal and Sinclair. 
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made available as quickly as possible on terms similar to Lend- 
Lease. ' A later telegram promised 5,000 tons of aluminium 
immediately and 2,000 tons a month thereafter. 
2 
Without doubt this was a politically-motivated decision. Al- 
though the Red Army's situation was critical, little in practical 
terms could be achieved by this promise being made three weeks 
earlier than anticipated. 
3 
The Cabinet obviously meant its com- 
mitment to meet not the critical shortages of the moment but 
Maisky's insinuations that a separate peace might be concluded. 
It aimed also at blunting criticism of the delays in the confer- 
ence and at reinforcing the Soviet will to survive. 
Regrettably this well-motivated decision was to cost Britain's 
Armed Services dear. It soon emerged that the United States War 
Department, from whom the Cabinet expected an offering of 250 
tanks and 200 aircraft a month for the Russians, did not intend 
to make such sacrifices. Already Marshall's attempt to protect 
the U. S. Army by allocating only 20 per cent of production to 
Defence Aid contracts had been eroded by extra offers of tanks to 
Britain. 
5 Consequently, although in principle the policy of sup- 
plying the Soviet Union was accepted in the War Department, there 
were considerable reservations there about the size of the U. S. 
commitment. 
6 
Roosevelt gave instructions on 30 August that he 
deemed it to be of 
paramount importance for the safety and security of America 
tthat all reasonable munitions help be provided for Russia, 
not only immediately but as long as she continues to fight 
the Axis powers effectively.? 
In view of this the War Department adopted a new basis for cal- 
culating the requirements of the U. S. Armed Forces: base and task 
forces would be 100 per cent equipped by 30 June 1942, but forces 
in training would receive only 50 per cent of requirements. Three 
of the six armoured divisions planned and fifteen of the separate 
tank battalions would receive only 50 per cent of their tanks by 
January 1942, and the 6th Armoured Division would not be activated 
1 Churchill, III, p. 408. 
2 Gwyer, p. 148. 
3 Although immediate shipments of tanks were begun. Forty had 
left Britain by 17 Sept. 1941. (Minute Beaverbrook to PM, 
17 Sept. 1941, AVIA 22/689. ) 
4 Churchill, III, p. 409. 
5 See Leighton and Coakley, p. 94. 
6 Lukas, p. 63- 
7 Leighton and Coakley, p. 99. 
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until March 1942. These adjustments would allow the Russians to 
be offered over the same period 991 37mm guns, 150 90mm guns, 
1,135 mortars, 20,000 sub-machine guns, 155,341 miles of teleg- 
raph wire and, most significantly for the British, 729 light 
tanks, 795 medium tanks and 1,200 aircraft. 
' 
There was thus a 
deficiency of 726 tanks and 600 aircraft between what the Ameri- 
cans were willing to sacrifice and what the British assumed they 
would provide. The other important difference between British 
and American calculations was that, in Washington's view, even 
the above offer of munitions was dependent on the British surren- 
dering some portion of Defence Aid contracts. (Most of the 1,200 
&iVcraft, for instance, were to come from Lend-Lease allocations. ) 
2 
London, on the other hand, expected its supply of U. S. munitions 
to remain untouched. 
These differences emerged starkly at the meeting of British 
and U. S. representatives in London from 15 September onwards. 
This conference had a dual purpose - to discuss Soviet needs and 
to assess Allied requirements for ultimate victory - and the Bri- 
tish decided before the discussions opened that the two questions 
must not be linked. Fearful of finding Britain forced to make 
immediate sacrifices to the Soviet Union in exchange for promises 
of long-term aid, Beaverbrook and the Chiefs of Staff agreed on 
13 September that they would concentrate first on securing guaran- 
tees that their own allocations from the United States would be 
met as promised. 
Only then would they discuss the question of Soviet aid. The 
subject of long-term of victory requirements meanwhile would be 
left until the issue of short-term deliveries had been settled. 
3 
The American delegation, headed by Averell Harriman, however, 
had other ideas. It brought with it schedules of what would be 
available for export from the United States and insisted on deci- 
ding first how much of this was to be allocated to the Soviet 
Union. 
4 
Beaverbrook's alternative procedure left the delegation 
'thunderstruck' -'a bald-faced bit of politics', one member 
called it, 
5and Harriman agreed. He insisted on deciding Russian 
1 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 99-100. 
2 Ibid., p. 101. 
3 Gwyer, p. 150- 
4 Ibid., p. 151- 
5 Colonel Victor Taylor, in conversation with the U. S. military 
attache to London, General Raymond E. Lee, 15 Sept. 1941. (The 
London Observer The Journal of General Raymond E. Lee 1940-19+1 
(London, 1972), p. 400. ) 
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needs first, even though, as the British pointed out, these would 
be difficult to determine before the discussions in Moscow, and 
it might have been sounder in some cases for British theatres to 
be reinforced with American equipment while the British supplied 
the Russians. 1 
Harriman's decision had profound implications. Under the terms 
of the agreement between Arnold and Air Marshal J. C. Slessor in 
March 1941 the Air Ministry had expected to receive in the nine 
months to July 1942 some 9,000 to 9,500 aircraft; 6,000 of these 
were to come from British contracts in the United States, 3,000 
from Lend-Lease contracts (of which Britain had almost a monopoly, 
with the exception of a small allotment to China), and the remain- 
der from surplus U. S. Army production. 
2 The figures the American 
delegation now presented, as shown in the table below, shattered 
all these hopes. 
Type of Total U. S. Estimated 
aircraft production Allocations proposed production 
available by U. S. Govt. in period 
for export* 
U. K. Russia China Others U. S. A. A. F. U. S. U. K. Total 
Heavy 238 188 30 10 10 532 770 1527 2297 
bomber 
Medium 
bomber 941 831 45 15 50 779 1720 2682 4402 
Light and 
Dive 3382 2710 356 119 197 394 3776 934 4710 
bomber 
Fighter 4765 3611 620 207 327 2599 7364 7514 14878 
Observation 382 194 112 38 38 331 713 - 713 
TOTAL 9708 753.4 1163 389 622 4635 14343 12657 27000 
* Including British contracts 
Source: COS(41)207(0), CAB 80/59" 
The British were dismayed. The Americans had abandoned the 
Slessor agreement for a new and arbitrary percentage system: 50 
per cent of Defence Aid was assigned to Britain, 30 per cent to 
1 BH(41)lst mtg, 15 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/6. 
2 Duncan Hall, p. 314; Gwyer, p. 152. 
6o 
the Soviet Union, and the remaining 20 per cent to China and other 
nations; 7.5 per cent of U. S. Army Air Force orders, meanwhile, 
were allotted to the British, 4.5 per cent to the Russians, and 3 
per cent to the others. 
1 
Such allocations seemed to the British to 
violate the fundamental military principle of concentration at the 
point of greatest strategic need. The dispersion of heavy bombers, 
in particular, seemed senselessly uneconomical. Thirty were to go 
to the Soviet Union and ten to China. 'All experience', the Bri- 
tish argued to the Americans, 'shows that small numbers cannot be 
employed with economy of effort'. 
2 
So few bombers would be 'quite 
useless' to the Russians, since it would not be worth their while 
to start this new type in service. 
3 Furthermore, the British 
argued, the Soviet Air Force could only undertake strategic bom- 
bardment of the Romanian oil fields, and these, at the rate of 
German advance, would probably soon be out of range. 
4 
The Ameri- 
can General James E. Chaney disagreed. Although the War Depart- 
ment itself had resisted supplying heavy bombers at first, 
5Chaney 
now argued that such aircraft might form the basis of a squadron 
to bomb Japan in the future; 
6they 
would also be of value in stimu- 
lating Russian morale.? The roles were strangely reversed from 
those at the Atlantic conference, the British arguing against an 
uneconomic diversion, the Americans stressing the value of a 
token gesture to boost morale. 
The reason for the British change of heart was the American deci- 
sion toetain many heavy bombers in the United States. 
8 
Some of 
these, the Chiefs of Staff had hoped, might come to Britain, where 
heavy bomber production was lagging behind schedule; 
9but the Ame- 
ricans proved determined to keep the bombers for the Philippines, 
Hawaii and the Caribbean. Although the British presented counter- 
proposals which would have left the U. S. A. A. F with some 260 heavy 
bombers, Harriman refused to consider British allocations until 
the Russian offer had been decided, 
10 
1 Gwyer, p. 153- 
2 BH(41)9, n. d. (c. 17 Sept, 1941), CAB 99/6. 
3 BH(41)11,17 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/6. 
4 Lukas, p. 86. 
5 Ibid., pp. 73-4. 
6 BH(41)11, loc. cit. 
7 BH(41)7,16 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/6. 
8 Leighton and Coakley, p. 101; COS(41)207(0), 17 Sept. 1941, 
CAB 80/59. 
9 Postan, British War Production, pp. 124-6,174. 
10 BH(41)11, loc. cit. 
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Eventually a compromise was hammered out. At the British sug- 
gestion the American delegation raised its allocation to the Soviet 
Union from 1,163 aircraft to 1,800, the number necessary to ensure 
a supply of 200 aircraft a month until 30 June 1942.1 These addi- 
tional munitions were to be taken from U. S. A. A. F., not R. A. F., 
allocations and, it was decided some days later in Washington, 
would not include the thirty heavy bombers. These instead were to 
go to Britain2and the Russians were to receive roughly 900 fighters, 
698 light and 72 medium bombers. 
3 
This decision on aircraft was still a bitter blow for Britain; 
but it was almost overshadowed by the parallel redudtion in supp- 
lies of tanks. Relying on Roosevelt's optimistic tank production 
schedules of July, the War Office had anticipated receiving in the 
next nine months not only 1,485 medium tanks on British contracts, 
but also 1,233 from Defence Aid. ' However, American production 
had not lived up to expectations. Now, instead of 5,000 to 5,500 
tanks, only 3,187 were thought likely to be produced by mid-1942.5 
This, together with the reduction of Britain's percentage of Lehd- 
Lease, left the War Office with only 611 medium tanks additional 
to those on its own contracts. 
6 
This loss was dismaying enough; 
but the American allocation of 795 medium and 729 light tanks did 
not meet even half of Russian requirements. The British therefore, 
had to sacrifice a further 726 light tanks to meet the deficiency, 
7 
on the understanding that they would receive a substantial increase 
when American production rose. 
8 
They justified doing this on the 
grounds that Roosevelt, informed by Harriman of the acrimony enter- 
ing the discussions, peremptorily ordered American tank production 
to be doubled by 30 June 1942 and the delivery dates on existing 
programmes to be stepped up by 25 per cent. 
9 Although the British 
were sceptical of Washington's optimistic schedules - as Beaver- 
brook observed, they had been promised forty medium tanks in Sep- 
tember, and had received six10 they had no choice but to act on 
the assumption that this one was realistic. 
1 Lukas, p. 86. 
2 Ibid., p. 90. 
3 Leighton and Coakley, p. 
4 Gwyer, p. 151. 
5 DO(41)11,22 Sept. 1941, 
6 Gwyer, pp. 151-2. 
7 Ibid., p. 152. 
8 Leighton and Coakley, p. 
9 Ibid. 




19 Sept. 1941, CAB 69/2. 
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For by now they were acutely aware of the rigidity which their 
premature promise of 400 aircraft and 500 tanks a month had imposed 
on them. It was politically impossible to renege on their commit- 
ment, and yet it had been made on false assumptions. They had over- 
estimated the willingness of the American Armed Services to be 'the 
arsenal of democracy', and had underestimated the concern the Ame- 
ricans felt at their position in the Philippines, the Caribbean and 
Hawaii. Their own loss to the Russians was much greater than ever 
intended, and for the Air Ministry at least, this was reason enough 
to reconsider the commitment. The promise of 200 fighters a month, 
it declared on 17 September, was made 
when British expectations from America were very much brighter 
than they now appear. In these circumstances, the Air Minis- 
try consider that the most practicable solution would be to 
return to the original Defence Aid allocations ... and any 
supply of aircraft additional to the fighters referred to 
above should be met from U. S. Army Air Orders. ' 
The Chiefs of Staff, however, knew that this was wishful thinking. 
Whatever the strain of Britain's sacrifice they knew it had to be 
borne, and the commitment to the Soviet Union could not be abroga- 
ted. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air, Harold Balfour, 
describes the meeting of the Defence Committee on 19 September at 
which this was acknowledged: 
... At once it was clear that Churchill, Eden and Beaver- 
brook were the only ones on the positive side for aid. The 
Service Ministers and their Chiefs of Staff were on the 
negative side. The Air Ministry case was, though invasion 
danger was past, the air defences of Britain had to be kept 
up to strength and further expanded to meet the threat of 
heavier enemy raids. Bomber Command had to be built up. 
The Middle East was crying out for Hurricanes and Spitfires 
for the Western Desert. As for the R. A. F. so for the Army 
and Navy. Not a rowing boat, a rifle or a Tiger Moth could 
be spared without weakening and without grave risk. It was 
soon clear that the division between positives and negatives 
was acute. 2 
This is a colourful account of the meeting, to put it charitably. 
The more phlegmatic official minutes3show that Portal and 
Dill, 
and their respective Ministers, Sinclair and Margesson, 
did agree 
to accept the American proposals. They did so reluctantly and 
1 BH(41)9, loc. cit. The fighters referred to were the 
200 Toma- 
hawks, 200 Hurricanes and two R. A. F. squadrons. 
2 Lord Balfour of Inchrye, P. C., M. C., Wings over Westminster 
(London, 1973), p. 167. 
3 DO(41)62nd mtg, min. 1,19 Sept. 1941, CAB 69/2. 
4 The Chiefs of Staff asked Beaverbrook to register 'their dismay' 
on the official record. (DO(41)11,22 Sept. 1941, CAB 69/3") 
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with considerable irritation, but this was directed more against 
the Americans than the Russians, and was felt by Beaverbrook too. 
Champion of aid for the Red Army he might be, but he resented al- 
most as much the sacrifices demanded of Britain. The United 
States, he pointed out, 'at present ... have only agreed to 
supply Russia with quantities which they can comfortably share'. 
The promise of four hundred aircraft and five hundred tanks 
a month ... can be fulfilled by a sacrifice. This sacri- 
fice will fall almost entirely on us. 1 
Indeed the British now faced a shortage of 1,613 tanks and 
1,800 aircraft. 
2 In practical terms this would mean the delay- 
ing of the formation of 3 armoured divisions and 1 armoured bri- 
gade until late in autumn, 
3and 
the loss over the next nine months 
of 20 heavy and medium bomber squadrons, 15 light bomber squadrons 
and 15 fighter squadrons. 
4 
This loss in bombers was particularly 
dismaying. The R. A. F. was now to receive only 49 heavy and 76 
medium bombers more than those it had ordered itself from the 
United States, 5and such reductions were 'likely to have a grave 
effect on the British air offensive against Germany'. 
6 
Fighter 
Command, meanwhile, would be immediately affected. It would have 
to surrender some aircraft to the Middle East and might conse- 
quently fall to a 'dangerously low' level in spring.? The Army 
Co-operation squadrons would not be able to be re-equipped with 
fighter reconnaissance types at the rate planned, and the offer 
of 500 aircraft to India, the Dominions and the Dutch would have 
to be abandoned. So also would the whole programme of light bom- 
ber expansion which had been planned for the nine-month period. 
8 
The effect on the Middle East was less predictable. The whole 
organization there, as Portal explained to the Defence Committee, 
was built on the expectation of receiving Kittyhawks, and 'rather 
than lose these, we would surrender other planes, like Airacobras 
and Lightnings'. 
9 Whether the Americans would agree to such 
1 DO(41)11, loc. cit. See also B. Bond (ed. ) 'Chief of Staff 
The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, vol. II, 
1940-1944 (London, 1974), p. 42. 
2 Gwyer, p. 152. 
3 DO(41)62nd mtg, loc. cit. 
4 Gwyer, p. 152. 
5 BH(41)9, loc. cit. 
6 Duncan Hall, pp. 332-3- 
7 DO(41)62nd mtg, loc. cit. 
8 COS(41)207(0), 17 Sept. 1941, CAB 80/59- 
9 DO(41)62nd mtg, loc. cit. 
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exchanges, in view of their attitude over heavy bombers, was unclear, 
but Portal intended, with the support of the Defence Committee, to 
negotiate with them on these lines in the little time left before 
the Moscow conference. 
1 
Only then, when the details of the air- 
craft to be offered had been settled, would the full impact on the 
Middle East be seen. 
In general, the loss to the British Armed Services was little" 
short of agonizing. It was therefore galling to find that this 
promise of aid, which cost so much, scarcely dulled Soviet com- 
plaints. When Cripps delivered Churchill's message of 5 September, 
2 
which promised-the supplies, he found Stalin 'very depressed and 
tired' with 'some of the old attitude of suspicion and distrust'. 
The Russian leader refused to guarantee that the Soviet Union 
would hold out until the spring of 1942, even with the supplies 
the United Kingdom offered. After all, he claimed, the Germans 
had no need to take the Western front into consideration. 
' 
Panfilov, the Soviet liaison officer for the army section of 
the mission in Moscow, took a similar line. In a meeting with 
Macfarlane he accused Britain of not pulling her weight in the 
war, and the 'whole atmosphere of this meeting showed a state of 
nervous tension and desire to criticise which is obviously the 
result of the present critical military situation'. 
4 
The pressure continued in the following week. On 15 September 
Stalin again contacted Churchill, thanking him for the promised 
supplies; but pressing for military action. 'It seems to me', 
he said, 'that Great Britain could without risk land in Archangel 
twenty-five to thirty divisions, or transport them across Iran 
to 
the southern regions of the. U. S. S. R. 'S This was a hopelessly un- 
realistic suggestion. The port facilities at Archangel and 
the 
Persian Gulf were primitive, the road and rail communications 




Furthermore Britain had little more"than the 
suggested number of divisions in the United Kingdom itself, and 
less than half that number in the Middle East. 
7 As the official 
1 DO(41)62nd mtg, loc. cit. 
2 Churchill erroneously gives the date as 4 September 
(III, p. 407)" 
3 Woodward (Concise), pp. 254-5. 
4 Macfarlane to COS, MIL 685,8 Sept. 1941, WO 193/649. 
5 Churchill, III, p. 411- 
6 For the shortage of personnel shipping see C. B. A. Behrens, 
Merchant Ship-ing and the Demands of War (London: HMSO, 1955), 
p. 250. 
7 Gwyer, p. 175; DO(41)12,22 Sept, 1941, CAB 69/3" 
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historian says, 'Even if transport had been available, no Govern- 
ment could have considered such a proposition for a moment. $1 The 
British government did not. 
Nonetheless it was clear that the Soviet government needed reas- 
surance. Possibly Stalin had made the suggestion because he over- 
estimated Britain's strength, 
2or 
believed what his officers told 
Macfarlane - that there were only twenty German divisions in France, 
and those inferior. 3 But the more likely supposition was that Sta- 
lin doubted Allied promises of aid. On 19 September he told Cripps 
in a conversation about the problems of no. 30 Military Mission, 
that he questioned whether British tanks would ever arrive. U. S. 
aid he viewed even more sceptically, and though he said that the 
did not wish Great Britain to go short of war material needed for 
her own defence, either by sending material manufactured in Eng- 
land or by forgoing what she would otherwise have received from 
the U. S. A. ', he left Cripps with the impression of mistrust. Stalin 
and his General Staff, the ambassador told London 'are still doubt- 
ful of the degree of help that we are going to give them, and ... 
are inclined to underestimate the help that we have already given'. 
4 
The conference in Moscow at the end of the month, therefore, 
had a political role to play almost as important as its military 
one. The British and American delegations had not only to deter- 
mine the details of the munitions to be supplied but also to con- 
vince the Kremlin of the West's sincerity. To Beaverbrook, the 
head of the British delegation, the political role was particularly 
important, and thanks largely to his skill, it was more than 
fulfilled. 
Churchill wrote of the Moscow conference after the war: the 
.. reception was bleak and the discussions not at all 
friendly ... The Soviet generals and officials gave no 
information of any kind to their British and American 
colleagues. They did not even inform them of the basis 
on which Russian needs of our precious war materials had 
1 Gwyer, p. 201. 
2 Gwyer suggests Stalin may have been misled by Churchill's 
tele- 
gram of 5 September which referred to a force of -t million men 
in the Middle East. He may have calculated that, on the rela- 
tively sparse organization of the Red Army, Britain should 
have 
25-30 divisions available for action in the Soviet Union. There 
is some evidence from German sources that the suggestion origi- 
nated from Marshal Timoshenko, the Red Army's senior field - 
commander, and was therefore intended as a serious military 
suggestion (p. 202). 
3 Macfarlane-to COS, MIL 391,15 Aug. 1941, AIR 8/568. The figures 
in September 1941 were 37 infantry and 1 Panzer division under OB. 
West and 31 Eratz divisions and 1 Panzer in Germany (Gwyer, p. 199n. ). 
4 Cripps to F0, no. 1170,20 Sept. 1941, F0 371 29469 N5585/3/38" 
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been estimated . .,. it might almost have been we who had 
come to ask for favours. 1 
The reality, however, was very different. The Soviet government, 
as Balfour reported on his return, showed hospitality which was 
'almost unprecedented': 'In every direction it was made clear to 
us that Russia welcomed the Mission and wished for a result of 
substantial aid'. 
2 
The Western delegates were feted with genero- 
sity not shown to Ribbentrop in August 1939,3and the final ban- 
quet at the Kremlin was of a kind not seen since the Revolution. 
4 
Stalin meanwhile enthused to Beaverbrook about the value of Allied 
supplies, 
5and Litvinov, dug up from obscurity to interpret and be 
a reminder of more amicable days, jumped from his seat when hearing 
of the mission's offer, and cried, 'Now we shall win the war'! 
6 
There were, of course, obstacles to agreement, and the confer- 
ence followed the pattern which became familiar in later meetings 
of the three Powers of cordiality on the first day, truculence and 
hostility on the second, and resolution on the third. At this con- 
ference the difficulties of the second day presumably resulted 
from the Russians' disappointed hopes. In aircraft, for instance, 
they had hoped for a large allocation of bombers; 300 to every 100 
fighters; but British and American calculations had been made on 
reverse proportions.? This disappointed the Russians. The Commissar 
for Aircraft Industries, Shakurin, had grossly inflated notions about 
American bomber production, which he estimated to be 1,000 to 1,200 
a month. The figure for medium bomber production was in fact closer 
to 300 a month, and that mostly on British contracts, as Chaney ex- 
plained to Shakurin at the second meeting of the Air Supply Committee. 
On learning this, the commissar reduced his demands, but only to 
200 bombers a month. The British and American representatives per- 
sisted, suggesting that the Soviet Air Force use Hurricane and Kitty- 
hawk fighters in a close-support bombardment role, 
8 
and pointing out 
that even the promised 100 bombers a month had been taken 
from 
1 Churchill, III, pp. 415-16. 
2 WP(41)238,8 Oct. 1941, CAB 66/19. 
3 Balfour's Moscow Diary, 1 Oct. 1941, BB library. 
4 W. Standley and A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia 
(Chicago, 
1955), p" 74 (quoting the Counselor of the U. S. embassy). 
5 Sherwood, vol. 1, p. 391- 
6 A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972), p. 487. Despite 
,, this evidence, Churchill's myth has been perpetuated 
by recent 
writers. See A. B. Ulam, Stalin The Man and his Era 
(New York, 
1973), P--562. 
7" Lukas, p. 94. 
8 Lukas, pp. 94-5. 
67 
British contracts on the understanding they would be replaced later. 
Reluctantly Shakurin accepted the proposed ratio. 
Still the difficulties remained. The Russians naturally prefer- 
red to receive one type of aircraft from each nation, thus minim- 
izing the problems of spare parts, ground equipment and training. 
But they also preferred the modern Spitfire to the Hurricane, 
1 
and even further, cannon-bearing to machine-gun fighters. 
2 
The 
British could not meet this demand for both uniformity and moder- 
nity. The current production of Spitfires could not provide 200 
a month in addition to R. A. F. needs, 
3 
and the Russians had there- 
fore to accept either an operationally awkward combination of Hurri- 
canes and Spitfires, or take the less desirable Hurricanes alone. 
Shakurin seemed to. favour the first alternative; 
4but 
Stalin, appa- 
rently concerned at the practical problems involved, told Beaver- 
brook he did not want Spitfires. 
5 Even with this concession he 
had to accept some mixed allocations; for although the Americans 
had enough Kittyhawks6to make the fighter allocation uniform, their 
100 bombers had to be a mixture of B-25s, A-20s and, A-29s. 
7 
The allocation of tanks was less contentious, but still Russian 
expectations were disappointed. They stated at the Military Supply 
Committee that they wished to receive cruiser, infantry and light 
tanks in that order of preference; 
8but 
by far the majority of 
Allied supplies fell into the latter two categories. Furthermore, 
the Russians requested 1,100 tanks a month, 
9but the Allies could 
offer only 500 a month, supplemented by 200 tankettes or 
Bren 
carriers a month from the United Kingdom. 
These disappointments in tanks and aircraft, however, did not 
prove a source of lasting disagreement. Within four days the con- 
ference had settled the major supply questions and been brought 
to a triumphant end. For this Beaverbrook is largely responsible, 
1 B. A. R. (A)2nd mtg, 30 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/7. B. A. R. (A) refers to 
proceedings of the Air Supply Committee at the conference. ) 
2 B. A. R. (A)l, 30 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/7. 
3 B. A. R. (A)2nd mtg, loc. cit. 
4 Ibid. 
5 AM Whitehall to 30 MM, X. 123,24 Nov. 1941, AIR 8/1000. 
6 The Russians preferred these fighters (Lukas, p. 96). 
7 B. A. R. (A)l, loc. cit. 
8 B. A. R. (M)2nd mtg, 30 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/7. Although, according 
to Beaverbrook, Stalin was vague about what percentage of light 
tanks he wanted. (BB's account, 29 Sept. 1941, BB papers, box 
20/6, Russia. ) 
9 Leighton and Coakley, p. 100; WP(41)238,8 Oct. 1941. CAB 66/19. 
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for he refused consistently to allow any contentious issues to 
enter the discussions. He would not press the Russians for infor- 
mation to justify their needs, nor would he encourage the devel- 
opment of political or military discussions between Allied and 
Soviet representatives. 
Cripps1and the members of the military mission were keen for 
him to do all these. They believed that Russian disclosures would 
rationalize the sharing of munitions and British firmness would 
earn Soviet respect and frankness. As early as July, Macfarlane 
had taken this line, advising the C. I. G. S. when the Soviet Mili- 
tary Mission arrived in London to 
Treat them very firm and make them realise if possible with- 
out saying so directly that the help they will get from us 
depends largely on the extent to which they come across and 
on the degree to which we are taken into their confidence 
out here. 2 
On 1 August he had argued more specifically; 'If we make the sup- 
ply of war material to Russia from us and America conditional on 
our being given fuller information we may succeed in getting resu- 
lts much earlier'. 
3 The heads of the naval and air sections of 
the mission agreed, and together they advised Beaverbrook to adopt 
this approach in negotiations with the Kremlin. 
4 
Beaverbrook, how- 
ever, to whom Macfarlane took an instant dislike, 
srefused. He knew 
the Nazi propaganda machine was poised to exploit the first sign 
of a rift in the conference - as it was, the German press crowed 
on the second day that the three Powers had fallen out-- and Beav- 
erbrook would not risk inflaming Russian suspicions. He had come 
to Moscow, he said, not 'to bargain but to give'. 
The one way to break down the suspicious attitude which 
had given rise to Russian secrecy was to make clear beyond 
a doubt the British and American intention to satisfy 
Russian needs to the utmost in their power, whether the 
Russians gave anything or not. 
7 
1 WP(41)238, loc. cit.; Sir S. Cripps, no. 68,5 Nov. 1941, PREM 
3 401/7. 
27 July 1941, appendix M, WO 178/25- 
3 MIL 234, wo 178/25. 
4 Interview with Admiral Sir Geoffrey Miles (head of the naval 
section of the mission, 1941-2, and head of mission, 1942-3), 
December 1972: Extracts from observations of General Mason- 
Macfarlane. .., PREM 3 401/7- 
5 E. Butler, Mason-Mac: The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Noel 
Mason-Macfarlane (London, 1972), p. 137- 
6 Sherwood, p. 391- 
7 Taylor, p. 487. 
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Consequently, although the British1and American delegations2 
asked the Russians for details of Soviet raw materials and indus- 
trial production, they did not press for these when the Kremlin 
proved reluctant. 
3 Satisfied that Soviet requests were reasonable4 
and the military crisis acute, they did not make the supply of 
munitions conditional on Soviet disclosures. Notwithstanding this, 
the Russians did divulge some information about their resources. 
Stalin told Beaverbrook that the Soviet forces were outnumbered 
3 to 2 in aircraft, and 3 or 4 to 1 in tanks, while the Red Army 
had only 280 divisions to 320 German. 
5 
Tank production, he said, 
had fallen from 2,000 a month at the beginning of the war to 
1,400 a month. 
6 
Aircraft production, on the other hand, Shakurin 
told Balfour in response to a specific enquiry, was 70 machines 
a day; 40 fighters, 20 bombers and 10 Stormovik bombers.? Obvious- 
ly this information was not detailed enough to incorporate into 
the Victory Programme, but it is doubtful whether the Russians 
would have disclosed more if pressed. Time and again in the future 
they were to prove willing to sacrifice military advantages for the 
sake of maintaining their secrecy and immunity from Western influen- 
ces. A policy of trading supplies for information would not have 
encouraged them to be open and a conference run on these lines 
would probably have ended in sterile reserve. 
In the same way it is unlikely that Beaverbrook could have 
extracted political concessions from the Kremlin in return for 
the offer of supplies. Throughout the war the Kremlin showed 
little willingness to compromise on questions like the status of 
the Baltic states, and no matter how desperate its military sit- 
uation, it defended its political interests doggedly. There 
is 
little reason to believe it would have acted differently in Octo- 
ber 1941. The question, in any case, is irrelevant. At the Mos- 
cow conference it was the Russians suggested political discussions 
and the Allies who shied away from them. The Americans were 
1 BM(A)lst mtg, 29 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/7. 
2 Supplement to memorandum by Harriman on meeting with Stalin, 
28 Sept. 1941, BB papers, box 20/6 Russia; BAR(M)2nd mtg, 
30 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/7- 
3 See BAR(M)2nd, 3rd mtgs, 30 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/7; vVP(41) 
238,8 Oct. 1941, CAB 66/19. 
4 Foreign Relations of the United States 1 41,1 
(Washington, 
1958), p. 844. For Ismay's eementi see WP(41)238; 
for 
Chaney's, The London Observer, p" 420- 
5 Sherwood, p. 389. 
6 VIP(41)238, loc. cit. 
7 BAR(A)2nd mtg, 30 Sept. 1941, CAB 99/7" 
70 
suspicious of British and Soviet collaboration over Poland and 
Iran, 1and they wished to leave the question of Eastern Europe 
(where they scarcely dreamt the reeling Soviet forces would ever 
be dominant) in abeyance until after the war. Conscious of this 
and eager to avoid controversy, Beaverbrook too avoided political 
discussions. He refused to let Cripps come to conversations at 
the Kremlin, and made little response to Stalin's suggestion that 
the Anglo-Soviet agreement of July 1941 should be extended into an 
alliance. 
2 
He deflected discussions on the question of Finland3 
and would not negotiate with General Anders, the Polish leader in 
the Soviet Union. He listened sympathetically to Stalin's demand 
for British recognition of the Russian boundaries of 1941,1but 
apart from this adhered throughout the conference to 'his fixed 
purpose to confine the talks to supply matters'. 
5 
Similarly he resisted efforts to initiate military discussions. 
Although Major-Generals Ismay and Macready had been included in 
the British delegation partly for this purpose, 
6Beaverbrook 
told 
them that he 'did not intend to allow discussions involving mili- 
tary negatives to cut across and impede the supply negotiations 
which were the purpose of the Mission'.? Strategic discussions 
at the conference were therefore limited to a ten-minute interview 
between Ismay and Stalin8and casual conversation between the lat- 
ter and Beaverbrook. 
9 Later the wisdom of this approach was called 
into question, since within weeks of the conference the Russians 
complained that their requests for aid, particularly for British 
troops in the Ukraine or at Archangel, had been ignored. 
10 Chur- 
chill, too, had expected strategic discussions to take place and 
was surprised that they had not. 
11 
But Beaverbrook's approach again seems sound. Whatever comp- 
laints the Russians made later, almost certainly strategic dis- 
cussions at the conference would not have pleased 
them. The 
1 Langer and Gleason, p. 557, Dawson, p. 130- 
2 Woodward, vol. II, p. 40. 
3 Minute by Beaverbrook for PM, 10 Nov. 1941, PREM 3 401/7" 
4 Taylor, p. 488. 
5 Minute Beaverbrook for PM, loc. cit. 
6 PM minute, M 1025/1, for Eden, 1 Nov. 1941, PREM 3 
401/7" 
Macready was Assistant C. I. G. S. (in charge of supply)- 
7 BB minute to PM, 2 Nov. 1941, PREM 3 401/7. 
8 WP(41)238,8 Oct. 1941, CAB 66/19. 
9 Summary of correspondence ..., 19 Nov. 1941, 
FO 371 29471 
N6654/3/38- 
10 See p. 86. 
11 PM minute, M 1025/1, loc. cit. 
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British would have rejected their proposed operations 
1and 
would 
have demanded disclosures which the Kremlin was unwilling to 
make. Dissension and recrimination could well have resulted. 
As it was, Stalin did not seem excessively keen to discuss mili- 
tary questions. Although he repeated his plea of 15 September 
twice to Beaverbrook on 28 September, 
2he 
did not persist in these 
enquiries. He did not mention Archangel or the Ukraine in his 
conversation with Ismay, and said simply . that he understood why 
the British army could not form a second front now. Ismay left 
Moscow with the impression that 'anything in the nature of joint 
planning, whether in London or in Moscow, would in present circ- 
umstances be valueless'. 
3 
Whatever the later criticisms by Cripps4or the military mis- 
sion, therefore, Beaverbrook's tactics at this conference stand 
vindicated. He gained a speedy and amicable agreement which for- 
med the basis for the long-term supply basis. Although many con- 
tentious questions were ignored, in this Beaverbrook was simply 
following the pattern already set in British policy in the past 
three months. This had been based on several assumptions: that 
the Soviet Union's and Great Britain's need of each other was 
self-evident; that Britain must, for political as well as mili- 
tary reasons, promise aid in defiance of strict military logic; 
and that the gamble of trusting the Russians now would pay divi- 
dends in the future. All these assumptions Beaverbrook accepted, 
and it was to his credit that the conference reached a triumphant 
end. Many have testified to his unique achievement. He 'got on 
amazingly well with Stalin, making an impression that no English- 
man had done hitherto. They "were both racketeers" - and could 
understand each other', recalled Sir Archibald Rowlands, 
5 'Beav- 
erbrook has been a great salesman', Harriman stated. 'His 
1 For example, see Macfarlane's attitude in MIL 1036 to Chiefs 
of Staff, 1 Oct. 1941, ABM 199/606. 
2 Summary of ciarr. espondence.., loc. cit. 
3 WP(41)238, loc. cit. 
4 Sir S. Cripps, no. 68,5 Nov. 1941, PREM 3 401/7" Kccdir_diftg ; td, - 
the journalist, C. L. Sulzberger, Cripps said later in November 
that Beaverbrook's trip was 'a fiasco'. 
'Georgians and Armenians like Stalin and Mikoyan are realists 
and appreciate expert bargaining. If you give them anything 
for nothing they think you are foolish and weak'. 
(Sulz- 
berger, A Long Row of Candles Memoirs and Diaries 
1934-54 
London, 1969, p. 183)- 
5 Conversation with Liddell Hart, 18 March 1942, LH papers 
11/1942/14. 
72 
personal sincerity was convincing. His genius never worked more 
effectively'. 
1 
The Sunday Times journalist in Moscow, Alexander 
Werth, agreed. 
... Beaverbrook's dynamics have unquestionably contributed to the success of the Conference; and his nightly talks with Stalin seem to have been decisive in smoothing away the rough 
edges ... At the little press conference yesterday he (Beaverbrook) was bursting with exuberance. Slapping his 
knees he was saying that the Russians were pleased with Beav- 
erbrook, and the Americans were pleased with Beaverbrook - 'Now aren't they, Averell? ' to which Harriman replied: 'Sure, 
you bet'. 
The Russians certainly did seem pleased. Their papers made 
much of the united front between the three great industrial powers, 
3 
and Molotov made an unusually warm speech at the closing session 
of the conference. He stressed the 
great political importance of the conference, which had 
foiled the Hitlerites' intention to destroy their enemies 
one by one, demonstrating to the world that a mighty front 
of freedom-loving peoples had been created ... 
4 
Cripps too reported that 'the unexpected rapidity with which res- 
ults have been achieved has made a great impression on the Soviet 
Government, who seem genuinely delighted at what has happened'. 
5 
In London the reaction was even more enthusiastic. Churchill 
telegraphed Beaverbrook on 3 October: 'Heartiest congratulations 
to you and all. The unity and success proclaimed is of immense 
value ... Impossible to restrain the feeling of optimism 
here'. 
6 
It was indeed a remarkable occasion. Two nations, one'of whom 
was not yet belligerent and both of whom had long viewed the third 
with distaste and suspicion, had promised to supply the following 
list of munitions and supplies: 
1 Harriman's memorandum of conversation with Stalin, 30 Sept, 
1941, BB papers, box 20/6 Russia. For Ismay's congratulations 
to Beaverbrook, see Taylor, p. 487. 
2 Werth, p. 276. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 275- 
5 Sir S. Cripps, no. 128,3 Oct. 1941, FO 418/87- 
6 Churchill, III, p. 418. 
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Light bombers 300 100 per month from U. S. Fighters 100 100 it it it 
200 " 'r it U. K. 
Tanks 1,100 500 per month from U. S. 
and U. K., plus 200 tank- 
ettes with machine guns 
from U. K. 
Anti-aircraft guns 300 500 two-pdrs from U. K. 
over nine months 
756 37mm from U. S. over 
nine months 
Anti-tank rifles 2,000 200 a month 
250 a month from January 
to March 1942 
300 a month from March on 
Scouting cars 2,000 5,000 from U. S. over nine 
months (later corrected 
to 5,600)* 
Lorries (3,2, and 14- 
ton) 10,000 To be investigated in U. S. 
Aluminium 4,000 tons 2,000 tons a month from 
(excluding 5,000 Canada 
shipped from U. K. To be investigated in U. S. 
in September 
Tin 1,500 tons 1,500 tons a month from U. K. 
Lead 7,000 it To be met from U. K. 
Nickel 800 "" To be investigated in U. S. 
and U. K. 
Molybdenum 300 it 300 tons a month from U. S. 
Cobalt 10 if To be met by U. K. 
Copper (Electrolytic) 3,000 it it It it by U. K. 
Rolled brass 5,000 it it it if in part from U. S. 
Magnesium alloys 300 it To be investigated in U. K. 
and U. S. 
Zinc (electrolytic) 1,500 It To be met by U. K. 
(Hoped that half would be 
provided from U. S. but U. S. 
government not committed) 
Petroleum 20,000 It To be investigated by U. S. 
and U. K. 
Armour plate for'tanks 10,000 it To be met by U. S. 
Sole leather 1,300 it 3,000 tons already released 
(later corrected by U. S. More to be given 
to 1,500 tons)* later. 
Rubber 6,000 tons To be met by U. K. 
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To be met by U. K. 
it ti 11 it It 
II it to of to 
(U. S. and U. K. working 
(out precise figures 
To be met by Canada 
To be met by U. K. 
U. S. and U. K. to meet as 
much as possible 
tt it ti it it 
* ASE(41)22,1 Dec. 1941, FO 371 29581 N6523/3084/38" 
In addition to this, there were many other demands for raw materials, 
industrial and medical supplies which were to be investigated on 
the delegations' return to London and Washington. There were also 
considerable naval requirements, including guns, 8 destroyers, 9 
anti-magnetic mine-sweeping trawlers and 150 Asdic sets, which had 
yet to be considered. A further list contained returned cargoes 
from the Soviet Union to Britain. 
1 
In surveying this list of supplies, Churchill might have felt 
irrepressible optimism. There can be little doubt, however, that 
the Service departments felt dismay, a dismay that was to grow as 
the assumptions on which this commitment had been made began, in 
the next nine months, to change. 
1 WP(41)238,8 oct. 1941, CAB 66/19. 
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3 
Though the signing of the Moscow protocol was the triumphant 
conclusion to three and a half months of British and American 
diplomacy, essentially it was only a beginning. A promise of 
definite and regular assistance had replaced the ad hoc gestures 
of the past, but there remained the far greater task of putting 
this promise into effect. The problems this entailed were nume- 
rous and formidable. On the practical level production program- 
mes had to be accelerated, allocations of munitions adjusted, 
strategic plans adapted and shipping schedules reorganized. On 
the political level the claims of Allies and neutrals, whose" 
loyalty might be suspect, had to be respected, while Russian 
claims for more and better munitions had also to be accommodated. 
The first two months of the protocol were therefore a constant 
struggle to resolve conflicting claims. In practical terms this 
meant recurring disputes between Beaverbrook, who championed 
Russian interests, and the Service departments, who, naturally 
enough, defended their own. From these disputes, in which Beav- 
erbrook consistently emerged the victor, a pattern was soon esta- 
blished of giving Russian claims to scarce munitions priority. 
Consequently, although the impact of the protocol was not imme- 
diately felt in British theatres of operations, since many of 
these were remote from their source of supply, the strain by 
early 1942 was acute. In fact Russian claims were given priority 
so consistently in the two months before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor that, even when the Japanese shattered the entire assump- 
tions on which the British and Americans had planned in October 
1941, the protocol was fulfilled in its original form. 
It was natural for the protocol to be given the highest prio- 
rity immediately after the Moscow conference since the problem of 
allocating and shipping the supplies was extremely complex. 
More- 
over, the various tasks involved in moving the munitions from 
fac- 
tory to port had to be co-ordinated with the greatest speed. 
Beaverbrook had cabled even before he left Moscow stressing the 
need for the munitions promised for October to be on their way to 
the Soviet Union by the end of that same month. 
The effect of this agreement has been an immense strength- 
ening of the morale of Moscow. The maintenance of this 
morale will depend on delivery. If there is a heavy fail- 
ure in October then the situation will in our opinion 
deteriorate ... I do not regard the military situation 
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here as safe for the winter months. I do think that morale 
might make it safe. 1 
Churchill completely agreed, and he promised Stalin on 6 October 
that all major munitions for that month, save nineteen tanks, 
would have left the United Kingdom by 22 October. 
2 
Given that 
munitions and raw materials promised before the Moscow conference 
were still awaiting shipment, 
3and 
that the details of the protocol 
did not reach the responsible departments until some days after 
the decisions in Moscow, 
4this 
was no mean undertaking. To deal 
with it, the Prime Minister established in mid-October the Allied 
Supplies Executive (A. S. E. ), an interdepartmental committee which 
replaced the Committee for Co-ordination of Allied Supplies. 
Beaverbrook, as Minister of Supply, was the new committee's chair- 
man. The Foreign Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Air and 
War and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Mini- 
stry of War Transport were invited to join. Members of the Admi- 
ralty could attend when necessary5and the committee as a whole had 
authority to co-ordinate all departments at policy level. It was 
in constant contact with representatives of the Soviet government, 
and was responsible for determining, where matters of strategic 
priority were not concerned, whether new Russian requests should 
be approved. It had ultimate authority over the shipment of supp- 
lies to the Soviet Union, since supplies were presented by the 
various departments to the Director of Movements at the War Office, 
whose loading programmes the A. S. E. approved three months in 
advance. It then passed them on to the Ministry of War Transport, 
which, through the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Committee, allocated the 
necessary shipping. Non-military supplies were in practice not 
the responsibility of the A. S. E., but the government agency cont- 
rolling these, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, worked 
closely with the secretariat of the A. S. E. at all times. In this 
system in fact the British had a procedure which, unlike the Ameri- 
cans', had all the ingredients for success - co-ordination of pol- 
icy by one body, presentation of cargo through one channel and 
loading by one agency. 
6 
1 Telegram to PM, no. 39 LINEN, 3 Oct. 1941, WO 193/580. 
2 Churchill, 'The Second World War, vol. III., pp. 418-19. 
3 Ibid. 
4 CAS(41)35th mtg, confidential annex (Committee for Co-ordination 
of Allied Supplies), 
8 Oct. 1941, F0 371 29578 N5912/3084/38. 
5 WP(42)417, appendix 1,17 Sept. 1942, CAB 66/28. 
6 Paper by W. 0. Hart, Mar. 1942, Beaverbrook Papers, box 19/2. 
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The importance of this cannot be overestimated, for the task 
confronting the British in October proved considerably more taxing 
than originally anticipated. This was because, as the C. I. G. S. 
learned with alarm early in October, they had undertaken to meet 
in the first two months of the protocol not only their own commit- 
ments, which strained their resources severely, but part of the 
American also. The British agreed in fact to provide an extra 84 
tanks in October and an extra 43 in November, bringing their total 
for these months to 334 and 293 respectively. 
1 At the same time-'. 
they agreed to release 300 light bombers (A-20s), then being pro- 
duced on British contracts in the United States, to help the Ame- 
ricans meet their aircraft commitment in the first months of the 
protocol. 
Later, when American production had expanded to meet its com- 
mitments, these planes, like the tanks, would be replaced, but 
the date of this was as yet unspecified. 
2 In the meantime there 
was the immediate problem of finding extra munitions in October 
and November, and this was particularly difficult, since both 
Americän and British production was slow to expand as anticipated. 
Churchill had asked Hopkins on 25 September to ensure that the pro- 
duction targets for the first half of 1943 were met in the second 
half of 1942,3but obviously, given the Americans' need for British 
help in October and November, the benefits of this would be felt 
only in the future. Similarly, despite measures to stimulate 
British industry, production there had not had time to respond 
and expand. Beaverbrook's 'Tank for Russia' week from 22 to 27 
September had admittedly produced an impressive increase in pro- 
duction - twice the rate of May 1941 -4but there was no guarantee 
that such appeals would always be effective. 
5 In fact, though 
Beaverbrook made another appeal on his return from Moscow for 
increased production in Britain and Canada, where tanks for the 
Russians were also being produced, he was forced to admit to the 
1 Minute by. C. I. G. S. to PM (but in fact not sent), 4 Oct. 1941, 
WO 193/580; tel. to U. K. High Commissioners, 17 Oct. 1941, 
PREM 3 401/20. 
2 Note by Balfour for Beaverbrook, 11 Nov. 1941. BB papers, 
file 3, box 17- 
3 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 334. 
4 Minute for PM, 30 Sept. 1941, BB papers, BBK D/127- 
5 Home Intelligence Weekly Report (HIWR) no. 51,24 Sept, 1941, 
INFO 1/292B. There was some indication of public concern that 
this kind of appeal would be used excessively and that the public 
had reached saturation point with appeals. 
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House of Lords on 23 October that 'we must have an increase in out- 
put which so far we have not got'. 
1 
In these circumstances it was extremely difficult for the Service 
departments to find the munitions in the quantities demanded by the 
protocol in these months, and it needed a co-ordinating force like 
the A. S. E. to prevent their falling into arrears. This was parti- 
cularly so since military calculations were constantly disrupted by 
strategic changes or by the Russians expressing preference for the 
type of tanks and aircraft already allocated elsewhere. The War 
Office, for instance, in early October agreed to allocated all in- 
fantry tank production for the first two months of the protocol to 
the Russians. ('Crusader' cruiser tanks were reserved for the 
Middle East where the desert conditions made speed and mobility all- 
important, and the other cruiser tanks, the 'Covenanter' and 'Chur- 
chill', were not yet ready for service outside the United Kingdom. ) 
The result of this decision was that the Middle East, which had also 
been anticipating some of the 373 American tanks now diverted to 
the protocol, had its allocation of tanks cut from 460 tanks to 
312.2 At the same time the re-equipment of the Home Forces was 
postponed and allocations to India, New Zealand and Australia were 
cancelled. At first the consequences of this did not seem unduly 
serious. The threat of invasion, for which the Home Forces had to 
be prepared, had receded during the winter, and the Middle East 
could still reach its target of 31 armoured divisions by 1 April 
1942. Obviously it was not desirable to reduce, as the British 
were obliged to, the reserves in the Middle East from 50 per cent 
to 331/3 per cent and to postpone the development of Australia's 
and India's armoured forces for service overseas. 
3 But as the 
C. I. G. S. explained to the Commander-in-Chief, India, who pointed 
out the political repercussions of doing this: 
It is not possible to reduce (the) allocation to Russia: 
if (the) result of this allocation is to keep Russia 
fighting it will have far reaching effects on war as a 
whole and will thereby directly effect security of India. 
4 
Within a few days of his saying this, however, the strategic 
sitüatiöii deterior. ted; bringing the logic of his argument into 
question. On 12 and 13 October many government offices and 
the 
1 Quoted in FO 371 29579 N6156/3084/38. 
2 Minute CIGS to PM, 4 Oct. 1941, WO 193/580. 
3 Minutes of meeting in W0,8 Oct. 1941, WO 193/58o. - 
4 CIGS to Wavell, tel. 96839, in response to tel. from Wavell, 
14 Oct. 1941, WO 193/580. 
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entire diplomatic corps were evacuated from Moscow as the German 
advance continued apparently irresistibly. By the 17th Field 
Marshal von Rundstedt's armies had overrun the whole of the Donbas 
basin in the Ukraine, and had entered Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. 
On the 24th, General Paulus's 6th Army took Kharkov and the way was 
open to Rostov and beyond it, the Caucasus. The British were faced 
by the end of October with the probability that German forces would 
be in Transcaucasia by the end of February 1942, threatening Anglo- 
Iranian oil vital to their war effort. The diversion of tanks from 
the Middle East and India, whose troops were defending Iran, there- 
fore seemed increasingly irresponsible. If it continued, the Mid- 
dle East Command could face a threat in the spring on its northern 
flank and in the desert with two armoured divisions and one army 
tank brigade less than the minimum force required. 
1 
The protocol 
therefore was under challenge, since whatever the Soviet Union's 
need - and of that there was little doubt - the Middle East was 
recognized to have first priority; 
2and, 
as the War Office concluded 
on 31 October, 'The only means of increasing the supply of tanks 
to our own forces would be by cutting down the allocation to Russia'. 
Fortunately, however, the War Office was not forced to do this. It 
realized that such action 'may be impracticable at present' and 
instead took a further 170 tanks from the Home Forces for the Mid- 
dle East, justifying this on the grounds that earlier estimates of 
the defence needed for the United Kingdom had been made before the 
Luftwaffe had been 'mauled' in the East. More significantly, the 
War Office recommended that the Americans send to the Middle East 
in the next three months 350 cruiser (M. 3) tanks which would other- 
wise have been allocated to the British from U. S. production in the 
first quarter of 1942.3 This General Marshall agreed to do on 6 
November, and the Middle East thus received virtually all the re- 
maining medium tank production which had been earmarked for the 
U. S. Armoured Force itself in that time. 
4 
As a result of this the War Office was able to meet its protocol 
commitments in November and December despite the strategic changes 
of October. It was saved from having to choose between the Soviet 
Union and the Middle East and, as far as actual numbers of tanks 
1 WO review of availability and requirements or armoured formations, 
31 Oct. 1941, WO 193/580,5]A. 
2 CIGS/PM/BM/171,15 Sept. 1941, PREM 3 401/20. 
3 WO reý, iew ...; Minute by CIGS, 17 Nov. 1941, DO(41)27, 
CAB 69/3- 
4 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, p. 104. 
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was concerned, was able to meet its obligations to both. There 
were, however, other conflicting claims and these too could have 
disrupted the protocol, had not the A. S. E. asserted its authority. 
Spare parts, for instance, were in desperately short supply, the 
War Office claimed, and there was some reluctance on its part to 
ship them uncritically to the Russians. Beaverbrook, however, 
insisting that 'The spares situation has never been so good as it 
is at the present time' took the issue to the Defence Committee; 
that, he claimed, seemed to be 'the only method of getting from 
the C. I. G. S. the right quantity of supplies'. 
1 
The committee gave 
him a ruling on 20 October that every tank shipped to the Soviet 
Union should be matched with three months' spare parts, whatever 
sacrifice this might entail. 
2 
Beaverbrook also used all his influence to ensure that the max- 
imum number of 'Valentines' tanks were sent to the Soviet Union 
each month. The War Office wanted to limit the number of these 
to one hundred a month, since it believed that only by doing this 
could it make good in the foreseeable future the losses suffered 
by the Home Forces and India. (The Matilda tank, which made up 
the rest of the Russian allocation was not suitable for the needs 
of either of these theatres. )3 Beaverbrook, however, regretted 
sending the Russians large numbers of the Matilda. Under pressure 
from the War Office - 'the importunities and blandishments of 
Lieut-General Macready', he later called it - he agreed to leave 
the December allocation for the Russians as it stood, at only 100 
Valentines; 
4but 
he soon struck back. On 3 December he received a 
request from Stalin for as many Valentines a month as possible, 
since they performed better in winter conditions and had a longer 
lease of life than the Matilda05 Beaverbrook therefore, without 
consulting the War Office, 
6promised 
the Soviet embassy late in 
December that the proportion of Valentines in the January alloca- 
tion would be increased to 150.7 
1 Beaverbrook to Macready, 20 Oct. 1941, BB papers, box 19/3- 
2 DO(41)67th mtg, min. 2, CAB 69/2. 
3 D0(41)27,17 Nov. 1941, CAB 69/3; DO(41)70th mtg, min. 1,17 Nov. 1941, 
CAB 69/2; minute Dill to PM, 21 Dec. 1941, PREM 3 401/20. 
4 Beaverbrook minute'to PM, 22 Dec. 1941, PREM 3 401/20; ASE(41)5th mtg, 
min. 6.9 Dec. 1941, CAB 92/1; BB to Stalin, 9 Dec. 
1941, BB papers, 
box 20/1. 
5 ASE(41)27, CAB 92/1. - 6 Lieut-General Ronald M. Weeks to Macready, TAUT no. 391,5 Jan. 1942, 
BB papers, file 1, box 22. (Weeks was Director-General of 
Army 
Equipment, War Office. ) 
7 ASE(42)8, annex, CAB 9y/3. - Progress reports of 
the-shipment of mil- 
itary supplies early in 1942 confirm this (ASE(42)40,74, 
CAB 92/3). 
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This was indicative of what was happening to the protocol. 
Increasingly as the practical problems of meeting its deadlines 
grew, the reservations of the Service departments were cast aside 
and the Russian claims were given priority. Failures of produc- 
tion, changes in the strategic situation and growing Russian dis- 
crimination forced the British to give the protocol precedence 
over almost every theatre. This was even more true of the Air 
Ministry than of the War Office. There the problems of meeting 
the protocol deadlines were more intense because the Americans 
did not ease the situation but instead exacerbated it. At the 
end of October they reneged on the agreement of the London con- 
ference which Harriman had warned at the time was tentative1 but 
on the basis of which the Air Ministry had agreed to supply the 
Russians. Now the Americans decided to abandon the percentage 
plan - 50 per cent-of Lend-Lease and 74- per cent of U. S. A. A. F. 
contracts for the British - and replaced it with arbitrary allo- 
cations, in some cases better for the British but in most cases 
worse. For instance, the British were allocated 100 per cent of 
Defence Aid production of Airacobras (P-39) and Mustangs (P-51), 
but they lost 343 Kittyhawks (P-40) and large numbers of bombers. 
In light bombers their allocation was reduced to only 19, the 
other 515 on Lend-Lease contracts being diverted to the Russians. 
2 
This was over and above the 300 Bostons (A-20) 'lent' from Bri- 
tish contracts and these were now not to be replaced until at 
least June 1942.3 As Sinclair said, 'The American contribution 
of bombers to Russia appears almost negligible and the main bur- 
den falls on us'. 
4 
In heavy bombers too the British lost seriously 
- this time, for the sake of the Philippines. 
5 Instead of 400 bom- 
bers, allocated under the Arnold-Slessor agreement, they were now 
- in November - assigned only 238.6 
These reductions threw the Air Ministry's calculations into 
chaos. Although the loss of the Kittyhawks was tolerable since a 
continuation order had recently been submitted for Hurricanes, 
1 Note on Allocation of U. S. Production, 8 Nov. 1941, BB papers, 
Air Ministry D/173- 
2 SOS to Balfour, WEBBER W. 396,31 Oct. 1941, AVIA 15/1451- 
3 British Air Commission, Washington to Ministry of Aircraft 
Production, BRINY 10339,29 Oct. 1941, AVIA 15/1451- 
4 WEBBER W. 396, loc. cit. 
5 W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II 
vol. 6 (Chicago, 1955), p. 403- 
6 Note on Allocation of U. S. Production, loc. cit. 
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the bombers were needed urgently in the Middle East and at home. 
' 
The metropolitan air force was severely depleted because of its 
campaign of daylight bombing of short-range targets, which it had 
been waging since June with the strategical aim of assisting the 
Russians by forcing the enemy to bring back fighter squadrons from 
the East. 2 In the two and a half months since the German attack on 
the Soviet Union, Fighter and Bomber Commands had lost 302 aircraft 
compared with only 42 in the five months before this. 
3 Supplies of 
American aircraft were essential to balance out these losses, but 
these were now completely unreliable. From the abrogation of the 
September agreement it was clear that American production at its 
present levels could not fulfil the role of the 'arsenal of democ- 
racy'. Yet there was no provision for an expansion of aircraft 
production in the second Lend-Lease Appropriation bill debated 
early in November, since the Americans were concerned more with 
development of their ordnance programme. 
4 
Furthermore there was 
no separate allocation for the Russians as the British wished, 
5 
though the Soviet Union was declared eligible for Lend-Lease aid 
on 7 November. Consequently it was likely that British interests 
would continue to be sacrificed in America's effort to meet her 
protocol commitments, particularly as there was some hardening of 
attitude in Washington. Balfour, who was in the United States at 
this time to clarify the aircraft supply position, reported of one 
meeting with the Americans: 
Chaney gave vigorous support to Russian claims and on the 
whole favoured concessions to the British. Arnold clearly 
did not like the Russian commitment and expressed deter- 
mination not to make any concessions which would involve 
removal of aircraft from U. S. squadrons without specific 
instructions from above. He reminded us that all aircraft 
off L. L. (Lend-Lease) contracts were at the disposal of 
U. S. Government to allocate at their (sic) discretion. .. 
and declined 6to make any definite commitments for the future. .. 
1 Minute for Deputy Air Member for Supply and Organization (D/AMSO), 
31 Oct. 1941, AIR 19/288; WEBBER W. 396, loc. cit. 
2 Note on Operations Undertaken by Fighter Command to Assist the 
Russians, 20 Oct. '1941, AIR 19/288; for a description of these 
operations, code named 'Circus', see Sir Charles Webster and N. 
Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939- 
1945, vol. 1 (London: zHMSO, 1961)j pp. 234-6. 
3 Note on Operations ..., loc. cit. 
4 Note by AM on American Supply ..., 27 Nov. 1941, BB papers, 
BBK D/173- 
5 Halifax to FO, no. 96 USLON, 8 Nov. 1941, AVIA 15/1451. - 
6 U/SOS to AM, Caesar 666,29 Oct. 1941, AVIA 15/1451. 
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In these circumstances the obvious way the British could salvage 
the situation was by limiting the fighter aircraft they sent to the 
Russians after October to those which the Americans still supplied 
liberally, namely the Airacobra and the Mustang. If they did this 
instead of sending Hurricanes, they could at least shield the Mid- 
dle East air force during its transition from Tomahawks to the un- 
tried Kittyhawk. 1 They could also relieve the strain on Hurricane 
spare parts which were in very scarce supply and which simply did 
'not exist' in the quantities the Russians requested. 
2 
Further- 
more the British could ensure reliable supplies for Fighter Command 
which was likely to face heavy attacks on the United Kingdom in the 
spring of 1942,3and could in effect transfer the burden of the pro- 
tocol to those aircraft least vital to Air Ministry planning. At 
the same time by supplying Airacobras the Air Ministry could meet 
Russian needs more effectively than if it supplied Hurricanes. 
Problems of maintenance and spare parts would be eased since the 
Airacobra and the Mustang had the same Allison engine as the Toma- 
hawk and Kittyhawk. Shipping would be simplified since all figh- 
ters would be issued from the one source, and most important, the 
Russians would receive aircraft with the type of armament they 
preferred. The Airacobra carried one cannon in addition to its 
four machine guns: 
4the 
Hurricanes which the Chief of Air Staff had 
released for shipment to the Soviet Union in October did not. 
5 
The plan to send the Russians Airacobras and Mustangs therefore 
had much to recommend it. Unfortunately, though, it was some time 
before the Air Ministry could implement it, even in part. At first 
Beaverbrook resolutely opposed it and insisted, when the question 
was rammed in mid-October, that Britain was bound for political 
and technical reasons to send Hurricanes. These had been mooted 
at the Moscow conference as the fighter the Russians were most 
likely to receive and, though there was no definite agreement con- 
firming this, 
6Beaverbrook 
believed that 'the most damaging thing 
1 DWO minute for CAS, 18 Oct. 1941, AIR 8/1000; DWO minute for SOS 
through Vice CAS, 30 Oct. 1941, BB papers, Air Ministry D/173- 
2 Sinclair to Beaverbrook, 19 Oct. 1941, BB papers, loc. cit. 
3 DO(41) 67th mtg, min. -2,20 Oct. 
1941, CAB 69/8. 
4 Mtg"of Air Council, 14 Oct. 1941, AIR 8/1000; DO(41) 67th mtg, 
min. 2, loc. cit. 
5 Portal minute for SOS, 20 Oct. 1941, AIR 8/1000. Instead of an 
anticipated 60 cannon Hurricanes, only 27 were produced in 
September 1941 (Sinclair to Beaverbrook, 19 Oct. 1941, BB 
papers, loc. cit. ). 
6 Sinclair to Beaverbrook, 19 Oct. 1941, BB papers, loc. cit. 
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we can do now is to give the Russians the impression that we are 
going to water down our promises. '1 Stalin expected to receive 
Hurricanes and Kittyhawks (from the United States)2and the Aira- 
cobra, Beaverbrook declared, was an inferior aircraft to these. 
3 
(It was in fact approaching obsolescence and was noted for its 
poor performance at high altitudes, its slow rate of climb and 
its lack of manoeuvrability; 
4but 
the Russians were later to prize 
it for its effectiveness in a ground-attack role. ) Beaverbrook's 
reservations were shared by Eden and Churchill, the latter of whom 
thought 'It would be better to put up with certain disadvantages 
in order to preserve the integrity of our offer' and avoid giving 
the Russians 'cause to imagine that we were trying to modify the 
Agreement, at any rate for the next month or two. '5 Nevertheless 
in time Beaverbrook did agree to the Air Ministry's proposals. 
Conscious of the value of standardizing types, he agreed late in 
October to increase the proportion of Airacobras in November and 
December. Mustangs, however, he vetoed, on the grounds that this 
would introduce too many types. The Russians, who approved the 
Airacobra allocations early in November, agreed and would accept 
Mustangs only for trial purposes. 
6 
The reprieve the Air Ministry gained from this agreement was 
shortlived. It depended on regular supplies of aircraft from the 
United States, and once again these proved unreliable. Airacobras 
arriving early in December were found to have mechanical faults 
and needed testing before they could be forwarded to the Soviet 
Union. The A. S. E. therefore decided that the December allocation 
of aircraft should be made up only of Airacobras which had first 
passed through British hands. If the full quota of 120 Airacobras 
could not be supplied in this way then the balance would have to 
be made up with Hurricanes. (The December allocation of these 
already stood at eighty. 
7) 
Beaverbrook for one was not prepared 
to send any plane that was not completely reliable, for he was 
still smarting from the embarrassment of the Tomahawk's failure in 
1 Beaverbrook to Sinclair, 20 Oct. 1941, BB papers, loc. cit. 
2 Minute by Balfour for SOS, 15 Oct. 1941, AIR 19/288. 
3 DO(41) 67th mtg, min. 2,20 Oct. 1941, CAB 69/2. 
4 Craven and Cate, p. 212. 
5 DO(41) 67th mtg, min. 2, loc. cit. 
6 SOS to Balfour (in Washington), WEBBER W. 324,24 Oct. 1941, 
AVIA 15/1451; Beaverbrook to G. Pugachev (Soviet Military Mission) 
4 Nov. 1941, BB papers, box 20/1; M. Stalin to Beaverbrook, 27 
Nov. 1941, ASE(41)28, CAB 92/1. 
7 ASE(41)5th mtg, min. 6,9 Dec. 1941, CAB 92/1. 
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the Soviet Union. Many df these planes had been hastily despatched 
in the preceding months without their generators being modified or 
without sufficient spare parts. They had then proved so unreliable 
that the Russians had quickly grounded them all. 
1 The military 
mission reported from Moscow on 18 November that the 'Russians are 
in a thoroughly bad temper about the Tomahawk and one can hardly 
blame them. It is a great pity that this was the first aircraft we 
sent them as it has caused them to suspect our goodwill and our 
ability to send proper spares for Hurricanes and other types. '2 
Given that aircraft were known to be the most urgent of Russian 
needs, 
3such 
a failure could not be tolerated again particularly as 
Soviet aircraft production at this time was estimated by the Joint 
Intelligence Committee to be only 20 per cent of the June 1941 
figure. 
4 
Stalin himself had also contacted Beaverbrook on 27 Nov- 
ember to inform him that 
The 'Hurricanes' 
however, are the 
however, to make 
the needs of the 
effected. We wo 
possible. 5 
are greatly appreciated. Less favourable 
reports on the 'Tomahawks'. We were able, 
even this type of aircraft suitable for 
front, after certain adaptions had been 
uld like as many 'Hurricanes' and tanks as 
Beaverbrook therefore told Sinclair on 4 December: 
I do not think you should send 137 Airacobras to the Russians 
at all. ... 
We got into a terrible mess with the Tomahawks. And we 
should not repeat. the error. It would discourage the Russians 
at a time when it seems to me to be of immensg importance to 
give them all the encouragement in our power. 
The Air Ministry agreed, 
7although it suspected that part of the 
trouble with the Tomahawk had been the Russian pilots' mishandling 
of the plane. 
8 
It undertook to make up any deficit in the December 
allocation with Hurricanes, even though on the previous month's cal9 
culations Britain's own requirements of this plane in the months to 
June 1942 exceeded stocks and anticipated production by 857.9 
Once again, therefore, the demands of the Russians were given 
overriding priority. The Air Ministry, like the War Office, learnt 
1 Britlistaff to Air Ministry, 4 Oct. 1941, AIR 8/1000. 
2 30 Military Mission to Air Ministry, AIR 1629,18 Nov. 1941, 
AIR 8/1000. 
3 ASE(41)2,29 Oct. 1941, CAB 92/1. 
4 Note for Director of Plans, 21 Nov. 1941, WO 193/580. 
5 ASE(41)28, CAB 92/1. 
6 BB to Sinclair, 4 Dec. 1941, AIR 8/1000. - 
7 AM to RAFDEL, W'ton, WEBBER W. 812,11 Dec. 1941, AIR 19/288. 
8 ASE to Kuibyshev, MOSSY no. 109, -29 Nov. 1941, AIR 8/1000. 
9 Availability of Hurricanes; November 1941 to June 1942, AIR 8/1000" 
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how difficult it was to limit the impact of the protocol. It 
could not judiciously select for the Russians the type of muni- 
tions it least valued itself, but was forced to make ever greater 
sacrifices. This was partly because, with the shortage of time 
and the failures of production, there was no other way to meet 
the protocol deadlines; but it was also the result of the tremen- 
dous political will in London to honour Russian commitment what- 
ever the cost. 
This political will was so strong at this time because through- 
out October and November 1941 relations between Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union were particularly sensitive. 
' Despite the Moscow 
conference, the Russians remained far from satisfied with the Bri- 
tish contribution to the war, and continued to press for actual 
military assistance. The offers of help the British made in res- 
ponse - to take over the duties of the five or six Soviet divisions 
in northern Iran, 
2or 
to send a token force to the Caucasus3 - made 
the Russians resentful and suspicious. On 23 October Molotov accu- 
sed the British - with some justice 
4_ 
of failing to give a direct 
answer to Stalin's earlier requests for twenty-five to thirty Bri- 
tish divisions. Maisky on the other hand stressed throughout the 
month the political importance of British troops fighting 'side by 
side with Russians on their soil', 
5and 
not merely in the Caucasus, 
an area of past conflict between Britain and the Soviet Union. 
6 
Cripps warned on 26 October that the Russians were becoming obse- 
ssed with the idea that the British would fight 'to the last drop 
of Russian blood', 
6and 
Macfarlane too confirmed that the Kremlin 
would accept troops 'only if they are employed at front against 
enemy. '7 The front at this time was not the Caucasus, but Lenin- 
grad, Moscow, Kharkov and Taganrog. 
The British strove to regain Russian confidence, but were unsuc- 
cessful for some time. Churchill offered on 4 November to send 
1 For a full account see Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. IT, 
pp. 40-54; and Churchill, III, ch. XXVIII. 
2 Made by Churchill on 12. October 1941. See Gwyer, Grand Strategy, 
pp. 208-9. 
3 Made by Eden to Maisky on 16 October (Woodward, II, p. 41). 
4A Foreign Office survey of correspondence between the two govern- 
ments admitted this on 19 November. FO 371 29471 N6654/3/38" 
5 Ibid. 
6 Woodward, p. 43- 
7 Macfarlane to COS, MIL 1308,25 Oct. 1941, WO 193/645A. 
i 
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two British generals, Wavell and Paget, 
1to Moscow for military 
discussions, 2but Stalin rejedted the offer brusquely. The reason, 
it seems, was. the Kremlin's annoyance at the Cabinet's reluctance 
to declare war on Finland, Romania and Hungary, and the premature 
publicity this issue received in the West. Stalin declared in 
his reply to Churchill on 11 November that this had made the situa- 
tion between their countries intolerable. There was no 'clarity' 
in Anglo-Soviet relations; 'no definite understanding between our 
two countries on war aims and on plans for the post-war organi- 
sation of peace'; 'no agreement ... on mutual military assistance'. * 
Unless Wavell and Paget were empowered to discuss these questions, 
Stalin declared, 'it would be ... very difficult for me to find 
the time for the conversations. ' He also added that protocol 
supplies had reached the Red Army broken, inadequately packed, and 
with their spare parts scattered on different ships. 
3 The public 
announcement he made on 6 November, the anniversary of the Revolu- 
tion, was equally hostile, declaring that the absence of a second 
front eased the German position 'and such a front must unquestion- 
ably appear in the near future'. 
4 
Churchill was offended, since his true feelings, as he explained 
to Cripps on 28 October, were that the Russians 
certainly have no right to reproach us. They brought their 
own fate upon themselves when, by their Pact with Ribbentrop, 
they let Hitler loose on Poland and so started the war. They 
cut themselves off from an effective second front when they 
let the French army be destroyed. 5 
Nonetheless relations did not deteriorate further. The Russians 
made it clear through formal communications and 'off-the-record' 
confessions by Maisky that they had not meant to cause offence. 
On 21 November therefore, Churchill offered to send the Foreign 
Secretary to Moscow for discussion of war aims and post-war settle- 
ments. Further he offered military experts to discuss the sending 
1 Wavell was C-in-C, India, Iran and Iraq, and would have been con- 
cerned with any force sent to the Caucasus. Paget, designate 
C-in-C, Far East, had been Chief of Staff, Home Forces, and could 
therefore explain the reasons why Britain could not attack the 
Continent. ' Wavell also spoke Russian. 
2 Churchill, pp. 468-9. 
3 Churchill, pp. 469-70. 
4 Woodward, p. 49. As Woodward points out, the word 'must' was 
used in the Tass Agency translation, but the embassy at Kuibyshev 
(evacuated from Moscow on 16 October) used the word 'ought'. 
5 Churchill, p. 420. 
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of British troops 'not only into the Caucasus but into the fighting 
line of your armies in the south'. 
1 (This was in fact a larger 
commitment than the Chiefs of Staff had originally intended but 
they agreed to it on the' understanding that there was no other way 
to secure Russian co-operation in the defence of Caucasian and 
Iranian oil. ) 
2 
Stalin accepted both offers cordially on 23 November. 
3 
Unfortunately, though, this accord was almost immediately threat- 
ened. Early in December the Chiefs of Staff withdrew their support 
for intervention in southern Russia since the assumptions on which 
they had agreed to it had changed. Auchinleck's offensive, finally 
launched on 18 November, had proved a larger commitment than expec- 
ted, and already a brigade of one of the divisions allocated to the 
southern Russian force had been drawn into it. 
4 
At the same time 
the Russians were no longer retreating to the Caucasus but had in 
fact on 29 November recaptured the city of Rostov lost to the 
Wehrmacht ten days earlier. To the annoyance of Churchill and 
Eden, therefore, the Chiefs of Staff advised the Defence Committee 
on 3 December that they could no longer support the offer of troops 
and air forces for the Soviet Union. Further to that, they were 
far from enthusiastic about providing an extra 500 tanks and 500 
aircraft as Beaverbrook urged them to do as a compensating gesture 
to the Russians. Tank casualties in the Middle East had been high 
5 
and aircraft holdings in the United Kingdom were now so tight that 
there were only one hundred more Hurricanes and Spitfires than at 
the same time in 1940.6 The Chiefs' of Staff attitude made the 
prospects for Eden's coming conference in Moscow look bleak, for 
it meant he must go empty-handed. In fact, on the following day 
the new C. I. G. S., General Alan Brooke, and Portal conceded that 
they could send fifty Churchill tanks a month after January 1942 
and possibly a further 300 aircraft from the United States; 
7but 
the Prime Minister had reservations about this. He thought it 
1 Churchill, p. 471- 
2 COS(41)383rd mtg, min. 9, AIR 8/930. See also the diary entry 
for 5 Nov. 1941 by Pownall: 'Both Dill and myself are anxious 
to get a move on towards the Caucasus ... I'm not interested 
at all in helping the Russians there, but I do want to lay hands 
on Baku so that we can make quite sure that place doesn't fall 
intact into German hands. ' (Pownall papers. ) For a full descrip- 
tion of discussions about intervention in southern Russia see 
Gwyer, pp. 206-16. 
3 Churchill, pp. 472-3" 
4 Gwyer, p. 321. 
5 D0(41)71st mtg, min. 2,3 Dec. 1941, CAB 69/2. 
6 COS(41)408th mtg, min. 4,4 Dec. 1941, WO 193/669. 
7 Ibid. 
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would be 'unsound' to send the Russians an untried type (like the 
Churchill). Eventually the compromise settled upon was to offer 
the Russians ten R. A. F. squadrons when the issue had been decided 
in Libya. 1 Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, records the Cabinet meeting at which 
this was discussed: 
Appears that we shall not even have material to offer Russians 
- in place of Divisions. A. (Eden) - rightly made a stink 
about this, but agreed to go. P. M. again stamped on A. Sin- 
clair for suggesting postponement. 2 
In the event, even this offer of squadrons was withdrawn; for, as 
Eden was en route to Moscow, news broke of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor and the extension of the war to the Pacific. 
3 
Given that the British were forced to disappoint Russian expec- 
tations so regularly, it is not surprising nothing was allowed to 
interfere with the protocol. In these months it alone represented 
in tangible form Britain's goodwill and determination to help its 
ally. It was a symbol of understanding and consensus when mis- 
understanding and discord prevailed. As Churchill said, while he 
forgave the Russians for their past 'in proportion to the number 
of Huns they kill', they forgave him 'In proportion to the number 
of tanks I send'. 
4 
Consequently, the Moscow protocol became in- 
violable, the unalterable factor in British calculations around 
which all other priorities had to be modified: the claims of the 
Service departments, in themselves legitimate and reasonable, 
became heretical in the threat they posed to the protocol. 
It was Beaverbrook, more than anyone else, who ensured that 
this happened. He was the dynamic force who secured priority for 
the Soviet Union and maintained a constant flow of supplies from 
British ports, whatever the disruption of military planning. Later 
it was said of him that 'his effect on any given industry is of a 
perniciously mixed cocktail, highly stimulating for an hour or two 
but leaving a particularly virulent hangover for ever after. '5 But 
in these months he was at his most stimulating, showing that faci- 
lity for meeting crises which distinguished his days in the 
1 COS(41)43rd mtg (0), confidential annex, 4 Dec. 1941, CAB 79/86. 
2 The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, D. Dilks (ed. ) (London, 
1971), p. 416. 
3 WO report of conversations at Moscow conference, 16 Dec. 1941, 
FO 371 29472 N7452/3/38" To Eden's relief Stalin said he 'fully 
understood' the withdrawal of the offer. 
4 Burns, Roosevelt; p. 187. -' 
5 parliamentary Debates, vol. 377, col. 849,28 Jan. 1942. 
Speaker: Capt. McEwen, member for Berwick and Haddington. 
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Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1940. Harold Macmillan, then 
Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Supply, described 
Beaverbrook at work on his return from Moscow. 
He collected into his large room a huge conference of Army, 
Navy and Air Force officers, together with all the different 
representatives of the supply Ministries involved ... With 
the help of the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries con- 
cerned an agenda was drawn up, with the subjects divided into 
their appropriate compartments. Senior officers and civil 
servants sat at a series of tables, not unlike a village whist 
drive, where they discussed how these onerous undertakings 
could be carried out and the effect upon our own position. 
From time to time, as when the Master of Ceremonies declares 
a change of trumps, they were seen to move from one table to 
another. These conflabations lasted for several days, or 
rather nights ... 
1 
In this way questions left outstanding at the Moscow conference 
were quickly settled. 
2 
Thereafter Beaverbrook maintained the 
momentum of supply by keeping a relentless watch on the Service 
departments and referring any issue in dispute to Churchill, on 
whom he could rely for support. 
3 
Why Beaverbrook did this with such conviction is difficult to 
say. Certainly he had reason enough, in being a signatory of the 
Moscow agreement and the chairman of the A. S. E., to insist on 
absolute priority for Russian supplies; and no doubt his friend 
of many years, Maisky, did his best to impress upon him the urgency 
of his task. But there was a passion in Beaverbrook's conviction 
which suggests other reasons. His recent biographer argues that 
he saw championing the Russian cause as a means of strengthening 
his claim to be leader of the Radical Left against the Labour lead- 
ers Cripps, Attlee and Bevin. 
4 
On the other hand, some suspected 
at the time that he was building up his position against Churchill 
himself. Pownall explained Beaverbrook's being 'quite'barmy over 
this aid to Russia business' by saying: 
"There is a rumour going round that what the Beaver is 
really at is Winston, whom he would like to replace. __ 
1 H. Macmillan, The Blast of War 1939-1945 (London, 1967), p. 136. 
2 Beaverbrook sent the Russians a list on 10 November showing a 
decision on all butýfour of the 70 items left outstanding"at the 
Moscow conference'(ASE(42)172, n. d., MT 59/551)- 
3 As usual Churchill was scornful of the armed forces' conservatism 
both about the size of their reserves and their ability to take- 
offensive action (D0(41) 70th mtg, min. 1,17 Nov. 1941. 
CAB 69/2). 
4 A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, p., 491. 
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He wants to beat him with the 'not enough aid to Russia' 
stick and is trying that weapon out first on the Chiefs 
of Staff. l 
Certainly Beaverbrook's complaints to the Defence Committee in 
October about the failure to take diversionary action do suggest 
that he was trying to claim all virtue in the Russian cause for 
himself. To quote from his memorandum of 20 October: 
He found himself in disagreement with his colleagues on the 
Russian issue. He wished to take advantage of the rising 
temper in the country for helping Russia. Others didn't. 
He wanted to make a supreme effort to raise production so 
as to help Russia. Others didn't. He wanted to fulfil in 
every particular the agreement made in Moscow. Others didn't. 
He wished the Army to act in support of Russia. The Chiefs 
of Staff didn't. The cleavage between himself and his coll- 
eagues and the Chiefs of Staff was complete. 2 
Similarly Beaverbrook's statements at the time of his resignation 
from the government in February 1942 distorted the role of others 
to his own advantage. He declared that his resignation was promp- 
ted 'over all' by the Russian issue - not simply the Cabinet's 
reluctance to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states 
into the Soviet Union, but the Service departments' obstruction. 
After the Protocol had been agreed and I had returned to 
England, my insistence on supplies going forward tried the 
Army Chiefs and also the Chief of Air Staff to such an 
extent that both the War Office and the Air Ministry asked 
for revision of its terms. Ill-feeling was aroused and 
disputes occurred ... The Service Ministries had all 
failed in their deliveries of supplies to Russia under the 
Moscow Protocol. And when challenged by me on this failure 
the Chief of Air Staff opposed the performance of the 
agreement. 3 
There is, however, no reason to conclude from these statements 
that Beaverbrook was using the Russian issue against the Prime 
Minister. His motives were possibly bett described by Cadogan, 
who thought that Beaverbrook's attack on the Defence Committee in 
October was nothing more than an attempt to 'put a certain amount 
of wind up Winston' in an effort to get his support against the 
Air Ministry and the War Office. 
4 
1 Bond (ed. ), Chief of Staff, p. 48. 
2 DO(41) 67th mtg, min. 2,20 Oct. 1941, CAB 69/8. 
3 BB papers, box 20/7, Russia, 28 Feb. 1942. As Taylor has 
pointed out, the original of this statement was stronger in 
its attack, particularly on Margesson, Minister for War 
(Beaverbrook, p. 493)- 
4 Op. cit. p. 409. 
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Whatever did inspire Beaverbrook's outbursts, he provided the 
impetus without which Britain could have fallen into arrears as 
badly as the Americans did. His contribution was widely acknow- 
ledged. Maisky for one was dismayed when he resigned. The ambass- 
ador had little respect for Britain's military leaders 
1and 
put the 
Minister for War, Margesson, in that most odious of Soviet categ- 
ories, Chamberlainites - that is, men more concerned with contain- 
ing Soviet power in Europe than with co-operating with Moscow to 
defeat Germany. 
2 
Though Margesson left the government at the same 
time as Beaverbrook, Maisky told W. P. Crozier, editor of the 
Manchester Guardian, that he feared the flow of supplies to the 
Soviet Union would diminish. 
3 
He confided the same fears to the 
Foreign Secretary, who proved a sympathetic audience: Eden wrote 
to Beaverbrook on 25 February 1942, 
Maisky knows that you alone have chased, hunted, insisted, 
until the stuff has been collected and dispatched. Maisky 
is right, and I view the future dispatch of supplies to 
Russia with anxiety. And that puts it mildly. 4 
In fact the Foreign Secretary was moved to warn the Northern 
department of the Foreign Office that 
Now that Lord Beaverbrook has gone Service Departments will 
do all they can to hold up help to Russia. It is department's 
task in interest of our war effort to be constantly on the 
wake to counter this and not to pander to the follies of Ser- 
vice Departments. 
5 
Even the public shared some of this anxiety. Ministry of Infor- 
mation reports showed that since the Minister of Aircraft Produc- 
tion, Colonel Moore-Brabazon, had reportedly stated in September 
1941 that it was in Britain's interests for Germany and the Soviet 
Union to destroy each other, 
6there 
had been widespread questioning 
of the enthusiasm in government circles for helping the Russians.? 
Beaverbrook's resignation brought a fresh rash of rumours; among 
these, the writer George Orwell recorded, was one claiming that 
'The Army insisted on Beaverbrook's removal because he was sending 
all the aeroplanes etc. to Russia instead of to Libya and the Far 
1 W. P. Crozier, Off the Record: Political Interviews, 1933-1943 
(London, 1973), p" 304" 
2 I. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador (London, 1967), p. 251- 
3 Crozier, p. 302- 
4 BB papers, BBK, C/17- 
5 Minute by Eden, 24 Feb. 1942, FO 371 32933 N994/178/38" 
6 See W. P. and Z. K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations 
(London, 1943) pp. 684-6. 
7 HIWR no. 58,3-10 Nov. 1941, INFO 1/292B. 
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East. '1 
Beaverbrook therefore was invaluable both as a symbol of the 
government's commitment to supply the Soviet Union and for the 
singlemindedness he brought to this task. Nonetheless, his 
achievement must not be allowed to distort and eclipse the effort 
made by the Service departments, for although they defended their 
interests as passionately as Beairerbrook did the Russians', they 
did not, as Beaverbrook implied, oppose the protocol. Their dis- 
putes with him were carried on within the framework of the commit- 
ment to the Russians and were simply interdepartmental jostling as 
to how best to adjust their limited resources, a conflict which at 
the time Beaverbrook recognized to be healthy. 
2 His retrospective 
accounts of Service department ! obstruction' are exaggerated, 
reflecting his intense dislike of air marshals, whom, as he told 
Harold Balfour, were 'like a red flag to a bull' to him. 
3 
His 
recollections were arguably more the result of his fury at the 
Chiefs' of Staff refusal to invade Norway in the autumn of 1941 as 
he wished, 
4than 
of any dispute over the protocol. He himself ad- 
mitted that his reactions were often irrational, those of 'a vic- 
tim of the Furies', 'a particularly dangerous wave that breaks 
viciously on the rocks' of New Brunswick, 'the rage'. 
5 Eden's 
and Maisky's testimonials aside, there is little objective evidence 
to support his claim that the Service departments obstructed the 
protocol. There is no record that Dill and Portal had reservations, 
and the War Office recorded on 8 October that it accepted even the 
increased commitment to the Russians for the following two months., 
The Director of Military Operations and Plans moreover assured 
Churchill that he thought Britain 'would get a better dividend out 
of keeping Russia in the war than we could by sending the equip- 
ment elsewhere'.? The Air Council for its part allotted to the 
Russians far greater quantities of ammunition than they thought 
reasonable for the equipment supplied, 
ßand 
Sinclair declared. to 
1 G. Orwell, The Collected Essays, Vol. 2, My Country Right or 
Left 1940-1943 (Penguin, 1970), p. 465. 
2 Interview of author with Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, Mar. 1974. 
3 Balfour's Moscow diary 1941, D. 8,23 Sept. 1941 (Beaverbrook 
library). 
4 For military opposition to this project see A. Bryant, The Turn 
of the Tide 1939-1943 (London, 1957), pp. 261-2. 
5 K. Young, Churchill and Beaverbook: A Study in Friendship and 
Politics (Great Britain, 1966), p. 214. 
6 Mtg of 8 Oct. 1941, WO 193/580. 
7 Kennedy, The Business of War, p. 167- 
8 Mtg of Air Council, 14 Oct. 1941, AIR 8/1000. 
94 
Beaverbrook at the height of the debate over the Airacobra8: 
Why should we have a disagreement over this? I agree with 
your policy of helping Russia to the utmost, I am resolved 
to give full and punctual effect to the Agreement you signed 
with the Russians at Moscow ... 
1 
Undoubtedly, though, the decisive testimony to the Service dep- 
artment's support for the Russians lies in what they achieved. For 
in these months, though flooded with new requests and conflicting 
priorities, 
2all 
asserted by the Russians through a confusing num- 
ber of channels, 
3they 
managed to supply munitions to schedule. 
Admittedly their backlog at the end of the year was 45 aircraft, 
35 tanks and 436 lorries4but this was not their fault. Lorries 
had been provided in the numbers required, but since they were low 
on the Russian list, they had not been given a high priority for 
shipping. 
5 In any case it was physically impossible to send them 
in the numbers demanded - 3000 by April 1942 - until the Russians 
agreed to accept them at least partially broken down, and this 
they did not do until January 1942.6 As for tanks, 200 were made 
available in December but they proved insufficient at the last 
moment when the Americans, who were to provide 50 in repayment of 
the 'loan' to them, 7defaulted on this late in the month. 
8 
By then 
there was not time enough to 'Russify' extra tanks in the United 
Kingdom, and tanks from Canada were delayed by the growing con- 
gestion in U. S. ports. Similar problems confounded the Air Mini- 
stry. Its calculations were disrupted by the Airacobras' failure, 
and when it retrieved Hurricanes earmarked for the Middle East, 
9 
it met a severe snowstorm which delayed the delivery of these 
aircraft to the ports. Not that this excuse impressed Beaverbrook 
at all: he told Balfour: 
1 Sinclair to Beaverbrook, 19 Oct. 1941, BB papers, Air Ministry 
D/173- 
2 Maisky gave Russian priorities as planes, tanks, anti-tank guns 
and rifles, aluminium, cobalt and rubber, in that order (ASE(41)2, 
29 Oct. 1941, CAB 92/1). Amtorg, the official Soviet trading 
organization in the United States, however, gave trucks a higher 
priority than all these (tel. BILGE 632,28 Oct. 1941, MT 63/237)- 
3 Beaverbrook to Maisky, 12 Feb. 1942, BT 28/144. 
4 BB papers, BBK/D82, file 24/D6,26 Jan. 1942. 
5 Lord Leathers (Minister of War Transport) to Beaverbrook, 30 
Jan. 1942, BB papers, loc. cit. 
6 WP(42) 417,17 Sept. 1942, CAB 66/28. 
7 ASE(41) 5th mtg, min. 6,9 Dec. 1941, CAB 92/1. 
8 ASE(42)8,6 Jan. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
9 Archibald Rowlands (Permanent Secretary, MAP) to Beaverbrook, 
MAP 379,12 Jan. 1942, BB papers, D/104. 
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If the Russians fight in the snow, surely we can move aero- 
planes in the snow. 
It would be a terrible confession if we had to write to 
Stalin and tell him that Harold Balfour, whose cheek he kiss- 
ed, is unable to provide the planes he promised because of 
snow. 1 
Nonetheless, whatever Beaverbrook might say, it was American fail- 
ures and the practical difficulties of delivering the munitions 
which caused the backlogs, not wilful obstruction on any individual's 
part. 
In fact the problems of delivering the munitions were emerging 
as the real obstacle to the fulfilment of the protocol. Many peo- 
ple had predicted that it would be so, and it had actually been 
suggested before the Moscow conference that these considerations, 
rather than the West's capacity to give, should determine the size 
of the offer. The director-general of programmes in the Ministry 
of Supply, Sir Walter Layton, had warned on 7 September: 
Russia was defeated in the last war through the breakdown of 
transport. The first task, before a programme of supply can 
be planned, is a searching report on the state of the Russian 
railways, the availability of rolling stock and the capacity 
of the key ports. 
The supply programme should be matched to these possibil- 
ities. 2 
Of course the protocol was not determined on these principles, 
given the Russians' secrecy on all domestic matters. After its 
signature, therefore, there remained the problems of ensuring that 
the ports of north Russia and the Persian Gulf could receive the 
munitions; ascertaining what shipping the Russians had available; 
liaising with the Americans; finding merchant shipping suitable 
for Arctic service; and providing naval escorts. All these prob- 
lems indeed had been more than obvious before the Moscow confer- 
ence, but it had been politically judicious to ignore them. 
From the start, for instance, it had been obvious that the 
Russians would be reluctant to agree to a common pool of shipping. 
This was demanded not only by Britain's general shortage of mer- 
chant shipping but by the lack of the Russian ships fitted with 
cranes to unload heavy machinery. If the British were to provide 
these types of ships, they expected the Russians to allow their 
ships to be used in the Atlantic. However, although the People's 
Commissar for Foreign Trade, A. Mikoyan, showed some interest in 
1 26 Jan. 1942, BB papers, BBK/D82, file 24/D6. 
2 BB papers, Sir Walter Layton file. 
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this late in June, 1Cripps soon reported that the Russians seemed 
to fear the British would use ships in a pool for their own pur- 
poses. 
2 
This attitude persisted even when the British asked for 
help in specific tasks like shipping the Hurricanes and Tomahawks 
promised in July and August. 
3 The Russians then produced the re- 
markably irrelevant suggestion that they should provide only the 
ships which were necessary to ship return cargoes, such as timber, 
from the Soviet Union to Britain. As Cripps pointed out to them 
this meant that convoys would be based on the quantity of Soviet 
supplies for Great Britain not vice versa. 'Carriage of supplies 
to the U. S. S. R. would become a secondary consideration. '4 Despite 
this the Russians remained unenthusiastic about pooling shipping 
and it was not until 18 November that an Anglo-Soviet shipping 
committee was finally instituted to co-ordinate the two countries' 
resources. 
5 
In the interim the British had to go ahead unilaterally prov- 
iding their own shipping to capitalize on the few months before 
the northern port of Archangel was closed by ice. 
6 
At the same 
time they undertook, as a goodwill gesture to dispel Russian sus- 
picions, to ship jute and lead from India and Burma to the Persian 
Gulf. 
7 
They could not, however, do the same for raw materials from 
the Far East since British vessels sailing to Vladivostock might 
well be provocative to the Japanese. This route, therefore, was 
declared the sole responsibility of Russian or neutral vessels, 
8 
and though the Russians discharged this responsibility in a 'gen- 
erally satisfactory' manner up until Pearl Harbor, 
9there 
were 
still reports late in September of 4,000 tons of lead and 1,375 
tons of tin waiting at Rangoon, Singapore and Penang for want of 
Russian ships. 
10 Similarly, though the Russians did provide 
1 Cripps to Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), no. 80 ARFAR, 
30 June 1941, FO 371 29566 N4074/3084/38- 
2 Cripps to MEW, no. 108 ARFAR, 6 July 1941, FO 371 29564. 
3 Cadogan-to Maisky, 2 Aug. 1941, FO 371 29568 N4319/3084/38. 
4 Sir S. Grippe, no. 229 ARFAR MOSSY, 7 Aug. 1941, FO 371 
29569 N4480/3084/38. 
5 Interview between Maisky and Col. J. J. Llewellin (Parl'y Sec'y, 
MINT), 18 Nov. 1941, FO 371 29581 N6757/3084/38. The committee 
actually met for the first time on 4 December. 
6 MEW to His Majesty's Representative (HMR) Moscow, no. 407 ARFAR 
MOSSY, 17 Sept. 1941, FO 371 29576, N5525/3084/38" 
7 MEW to HMR Moscow, ARFAR 407 MOSSY, 17 Sept. 1941, ibid. 
8 SOS to Governor, Burma, 10 July 1941, FO 371 29566 N3852/3084/38. 
9 ASE(42)172, n. d, MT 59/551- 
10 MEW to HMR Moscow, ARFAR MOSSY 442,26 Sept. 1941, FO 371 29576 
N5629/3084/38. 
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ships to carry supplies from the American seaboard, their contri- 
bution was again inadequate. The British shipping representative 
in New York reported on 23 September: 
The whole question of supply tonnage for Russian shipments 
from America is becoming acute, Maritime Commission have 
asked Russians to declare what tonnage they have available 
but it is improbable that it would be sufficiency. If 
Maritime Commission has to find Tonnage elsewhere it will 
undoubtedly come from Tonnage intended for North Atlantic. 1 
By the time of the Moscow conference therefore, the problems 
infierent in increasing the volume of supplies for the Soviet Union 
were clear. Nonetheless a commitment was undertaken which involved 
on Russian calculations an average total import of 500,000 tons a 
month. 
2 The Russians promised that they would help by providing 
some shipping to serve in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, 
3but 
the tonnage they offered was only a small proportion of the 1.5 
million tons the British considered necessary. 
4 
They and the 
Americans made it clear that, though they would assist the Russians, 
they had no responsibility to deliver the supplies; their obliga- 
tion was simply to make supplies 'available at the centres of pro- 
duction'. 5 Predictably, though, this proviso was not invoked in 
the coming months, though members of the mission to Moscow had 
thought it a genuine safeguard of their interests. 
6 
Instead Pres- 
ident Roosevelt instructed the War Department that shipments to 
the Soviet Union in October must have precedence over all other 
shipments of defence material? and the British found their import 
programme suffering from the diversion of both their own and Ameri- 
can shipping to the Russians. 
8 
Within two months in fact Maisky 
was claiming that it was the West's obligation to provide shipping 
and that to interpret the Moscow agreement in any other way was 
excessively legalistic. 
9 
For the British this naturally posed considerable problems. 
1 Sparks N. Y. to Shpmdr London, 1033 AMAST 751,23 Sept. 1941, 
FO 371 29577 N5699/3084/38. 
2 BAR(Týl, 1 Oct. 1941, CAB 99/7- 
3 British Supply Mission, Moscow (Lord BB) to F0, no. 42 LINEN, 
3 Oct. 1941, FO 371 29577 N5861/3084/38. 
4 Gwyer, p. 160. 
5 Minute E. P. Donaldson (A. S. E. secretariat) to BB, 1 Dec. 1941, 
FO 371 29583 N7299/3084/38; Gwyer, p. 160. 
6 Britlistaff, Moscow to CAS, AIR 1077,3 Oct. 1941, AIR 8/1000. 
7 Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 73- 
8 Minutes of 52nd mtg of British Supply Council in North America, 
NAS(41)90,3 Dec. 1941, CAB 92/30. 
9 Minute Donaldson to BB, 1 Dec. 1941, loc. cit. 
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Although their shipping losses unexpectedly declined in the last 
quarter of 1941,1 the provision of the right type of shipping and 
escorts for convoys to north Russia remained problematical. Even 
when the Americans began in September 1941, under the Western Hemi- 
sphere plan no. 4, to provide escorts for Atlantic convoys, the 
Home Fleet was stretched to the utmost by the convoys it was then 
running to north Russia. 
2 Its problems were intensified when the 
Russians requested at Moscow that 270,000 tons a month3 - including 
all war materials, most raw materials and half the promised food - 
be shipped to Archangel. 
4 
This obliged the Admiralty to shorten 
the northern convoy cycle from forty to ten days and reduce the 
Home Fleet's defences against a breakout by the German fleet into 
the Atlantic. Not until December, when the Arctic weather had 
deteriorated and the perpetual night descended, did the Admiralty 
agree to allow vessels to proceed east of Bear Island unescorted. 
5 
Taxing as these problems of naval escort were, though, they 
were overshadowed in these first months of the Moscow protocol by 
the problems of merchant shipping. The British were inexperienced 
in the Arctic, and though they provided an average of only seven 
merchant ships a month in the last five months of 1941 and about 
six a month in 1942, extensive adjustment of both their methods 
and equipment was required. Hulls had to be reinforced to with- 
stand the pressure of ice, propellers had to be made of bronze or 
cast iron to prevent their snapping or buckling in the cold, and 
ships had to be specially heated. 
6 
Ballast had to be provided 
for the return journey to keep ship propellers below the level of 
the ice, for although the Russians undertook to supply return 
cargoes, they could never provide them on a scale to ensure all 
ships were adequately ballasted.? New techniques of stowage had 
to be adopted. The first cargoes of tanks and aircraft arrived 
in north Russia damaged - and the Russians, as has been seen, were 
quick to make political capital of this. The British had not real- 
ized that even after draining of the engine block, the Matilda tank 
1 Gwyer, pp. 12-15- 
2 Letter Pound to Admiral Andrew Cunningham (C-in-C Mediterranean 
Fleet), 3 Sept. 1941, ADD MSS 52561, British Museum. 
3 Leighton and Coakley, p. 114. 
4 Tel from Lord Beaverbrook, no. 42 LINEN, loc. cit. 
5 Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. 1, pp. 492,495- 
6 Behrens, Merchant Shipping, pp. 254-5-- 
7 FO to Moscow, ARFAR no. 45 MOSSY, 27 Sept. 1941, FO 371 
N5405/3084/38; Interview Maisky-Llewellin, 18 Nov. 1941, loc. 
cit; ASE(42)41,7 Feb. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
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retained a little water which, if not treated with anti-freeze 
liquid, could crack the engine case. 
1 Aircraft carried on deck 
were damaged by the heavy seas or ruined by ice. 
2 Deck stowage 
had to be abandoned3but the normal British packing case, made of 
plywood in an effort to save timber, was too fragile to survive a 
journey in the hold. 
4 
Markings on cases were not distinct enough, 
nor accompanying instructions precise enough, for Russians unfam- 
iliar with the equipment. 
5 Some of these problems were easily 
eradicated, the results simply of excessive speed in packing and 
unfamiliarity with Arctic conditions. 
6 
There remained, however L the more serious problems of the primi- 
tive state of Archangel's berthing facilities and the freezing of 
that port from December to May. Here Russian sensitivity and 
honour intervened to complicate the issue. Maisky always insisted 
that Archangel would be able to cope with any quantity of equipment 
the British could ship. The Ministry of War Transport on the other 
hand, knowing that in the past Archangel had been mainly a timber 
port 
? had severe reservations about this. It wished every ship 
sailing to the port to have its own crane capable of lifting the 
heaviest of its cargo. This rendered five of the six Russian ships 
provided for the northern run unsuitable, 
8and 
since horrific reports 
of delay were being reported from Archangel, the Ministry of War 
Transport feared the consequences of sending their own ships in 
unlimited numbers. It was, for instance 
taking six weeks to discharge from an American ship a single 
piece of machinery weighing sixty-eight tons - for the only 
way of getting it out was to raise it alternatively at either 
end by means of a thirty-five-ton crane while sixty truck- 
loads of timber were jammed beneath it. 
The Ministry of War Transport's other fear was that the Russians 
would prove unable to move all the shipping once the port of Arch- 
angel froze over. The Russians insisted at the Moscow conference 
that they would be able to discharge eighteen ships simultaneously 
before the harbour froze around 15 December and twelve ships 
1 Draft telegram, ASE to Cripps, Kuibyshev, BB papers, box 19/10. 
2 Letter Llewellin to BB, 10 Nov. 1941, BB papers, BBK D/170- 
3 ASE to Kuibyshev, no. 95 MOSSY, 26 Nov. 1941, FO 371 29580 
N6207/3084/38. 
4 AM to Rowan, 19 Feb. 1942, PREM 3 401/4. 
5 30 MM to AM, AIR 1563,13 Nov. 1941, AIR 8/1000. 
6 So an enquiry set up by Churchill and Beaverbrook to investigate 
the damage reported by Stalin concluded. 31 Jan. 1942, PREM 3 401/4. 
7 CAS(41)34th mtg, min. 2,2 Oct. 1941, FO 371 29577 N5835/3084/38- 
8 Mtg between Kharmalov and Llewellin, early Nov. 1941, F0 371 295F' 
N6519/3084/38. 
9 Behrens, p. 254. 
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simultaneously after that date. 
1 Later in October Maisky went fur- 
ther and claimed there would be ten icebreakers available and that 
the capacity of Archangel would be fifty ships a month. The Bri- 
tish, however, knew of only three icebreakers and thought the capa- 
city of the port when these were operating was more likely to be 
six to twelve ships a month. 
2 
The Ministry of War Transport's rep- 
resentative in Archangel in fact reported that the port would be 
able to receive only two-thirds after December and one-third in the 
New Year of the ships needed to cover the military programme. 
3 
For 
even if Maisky's estimate of icebreakers proved correct, then the 
berths and the lack of skilled labour would become the bottleneck. + 
The Americans were reluctant to question the Russians' estimates, 
5 
but the Ministry of War Transport urged the Russians to allow some 
ships to be diverted to Murmansk. This port was ice-free, had a 
maximum capacity of sixteen ships a month6and cut five days off the 
return journey from Britain.? The Russians were loath to use it, 
however, since Murmansk was vulnerable to attack from German aero- 
planes in northern Norway and was connected to southern Russia by 
a single railway, threatened by the fighting on the Finnish front. 
They gave their agreement 'in principle' to using it early in Nov- 
ember but, as many Allied representatives in Moscow were to learn 
to their frustration, this was an elusive concession. Some three 
weeks later the only floating 35-ton crane the Russians had capable 
of hoisting 26-ton Matildas was sent to Archangel, 
9 
and traffic 
continued to move to this port. By this time there were only two 
icebreakers operating there, the Lenin and the Stalin, and one of 
these was under repair. 'Can one imagine a more unsuitable time 
for refitting? ' the S. B. N. O. in Archangel moaned. 
10 Another ice- 
breaker, the Montcalm, which had been ordered earlier from Canada 
was still there being reconditioned at this time. 
11In 
consequence 
1 BAR(T)1, CAB 99/7- 
2 ASE(41)lst mtg, min. 5,29 Oct. 1941, CAB 92/1. 
3 FO to Kuibyshev, no. 11 MOSSY, FO 371 29580 N6207/3084/38. 
4 ASE to Kuibyshev, 1 Nov. 1941, ibid.; J. P. Maclay to MWT, 
Telegram, 18,4 Nov. 1941, ADM 1/11022. 
5 Sparks N. Y. to Shpmdr, London, BILGE 638 MOSSY, 3 Nov. 1941, 
MT 63/237- 
6 ASE(41)33,8 Dec. 1941, FO 371 29583 N7178/3084/38. 
7 Private letter of Senior British Naval Officer (SBNO), Murmansk, 
to Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), 14 Oct. 1941, FO 371 
29581 N6520/3084/38. 
8 ASE to Kuibyshev, no. 45 MOSSY, 6 Nov. 1941, FO 371 29581 N6520/ 
3084/38- 
9 Letter SBNO, N. Russia, to DNI, 26 Nov. 1941, FO 371 29583 N7728/ 
3084/38. 
10 Letter from SBNO, N6 Russia, 12 Dec. 1941, FO 371 29583 N7436/3084/38 
11 Donaldson to Beaverbrook, 18 Feb. 1942, BB papers, box 19/11. , 
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all ships of convoys PQ 3 and PQ'-4 were ready in the third week of 
December to leave Archangel for the United Kingdom but could not 
because the Lenin was preoccupied with bringing in the inward PQ 501 
This it could do only one ship at a time because the ice closing in 
behind that ship crushed any other ship following it. 
2 
On 18 Dec- 
ember Cripps finally got Mikoyan to agree to the immediate diversion 
of three or four ships to Murmansk, 
3and 
convoys arriving early in 
January all went to that port. Russian agreement came too late, 
however, to prevent nine ships, six of them their own, from being 
frozen in at Archangel. 
4 
This experience brought home to the British the need for other 
reliable routes by which to deliver supplies to the Soviet Union. 
All alternative routes, however, seemed as problematical as the 
northern one. Vladivostock, which the Russians estimated could 
receive some 220,000 tons a month, 
5was dependent on Japanese conn- 
ivance and could not, for that reason, be used for military supp- 
lies. Flying aircraft across Africa involved lengthy tropicali- 
zation and reconversion of the planes, and in any case crowded a" 
route on which the Middle East depended. 
6 
The Russians were sus- 
picious of any plan to fly aircraft from Alaska to Siberia: Harri- 
man, who suggested it to Stalin in September, thought this was be- 
cause of the fear of provoking the Japanese, 
7and in fact it was not 
until October 1942 that the Americans succeeded in operating this 
route. In 1941 meanwhile, the only alternative which offered any 
real prospects of supplying the Soviet Union was the route through 
Iran, and it was to this that the Americans decided late in Novem- 
ber to divert all their aircraft. 
8 
Persian Gulf communications, however, were so primitive at this 
time that they made the hazards of the northern route seem mere 
inconvenience. In the words of the historian of the Persia and 
Iraq Command, the country possessed 
1 Letter from SBNO, 12 Dec. 1941, loc. cit. 
2 Letter SBNO, Murmansk, to DNI, 14 Oct. 1941, F0 371 29581, N6520/ 
3084/38. 
3 Sir S. Cripps, no. 19,20 Dec. 1941, FO 371 29583 N7339/3084/38" 
4 Summary of position of ships at or en route to Russian ports, 
22 Jan. 1942, BB papers, BBK D/170- 
5 Gwyer, p. 160. 
6 Conversation of Balfour and Harriman, 5 Feb. 1942, BB papers, 
box 19/11. 
7 Supplement to memorandum by Harriman on mtg with Stalin, BB 
papers, box 20/6, Russia. 
8 Air Ministry to 30 Military Mission, X. 877,20 Nov. 1941, FO 371 
29581 N6722/3084/38. 
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nearly all the obstacles which Nature devises against travel: 
deserts with no water and no landmarks, deserts with soft and 
treacherous sands, malarious bogs; not one range but series 
of ranges of high, precipitous mountains, often piled with 
snow or drenched from the snow thawing, the home of bears and 
eagles; sandstorms, rainstorms, blizzards of snow and hail; 
the highest and lowest temperatures man can survive. 1 
In keeping with this, the port, road and rail fa 
primitive. There was only one port of any size, 
was in Iraq, on the wrong side of the confluence 
Euphrates, and connected to Iran by a circuitous 
inland from Khorramshahr and Bushire, themselves 
cilities were all 
Basra, and this 





were rudimentary3and the supply of lorries to utilize them woefully 
inadequate. The Persian railway, connecting the capital, Teheran, 
with the coast, had a capacity of only two hundred tons 
4or 
two 
trains, a day, one of which was needed to maintain civilian imports. 
5 
Its northern terminus was 300 miles short of Tabriz where the rail- 
way from the Caucasus terminated. 
6 
Its gradients were steep,? its 
supply of powerful diesel engines non-existent8and its capacity for 
steam engines limited by the scarcity of water on the route. 
9 
This 
was the route which the Allies estimated could eventually carry 
60,000 tons of thEir supplies a month, 
10and for which the A. S. E., 
confronted with a new, threat to the Vladivostock route after Pearl 
Harbor, set an even more optimistic target of 100,000 tons a month 
by the spring of 1942.11 
Thanks to their intervention in Iran in August and September, 
1 Paiforce. Official Story of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941- 
1946 (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 75- 
2 E. R. Stettinius, Jnr, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York, 
1944), p. 214. 
3 T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia: U. S. 
Army in World War II: The Middle East Theater (Washington, 1952), P-33- 
4 Ibid., p. 331- 
5 Mtg of sub-committee on communications, CAS, 29 Aug. 1941, MISC 
(41)1/6, CAB 78/1. 
6 Manchester Guardian, 31 Oct. 1941. 
7 Hankey report on Middle East railway projects, 2 Sept. 1941, BB 
papers, box 19/1. 
8 Paiforce, p. 103- 
9 Ibid., p. 100. 
10 Gwyer, p. 161. 
11 ÄSE(41)5th mtg, wins. 3 and 4,9 Dec. 1941, FO 371 29583 N7141/3084/ 
38. This was the objective for protocol supplies only. A further 
25,000 tons a month was to be added to this for civil requirements 
and a further unstated tonnage for military forces. The overall 
target for 1 April 1942 was 200,000 tons via Persia and Iraq. 
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the British and Russians had the right to control these communi- 
cations. The development of them in fact soon took over from 
eliminating German influence as their main motive for invading 
the country. 
1 In Spptember the British set about increasing the 
capacity of Basra2and other ports. 
3 
They assisted the Iranian 
government in improving the roads and they collected, under the 
auspices of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, a fleet of 
lorries capable of carrying several thousands of tons of supplies 
. 
They opened a route from Meshed in north-eastern Iran to Nokkundi 
in India, despite the reservations of the Indian government about 
the strategic implications for the future of opening its northern 
frontier. 5 This route was intended to carry only 2,000 tons a 
month. of supplies from the Far East, but by November the British 
were considering using it to carry lorries assembled in Karachi.? 
They enlisted the help of the Americans, who extended Lend-Lease 
to the British in the Middle East on 13 Septemberband agreed at 
the London discussions that month to provide lorries, personnel 
and equipment to help develop the routes, other than the Nokkundi 
- Meshed one, to a capacity of 2,000 tons a day. 
9 
The complexity of the problems in the Persian Gulf area, however, 
ensured that for all this activity the capacity of the routes did 
not rise quickly. Skilled labour was scarce and the tools of the 
native labour force primitive. Mobility in many cases meant a don- 
key and tribal raiders operated unchecked in many districts. There 
were continual clashes of priority between British military inter- 
ests and civilian needs on the one hand and Russian supplies on the 
other. The British army in Persia and Iraq consumed much of the 
capacity of Basra10and its plans for intervening in the Caucasus 
threatened to devour even more. The War Office, which was respon- 
ll 
sible for improving communications in the area, was preoccupied 
1 See Woodward, II9 pp. 23-7. The way in which British motivation 
changed is clear in Churchill's statement to the Defence Committee 
on 20 August: 'Delay in the expulsion of the Germans from Persia 
would be dangerous, and it was essential we should have one clear 
channel by which we could send supplies to Russia. ' (D0(41)59th 
mtg, min. 1, CAB 69/2). 
2 Motter, pp. 32-3- 
3 Paiforce, p. 82. 
4 CAS(41)33rd mtg, 23 Sept% 1941, F0 371 29576 N5574/3084/38" 
5 COS(41)388th mtg, min. 5,14 Nov. 1941, CAB 79/15- 
6 cos(41)296th mtg, min. 4,25 Aug. 1941, CAB 79/13. 
7 ASE(41)9,11 Nov. 1941, CAB 92/1. 
8 Motter, p. 31- 
9 CAS(41)208,21 Sept. 1941, FO 371 29576 N5574/3084/38. 
10 Motter, pp. 33-4. 
31 WP(G)(41)111,15 Oct. 1941, F0 371 29583 N7486/3084/38. 
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with developing other facilities in Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and 
Jordan. 1 The Iranian population resented the preference given to 
Russian supplies and 'intense anti-British feeling in places where 
bread and sugar are almost unobtainable' was reported by the ambas- 
sador in Teheran in December. 
2 
The plethora of agencies created by 
the British and Americans created further problems. By the end of 
January 1942 there were two American missions in Iran and inevitably 
jurisdictional disputes arose with the British 10th Army, to whom 
they were subordinate, and the U. K. C. C. The practice of leasing 
contracts for developing communications to civilian agencies fur- 
ther increased the likelihood of duplication of functions. 
' 
Most significant in the failure of the Persian Gulf route to 
develop quickly, however, was the delay in the arrival of essential 
equipment, particularly from the United States. By the end of Nov- 
ember the shortage of shipping and the congestion in America's east- 
ern ports was such that they were in arrears even with their ship- 
ments of protocol munitions-of the 242 aircraft delivered to the 
ports, for instance, only 63 had been sent; of 181 tanks, only 98; 
and of 8,859 lorries only 2,261 were on their way to the Soviet 
Union. 
4 
What is more, to ship even these small totals the Ameri- 
cans had had to call on the British for shipping. 
5 
Not surpris- 
ingly, therefore, the shipment of lorries and locomotives to the 
Persian Gulf was neglected and for many months this limited the 
capacity of the routes to the north. As the War Office pointed 
out in the following spring when the port capacity was 97,000 tons 
a month but the road. and rail capacity only 62,000 tons: 
the expansion of transportation facilities through Persia is 
in the main limited, not so much by the rate of construction 
or repair of the roads and railways, as by the rate of deli- 
very of lorries and rolling stock from America. 6 
By the end of 1941, therefore, the Persian Gulf route was far 
from being able to bear a major part of the delivery of supplies 
to the Soviet Union. In fact it took only 3.7 per cent of the 
1 C0S(41)535,3 Sept. 1941, CAB 80/30. 
2 Teheran'to F0, no. 1337,24 Dec. 1941, ASE(41)46, CAB 92/1. 
3 Motter, Pp. 31,43,185. 
4 FRUS, 1941, I, pp. 862-3; BB papers, box 19/11, table A, 27 Nov. 
1941. These figures, submitted to Beaverbrook, may not-be " 
strictly accurate, as the A. S. E. received no comprehensive report 
on shipments from the United States until well into 1942. But 
they certainly reflect the dire situation which later statistics 
confirmed (see ASE(42)13,28, CAB 9213)- 
5 Minute Donaldson to BB, BB papers, box 19/11. 
6 ASE(42)114,26 April 19+2, CAB <92/4. 
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total shipped from the Western Hemisphere in 1941,1and its prog- 
ress was limited even further when the Russians asked in December 
for other routes to be favoured in preference to it. They reques- 
ted that the Persian route should carry only 2,000 trucks and 100 
aircraft a month as well as raw materials from India, and that all 
these should pass through the western route rather than the remote 
Nokkundi and Meshed. 
2 
They retracted this decision in February 
19423but by this time shipments had been reduced and future devel- 
opment disrupted. 
4 
The British and Americans therefore were for- 
ced into greater reliance on the Arctic route at a time when its 
technical problems and dangers could only increase with the approach 
of summer. 
At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, therefore, the Moscow 
protocol was emerging as a drain on shipping and naval resources 
rather than on munitions and raw materials. This was a pattern 
which was to continue and intensify in the early months of 1942. 
Although the problems of allocating munitions to the Russians did 
not diminish - indeed with the Japanese attack they became more 
acute than ever - these did not undermine the protocol. The Bri- 
tish government's will to meet its commitments remained as strong 
as ever. The rock on which the protocol did founder was that of 
delivering the munitions; for although the British were willing to 
make great sacrifices on the Russians' behalf, there was one thing 
in which their priority was absolute. This was their naval secur- 
ity and this'in the middle of 1942 the protocol came to challenge. 
1 Motter, Appendix A, Table 1. 
2 C-in-C India to WO, VVY/802/Q, rec. 15 Jan. 1942, AIR 20/3910; 
Motter, p. 142. 
3 Kuibyshev to ASE, no. 112 MOSSY, 18 Feb. 1942, MT 59/79- 
4 Sparks N. Y. to Shpmdr, London, 14310 AMAST 1397 MOSSY, 23 Jan. 
1942, MT 63/237. 
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During the latter half of 1941 Britain's policy towards the 
Soviet Union had been remarkable for the subjection of her own 
immediate military aims to the long-term rewards of supporting 
the Red Army. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor it became 
even more notable in this respect, for despite the rapid worsening 
of Britain's position, the Moscow protocol remained almost unchan- 
ged. Admittedly Pearl Harbor was not all loss for the British - 
assuming the Americans first concentrated on defeating Germany, 
their entry into the war made victory in Europe certain. But in 
the immediate sense Britain was further weakened and extended with 
the Japanese attack. Thanks to the starving of the Far East in 
favour of the Middle East, British forces faced humiliating defeat 
at the hands of the Japanese unless they were rapidly reinforced. 
In these circumstances some military circles argued that the basis 
of the commitment to the Soviet Union had been invalidated. Now 
" that Britain was retreating and the Red Army actually advancing, 
there was little logic in continuing unchecked the flow of supplies. 
Churchill and his immediate colleagues did not agree. Following the 
pattern of the past three months the Prime Minister ignored military 
reservations and ordered that the protocol be fulfilled in its ori- 
ginal form. Roosevelt did likeiise in the United States and tog- 
ether he and Churchill established the principle that nothing other 
than a dire threat to the Allies' vital interests could justify mod- 
ification of the protocol. Not until July 1942 were the problems 
of delivering the munitions deemed to pose this threat and so in the 
first six months of the year, as the British retreated in Malaya, 
Burma and the Middle East and as the Americans abandoned the Phili- 
ppines, the commitment to the Soviet Union remained unchanged. 
For the British, maintaining this commitment in December 1941 
involved making a courageous, if almost inevitable, decision. For 
while it was unthinkable to withdraw support for the Russians, given 
their central place in strategy for 1942, the British could not be 
sure of American support. Until Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff 
went to Washington late in December, they did not know what the 
Americans' strategic priorities would be; nor could they predict 
with any accuracy the implications of the Far Eastern war for their 
own supply position. Their only certainty was that the U. S. armed 
forces would demand for themselves some Lend-Lease munitions -` 
107 
freeze on Defence Aid shipments immediately after the Japanese 
attack showed this clearly, even though it was temporary. 
1 None- 
theless, before the British delegation left for Washington, the 
Soviet embassy had been assured that shipments to the Soviet Union 
would go ahead as planned in December. What is more the Russians 
were promised increased quantities of ammunition for tanks, air- 
craft and Besa guns, even though this was in very short supply. 
2 
The Chiefs' of Staff attitude, as they stated in their review of 
strategy prepared on the Atlantic voyage, was that it was 
essential to afford the Russians such assistance as will 
enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow 
and the oilfields of the Caucasus. 3 - 
Churchill agreed, arguing: 
Hitler's failure and losses in Russia are the prime fact in 
the war at this time. ... Neither Great Britain nor the 
United States have any part to play in this event, except 
to make sure that we send, without fail and punctually, the 
supplies we have promised. In this way alone shall we hold 
our influence over Stalin and be able to weave the mighty 
Russian effort into the general texture of the war. 
4 
As they had in the previous SeptemberýChurchill and his advisers 
assumed that the Americans would agree with them and that the cost 
to Britain of their decision would soon be repaid by enormously 
increased American production. 
In fact these assumptions were largely vindicated by the sub- 
sequent meeting in Washington. President Roosevelt proved to be 
in favour of continuing aid to the Soviet Union since he accepted 
that the defeat of the major Axis power, Germany, was the Allies' 
first concern. 
5 
Be ignored the caution of Marshall and Stimson 
who felt that, though Soviet needs should be met to the 'maximum 
extent possible', the protocol should be revised in the light of 
'imperative' U. S. needs. 
6 
Instead the President assured the 
1 Lukas, Air Force Aspects ..., p. 114; Stettinius, Lend-Lease, 
p. 204. 
2 ASE to Kuibyshev, no. 9,13 Dec. 1941, FO 371 29582 N6989/3084/38. 
3 Gwyer, Grand Strategy, p. 346. 
4 Churchill, III, p. 574. 
5 For a description of the strategic discussions at the Arcadia 
conference see Gwyer, chs. XIV and XV. 
6 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, p. 552; Lukas, p. 115. 
Later Stimson said of himself: ' ... in Lend-Lease transactions 
he sometimes found himself the advocate of the Army's needs agai- 
nst those of the Russians; but this was the necessary result of 
his duty to equip the Army, and implied no disagreement whatever 
with the policy of aid to Russia. ' (Henry Stimson and McGeorge 
Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, New York, 1947, p. 526). 
l08 
Soviet ambassador on 8 December that aid to the Red Army would 
continue and deliveries of munitions were in fact resumed within 
ten days. 
l 
Further on 28 December Roosevelt ruled that 
the Soviet Aid Program as provided in the Protocol Agreement 
be reestablished beginning January 1. (Existing deficiencies 
must be made up not later than April 1. ) The whole Russian 
program is so vital to our interest that I know that only the 
gravest consideration will lead you to recommend withholding 
longer the munitions our Government has promised to the 
U. S. S. R. 2 
Any delays which might be inevitable in delivery, Roosevelt added, 
should be matched by increased shipments of other supplies. 
3 
This ruling, later events in the 'Arcadia' conference showed, 
meant that shipments to the Soviet Union were given preference over 
all commitments except the reinforcement of fighting fronts like the 
Middle East. Roosevelt would not consider the suggestion Marshall 
made on 12 January 1942 to reduce protocol shipments by 30 per cent 
over the next three months in order to send American troops to New 
Caledonia. Important though this operation was in view of Australia's 
inability to find troops, 
4he 
ordered Hopkins and Beaverbrook to 'find 
ships'5rather than default on the protocol. The number of ships 
required was only seven, and the maintenance of supplies to Russia, 
he said, was 'a moral obligation which could hardly be avoided'. 
6 
At the same time Roosevelt agreed with the British that his own 
country's production targets would have to be radically revised. 
For this much of-the credit must go to Beaverbrook who once again 
proved to be 'a power house with regard to what could be done and 
what had to be done'.? Realizing that Britain would have to suffer 
some temporary cutback in supplies from the United States, Beaver- 
brook nonetheless used the figures of Jean Monnet of the British 
Supply Mission in Washington to raise American sights for the fu- 
ture. He showed Roosevelt and Hopkins that the targets of the Off- 
ice of Production Management for 1942 and 1943 could be raised by 
50 per cent; as a result the plans the President announced to the 
Congress on 6 January were far in excess of any his administration 
had contemplated. Production for 1942 was set at 45,000 aircraft 
8 
1 Lukas, pp. 115-6. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 552- 
3 Lukas, pp. 116-7- 
4 7M 9th mtg (Arcadia), 12 Jan. 1942, CAB 99/17- 
5 Leighton and Coakley, p. 555- 
6 W'N 9th mtg. 
7 Vice-President Wallace, quoted in footnote to p. 136 of Foreign 
- _-t_A..! _... .. 
4' tL,.. TT.. 44- A C4--4- -. r'__F-.... --moo of IAFM-In4 rrnfnn lO l- 
1943 and uasaoianca iy4S . wasnington, vjoo). 
Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 342. 
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instead of 28,600; 45,000 tanks instead of 20,400; 20,000 anti- 
aircraft guns in place of 6,300; 14,900 anti-tank guns instead of 
7,000; and 8 million deadweight tons of merchant shipping against 
a previous estimate of 6 million tons. For 1943 the targets were 
even higher - 100,000 aircraft, 75,000 tanks, 35,000 anti-aircraft 
guns and 10 million tons of shipping. 
1 
These figures did much to 
justify Churchill's decision to continue supplying the Soviet 
Union. Admittedly they were more the result of political impulse 
than rational planning, but they offered the hope that Britain's 
needs could still be met from even a reduced proportion of Ameri- 
can production. 
This hope was strengthened by the American's agreement at the 
conference to treat the two countries' resources as a common pool 
to be distributed according to the strategic need. This meant in 
in the immediate sense that Britain was promised 10,382 aircraft 




also in the long-term, through the creation of the Munitions Ass- 
ignment Board (M. A. B. ), the Combined Raw Materials Board (C. R. M. B. ) 
and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (C. S. A. B. ), that Brit- 
ain's interests would be represented in Washington. Not all Amer- 
icans were happy with this: General 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell wrote 
of a meeting on 11 January: 
(Marshall, Stark, King, Turner, Holcomb, etc., etc., etc. ) 
All agreed on being disgusted with the British hogging all 
the material: quite willing to divide ours with us, but 
never any mention of putting theirs into the pot ... 3 
Indeed for the British the benefits of Anglo-American co-operation, 
as promised at'Arcadia', were incalculable. In contrast with them 
the commitment to the Soviet Union, though it involved consider- 
able sacrifices, did not seem excessive. 
The Service departments in London, however, were not so certain 
of this. Remote from the decision-making and sense of purpose in 
Washington, they succumbed to the bleak reality of disaster, as in 
almost every theatre of operations in December and January Britain's 
fortunes deteriorated rapidly. In the Far East the Japanese cap- 
tured Hong Kong, entered Kuala Lumpur and invaded Wake Island, Bor- 
neo and the Celebes. In the Atlantic shipping losses soared as 
German U-boats capitalized on American inexperience in the waters 
1 Sherwood, The White House papers ..., pp. 486-7- 
2 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces ..., p. 
406. 
3 T. H. White (ed. ), The Stilwell Papers (London, 1948), p. 48. 
Brackets and emphasis in the original. 
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of their eastern seaboard. 
1 
In the Mediterranean the Queen Eliza- 
beth and the Valiant were damaged and the Barnham sunk, reducing 
the fleet there to three cruisers and a handful of destroyers. 
2 
In Cyrenaica Rommel recaptured the airfields of the Benghazi-Derna 
bulge from an over-extended 8th Army and nullified much of what 
Auchinleck had achieved. Everywhere in Great Britain there was 
disquiet and dismay at these reverses. In the public sphere this 
expressed itself in the demand for Churchill to relinquish his 
position as Minister of Defence and to establish a Ministry of 
Production. In the Service departments it directed itself against 
the commitment to the Russians. 
The reasons for this are obvious. The Moscow protocol was the 
most easily defined of Britain's commitments and the most illog- 
ical militarily, given the radical changes in the strategic sit- 
uation. The Red Army's position was much improved with its recent 
successes in the winter, while Britain's was much worse. In air- 
craft alone the position had been revolutionized by the Japanese 
entry into the war and by Hitler's decision in December to estab- 
lish a new command in southern Italy under Field-Marshal Kessel- 
ring and to almost double the number of aircraft there. 
3 
Accord- 
ing to Air Ministry estimates in early January 1942 the Soviet Air 
Force of 3,400 aircraft now faced only 1,500 German'planes, while 
in the Far East the British and Dutch air forces were outnumbered 
nine to one. On the Western front and in the Mediterranean mean- 
while they had only 3,800 aircraft against a combined Axis force 
of 3,100.4 As for tanks, on Stalin's own admission to Eden in 
December, production in the Soviet Union was larger than before 
the outbreak of war. Indeed, Stalin had said, 'In general the 
equipment situation did not cause any anxiety. '5 The protocol 
included an escape clause intended to apply to just this situation: 
In the event of the war situation changing (it stated) and the 
burden of defence being transferred to other theatres of war, 
it will be necessary for the three countries concerned to con- 
sult together, and to decide what adjustment of the present 
arrangement is necessary. 6 
1 S. E. Morison, The History of United States Naval Operations in 
World War II, vol. I (London, 1946), pp. 200-1. 
2 Gwyer, p. 244. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Draft telegram from SOS to Beaverbrook, c. 6 Jan. 1942, AIR 8/930.. 
5 WO report, Conversations at Moscow conference, F0 371 29472 N7452/ 
3/38. 
6 BAR(41)11A, 13 Oct. 1941, CAB 99/7" 
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To certain officials in the Air Ministry and War Office, it now 
seemed high time to bring this clause into effect. 
Obviously, though, in view of the consensus at 'Arcadia', their 
attempts to do this were futile. On 4 January instructions came 
from Churchill that shipments to the Soviet Union were to continue 
throughout January and that December's backlog must be despatched 
by the end of the month as well. 
1 Added to this were Beaverbrook's 
emphatic instructions: 
It is not possible to give an elastic interpretation to the 
terms of the pledge (to the Russians). We must not juggle 
with the terms of the agreement. We must carry it out. ' 
The Secretary of State for Air therefore eliminated from the tele- 
gram drafted for him by his department the suggestion that the pro- 
tocol be revised, and instead promised that his subordinates would 
do their best to meet the Russian commitment in January. 
3 
In fact 
this meant further shipments of Hurricanes and further deprivation 
of Fighter Command, since the Russians would not accept Mustangs 
and only thirty-five Airacobras were fit to send. 
4 
But the Air 
Ministry deferred its objections5for, as Portal cabled from Wash- 
ington, 'any proposal to cut the monthly allotments for Russia will 
not succeed in present atmosphere. '6 
The War Office met the same reaction when, under pressure from 
the Australian government, it tried to revise the protocol later 
in the month. Owing to the diversion of U. S. tanks to the Soviet 
Union and of aircraft to other theatres, the Australians faced the 
threat of invasion with forty-three aircraft - Hudsons, Catalinas 
and Wirraways! 
7- 
and 'practically no tanks' at all. 
8 
Their Prime 
Minister complained bitterly on 26 January at this and at Austr- 
alia's, exclusion from decision-making in the past: 
We understand that in past requirements for Australia were 
treated as of less importance than those for theatres of 
active operations and that priority was accorded to orders 
far more recent than our own resulting in diversion of tanks 
intended for Australia. ... We strongly contend that 
grave situation in the Pacific and improvement in Russian 
position affords grounds for a complete review of distribu- 
tion of allied pool of tanks. A distribution determined in 
one state of emergency should not be allowed to prevail when 
1 ASE(42)8,6 Jan. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
2 ASE(42j1, annex 1,4 Jan. 1942, CAB 92/3- 
3 SOS to BB, TAUT no. 406,7 Jan. 1942, AIR 8/930. See same file 
for proposed draft telegram. 
4 Freeman to Portal, 13 Jan. 1942, AIR 8/930- 
5 Mtg on Fighter resources in Air Ministry, 6 Jan. 1942, AIR 20/3096. 
6 Portal to Freeman, CAESAR ARCADIA 873,12 Jan. 1942, AIR 8/930- 
7 Australian PM to PM, JOHCU no. 22,27 Jan. 1942, PREM 3 15015- 
8 High Commissioner for Australia, Bruce, to Beaverbrook, 21 Jan. 
1942, PREM 3 150/4. 
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the situation has completely changed. 
1 
Rather than continue supplying the Russians with munitions, the 
Australians suggested that Britain recognize Soviet claims to 
their 1940 frontiers, as well as their right to an outlet to the 
Indian ocean through Iran and their territorial interest in areas 
of the Far East like north Korea. This was the way, the Austral- 
ians believed, to 'bargain frankly for immediate Russian support 
against Japan'. 
2 
The C. I. G. S., Brooke, supported the Australians, at least in 
their claims for armaments. As Commander-in-Chief of the Home 
Forces in 1941 he had opposed the continual drain in tanks imposed 
, 
by the protocol, 
3and 
on his colleagues' return from'Arcadia'in 
January 1942 suggested amendments to it. He presented a plan on 
30 January whereby Australia would receive 141 Matildas and India 
and New Zealand 70 and 72 Valentines respectively if the Soviet 
Union received 283 tanks less than the protocol stipulated over 
the next two months. 
The general strategical situation has changed entirely since 
the signature of the Russian Protocol, (Brooke argued) and 
urgent requirements of the Far East cannot be met from Bri- 
tish production. Nor can we expect additional allotments 
of tanks from American sources during the next three months. 
In my opinion the time has come when the Russians should be 
told frankly that we are unable to continue to supply the 
full number of tanks without running the gravest risks in 
other vital theatres of war. 4 
Predictably the Defence Committee did not agree. Churchill for 
one had no sympathy for Curtin who had ignored Australia's conn- 
ection with Britain by appealing to the United States for help in 
an article in the Melbourne Herald on 27 December. 
5 'Curtin is 
in a panic and does not speak for Australia', Churchill. declared, 
6 
and the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the danger to Australia was 
not imminent. They expected at the end of January that the Japan- 
ese would continue collecting islands rather than invade the cont- 
inent of Australia, 
7and if they did not, Australia's security 
1 DO(42)8,29 Jan. 1942 (telegram dated 26 Jan. ), PREM 3 150/4. 
2 Australia (Govt. ) to Defence Committee, no. 819,22 Dec. 1941, 
PREM 3 394/2. 
3 Memorandum on Home Defence, 31 Oct. 1941, WO 193/580. 
4 COS(42)55,26 Jan. 1942, WO 193/539- 
5 Gwyer, p. 367. 
6 Exchange on Russia between Eden and PM, n. d.,, BB papers, box 
19/3- 
7 COS to Joint Staff Mission (JSM), no. (W) 20,28 Jan. 1942, 
PREM 3 150/3" 
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rested with the Americans, who had declared at'Arcadia' that they 
would base 36,000 troops there. 
1 
Apart from this, on the political level Eden and Beaverbrook 
argued that it would be wrong to approach the Russians 'just when 
things were going so well'. 
2 It might tempt them, the Foreign 
Office feared, to make a peace with Hitler, particularly if the 
Red Army's winter offensive drove the Wehrmacht back to the 1940 
border. 3 Even though the Kremlin had signed the United Nations 
Declaration earlier in January, declaring that they would not make 
a separate peace, 
4the 
British had to set against this the failure 
at the same time of discussions for combined operations, this time 
against Petsamo. 
5 As well, Eden had failed to reach agreement 
with Stalin at his conference in Moscow on questions of post-war 
boundaries, 
6and 
the British were loath to make concessions on these 
as the Australians wished. American opposition to any modification 
of the Western position would be extreme, for as their ambassador 
had explained to Eden before he left for Moscow, they 
took the position that the test of our good faith with regard 
to the Soviet Union should not be our willingness to agree to 
the recognition of extended Soviet frontiers at this time, 
but rather the degree of determination which we show loyally 
to carry out our promises of aid to the Soviet Government with 
equipment and supplies. 7 
The protocol was therefore a gage of Allied goodwill again and 
Britain's allocation of tanks to the Russians in February and 
March remained at five hundred. In fact, even with this allocation 
it was found possible to maintain the Australian and the Middle 
East allocations at the levels Brooke proposed, but the Home Forces 
were further deprived, India given 88 fewer tanks than hoped and 
all three countries, India, Australia and New Zealand, promised 
only enough to meet 50 per cent of their requirements by the end 
of March. 
8 
What is more, while Russian aircraft allocations were 
also maintained, Australia received only half of the 250 fighters 
1 D. McCarthy, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, series 1, vol. 
V, p. 15- 
2 D0(42)5th mtg, 30 Jan. 1942, P REM 3 150/4. 
3 Cadogan minute, 7 Feb. 1942, FO 371 32905 N885/30/38- 
4 Woodward, II, pp. 210 ff. 
5 COS(42) 3rd mtg, min. 4,3 Jan. 1942, WO 106/3269. 
6 Woodward, pp. 220-36. 
7 C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II (London, 1948), 
p. 1168. 
8 D0(42)11 and annex, 31 Jan. 1942, CAB 69/4. 
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she requested from Britain1and was forced to rely on diversions 
of U. S. forces to the south. 
With this decision the priority of the Moscow protocol over all 
other demands for munitions was effectively assured for the remain- 
der of its life. No matter how pressing the claims of other thea- 
tres became, they were not allowed to be satisfied at the Russians# 
expense. The Chiefs of Staff wished late in February to borrow 
from Russia's March allocation 72 Hurricanes for the reinforcement 
of Burma, repaying the Russians over the next three months. 
2 
The 
Cabinet ruled: 'there must be no interference with supplies of 
Hurricanes to Russia. '3 The Commander-in-Chief, India, asked on 
28 April for twenty Bostons in Karachi en route to the Soviet 
Union to be diverted to the defence of India. 'Regret your prop- 
osal impracticable since it is inconceivable that British, US and 
Russian Governments would agree .. .' replied the Air Ministry. 
5 
The Secretary of State for Air despaired of finding the aircraft 
for protocol commitments in May and June. He recommended to the 
A. S. E. that the Russians be asked to accept smaller quotas, 
6but 
was ordered in answer to meet the Russian commitment in full 
F 
red- 
ucing further allotments of Hurricanes to Fighter and Bomber Comm- 
and. 
8 
Throughout these months the principle was established that 
the protocol must be maintained, and maintained it was, in many 
cases with gratuitous generosity. 
Aluminium shipments, for instance, were kept well ahead of sched- 
ule and the full nine months' commitment was shipped by the end of 
March. 9 An extra hundred tanks were promised from June and July 
production, 
10 
and Russian requests for a tank with a more effective 
gun than the two-pounder were met by shipments of the six-pounder 
Churchill from May onwards. 
11 Supplies of aircraft, after the short 
fall in the New Year, were punctually fulfilled, and on two occa- 
sions actually kept ahead of schedule. 
12 Hurricanes with cannon 
1 Australia (PM) to PM, JOHCU no. 21,24 Jan. 1942, PREM 3 150/3; 
DO to Australia (Govt), no. 138,31 Jan. 1942, PREM 3 150/5. 
2 C0S(42)48(0), 23 Feb. 1942, CAB 80/61. 
3 WM(42)24th concl., min. 1,25 Feb. 1942, CAB 65/25. 
4 C-in-C India to Air Ministry, 10320/C, 28 April 1942, AIR 8/685- 
5 Air Ministry OZ 107,29 April 1942, ibid. 
6 WP(42)181,29 April 1942, AIR 19/290. 
7 DO(42)13th mtg, min. 2,29 April 1942, CAB 69/4. 
8 CAS note for COS approved by Sinclair, 5 May 1942, AIR 19/290. 
9 WP(42)417,17 Sept. 1942, CAB 66/28. 
10 ASE(42)13th mtg, min. 1,12 June 1942, CAB 92/2. 
u WP(42)417, loc. cit. 
12 ASE(42)172, MT 59/551" 
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were shipped at a rate of fifty a month after May, 
1and three thou- 
sand lorries, and extra-protocol commitment, were all despatched, 
despite the initial shipping problems, by the end of March. 
2 
There were failures and exceptions to this rule, of course. 
Some naval supplies, like Asdic sets, were not provided in the pro- 
mised quantities, 
3while 
raw materials from territories lost to the 
Japanese, rubber and tin in particular, could not be supplied at 
full rates in the later months of the protocol. 
4 
Extra-protocol 
requests were not automatically approved: field artillery tractors, 
motor-cycle combinations and Lysander aircraft, to name but a few, 
were not provided on request. 
5 In spare parts and ammunition too 
the British disappointed the Russians. Well into 1942 they wrangled 
with the Americans over who was responsible for 'spares' for Ameri- 
can aircraft provided on Britain's account. 
6 
At the same time they 
were slow to provide spare parts on the scales which the Russians 
said they needed. The original rates of October 1941 - three months 
supply for each tank7and one month for each Hurricane- were, even 
the British admitted, scarcely adequate9- particularly as the Far' 
East was given priority in Hurricane spares after Pearl Harbor. 
10 
Consequently in February 1942 the War Office bowed to Russian pres- 
sure and increased the scale of tank spare parts to six months'sup- 
ply per tank with four months'supply every four months thereafter. 
11 
The Air Ministry also agreed to new scales in March for the air- 
craft which the Russians insisted were grounded in the Soviet Union 
for lack of spare parts. 
12 In both instances the cost to Britain 
was considerable and involved, in the case of aircraft spares, act- 
ually breaking down new Hurricanes. 
13 
1 Air Mission's War Diary entry for 11 May 1942, AIR 2/7861. 
2 WP(42)417, loc. cit. 
3 Ibid. 
4 ASE(42)172, loc. cit. 
5 Wp(42)417, loc. cit. 
6 30 MM to AM, AIR 313,18 Feb. 1942, FO 371 32933 Nloo6/178/38; 
Leighton and Coakley, p. 554; for detailed account see Lukas, 
pp. 134 ff. 
7 D0(41)67th mtg, min. 2,20 Oct. 1941, CAB 69/2. 
8 ASE(42)42,5 Feb. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
9 Minute for ACIGS, 23 Jan. 1942, WO 32/10518. 
10 ASE(42) 7th mtg, min. 5,13 March 1942, CAB 92/2. 
11 WO to 30 MM, 70880,14 Feb. 1942, and 75879,13 Mar. 1942, 
WO 32/10518. 
12 ASE(42) 7th mtg, loc. cit. 
13 ASE(42)95,31 Mar. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
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Nonetheless in May 1942 the Russians increased their demands 
further and asked for tank spare parts at rates three times the 
British scale for Matildas and four times that for Valentines. 
1 
Aircraft spares they also demanded in increased quantities bec- 
ause, it seemed, they insisted on treating all planes as initial 
equipment, put none into reserve and made no allowance for wast- 
age. The British simply could not provide spare parts in the 
quantities now demanded even when they accepted, as they did with 
considerable reservations in view of the Russian failure to con- 
suit British officers in the Soviet Union, 
3that 
the fighting on 
the Eastern front justified them. 
4 
The War Office had to reject 
9 of the 123 requests for tank spares outright and a further 17 
it could provide only if deliveries of Valentine spare parts from 
the United States were more reliable than in the past. 
5 
The Air 
Ministry meanwhile accepted the Russians'scales early in July but 
had to exclude from these the aircraft provided between March and 
June which the Russians wished to include. 
6 
Lyttelton thought 
this was merely the Air Ministry being 'adamant in their lack of 
sympathy for all things Russian', 
7but in fact the new scales did 
involve a cutback in production of some sixty new Hurricanes. 
Even then the A. S. E. was forced to admit when reviewing the first 
protocol: 'It is no exaggeration to say that spares have been the 
most unsatisfactory feature of our supply of military equipment 
sent to the U. S. S. R. '8 
Failures like this, however, could not obscure the fact that 
in general the British scrupulously maintained their commitments 
to the Soviet Union in the first six months of 1942. In fact, if 
anything, the spare parts negotiations demonstrated this, for in 
them the British accepted unsubstantiated and possibly exaggera- 
ted claims from the Russians at further cost to themselves. In 
doing this they showed that they accepted that, whatever the irra- 
tionality of some parts of the protocol, as a whole it was justi- 
1 ASE(42)123,5 May 1942, CAB 92/4. 
2 ASE(42) 11th mtg, min. 8,11 May 1942, CAB 92/2; Sinclair to 
Beaverbrook, 10 Feb. 1942, BB papers, box 19/6. 
3 This was a long story of frustration for the British, perhaps 
best summarized in Sinclair's letter to Beaverbrook on 10 
February, 1942, ibid. 
4 Letter Macready to Layton, 22 May 1942, WO 32/10518. 
5 ASE(42)131,24 May 1942, CAB 92/4. 
6 ASE(42)155,5 July 1942, CAB 92/4. 
7 Letter Lyttelton to Eden, 9 July 1942, BT 28/144, SEC/12/13. 
8 ASE(42)172, loc. cit. 1. 
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fied by political and military events in early 1942. 
For increasingly British planning in both military and politi- 
cal spheres centred on the Soviet Union. From January onwards 
the political scene was dominated by efforts to secure a treaty 
with the Soviet Union without antagonizing the United States by 
recognizing Soviet claims to the Baltic states. In this delicate 
situation the protocol had an important diplomatic role to play, 
as Eden later recalled: 
The manner in which we fulfilled our obligations ... 
undoubtedly impressed the Soviet Government and has had 
the important political effect of helping to convince 
them of the sincerity of our desire for collaboration. 1 
Militarily too, the Russian effort, of which the protocol was part, 
gained increasing prominence in British thinking. At the time of 
the 'Arcadia' conference the Chiefs of Staff had admitted that they 
regarded the continuation of Russian resistance as 'of primary im- 
portance to the Associated Powers in their strategy for the defeat 
of Germany. ' They rated giving all possible assistance to Russia 
as one of the four major ways, together with blockade, bombing and 
subversion, of wearing down the German forces in 1942.2 Nothing 
that happened in the six months after 'Arcadia' altered this judge- 
ment. On the contrary the indecisive end to 'Crusader', Auchin- 
leck's offensive in the desert, the strengthening of Rommel's forces 
in Libya and the drain of forces to the Far East made it essential 
that the Russians should be sustained. Not only was there the hope 
that the Red Army would one day enter the war against Japan, 
3but 
the whole northern flank of the Middle Eastern theatre depended on 
the Russians' holding the Germans' summer attack. As the Joint 
Planners stressed to the Chiefs of Staff when reporting on the sit- 
uation in the Middle East and India in April: 'We are already com- 
mitted to gambling on the success of Russian resistance. We must 
do all in our power to help it. '4 
Such was Allied weakness, however, that they could not help the 
Russians in 1942 by invading the continent of Europe. 
5 Nor could 
1 WP(42)417,17 Sept. 1942, CAB 66/28. 
2 CR(JP)6,16 Dec. 1941, CAB 99/17. 
3 Although it had been agreed at'Arcadia'that, since it was better 
for Russia not to act against Japan until she was strong enough 
to do so effectively, it would be unwise to press the Russian 
government on this point. (COS(42)79, CAB 80/34). 
4 JP(42)348,3 April 1942, CAB 84/44. 
5 For full discussion of the failure of plans to invade Europe 
see J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. III (pt. II), June "'. 
1941-August 1942, (London: HMSO, 1964), chapters XXIV and XXVII. 
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they, in view of Auchinleck's insistence that his armoured forces 
were inadequate, renew their offensive against Rommel in the early 
part of the year. 
1 Their blockade of Germany meanwhile offered 
meagre support to the Russians being 'little more than bluff' 
thanks to the strain on the Royal Navy and the leakage through 
unoccupied France. 
2 
Raids on the enemy coastline also had minimal 
impact, spectacular and effective though they were within their 
own objectives. 
3 The British could, and did, support the Russians 
with their bombing offensive over Germany, which after 14 February 
1942 aimed specifically at breaking civilian morale. 
4 
This, the 
Air Ministry said in June, diverted one third of the German bomber 
force and half its fighter force from the Eastern front; 
5 
and 
though this claim was later shown to be exaggerated, 
6the 
bombing 
campaign undoubtedly assisted änd. impressed the Russians with the 
scale of operations such as the thousand-bomber raid on Cologne 
in May. 7 But apart from this, there were only supplies to the 
British credit, and scant therefore was the attention paid to those 
who suggested reducing them - particularly as public opinion was so 
overwhelmingly in favour of supporting the Soviet Union. 
1942 was the high-water mark of public enthusiasm for a second 
front in support of the Russians. Maisky, two years earlier 'the 
oily old dodger', 
8was 
welcomed into the Athenaeum club. 
9 
Communist 
party membership rose 25,000 in the first two months of the year, 
10 
and by April fifty-six Anglo-Soviet societies had sprung up in 
London alone. 
11 
By the end of the year Mrs. Churchill's Aid to 
Russia Fund had raised £2,250,000.12 Agitation for a second front 
grew to a crescendo in the spring under the solicitous attention 
of Beaverbrook and the Daily Express. Fifty-three thousand people 
1 Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol. III, pp. 197 
-204.11 
2 Admiralty, October 1942, quoted in Butler, p. 510- 
3 Ibid., p. 516. 
4 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 1, P-323- 
5 WM(42)73rd concl., appendix, 11 June 1942, CAB 65/30- 
6 Webster and Frankland analyse the success of the attempt to draw 
the Luftwaffe from the Eastern front (p. 490). They conclude 
that although the Air Ministry's claims were unsubstantiated, 
there was in fact some relief afforded the Russians, as the num- 
ber of day and night fighters of the Luftwaffe in the West incr- 
eased throughout 1942. 
7 Woodward, II, p. 273; A. Werth, The Year of Stalingrad (London, 
1946), p. 67; telegram for DMO, MIL 4861,4 June 1942, WO 193/ 
645A. 
8 Dalton, The Fateful Years, p. 257- 
9 Werth, The Year of Stalingrad, p. 2. 
10 A. Calder, The People's War: Britain, 1939-45 (London, 1969), 
p. 298. 
11 WP(42)142,3 Apr. 1942, CAB 66/23. , 
12 A. V. Alexander papers, AVAR 12/98,20 Feb. 1943. 
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attended the second-front meeting in Trafalgar Square on 29 March, 
and 50,000 the one in May. The Hippodrome housed 1,400 on 24 May 
when Michael Foot of the Evening Standard and John Gordon of the 
Sunday Express supported the Daily Express's call for immediate 
action in Europe. 
1 In this context supplies of munitions seemed 
scarcely enough; as the Times wrote on 7 March: 
On the part of Great Britain there cannot be a moment's hesi- 
tation in meeting this demand (for a constant flow of supplies), 
whatever competing claims there may be on the output of Brit- 
ish factories and the capacity of British shipping. ... What is sent to Russia in the coming weeks may yet prove a 
determining factor in the summer campaign. 
The House of Commons, the forum for which Churchill had the most 
respect, naturally reflected this wave of public sentiment. Only 
the occasional member of Parliament questioned the flow of munit- 
ions to the Soviet Union and most members urged for greater sacri- 
fices to increase it. Even in the long debates on the war situa- 
tion in January and February, which culminated in a vote of confi- 
dence in Churchill's leadership, the protocol was accepted as a 
sound use of Britain's resources - and this despite Churchill's 
and Attlee's3assurances that the reverses in the Far East were in 
part attributable to it. The member for Wycombe, Major-General 
Sir Alfred Knox, was not representative of the House when he said 
on 25 February: 
I should like to know from a military expert whether we could 
not have sent half of those planes - which amounted to so 
much from our own point of view, and must have been but a 
drop in the bucket for Russia, which has so enormous a front 
- to Russia, and given the other half to our own people 
in 
the Far East and in the Middle East. I realize that we had 
to help Russia, and that they are doing splendidly, but it 
seems a frightful thing to let our own people down for want 
of the necessary protection. 
'+ 
To most members of Parliament in February 1942 the issue was not 
whether Soviet demands were impeding British operations, but whe- 
ther the leadership of Churchill's government was doing so. 
5 
The effect of this public agitation in support of the Soviet 
Union was not great enough to force the Cabinet into a premature 
1 Coates, History of An lo-Soviet Relations, pp. 706,712. 
2 Parliamentary Debates, vol. 377, col. 606,27 Jan. 1942, and 
col. 1011,29 Jan. 1942. 
3 Ibid., col. 90,8 Jan. 1942. 
4+ Ibid., vol. 378, col. 258-9- 
5 For full debate see Parliamentary Debates, volumes 377 and 378. 
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invasion of the Continent. In fact the Anglo-American discussions 
on the second front were conducted almost entirely without refer- 
ence to it, and there was evidence in the Home Intelligence reports 
that sections of the public thought this should be so. 
l Nonetheless 
the agitation did provide a climate of opinion in which it was un- 
thinkable to reduce the flow of supplies to the Red Army and in 
which supplies continued to compensate for Britain's military in- 
activity. As Balfour said when the Air Ministry was considering 
defaulting on aircraft allocations in May and June: 
Politically in this country it will be difficult to explain. 
There is the second front cry, and we- cannot defend our action 
by supporting figures ol'avallable production in relation to 
the priority calls of other theatres of war. 2 
Lyttelton too, as Minister of Production, was persuaded by this 
argument to recommend an increase in Britain's commitment after 
the Moscow protocol had expired. Britain, as he saw it, had two 
choices in 1942: to invade the Continent or provide supplies. The 
latter seemed more politic, particularly as 'Any slackening in our 
aid to Russia would impair the keenness of workers in this country. '3 
It is the irony of the commitment to the Soviet Union that while 
this consensus on its necessity grew in the first half of 1942, so 
also did the obstacles in the way of putting it into effect. All 
the potential difficulties of the supply routes to the Soviet Union 
in 1941 intensified in 1942, with the result that while profess- 
ional objections to the allocation of munitions were silenced, pro- 
tests about the risks of delivering them became louder. 
Admittedly the Persian Gulf route saw considerable progress over 
these months once the Russians had lifted the restrictions they had 
placed on the route in December. Roosevelt declared Iran eligible 
for Lend-Lease aid on 10 March, 
4and 
by April the Persian transport- 
ation facilities had more than trebled compared with September 
1941.5 The railway's capacity meanwhile had risen by August 1942 
from 200 tons a day to 1,500 tons6of which 661 tons a day was for 
the Russians.? However, these figures fell 25 per cent short of 
1 HTWR, no. 83,27 Apr. -4 May 1942, HINR, no. 86,18 - 26 May 
1942, INFOU/Z92B. 
2 Minute Balfour to SOS, 24 Apr. 1942, AIR 19/290. 
3 WP(42)178,26 Apr. 1942, CAB 66/24. 
4 Motter, The Persian Corridor, p. 156. 
5 ASE(42)114,26 Apr. 1942, CAB 92/4. 
6 Motter, p. 348. 
7 Ibid., p. 331" 
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target1and in individual projects too there was a recurring backlog. 
In December 1941 it was agreed that aircraft from the United States 
would be erected at the British base at Abadan, 
2and by a similar 
arrangement in January 1942 2,000 U. S. lorries a month were to be 
assembled at Andimeshk. 
3 But the problems of 1941 - lack of skil- 
led workmen and slow delivery from the United States 
4_ 
retarded 
these plans. The first Douglas aircraft, for instance, arrived on 
23 January, but Douglas equipment and employees did not arrive un- 
til May. 5 Likewise the Andimeshk plant did not start operations 
until 30 April. 
6 
In the interim the British assisted the Americans 
by converting Boston light bombers in their holdings at Shu'aiba 
to Russian specifications, 
7and by assembling 1,554 lorries at Bush- 
ire, some 1,204 of them for the Russians. 
8 
But even these opera- 
tions were impeded, this time by international dissension. The 
Russians suspected the U. K. C. C., which operated the Bushire plant, 
of profiteering and seeking a monopoly of transport in Iran. As 
well they thought the Bushire-Tabriz route too difficult. 
9 
The 
British for their part suspected the Russians of political ambit- 
ions in Iran10and resented the introduction of Russian mechanics 
and lorry drivers into their zone. 
11 They were also disturbed by 
the Russians' insistence that responsibility for the railway should 
be divided at Qüm, equidistant between Soviet and British zones, 
rather than at Teheran, the natural breaking point. 
12 By May Auch- 
inleck felt obliged to send a telegram to Lieut-General Quinan of 
the 10th Army, saying: 
I wonder whether all officers really do appreciate the imp- 
portance of concentrating on the business in hand - the 
1 ASE(42)114, loc. cit. 
2 Motter, p. 128. 
3 Ibid., p. 143; Memo by Deputy Quarter-Master in HQ 10th Army, 
13 Feb. 1942, WO 201/1390- 
4 CSAB London/MWT to CSAB Washington, MAST 14188 SABLO 7,10 
May 1942, MT 59/79- 
5 Lukas, p. 189. 
6 FO to Washington, no. 17 LONUS SAVING, 1 Aug 1942, MT 59/79. 
7 Motter, p. 128. 
8 260 were for UKCC use and 90 for the Poles. 
(no. 17 LONUS 
SAVING, loc. cit. ) 
9 Motter, p. 147- 
10 C-in-C India to WO, VVY/1057,17 Jan. 1942, WO 193/159; see 
also Sir Claremont Skrine (Consul-General at Meshed), World 
War in Iran (London, 1962). 
11 Motter, p. 144; Lukas, p. 194. 
12 FO to Charge d'affaires, Kuibyshev, no. 22,10 Feb. 1942, and 
Teheran to F0, no. 58,15 Feb. 1942, FO 181/970. 
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defeat of Germany. 
Most officers are to some extent politically minded in 
regard to Russia but whatever their apprehensions for the 
future it is essential that their private views should be 
subordinated to the main task. Our help to Russia ... 
must be unstinting and ungrudged. 1 
These difficulties were largely eliminated by August 1942 through 
the good offices of the Americans, 
2but 
together with the lag in 
the development projects and the time taken in extensive Russian 
inspections of supplies, 
3they had ensured a backlog by the end of 
June of 100 aircraft and 526 lorries 
4_ 
and this at a time when the 
delivery of lorries to the Persian Gulf had been raised by 50 per 
cent during Molotov's visit to Washington5and when the crisis in 
the northern convoys was threatening to flood the Persian Gulf 
with supplies. 
For it was the northern supply route that posed the more serious 
problems in the spring of 1942 to the implementation of the proto- 
col. Many of the dire expectations of the British about this route 
were fulfilled when the winter of 1941-2 proved to be the worst for 
fifteen years and the ice at Archangel was exceptionally thick. 
6 
The port was effectively closed to all incoming traffic until late 
March when on 15 January the Luftwaffe damaged the icebreaker 
Stalin. 
7 (The Montcalm was still in Canada after a dismaying series 
of false starts. ) 
8 
The ability of Murmansk to take all of Archangel's 
traffic was therefore the first concern of the Chiefs of Staff in 
February. They saw their scepticism about Russian estimates for 
Archangel justified, and the C. I. G. S. warned the Ministry of War 
Transport on 27 February about the dangers of 'a hard and fast det- 
ermination to ship everything within the month regardless of the 
consequences'. 
We ourselves are desperately in need of more ships for the 
reinforcement and maintenance of our forces overseas and 
could make good use of the valuable material locked up in 
these idle ships (awaiting berth at Murmansk). 
1 Auchinleck to Quinan, DO/PSC/25,9 May 1942, WO 201/1314. 
2 Motter, p. 131- 
3 Lukas, pp. 191-3- 
4 Motter, pp. 135,148. 
5 Ibid., p. 149. 
6 Maisky to Llewellin, 11 Feb. 1942, BB papers, BBK D/82, file 
24/D6. 
7 Signal from SBNO, Archangel, no. 2215A, 27 Jan. 1942, BB papers, 
BBK D/170. There was known to be another Russian icebreaker, 
Litke, apart from the Lenin in Archangel. 
8 Donaldson to Beaverbrook, 18 Feb. 1942, and attached memorandum, 
BB papers, box 19/11. 
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It is not suggested that we should reduce our releases to 
Russia, or go back on our promises as regards the totals to 
be sent .. .1 
But privately Brooke wrote: 'Personally I consider it absolute 
madness. We have never even asked Russia to inform us of the 
real urgency of these reinforcements. '2 
In fact Murmansk showed an unexpected capacity for handling 
shipping, thanks to Russian improvisation, and the congestion 
Brooke feared did not develop. 
3 Nonetheless there remained the 
problematical shortage of shipping. Between August 1941 and Feb- 
ruary 1942 the British provided 535,863 tons of shipping for the 
north Russia-United Kingdom route and 65,157 tons for the north 
Russia-U. S. A. route. 
4 
In March, despite the fact that the convoy 
cycle was lengthened to fifteen days5and the Russians were making 
a limited contribution towards the provision of shipping, 
6the 
British were providing 100,000 tons to supplement the 360,000 
tons of American shipping on the protocol run. 
7 They gained lit- 
tle compensation for this in precise shipping terms, for on 27 
March the Russians rejected finally the idea of a shuttle service 
between the U. S. A. and Britain of Russian ships not suitable for 
the carriage of tanks and aircraft. All such ships, the Russians 
claimed, were needed for coastal work in north Russia or were al- 
ready operating in the Atlantic. 
8 
At the same time the supply of 
return cargoes from north Russia, which could have relieved Brit- 
ain's import position, 
9declined. 
The most reliable cargo, timber, 
was available only at Archangel, and the difficulties of winter 
transport to Murmansk reduced the originally 'considerable' flow 
of items like chrome and magnesite to a trickle. 
10 At the end of 
January Mikoyan gave Cripps a list of supplies which he undertook 
to make available by the end of March, 
11but 
for understandable 
reasons the supply proved irregular. Since the whole future of 
1 COS(42)137,26 Feb. 1942, FO 371 32984 N1236/1214/38. 
2 Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 376. 
3 M'NT telegram, MAST 12783 MASTA 1977 MOSSY, 23 Apr. 1942, MT, '63/237" 
4 Note by Leathers on shipping, BB papers, BBK D/82, file 24/D6. 
5 MT 59/551, ASE(42)172, n. d. 
6 Anglo-Soviet Shipping Committee sub-committee report on Prog- 
rammes and Tonnage, February 1942,5 Mar. 1942, MT 59/548. For 
British supplies 9 British and 1 Russian ships were allocated. 
7 MWT memorandum, 9 Mar. 1942, FO 371 32863 N1558/1/38" 
8 UK-S(Sh)42 10th minutes, item 1,27 Mar. 1942, MT 59/1801- 
9 ASE(42)102,7 Apr. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
10 ASE(42)172, n. d., MT 59/551- 
21 ASE(42)43,8 Feb. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
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the convoys was soon in doubt the British did not press the Russ- 
ians unduly, 
1and 
consequently cargoes were provided for only 30 
per cent of the ships leaving north Russia. 
2 
The list of return 
cargoes which had been agreed upon at the Moscow conference was 
in no way fulfilled. 
3 
Serious though this was, in view of the fact that British ship- 
ping losses in the first quarter of 1942 were twice those of the 
last quarter of 1941,4it nonetheless did not pose the real threat 
to the northern convoys. This emerged in the concentration of 
enemy surface forces in northern Norway late in February. On 14- 
15 January, the battleship Tirpitz moved to Trondheim, followed 
in later months by the pocket battleships, the Lützow and the 
Admiral Scheer, the heavy cruiser, the Admiral Hipper and a force 
of modern destroyers. 5 Over the same period the German High Com- 
mand. strengthened its air and submarine forces in northern Norway 
making the Allied convoys vulnerable to four forms of attack: 
heavy ships, light surface forces, U-boats and land-based aircraft. 
To meet such threats the British, who were responsible for provi- 
ding escorts, had to mount a major fleet operation west of Bear 
Island and persuade the Russians to provide intensive naval and 
air protection east of that point. 
This the Russians consistently failed to do, at least on a 
scale which satisfied the Admiralty. Whether this was from lack 
of resources, lack of skill or lack of inclination, it is diffi- 
cult to say. The naval historian, Roskill, believes that 'within 
the limits imposed by their somewhat primitive conceptions of mari- 
time war' the Russians probably did what they could. 
6 
But the Sen- 
ior British Naval Officer in north Russia at the time thought that 
the Kremlin, as distinct from the Soviet Navy, took the attitude 
that 'These convoys are your only contribution. If you want them 
protected send along the aircraft'.? Certainly a case can be made 
that the Soviet Navy simply did not possess, or was not allocated, 
the necessary resources. It was undoubtedly the inferior service 
in the Soviet Union and very much the poor relation when it came 
1 WP(42)417,17 Sept. 1942, CAB 66/28. 
2 ASE(42)102,7 Apr. 1942, CAB 92/3- 
3 See table F, WP(42)417, loc. cit. 
4 Behrens, Merchant Shipping o.., p. 263- 
5 Morison, p. 161. 
6 S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. II (London, HMSO, 1956), 
p. 128. 
7 Letter from SBNO, North Russialto DNI, 21 May 1942, ADM 205/21. 
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to claiming aircraft from the Red Army. 
1 The Soviet Chief of 
Naval Staff admitted, when Admiral Miles, head of the naval mis- 
sion in Moscow, requested greater air support in February, that 
there were no long-range fighters available for convoy duty. 
2 
Prior to this in fact he had appealed unofficially for Beaufigh- 
ters and Mosquitoes from the British, and a flotilla of American 
destroyers to assist in the protection east of the meridian 280 
East that the Allies demanded. 3 Both these requests were turned 
down, however - the British committing themselves only to provid- 
ing long-range Hurricane sets 
4_ 
and the Russians therefore agreed 
to send twenty PE. 2B bombers, 30 Hurricanes5and a further twenty 
of their relatively new long-range fighter, the PE. 3, to north 
Russia. The British did not think this number of aircraft adequ- 
ate to give protection throughout the long daylight hours their 
convoys now faced, but had to rest content with Admiral Kutnezov's 
assurances on 2 March that the Northern Fleet was making the def- 
ence of convoys its primary task.? 
The situation did not improve, however. Although Russian sur- 
face patrols were more active8and the Russian Naval Air Force was, 
reported as 'doing well - active and ready to help according to 
their ability', on the negative side the Senior British Naval Off- 
icer observed: 
if you study recent reports, there is more bombing of enemy 
positions and aerodrommes, more reconnaissance and more 
Hurricanes. Over sea they are a bit lost ... but they do 
meet HM ships and convoys at about 50 miles, not enough of 
course. 9 
It was obvious in fact by March that Russian pilots, though able 
to hold their own over land, were not as competent over sea, 
10and, 
1 Mtg with Naval Otdel (Soviet liaison body) in Moscow, 14 Apr. 
1942, AIR 2/7861. 
2 Miles and Collier (Head of air mission) to Air Ministry and 
Admiralty, AIR 3297,28 Feb. 1942, FO 371 32984 N1214/1214/38. 
3 Collier to Vice-CAS, AIR 3039,14 Feb. 1942, AIR 2/7861; War 
Diary of British Naval Mission, Moscow, 26 Feb. 1942, FO 371 
32899 N2016/23/38. 
4 Air Ministry to 30 MM, AX. 679,25 Feb. 1942, AIR 6/618; C0S(42) 
43rd mtg, min. 11,3 Mar. 1942, FO 371 32984 N1214/1214/38. 
5 30 MM to Admy, AN, 1525/2 March, N1214/1214/38. 
6 Eighth monthly report- North Russia, March 1942, FO 371 32899 
N2016/23/38- 
7 30 MM to Admy, AM, 1525/2 March, loc. cit. 
8 Eighth monthly report, loc. cit. 
9 Letter SBNO, N Russia, to DNI, 14 Mar. 1942, FO 371 32984 
N1945/1214/38. 
10 Letter from Polyarnoe to C-in-C, 5 Mar. 1942, ibid. 
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perhaps in recognition of this, they accepted an offer of Coastal 
Command officers to assist in the organization of convoy protec- 
tion. In the meantime, however, convoy losses, which had been 
negligible over the winter, 
2began 
to mount. The Tirpitz made a 
sortie on 6 March during PQ 12, the, first convoy to be covered by 
the main fleet, but this, thanks mainly to bad weather, came to 
nought. 
3 PQ 13 (20-31 March), however, was not so lucky. Scatt- 
ered by a gale five ships, one quarter of the total convoy, fell 
victim to enemy aircraft and destroyers. 
4 
In the first three 
weeks of April a further eight ships were lost, five again to 
enemy aircraft and another three by air attacks on Murmansk. 
This is a rate of loss (the Admiralty concluded) that our 
merchant navy can hardly afford to sustain. In the light 
of our shipping casualties in other parts of the world, 
it is a rate in which we cannot contemplate an increase. 
5 
As Pound explained to his colleagues on 4 April, Britain's abil- 
ity to ship supplies to the Soviet Union had never been given 
sufficient consideration. 
6 
Brooke agreed that the 'great mili- 
tary risks involved' were difficult to justify since 'We our- 
selves urgently required the equipment. '? 
The Cabinet, however, when warned by the Chiefs of Staff on 13 
April of the dangerous situation, was understandably reluctant to 
do more than make further representations for aid to the Russians. 
$ 
The Admiralty persisted, and on 24 April it was agreed that future 
convoys should be limited to twenty-five ships each, at a frequency 
of three convoys every two months. 
9 This the Admiralty estimated 
would allow the carrying of all British and American protocol sup- 
plies, providing the American ships waiting to sail from Iceland 
were unloaded and restowed in Britain. 
10 At present only one-fifth 
of their cargoes were protocol materials, 
11 thanks to Soviet demands 
1 30 Mission, Moscow to Admy, AM, AIR 3485,9 Mar. 1942, AIR 
20/4986. 
2 Roskill, p. 119. 
3 Ibid., pp. 120-4. 
4 Ibid., pp. 126-7. 
5 Information prepared by Admy for presentation to Maisky, 19 
Apr. 1942, ADM 1/12057- 
6 COS(42)106th mtg, min. 1,4 Apr. 1942, CAB 79/20. 
7 COS(42)114th mtg, min. 1,10 Apr. 1942, CAB 79/20. 
8 ADM 1/12057, 'NM(42) 47th conci., 13 Apr. 1942. 
9 'M(42)52nd conclusions, min. 5,24 Apr. 1942, CAB 65/26. 
10 Note by Donaldson for Foreign Secretary based on conversation 
with Pound, 27 Apr. 1942, ADM 205/13- 
11 WM(42) 48th concl., min. 4, confidential annex, 14 Apr. 1942, 
CAB 65/30. 
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for foodstuffs and other commodities. 
1 
These must be unloaded if 
protocol cargo was to make its way to the Soviet Union on schedule. 
Both the Russians and the Americans, however, strongly opposed 
this change. The Russians had been making consistent efforts 
through February and March to have the rate of convoys increased 
to three a month. They naturally enough wanted more supplies in 
the spring in anticipation of the Wehrmacht's summer offensive, 
even if this meant a reduction of supplies in later months. 
2 
Ins- 
tead they found, not only that they were not granted this, 
3but 
that 
flow of supplies dropped drastically in April. Only 7 of the 24 
ships which sailed on 8 April reached north Russia, since one was 
sunk and 16 turned back to Iceland after encountering heavy ice. 
4 
The backlog at Iceland by 25 April was 41 ships and threatened to 
reach 86 before the next convoy sailed. 
5 
This backlog represented much of the U. S. protocol offering to 
date, which explains the Americans' dismay at the Admiralty's de- 
cision to limit convoys; for it was only in April that the Ameri- 
cans had started clearing the backlog in shipments to the Soviet 
Union which they had accumulated in their own country since Octo- 
ber 1941. Before that they had been bedevilled by the problems of 
finding suitable shipping, 
6by 
Russian ambiguity about the priority 
of supplies7and by the lack of any central authority like the A. S. E. 
The President's Soviet Protocol Committee, responsible for co- 
ordinating all activities, was not formed until 9 November 1942,8 
and in the interim responsibility for loading and shipping supp- 
lies was woefully fragmented - procurement and loading programmes 
were determined by the Soviet Supply Section of the Office of 
Lend-Lease Administration (O. L. L. A. ), stevedoring was controlled 
by the War Shipping Administration and details of stowage by the 
inexperienced Soviet commercial organization, Amtorg. 
9 The Ameri- 
cans were loath to save shipping space by knocking down bombers as 
1 Notes of weekly reports submitted by Soviet Supply Section of 
Lend-Lease Administration to Stettinius, 3 Jan. 1942-28 Feb. 
1942, FO 32863 N1651/1/38- 
2 ASE(42)66,27 Feb. 1942, CAB 92/3; Maisky-Eden conversation, 
23 Mar. 1942, FO 371 32863 N1549/1/38. " 
3 Letter P. J. Grigg (Minister for War). from; Eäený 6 Mar. 1942, 
FO 371 32933 N1004/178/38; FO 371 32863 N1549%1/38. 
4 Roskill, p. 127. 
5 Note to Harriman, 25 Apr. 1942, PREM 3 393/2- 
6 Leighton and Coakley, p. 556. 
7 See p. 94 , and Soviet Supply Section report, loc. cit. 
8 Foreign 
_Relations of 
the United States, 1942, IIIt(Washington, 
1961), p. 743- 
9 Paper by W. 0. Hart, Mar. 1942, BB papers, box-19/2. 
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the British and Harriman advised, 
Iand 
shipping itself was scarce 
because in practice the Pacific theatre was given precedence, 
despite the ruling at 'Arcadia'. 
2 Supplies flowed to U. S. ports 
nonetheless and acute congestion developed. 
3 
This in turn prev- 
ented shipment not only of American supplies but many goods, inc- 
luding Canadian tanks, promised to the Russians on Britain's 
account. 
4 
Only in March did the situation start to improve when a new 
Soviet organization to deal solely with Lend-Lease matters, the 
Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, took over Amtorg's res- 
ponsibilities. 
5 At the same time the President intervened dras- 
tically. Roosevelt was told of the backlog early in March and 
he declared to Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary for the Treasury: 
I do not want to be in the same position as the English. 
The English promised the Russians two divisions. They 
failed. They promised them help in the Caucasus. They 
failed. Every promise the English have made to the Russ- 
ians, they have fallen down on ... The only reason we 
stand so well with the Russians is that up to date we have 
kept our promises ... Nothing could be worse than 
to 
have the Russians collapse ... I would rather 
lose New 
Zealand, Australia or anything else than have the Russians 
collapse. 
Authorizing Morgenthau to expedite shipments to the Soviet Union, 
Roosevelt added, 'This is critical because (a) we must keep our 
word (b)because Russian resistance counts most today. '6 On 17 
March he gave further instructions that shipping must be provi- 
ded for the protocol from South American and Caribbean routes 
'regardless of other considerations', and under this stimulus 
April shipments soared. Seventy-nine ships left the United Sta- 
tes that month - 63 for the northern route, 
6 for the Persian 
Gulf and 10 for Vladivostock - compared with a total of 
24 in 
January and even less in February.? April shipments totalled 
450,000 tons whereas in the whole period October 1941 to March 
1 ASE(42)64,27 Feb. 1942, FO 371 32862 N1132/1/38; and ASE(42) 
6th mtg, min. 2,2 Mar. 1942, N1296/1/38, 
ibid. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, loc. cit. 
3 Soviet Supply Section report, loc. cit. 
4 Eden to Lyttelton, 20 Apr. 1942, FO 371 32864 N2017/1/38; only 
150 of the 596 tanks produced in Canada for the 
Soviet Union 
had reached their destination by 30 June 1942. 
(ASE(42)172, 
n. d., MT 59/551. ) 
5 FRUS, 1942, III, p. 696. 
6 J. M. Blum, From the Morgenthau diaries, vol. 3, The Years-of 
War, 1941-19+5 (U. S. A., 1967), PP- 81-2. 
7 Leighton and Coakley, p. 556. 
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1942 only 375,000 tons had been shipped. 
1 'Real effectiveness in 
getting supplies to the seaboard has been attained, ' the O. L. L. A. 
reported to the President late in April2- just when the British 
announced that the size and frequency of the convoys must be 
curtailed. 
Roosevelt urged Churchill to reconsider this decision. He was 
dismayed at the political ramifications of the Russians learning 
that only a few of the 107 ships planned for May would actually 
sail for north Russia. 
3 Moreover, as he told Churchill on 30 
April: 
I am very anxious that ships should not be unloaded and re- 
loaded in England, because I believe it would leave an im- 
possible and very disquieting impression in Russia. 
4 
He wanted, as the British Admiralty Delegation (B. A. D. ) in Wash- 
ington put it, 'everything possible done to keep the Russians 
sweet'. 
5 
For the British, however, it was a question of their national 
security, and Churchill answered Roosevelt on 2 May begging him 
'not to press us beyond our judgement in this operation'. 
6 
He 
was well aware of the political implications of the Admiralty's 
decisions, for instructions had already been given to the Minis- 
try of Information to keep the news of unloading the cargoes sup- 
pressed; furthermore, the dock workers involved were to be told of 
the reasons for this action, 
7 These were, as Churchill explained 
to Roosevelt, that Britain's naval resources were 'absolutely ex- 
tended', and that a short convoy cycle could be run only at the 
risk of disrupting Britain's life-line, the Atlantic convoys &8 
Already two cruisers, the Trinidad and the Edinburgh had been lost 
during PQ 15 and QP 11, and the battleship Kind George V had been 
damaged when it collided with and sank the destroyer Punjabi. 
Confronted with this, Roosevelt conceded defeat and gave his con- 
sent to the reduction of the convoys, with the proviso that they 
1 M. Matloff and E. M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition 
Warfare 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953), p. 206. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 557. 
3 Sir Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV (London, 
1951), p. 231. 
If Ibid. 
5 BAD Washington to Admy, AIDAC 508,27 Apr. 1942, F0 371 32984 
N2313/1214/38. 
6 Churchill, p. 232. 
7 WM(42)52nd concl., min. 5,24 Apr. 1942, FO 371 32984 N2230/ 
1214/38- 
8 Churchill, pp. 231-2. 
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should contain thirty-five ships each if at all possible. 
1 
The Admiralty soon had doubts even about this, for Russian air 
support for the convoys declined in Apriltand threatened to be 
even less in May. On their own the British were able to control 
the U-boat threat - by providing anti-submarine protection on 
three times the Atlantic convoy scale3but they were unable to 
neutralize the Luftwaffe. This was the major threat, for until 
Arctic ice receded, the convoys would be exposed to heavy air att- 
ack for seven days, during which the British could provide only 
limited fighter and anti-aircraft protection. 
4 
The Prince of Wales 
and the Repulse showed what could happen to ships in these cir- 
cumstances, and Russian assistance was therefore essential: figh- 
ters to protect the convoys, long-range bombers to attack German 
aerodrommes, and anti-aircraft defences for the ports. 
5 
Yet in 
April the Naval Otdel had admitted that it would have difficulty 
in extracting bombers from the Red Army when large-scale opera- 
tions resumed in the spring. 
6 
Stalin also, when asked specific- 
ally for air and naval support by Churchill on 9 May, replied: 
You may not doubt that on our part all possible measures 
will be taken. It is necessary however to take into con- 
sideration the fact that our naval forces are very limited, 
and that our air forces in their vast majority are engaged 
at the battle-front.? 
In these circumstances the First Sea Lord soon concluded that 
he could not countenance the sailing of the convoys planned for 
18 May (PQ 16) and 3 June (PQ 17). 'The whole thing is a most 
unsound operation with the dice loaded against us in every direc- 
tion', he wrote to Admiral King, 
8and 
he refused to risk in such 
conditions capital and aircraft carrier units which were vital to 
Britain's future. Should they be damaged or sunk, Britain could 
lose control of her communications in the Atlantic or the Indian 
Ocean, and compared with this Russia's losing the convoys - or 
even Germany's losing the Tirpitz - was minor. 
9 
On 17 May, there- 
fore, Pound recommended to the Cabinet that convoys 
be suspended 
1 Churdhill, p. 232. 
2 SBNO, N. Russia to Admy, 771,15 Apr. 1942, AIR 20/4986. 
3 Conversation with Pound and Rear-Admiral A. J. Power, Assistant 
Chief of Naval Staff(Home), 7 May 1942, BT 28/144, SEC/12/1. 
4 Memorandum by First Sea Lord, 16 May 1942, F0 371 32984 N2591/ 
1214/38. 
5 Pound-Power conversation, loc. cit. 
6 Mtg with Naval Otdel, 14 Apr. 1942, AIR 2/7861. 
7 Churchill, p. 233- 
8 Roskill, p. 130- 
9 Pound to First Lord of the Admiralty, 10 July 1942, 
ADM 205/14. 
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until July 1 when ice conditions would allow larger convoys of 
fifty ships. With Roosevelt's protests fresh in mind, however, 
the Cabinet refused. There were the practical problems of the 
strain on Russian ports when the convoys resumed, 
1and, 
as Church- 
ill explained, 'Failure on our part to make the attempt would wea- 
ken our influence with both our major Allies. ' Already, it seems, 
he was fearful of Britain's eclipse by its more powerful allies, 
and though, as he explained to the Chiefs of Staff, he shared their 
misgivings, he thought the convoys 'a matter of duty'. 
2 PQ 16 must 
sail and its fate would determine that of PQ 17.3 
In the event PQ 16 was not the disaster the Admiralty predicted. 
Only seven of the fifty ships in it and the returning convoy were 
lost, 
4whereas 
Churchill had been prepared to tolerate an attrition 
rate of 50 per cent. 
5 
German U-boats were unexpectedly quiet, and 
the Russians, faced with further appeals from both Churchill7and 
Admiral King in Washington, 
8exerted 
themselves in defence. Warned 
that the convoys might be suspended if losses were too high, 
9they 
diverted 194 fighters from the Red Army and provided in addition 
59 bombers and 45 flying boats for work in north Russia. A fighter 
escort met the convoy eleven hours before it reached the Kola Inlet, 
and German aerodrommes at Banak, Kirkenes and Petsamo were attacked, 
with mixed success, on that and the two preceding days. Two Russian 
destroyers accompanied QP 12 to 30° East, and three met PQ 16 at the 
same point. Five submarines were provided for patrolling the coast 
and areas further to sea in an effort to deter the Lützow and the 
ll Scheer10 The Admiralty was not satisfied with the submarine action, 
but Admiral Miles confessed: 
I think they have really tried quite hard this time and now 
that they have got more bombers they intend to bomb Tromso, 
Bardufoss and Hammerfest during the passage of PQ 17.12 
1 'M(42) 64th concl., min. 2, confidential annex, 17 May 1942, CAB 
65/30; Pound's memorandum is contained in annex to C0S(42)1ý2nd 
mtg, FO 371 32984 N2591/1214/38. 
2 Churchill, p. 234. 
3 ViM(42) 64th concl., min. 2, loc. cit. 
4 Roskill, p. 132. 
5 DO(42)15th mtg, 13 July 1942, CAB 69/4. 
6 Roskill, p. 132. 
7 PM to Premier Stalin, T. 743/2,19 May 1942, PREM 3 393/2- 
8 Burns, Roosevelt, p. 233- 
9 T. 743/2, loc. cit. 
10 'PQ 16 and QP 12: Russian Co-operation', ADM 205/21. 
11 Admy to Miles, 2114B, 7 June 1942, AIR 20/4986. 
12 Admiral Miles to Admy, 1719C/3 June, ibid. 
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In view of this, and the euphoria which prevailed after the sign- 
ing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty on 2& May, it was unthinkable not 
to sail the next convoy. Even Molotov had said in his report at 
the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. on 18 June: 
We must, of course, bear in mind that the delivery of arma- 
ments and war materials to the Soviet Union was and is a 
matter of no little difficulty. ... Nevertheless, the 
delivery of arms and materials from the U. S. A. and Great 
Britain has not only not decreased, but has increased in 
recent months. These supplies are an essential and imp- 
ortant supplement to those arms and supplies which the Red 
Army receives, in their overwhelming bulk, from our inter- 
nal resources. ... the fulfilment of these deliveries 
has played and will play in the future an important part 
in strengthening friendly relations between the U. S. S. R., 
Great Britain and the U. S. A. 1 
In further recognition of the convoys' value, Stalin accepted on 
20 June an offer of six R. A. F. squadrons for convoy defence in 
north Russia. 
2 
Unfortunately PQ 17, which sailed on 27 June, was struck by 
such catastrophe that all arguments for continuing the convoys 
were shattered. Only 11 of the 34 ships in the convoy arrived at 
Archangel after the Admiralty, fearing an attack by the Tirpitz 
and the Hipper, ordered the convoy to scatter. 
3 
Of the nine Brit- 
ish ships in the convoy only two arrived with a small portion of 
protocol supplies loaded in Britain - only 53 of 215 aircraft, 
only 40 of the 245 tanks, 15 of the 144 Bren carriers, 28 of the 
80 anti-tank guns, 133 of 200 Bren guns, and 177 of 300 Boys anti- 
tank rifles. Substantial quantities of ammunition were also lost 
and urgently needed spare parts for aircraft and tanks. 
4 
This was 
disaster on the scale the Chiefs of Staff had dreaded, and they 
would not guarantee that it, or worse, would not happen again. 
5 
On 13 July therefore, the Defence Committee, which was faced with 
shipping losses of 400,000 tons in one week, decided to suspend 
PQ 18.7 Roosevelt's agreement to this was reluctantly given, and 
1 Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War: documents and 
materials, transl. by A. Rothstein (London, 1946), p. 172. 
2 Butler, p. 598. 
3 This controversial and disastrous decision has been the subject 
of numerous books and also of litigation. Roskill's account of 
the sequence of events and reasons for the Admiralty's decision 
is in his vol. II, pp. 134-45- 
4 ASE(42)167,1 Aug. 1942, CAB 92/4. 
5 COS(42) 203rd mtg, min. 1,10 July 1942, CAB 79/22. 
6 PM to Roosevelt, no. 113, '14 July 1942, AIR 8/933- 
7 D0(42) 15th mtg, CAB 69/4. 
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the news broken to Stalin on 17 July. 
My naval advisers tell me (Churchill telegraphed Stalin) 
that if they had the handling of the German surface, sub- 
marine and air forces, in present circumstances, they would 
guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North 
Russia. They have not been able so far to hold out any 
hopes that convoys attempting to make the passage in perp- 
etual daylight would fare better than P. Q. 17. 
He promised that the British would consider in the autumn both 
combined operations in northern Norway with the aim of eliminating 
the threat to the convoys there, and the sending of air forces to 
the southern Russian front. 'Believe me', he assured Stalin, 
'there is nothing that is useful and sensible that we and the Ame- 
ricans will not do to help you in your grand struggle. '1 
Stalin's reaction was harsh. He accused the British of refus- 
ing 'to continue the sending of war materials to the Soviet Union 
via the Northern route. ' He rejected the arguments against the 
sdiling, of the convoys and insisted that 'with goodwill and readi- 
ness to fulfil the contracted obligations these convoys could be 
regularly undertaken and heavy losses could be inflicted on the 
enemy. ' He criticized the actual decision to scatter the convoy 
and protested that supplies through the Persian Gulf could in no 
way compensate for the cancellation of the convoys. As a final 
jibe, he attacked the reference in Churchill's telegram to a sec- 
ond front in 1943, emphasizing that the Soviet government could 
not 'acquiesce in the postponement of a Second Front in Europe 
until 1943.2 
As if this telegram, which ignored that Britain had given no 
undertaking either to ship supplies or to invade the Continent in 
1942,3were not enough, rumours about PQ 17 began to circulate in 
London. With little difficulty they were traced to the Soviet 
embassy, 
4and 
when Maisky and Admiral Kharmalov were called to con- 
sultations with Eden and Pound, they took it upon themselves to 
criticize the Admiralty's controversial decision. Kharmalov dec- 
lared that 
1 Churchill, pp. 239-41. 
2 Ibid., pp. 241-3. Stalin's irritation was doubtless increased 
by the fact that less than two weeks before this he had agreed 
to a temporary diversion of forty light bombers at Basra to the 
British forces in the Middle East. (FRUS, 1942, III, pp. 606- 
7; wi(42)85th concl., min. 1,3 July 1942, CAB 65/27. ) 
3 See Aide-Memoire for Molotov on continental landings, 10 June 
1942, Churchill, p. 305- 
4 WVM(42)101st concl., 1 Aug. 1942, CAB 65/27. 
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the British Admiralty had made a mistake. The basis of the 
mistake was that the Tirpitz, even if it had come out of 
the fiord in which it was stationed, could not all the same 
have caught up, with the convoy. The distance from the fiord 
to the convoy was too great. Consequently there was no jus- 
tification for recalling the cruisers, and still more the 
destroyers. 
Maisky added 'with emphasis', 'No one denies the great services 
of the British Navy in this war, but ... but even British Admi- 
rals are not without sin. '1 
The Russians' remarks were tactless, but beneath them lay a 
disappointment which was perhaps understandable. They were fac- 
ing a serious situation on their own military front, for the Red 
Army's offensive against Kharkov in May had seriously misfired. 
The Wehrmacht was advancing after its own blow in the Kursk area 
in June and had brought to an end the nine-month-old siege of 
Sebastopol, an event which the Russians put in damning contrast 
to the Britons' swift loss of Tobruk on 21 June 1942.2 The Rus- 
sians needed relief, from either a second front or increased sup- 
plies, and were being denied both for reasons of which they, as 
a land power, had little understanding. They doubtless felt the 
injustice of PQ 17 which owed nothing directly to their incompe- 
tence and came just when they were exerting themselves in defence 
of the convoys. The British did not take them into their confid- 
ence and give them details of the shipping losses which paralysed 
their convoys. 
3 All the Russians could see was that British 
boasts of 'making supplies available at the centres of production' 
were hollow, when it was on the Eastern front that these supplies 
were needed. What did it benefit them if 2,443 tanks were supp- 
lied but only 1,442 reached the Soviet Union on time; if only 
1,323 of the 1,822 aircraft saw action in the summer, and an even 
smaller proportion of Bren carriers? 
4 
How could they rely on 
British aid if there were no guarantee that losses would be repla- 
ced, 
5and 
when in practice only minor items of civil equipment and 
spare parts for military equipment were replaced? 
6 
Nonetheless, whatever their cause for complaint, Stalin and 
1 Maisky, Memoirs, p. 313- 
2 Werth, Russia at War, pp. 368-9. 
3 ADM 1/13092, Feb. 1943- 
4 Wp(42)417,17 Sept. 1942, table A, CAB 66/28. See page 136. 
5 WP(42)417, CAB 66/28. The Americans also assumed no oblig- 
ation to replace losses during shipment (Visc. Halifax no. 
329 USLON MOSSY, 18 June 1942, FO 371 32865 N2324/1/38. 
6 ASE(42)172, MT 59/551. 
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Maisky did the British an injustice. They chose to ignore in 
the crisis of July what in the past they had freely acknowledged 
- that Britain's achievement under the first protocol was remark- 
able. Stalin had told the new ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark 
Kerr, in March of his 
gratification at the promptitude and regularity with which 
supplies were arriving from Great Britain, which he confes- 
sed had taken him and his people by surprise, for they had 
been persuaded that we could not live up to our commitments 
and would fail as the Americans had. 
1 
Britain had sacrificed her interests to maintain her commitments 
at a critical time in the war. She had ignored the reservations 
of her military chiefs and had compensated for the Americansin 
both tanks and aircraft without immediate repayment. She had 
provided more in major military items than the Americans2despite 
the vast disparity in their potential strength. The goodwill and 
readiness to fulfil obligations which Stalin said was lacking had 
dominated her thinking. It had ensured that the protocol was ful- 
filled in circumstances vastly different to those envisaged at the 
time of its signature in October 1941. 
I 
1 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 4,29 Mar. 1942, WO 193/645A. 
For Maisky's gratitude see conversation between him and 
Lyttelton, 9 Apr. 1942, BT 28/144, SEC/12/3. Stalin's 
comment contrasts strikingly with Roosevelt's statement to 
Morgenthau at approximately the same time. 
2 Stettinius, Lend-Lease, p. 208.4 
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MILITARY SUPPLIES UNDER THE PROTOCOL 
Item Pro- Made Arrived Sunk En Remarks 
raised Avail- U. S. S. R. Route 
able 25 July 
Fighter aircraft 1,800 1,822 1,323 288 211 
ARMY SUPPLIES 
Tanks (with 2,250 2,443" 1,442 470 531+ * includes 127 
ammunition) sent in 1941 to 
meet USA defic- 
Bren carriers 1,800 1,882 
Bren Guns (with 1,800 1,853 
ammunition) 
2-pdr A/T Guns 500 500 
(with ammunition) 
Boys A/T rifles 2,300 2,300 
(with ammunition) 
M/T vehicles 3,000 3,001 
(trucks) 
NAVAL SUPPLIES 
A/M. M/S trawlers 9 9 
130 mm. Vickers 50 - 
Barrels with Locks 
and spare barrels 
A/A. M/Gs (with 
ammunition) - 
(i) Oerlikons 230 230 
(ii) Colts 300 300 
(iii) .5 Quads 
61* 61 
iency and 92 
extra sent in 
June 1942. 
+ includes 285 
from Canada. 
1,049 220 613* * all from 
Canada 
1,411 242 200 










_ delivery at rate 
of 8 each month 
from Aug. 1942 
-* an additional 
120 have been 
shipped from USA 
200 
18 * 30 + balance 
of production 
Asdics 100 57 
Storage Batteries 32 13 52 -5 Balance for del- 
l48 ivery by Sept. 
1942 
Source: CAB 66/28, WP(42) 417, Report on the Fulfilment of the Moscow 
Protocol, 17 September 1942, table A. 
(The last three lines of the table are reproduced as in the original. 
Presumably, though, the last two lines of the 4th, 5th and 6th columns 
should be transposed upwards. ) - 
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5 
The Moscow or first 'protocol' was in many ways Britain's 
protocol. Her delegation had dominated its signature at Moscow; 
her navy had escorted its convoys to north Russia; her army had 
controlled the delivery of supplies through the Persian Gulf; 
and comparatively speaking, her performance had been the more 
impressive. This was a dominance by the British, however, which 
was not to last. In the second and succeeding protocols, the 
United States assumed her natural preeminence. Her industry rea- 
lized its full potential and Russian needs changed to those which 
production on this scale alone could meet. Shipping was needed 
in quantities too, quite beyond British capacity, and the Persian 
Gulf demanded aid on scales which only the Americans could provide. 
The northern convoys alone remained predominantly Britain's sphere, 
and even here her merchant vessels formed the minority of those she 
escorted. 
The effect of this change in the balance of the protocols was 
that British control over them diminished. For political and mil- 
itary reasons the British became increasingly eager in 1942 and 
1943 to alter at least features of the supply agreement, but the 
wishes of the Americans, the dominant partner, prevailed. In many 
cases it was the'wishes almost of Roosevelt alone, whose commit- 
ment to supplying the Soviet Union remained so uncritical that 
even when his advisers agreed with the British, he overruled them. 
The protocols therefore remained an unquestioning, diplomatic com- 
mitment, justified as before by a broad assumption of their poli- 
tical and military necessity, not by any critical analysis of the 
resources available to the three powers. 
This was increasingly contrary to the thinking of the British 
who, wracked by the problems of the first protocol, were deter- 
mined not to repeat them in the second. Any commitment after 30 
June 1942, they came to believe in the spring, must be based on 
frank discussion with the Russians of their operational and prod- 
uction situation. 'Any further allocation of the available re- 
sources of the Allies in raw materials and munitions must be gov- 
erned by the general war situation and by our strategic needs and 
plans'. 
1 
The best way such an allocation could be arranged, the 
1 ASE(42)93,17 Mar. 1942, CAB 92/3. This is a draft memorandum 
by Eden, which later became DO(42)33. 
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British believed, was through another tripartite conference in 
Moscow. The difference between this and its predecessor would 
be that the Russians would have to justify their demands. 
On this there was almost universal consensus in London. The 
Service departments, of course, had felt since Pearl Harbor that 
their claim on the scarce munitions and shipping resources was 
equal to that of the Russians, but through the spring they had 
become increasingly convinced of this by reports from the military 
mission in Moscow. These officers, denied any meaningful contact 
with their counterparts in the Soviet forces, 
1increasingly 
ques- 
tioned the legitimacy of Russian claims for aid and the use to 
which British supplies were put. Technicians sent to train the 
Russians in the use of British weapons were often ignored, 
2and 
there were worrying stories of Russians, in their efforts to im- 
provise, leaving spanners in engines, damaging machinery with 
which they were unfamiliar3and flying aircraft with their brakes 
on during take-off and landing. 
4 
Masses of tents, completely un- 
suitable for Russian conditions, were known to be arriving in the 
Soviet Union, and the air section of number 30 Military Mission 
thought that much of the parachute and gas equipment was unlikely 
to be used until after the war. 
5 
The mission became insistent 
that the flow of supplies should be conditional on greater Russ- 
ian co-operation with them, and for some time they opposed the 
increase in spare parts on these grounds. 
6 
Eventually they were 
prepared to admit that the Russian skill at improvising was unique 
and that the Red Army was 
technically and operationally very well qualified to use the 
armaments against the Germans. Other things, and especially 
shipping, being equal we should undoubtedly give the Russians 
anything they ask for and we can spare. 
1 For a short history of the mission see J. Beaumont, 'A Question 
of Diplomacy: British Military Mission 1941-1945', Journal of 
the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, ' Sept. 
1973- 
2 Air Vice-Marshal Collier to CAS, AIR 2738,3 Feb. 1942, AIR 
2/7861; War diary entry for 30 April 1942, WO 178/26; the 
mission was reduced considerably in size in March 1942 (app- 
endix D, March diary entry, WO 178/26). 
3 Final report of 'Shallow' (Hurricane instruction party), 18 
Jan. 1942, AIR 2/7861. 
4 Report on conditions encountered during Operation 'Shallow', 
10 Apr 1942, AIR 46/21. 
5 Final report of 'Shallow', loc. cit. 
6 30 Mission, Moscow to Kuibyshev, MIL 3419,6 Mar. 1942, WO 
178/26. 
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But, Macfarlane advised the Chiefs of Staff on 13 April, 'as re- 
gards items which we urgently need ourselves we must make it clear 
that we cannot contemplate provision unless they prove to us that 
their need is greater and more imminent than ours. The situation 
is very different to what it was at the time of the Moscow con- 
ference. '1 
There was a ready audience for this advice in London. The 
Joint Planners in their strategic directive for munitions' assign- 
ment on 29 March recommended that in future supplies should be 
based 'on Russian essential needs rather than on giving maximum 
aid to Russia within limits of transportation capability. '2 The 
C. I. G. S. went further and wanted to force co-operation on the 
Russians before even agreeing to discuss the continuation of supp- 
lies. 'Hitherto', he said early in April, 'we had given everything 
to the Russians; we were now proposing to sign a treaty with them 
and we had still really got nothing in return. ... before we 
embarked on any conference for the renewal of the Arms Protocol ... 
he would want information in regard to Russian military dispositions, 
the state of their material, etc. At present we knew more about 
the German army on the Russian front than we did about the Russian 
army. '3 The Foreign Office feared this type of demarche might do 
Anglo-Soviet relations 'incalculable harm', 
4but 
still agreed it was 
desirable to make the supply policy towards the Soviet Union more 
rational. A conference in Moscow it thought would achieve this, 
and would have the added political benefit of including the Russ- 
ians in the type of discussion from which they had so far been ex- 
cluded. 
5 It would also be preferable to including the Russians on 
the Anglo-American committees since these were in their infancy, 
and it was unlikely that Moscow would delegate sufficient authority 
to any Soviet representative. 
The A. S. E. as a whole, with Eden now as chairman after Beaver- 
brook's departure, agreed. It thought also that a conference would 
serve the further purpose of explaining to the Russians in detail 
the operational considerations which made it impossible for Britain 
to increase her supply commitments after June 1942.6 Beaverbrook 
1 Macfarlane to COS, MIL 4219,13 Apr. 1942, WO 178/26. 
2 JP(42)332,29 Mar. 1942, CAB 84/44. 
3 Minute Cadogan for SOS, 9 Apr. 1942, FO 371 32864 N1875/1/38. 
4 Minute by Mr. Warner of Northern dept., 12 Mar. 1942, 
F0 371 32898 N1294/23/38. 
5 ASE(42)85,16 Mar. 1942, CAB 92/3- 
6 ASE(42)93,17 Mar. 1942, CAB 92/3; confidential annex to ASE(42) 
8th mtg, min. 5,21 Mar. 1942, FO 371 32863 N1852/1/38. 
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had given an oral undertaking in October 1941 that, subject to 
enemy action or force mai 'eure, supplies would be increased by 
50 per cent in July 1942 and by a further 50 per cent at the 
end of that year. 
1 He had the authority of Churchill for doing 
so at the time, 
2but 
events since then had made the promise un- 
realistic. Nonetheless the Russians were still anticipating 
an increase, since Beaverbrook, Maisky claimed, had taken it 
upon himself, when no longer a member of the government, to 
assure the ambassador that the promise still stood. 
3 
With almost complete unanimity, therefore, London suggested 
to Washington that a supply conference be convened in Moscow to 
discuss the second protocol. There were a few dissenters to this 
recommendation, amongst them the Minister for Production and 
deputy-chairman of the A. S. E., Lyttelton. He thought that the 
pressure to reach a quick and spectacular agreement at this con- 
ference would force the British to make excessive promises, whe- 
ther the Russians proved co-operative or not. What would be wor- 
se, the Russ'jans would realize this and would be tempted to ex- 
ploit it to their own advantage. Lyttelton therefore favoured, 
as did Portal 
4and 
E. P. Donaldson, of the A. S. E. secretariat, 
5 
the gradual incorporation of the Russians into the Anglo-American 
committees where their suspicions of the West would soon diminish. 
6 
However, his proposals remained academic, as did those of the 
A. S. E. Both were dismissed by President Roosevelt who, though his 
own advisers sympathized with the British position, saw things very 
differently. He had given instructions to his Secretaries for War 
and the Navy on 24 March: 
I understand that, from a strategical point of view, the 
Army and Navy feel that aid to Russia should be continued 
and expanded to the maximum extent possible, consistent 
with shipping possibilities and the vital needs of the 
United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and 
other of the United Nations. I share such a view. 
... I desire that you submit to me by April 6th next 
the monthly assignment schedules of major items pertaining 
to your department which you recommend be offered to the 
U. S. S. R. during the period July 1,1942 - June 30,1943. 
It is appreciated that Soviet needs may not be known, but, 
1 ASE(42)93, loc. cit. 
2 Guide for Lord Beaverbrook, 19 Sept. 1941, PREM 3 401/7. 
3 Donaldson minute for Eden, 13 June 1942, F0 371 32934 N3189/ 
178/38. 
4 Minute to SOS, 19 Mar. 1942, AIR 19/20. 
5 Memorandum by Donaldson, 14 Mar. 1942, FO 371 32863 N1545/1/38. 
6 ASE(42)89,18 Mar. 1942, CAB 92/3. 
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when necessary, assumptions should be made which are based 
on your estimate of the Soviet situation. 1 
Not surprisingly, when confronted with the British proposal for 
a conference, the President declared it not feasible. The best 
approach, he declared, was for the United States and His Majesty's 
Government to determine what they could offer the Russians and 
inform them of this jointly. 
2 
To the U. S. ambassador in Moscow, Admiral Standley, Roosevelt's 
decisions 'initiated a policy of appeasement of the Soviets', 
3and 
no doubt many in London agreed with him. They had no choice, how- 
ever, but to acquiesce. Their proposed conference could succeed 
only if they and the Americans presented the Russians with a uni- 
ted front. Without this they could only do what Roosevelt had 
advised his subordinates'to do - make assumptions about Russian 
needs and judge accordingly whether these or their own had priority. 
In practice this involved them once again in considerable diffic- 
ulties. In tanks, for instance, although the British position had 
improved with an increased supply of medium tanks from the United 
States and a surplus production of infantry tanks at home, the 
Defence Committee was divided as to how to allocate these supplies. 
Lyttelton wanted to give the Russians the promised 50 per cent 
increase, 5but the C. I. G. S. argued that the surplus production was 
needed for the build-up for continental operations. He would not 
guarantee 'Sledgehammer', the landing in France then under consid- 
eration for 1942, unless more tanks boosted the armoured reserves. 
6 
Supplies from the United States were never totally reliable, given 
the shipping shortages -- in fact at that time production of 
Valentines in Great Britain was being cut by the failure of trans- 
missions and suspensions to arrive from the United States. The 
? 
Defence Committee therefore, impressed by the need for a second 
front, decided on. 29 April to maintain the offer of tanks at its 
present level only. 
8 
At the same meeting it was-decided to continue supplying air- 
craft at the previous rate of 200 a_month until the end of the 
year. This was again a controversial decision, for Sinclair 
1 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics 1940-1.943, p. 560. 
2 FO to Washington, no. 2566,15 Apr. 1942, FO 371 32863 
N1865/1/38- 
3 Standley and Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, p. 240. 
4 Duncan Hall and Wrigley, Studies of Overseas Supply, p. 34. 
5 WP(42)178,26 Apr. 1942, CAB 66/24. 
6 DO(42) 13th mtg, min. 2,29 Apr. 1942, CAB 69/4. 
7 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 381. 
8 DO(42) 13th mtg, min. 2. 
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warned his colleagues that continuing the Russian commitment 
would mean running 'further risks in India or the Middle East, 
or the Trade Routes or in the night defence of our ports and 
factories'. ' The Ministry of Aircraft Production however, dis- 
puted this, arguing that it was quite within Britain's capabil- 
ities to meet the Russian commitment with Hurricanes, Mustangs 
and Airacobras. 
2 This was the view that prevailed. 
No sooner had these decisions been communicated to the Ameri- 
cans on 2 May, however, 
3than the situation arose which the Brit- 
ish had hoped to avoid with a tripartite conference. All their 
calculations were shattered by a major and unilateral reassesment 
of supply policy in the United States. This occurred because 
dissatisfaction had grown in Washington during the spring at the 
diversion of U. S. aircraft to other countries. American aircraft 
production had not expanded in the spectacular manner anticipated 
in January 
4and 
the U. S. A. A. F. failed to reach even its minimum 
programme in these months. Consequently in April Arnold and Mar- 
shall both vetoed an allocation of twenty-nine transport aircraft 
to the Russians which the M. A. B. had approved, 
5and 
proposed cuts 
in both British and protocol allocations in the future. As Arn- 
old said on 1 April, 
as far as equipment was concerned, the Air Forces were trea- 
ted like a sort of step-child. After all other nations were 
given the airplanes they asked for, the United States Air 
Forces received what was left. 6 
If America's build-up for operations in Europe was to proceed, 
Arnold said, this drain on aircraft must stop, and the Russians 
must receive 983 less aircraft in the second than in the first 
protocol.? Marshall, believing that the United States had gone 
beyond the 'reasonable point' in generosity, 
8presented 
a similar 
plan later in May-9 Roosevelt, however, would consider neither 
of these recommendations, and insisted that the Russians should 
continue to receive 212 planes a month, at least until October 
1 Memorandum: Aircraft for Russia, 23 Apr. 1942, BT 28/144, 
SEC/12/8. 
2 Liewellin (now Minister of Aircraft Production) to Lyttelton, 
28 Apr. 1942, BT 28/144, SEC/12/13. 
3 ASE(42)117,2 May 1942, CAB 92/4. 
4 Duncan Hall, pp. 361-2. 
5 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp. 207-10- 
6 Lukas, Air Force Aspects ..., p. 246. 
7 Ibid., p. 248. 
8 Matloff and Snell, p. 209. 
9 Lukas, p. 250. 
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1942.1 In compensation, however, he agreed to Arnold's plan 
for cutting British allocations. He adopted the principle that 
'every appropriate aircraft built in the U. S. A. should be manned 
and fought by American crews, '2with the exception of the Soviet 
Union where because of 'geographic, logistic and racial problems 
the American planes will in general be flown and maintained by 
Russians'. 3 
This meant that British allocations, previously set at 7,000 
for the months June to December 1942, were reduced to little more 
than 3,000.4 This, in the opinion of the Air Ministry, amounted 
'to a breach of faith ... (which) would be disastrous in its 
effect not only on our ultimate expansion, but still more on our 
capacity to meet in this crucial year the present requirements 
of the R. A. F. in areas in which we are actually fighting. '5 Al- 
though, as became clear in later negotiations, the Americans were 
to supply those R. A. F. squadrons using U. S. aircraft for which 
U. S. units could not be substituted, and were to send U. S. squadr- 
ons to British and Combined theatres of operations, 
6Portal 
fear- 
ed 'a definite loss of impact against the enemy'. He doubted 
whether American units would be adequately trained or would arr- 
ive on the promised dates.? Even. if they did, the fact remained 
that Air Ministry planning for 1942 was confounded. Whereas it 
had counted on vast increases in supplies with American bellig- 
erence, in the whole of 1942 it received only 1,653 more aircraft 
than in 1941.8 
Despite this the British still maintained their offer of air- 
craft to the Soviet Union. Even it, they knew well, would dis- 
appoint their ally; and to supplement it, the A. S. E., despite 
the reservations of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, 
9offered 
a further 6,000 tons of aluminium in three monthly instalments 
of 2,000 tons each. 
10 It also offered greater quantities of other 
military supplies for the second protocol period. Six hundred 
more Bren carriers from Canada, 100 more two-pounder anti-tank 
guns and 1,300 more anti-tank rifles were offered, as well as 
1 Lukas, pp. 246,250. 
2 Arnold-Towers-Portal (A/T/P) Agreement, 21 June 1942, AIR 8/648. 
3 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, p. 407. 
4 Craven and Cate, p. 408. 
5 COS(42)141(0), annex 3,20 May 1942, AIR 8/647. 
6 A/T/P Agreement, loc. cit. 
7 Butler, Grand Strategy, p. 557- 
8 Duncan Hall and Wrigley, p. 32. 
9 ASE(42) 11th mtg, min. 3 (ii), 11 May 1942, CAB 92/2. 
10 WM(42) 63rd concl., min. 3,14 May 1942, CAB 65/26. 
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600 six-pounder anti-tank guns, a new commitment. Naval supplies 
outstanding from the last nine months were also maintained, and 
though there was no specific order for food, the British agreed 
to supply some as 'broken stowage' in ships carrying military 
supplies. Added to all this were substantial quantities of raw 
materials., 
1which 
brought the total tonnage promised 'to'" 800,000 
to 1,000,000 tons. 2 
The extent of America's dominance in the second protocol is 
shown by the fact that her offer to the Soviet Union was over 
seven times this - 7.2 million short tons. Of this, 1.1 million 
were naval and military supplies and ammunition; 1.8 million tons 
were machinery and industrial equipment, and 4.3 million tons, 
food products, 
3which 
had been insignificant in the first protocol. 
Two hundred and twelve aircraft were promised each month until 
October 1942, and though this fell far short of the 300 a month 
the Russians wanted, they were promised in compensation 7,500 
tanks, which was 2,250 more than they requested. Moreover, lorr- 
ies were to be provided by the United States at a rate of 10,000 
a'month; scout cars and jeeps were to be continued on first prot- 
ocol scales, and new items like motor cycles, radio equipment and 
prime movers for artillery were included. The United States in 
fact offered thirty-four items of military equipment alone4com- 
pared with less than one dozen on the shared U. S. -British list 
in the first protocol and only ten on the British schedule for 
the second. 
5 
Together the British and American commitments amounted to over 
8 million short tons. It was apparent to everyone, however, in 
view of the shipping difficulties then being experienced, that 
nowhere near this total could be transported to the Soviet Union. 
It was decided therefore in May by the informal committee Roose- 
velt set up under Hopkins to prepare the American schedules, to 
offer the Russians the full list of supplies from which they 
could choose 4.4 million short tons. This was the quantity which 
the C. S. A. B. estimated could be carried by the northern and Per- 
sian Gulf routes, a highly optimistic estimate in fact as was 
1 WP(43) 475,25 Oct. 1943, CAB 66/42. 
2 FRUS, 1942, III, p. 709. 
3 Ibid. 
4 U. S. State Department, Wartime International Agreements, Soviet 
Supply Protocols, Publication 2759 (Washington, 1948) pp. 19 ff. 
5 WP(42) 417,17 Sept, 1942, CAB 66/28; WP(43) 475,25 Oct. 1943, 
CAB 66/42. 
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noon pointed out by Admiral King. Not only did it assume that 
losses on the northern route would be 10 per cent when in March, 
April and May they had been 18 per cent, but it took an unduly 
sanguine view of the Persian Gulf's capacity. General Marshall 
and Admiral King both thought the target unattainable, and told 
the President on 31 May that such a figure could be met only if 
some other war effort of the Allied nations were curtailed. 
1 
Roosevelt, however, showed the facility, in the words of Ad- 
miral Andrew Cunningham, 'to sweep difficulties away with a wave 
of the hand'. 
2 He did propose to Molotov, then visiting Washing- 
ton, that the shipment of general supplies to the Soviet Union 
be reduced during the second protocol period from 2,300,000 tons 
to 700,000 so that more shipping could be diverted to 'Bolero', 
the build-up of troops in Britain for the invasion of the Cont- 
inent. As he said to the Soviet Foreign Minister, every ship 
that could be shifted to the English run 
meant that the second front was so much nearer to being 
realized. After all, ships could not be in two places at 
once, and hence, every ton we could save out of the total 
of 4,100,000 tons would be so much to the good. The Sov- 
iets could not have their cake and eat it too. 3 
When Molotov seemed intent on doing just that, though, and actually 
asked Roosevelt to guarantee a convoy every month from the United 
States to north Russia, 
4the 
President did not press his point-5 
The plan to ship 4.4 million short tons of supplies, 3.3 million 
by the northern route and 1.1 million by the Persian Gulf, went 
ahead, and a clause to this effect was inserted in the protocol 
agreement. 
6 
To the annoyance of the British, who thought the 
estimate too optimistic7and who eschewed any definite shipping 
undertaking at all, the Allies were committed to the following: 
'Within the limits imposed from time to time by the factors 
mentioned' - escorts for the northern route, shortages of ship- 
ping and inland transportation in Persia - 'we will supply the 
shipping necessary to lift that part of the programme for which 
1 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 561-2. 
2 Letter from Cunningham to 'Doodles' (an aunt), 23 Aug. 1942, 
ADD MSS 52559, British Museum. Cunningham was then on the 
BAD, Washington. 
3 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 562-3- 
4 FRUS 1942, III, pp. 707-8. 
5 Leighton and Coakley, p. 563- 
6 ASE(42)143,8 June 1942, CAB 92/4. 
7 AM to Britman, Washington, OZ. 51,20 Apr. 1942, PREM 3 401/11. 
8 ASE(42) 8th mtg, confidential annex, 21 gar. 1942, FO 371 
32863 N1852/1/38. 
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U. S. S. R. ships can not be made available. '1 What is more, the 
'escape clause', thanks to Roosevelt, was considerably less 
specific than the British - and Marshall - wanted. It was 
stronger than in the first protocol certainly, but still a rel- 
atively unimpressive safeguard of Allied interests. 
It is understood (the clause read) that any program of this 
sort must be tentative in character and must be subject to 
unforeseen changes which the progress of the war may require 
from the standpoint of stores as well as from the standpoint 
of shipping. 2 
The second protocol, therefore, bore very much the mark of the 
Americans, and of Roosevelt in particular. Thanks to them it was 
exactly what the British had opposed -a statement of the maximum 
the Allies could provide and ship. Possibly the Americans were 
more realistic than the British: all experience with the Kremlin 
suggested that it would never provide the information needed for 
a rational analysis of the three Powers' needs and resources. 
Yet in many other ways the American approach was extremely unreal- 
istic. Even before the protocol was formally signed in Washington 
on 6 October 1942 (it had been'agreed to by the Russians and imp- 
lemented from early in July), it was clear that much of it was 
inappropriate to the strategic situation then. It was impossible 
to predict with any accuracy even three months ahead either the 
shipping position or Russian needs, for both of these were con- 
stantly changing. A predetermined supply programme quickly lost 
its relevance. 
As early as August, for instance, the Russians began altering 
the emphases of their demands. One of the first opportunities 
they seized to do this was Churchill's visit to Moscow in the 
middle of this month. Like the supply conference eleven months 
earlier this meeting coincided with one of the most profound mil- 
itary crises on the Eastern front - in the preceding week the Red 
Army had lost ? 50 guns, 1,000 tanks and 57,000 prisoners of war 
to the Wehrmacht. 
3 
This conference also was one of fluctuating 
moods, and though it ended on a note of extreme cordiality, its 
second day saw bitter recrimination by the Russians, including 
an attack on the protocol programme. 
4 
On this day Stalin, it 
1 ASE(42)143, loc. cit. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 563- 
3 M. Howard, Grand Strategy, vol. IV, August 1942 - September 
1943 (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 31- 
4 See Churchill, The Second World War, IV, pp. 425-51 for a 
full account of the conference. 
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seems, was reflecting the dismay of the Soviet High Command, 
the Stavka, at Churchill's news that the continental landing 
had been abandoned in favour of landings in north Africa. 
1 
As well, Stalin may have been influenced not simply by the 
news from the front but by the behaviour of the British Gen- 
erals, which, almost without exception, 
2was 
offensive. Clark 
Kerr wrote of the British meeting with the Soviet Assistant 
Commissar for Defence, Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, at Moscow 
airport: 
I was struck by the bad manners of our soldiers. After 
introductions they left the sick old man standing, alone 
and abandoned, to watch them while they chatter among 
themselves and fussed quite unnecessarily, about their 
luggage. Finally I had to take hold of Wavell, who speaks 
Russian, and make him be polite. He was surprised. 3 
Another member of the embassy staff recorded similar impressions: 
The Generals, I thought, distinguished themselves by their 
bad, or rather, inadequate manners. For instance: Wavell 
sat next to Malenkov at the Kremlin dinner, and, although 
making a competent speech in Russian, never addressed a 
single word to his eunuch-like neighbour. I was sitting 
next to Voroshilov, a fine hearty old soul, willing to talk 
about anything with great vivacity and expertise, but the 
CIGS who was sitting on the other side of him could hardly 
be induced to stop masticating to answer his occasional 
questions. k 
It is understandable, perhaps, that at his gloomiest meeting with 
Churchill Stalin insisted that the backlog in supplies was caused 
not by enemy action but by 'an underestimate of the importance of 
the Russian front. This led to supplies only being given from 
the remnant of equipment which could be spared'. 
5 What the Red 
Army needed immediately, he said later, was aluminium and lorries 
- as many as 20,000 to 25,000 monthly - 
in preference to tanks, 
1 Ulam, Stalin, p. 572. 
2 The exception being Air Marshal Tedder of Middle East Command, 
who was 'beyond praise and got on hugging terms with 
No. 1 
Gestapo Chief Beria, who was very drunk' at the Kremlin ban- 
quet. (Clark Kerr's personal account of Churchill's Moscow 
visit, Fo 800/300. ) 
3 Ibid. 
4 Letter from John Reed, 19 Aug. 1942, FO 800/300. Major A. 
Birse, Churchill's interpreter at this and later conferences, 
told the author in June 1974 that Wavell's Russian was very 
poor. G. M. Malenkov was a member of the State Defence Comm- 
ittee. Marshal K. E. Voroshilov was vice-president of the 
Council of People's Commissars and a member of the State 
Committee of Defence. 
5 Minutes of mtg of 13 Aug. 1942, FO 800/300. 
I, - 
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of which the Soviet Union was producing 2,000 a month. 
1 
This was the first of many indications; of the Red Army's grow- 
ing need for mobility, and this kind of request characterized 
the rest of the protocol period. The demand for lorries contin- 
ued, together with pleas for transport aircraft, aluminium and 
food, all reflecting the Russian retreat in autumn 1942 over 
vast expanses of territory in the south. On 1 August Maisky ad- 
mitted that the Soviet Union had lost three-quarters of its alum- 
inium supplies, 
2and in early September he pleased for lorries and 
'hundreds' of transport aircraft. 
3 In response the British agreed 
to supply a further 6,000 tons of aluminium from September to Dec- 
ember, 
4and 
in the following months provided 520 three-ton and 382 
thirty-cwt lorries. 5 Furthermore, even though they were almost 
entirely dependent on the United States for supplies of trans- 
port aircraft themselves, they offered as a gesture to the Russ- 
ians one hundred Albermarles which could be converted to carry 
troops.? 
This did not satisfy the Russians. Late in September Stalin 
again pressed their claims during the visit of another Allied 
dignatory. This time it was 'Mendell Willkie, who had previously 
been Roosevelt's election opponent but was now the President's 
special emissary to the Soviet leader. At a banquet given in 
the American's honour on 26 September Stalin attacked the Allies 
for sending the Red Army obsolescent aircraft - Hurricanes instead 
of-Spitfires and Kittyhawks instead of the desired Airacobras. 
8 
He also complained bitterly at the fact that 150 Airacobras en 
route to north Russia had been diverted9to the U. S. A. A. F. in 
Britain on 12 September. This had been done at the express re- 
quest of General Marshall to assist the preparations for the in- 
vasion of north Africa, 
l0but Stalin was not impressed with the 
1 Churchill, IV, p. 450; note for Sir Walter Layton, 7 Sept. 
1942, BT 28/144, SEC/12/8. 
2 ASE(42)168, CAB 92/4. 
3 ASE(42)176, annex A and B, ? Sept. 1942, CAB 92/4. 
4 ASE(42)184,1 Oct. 1942, CAB 92/4. 
5 WP(43)475,25 Oct. 1943, CAB 66/42. 
6 ASE(42) 19th mtg, min. 3,11 Sept. 1942, CAB 92/2. 
7 Minute Eden to PM, PM/42/90,23 Sept. 1942, PREM 3 401/17. 
8 FRUS, 1942, III, p. 725- 
9 Ibid., p. 643- 
10 In fact the number of planes diverted was 176 (Staff confer- 
ence at Chequers, 12 Sept. 1942, PREM 3 395/5). They were to 
be replaced via the Alaska-Siberia route in October, November, 
and December (Tel. AGINAR, 'N'ton, 12 Sept. 1942, PREM 3 401/21). 
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British ambassador's response that he had lost sight of the common 
cause in which the machines had been retained. 
1 
Clark Kerr wrote 
later to Mr. Warner of the Northern department of the Foreign 
Office: 
Willkie had told me that he (Stalin) was mudsick about the 
Airacobras, but it had not occurred to me that he would blurt 
it all out, as gracelessly as he did, over his dinner table. 
When I got back to my bed I thought of a dozen different for- 
mulae I might have used, and did not, in my reply. Indeed 
from my bed I squelched him flat, whereas at the banquet I 
feared that I left him as plump and pear-shaped as God made 
him. 2 
As if to demonstrate this, Stalin on 3 October approached both 
Roosevelt and Churchill with a further request for aircraft. The 
month of October, he later admitted, was the most dangerous time 
for the Soviet Union in the whole war, 
3and German troops had ad- 
vanced into the heart of Stalingrad on the Volga. They had been 
able to do this, Stalin told Churchill and Roosevelt, partly bec- 
ause they had attained a2 to 1 superiority in aircraft in the 
area. As a result the Red Army needed from its allies 800 fight- 
ers a month, 300 from the British and 500 from the Americans. 
These supplies, Stalin said, were more urgent than tanks and art- 
illery, which they could temporarily replace. 
4 
He went on further 
in the days that followed to ask for more aluminium, more explos- 
ives, two million tons of grain and a guarantee of 8,000 to 10,000 
trucks a month. 
5 
Shipments of the last of these had fallen greatly 
into arrears and Soviet production could in no way compensate. It 
was, as Stalin had admitted two months earlier, only a meagre 
3,000 lorries a month.? Grain meanwhile had become a much scarcer 
commodity than even the Kremlin had anticipated. In July it had 
excluded wheat from the list of goods with high priority 
for ship- 
ping8but now, as Molotov told Standley on 
6 October, 
The Germans had taken all of the Ukraine and the North Cauc- 
asus and much of the black soil region, which were among 
the 
richest food producing areas of the country. The 
food situa- 
tion would therefore be bad during the winter. The Soviet 
1 Woodward, II, p. 275- 
23 Oct. 1942, F0 800/300- 
3 Werth, Russia at War, p. 443- 
4 Stalin to PM, T. 1293/2,3 Oct. 1942, AIR 8/1054. 
5 Leighton and Coakley, p. 584. 
6 By the end of October the United States had exported only 
10,224 trucks against a commitment of 40,000 (ASE(42)207, 
22/12/42, CAB 92/4). 
7 Note for Sir, Walter Layton, 7 Sept. 1942, BT 28/144, SEC/12/8. 
8 FRUS, 1942, III, p. 712. 
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Union would need 2,000,000 tons of wheat and a corresponding- 
ly large quantity of concentrated foodstuffs such as butter, 
condensed milk, lard, meat products, and so forth. If Great 
Britain and the United States could transfer ships to operate 
under the Soviet flag these products could be imported thr- 
ough Pacific ports. l 
Apart from the critical situation on the Russian front at this 
time, there were strong political reasons for meeting these requ- 
ests, at least in part. As Stalin's attack at the dinner for Will- 
kie had shown, the Allies' standing with the Kremlin had declined 
drastically in the two months since Churchill's visit to Moscow. 
Throughout September Russian representatives in Washington, London 
and Moscow pressed for assurances about the second front 
2which, 
as a result of Molotov's visit to Washington in May and June, they 
expected in 1942, The official statement after this. meeting had 
said that 'full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent 
tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942'. 
3 When by Oct- 
ober, it was clear that this action had been postponed, the Russian 
press assumed a bitter tone. Willkie had declared himself in fav- 
our of a second front, 
4and 
so it was the British who were cast as 
the villains. On 6 October Pravda published a vicious cartoon 
which showed, in the words of the Sunday Times journalist, Alexander 
Werth, 
a number of bald-headed and walrus-moustached Blimps sitting 
round a table and facing two dashing young soldiers in Ameri- 
can unifori. These two were labelled 'General Guts' and 
'General Decision', while the Blimps were called 'General 
What-if-they-lick-us', "General What's-the-hurry', 'General 
Why-take-risks', and so on. 5 
The cartoon was entitled 'The Second Front'. On the day it app- 
eared Stalin's reply to questions submitted to him by the Assoc- 
iated Press correspondent, Henry Cassidy, was also published. In 
this the Russian leader said that the second front occupied a 
place of first-rate importance in the current situation, and that, 
compared with the aid the Soviet Union was giving the 
Allies by 
drawing upon itself the main German forces, 'the aid of the Allies 
1 FRUS, 1942, III, p. 729. 
2 Woodward, II9 pp. 272-5- 
3 Butler, p. 595- 
4 Werth, Russia at War, p. 444. 
5 Werth, p. 445. 
ý* 
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to the Soviet Union has so far been little effective'. 
1 
Public reaction to this in Britain was dulled by the shock at 
the Dieppe raid casualties which indicated the likely cost of a 
continental invasion in 1942.2 Nonetheless the government still 
felt under pressure to respond to Stalin's pleas for aid, espec- 
ially as at this time they were forced by shortage of escorts to 
abandon the convoys to north Russia. 
3 The Chief of Air Staff 
therefore agreed to provide 'at real risk and sacrifice' a once- 
only offer of 150 Spitfires with an extra 50 as spare parts. 
4 
Recognizing that this offer was primarily a 'political gift', 
he offered Spitfires with cannon, 
5not 
machine-guns since these, 
it was known, the Russians thought were of little use. 
6 
Portal's counterparts in the United States, however, were not 
so easily persuaded to make a gesture to the Russians. Under 
pressure from Roosevelt and the Soviet representatives, 
7the 
Joint 
Chiefs of Staff did extend the aircraft commitment of 212 a month 
after it expired on 30 Septeriber; but they would not make any in- 
crease on this, as Roosevelt wished in view of Stalin's plea. The 
President had hoped that, by reducing U. S. coastal defences, he 
could offer the Russians an extra 300 aircraft, but Marshall insis- 
ted that this would affect 'active combat theatres' or seriously 
curtail 'Torch'. Roosevelt had therefore to rest content with 
offering Stalin the food, trucks, explosives and twenty ships for 
the Pacific he had requested. 
8 
Nevertheless, to go some addition-al 
way towards meeting the Russian demand for aircraft - and to comp- 
ensate them for the loss of the northern convoys - the President 
gave his full support to the plans the British then had 
for send- 
ing air squadrons to south Russia early in 1943.9 
1 W. P. and Z. K. Coates, Anglo-Soviet Relations, p. 733. For 
Cassidy's account see H. C. Cassidy, Moscow Dateline 
(Boston, 
1943). This outburst was followed little more than a week later 
by a violent campaign against the British government for its 
handling of the capture of Rudolph Hess. Pravda called England 
'a sanctuary for gangsters' (Werth, p. 
446). 
2 HIWR, no. 105,29 Sept. - 6 Oct. 1942, INFO 1/292C. 
3 See p. 159- 
4 Portal to PM, 1807,7 Oct. 1942, AIR 8/1054. 
5 CAS minute to PM, 17 Oct. 1942, PREM 3 
401/14. 
6 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 243 DEDIP, 12 Oct. 1942, FO 371 32936. 
7 Leighton and Coakley, p. 563- 
8 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning ... 1941-1942, pp. 
346-8; 
Leighton and Coakley, p. 566- 
9 R. E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 
II (London, 1949), p. 636; Matloff and Snell, p. 331. For a full 
account see Howard, pp. 34-40. 
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'Velvet', as this project was called, however, proved to be 
no substitute as far as the Soviet government was concerned for 
an increased supply of aircraft. When it was originally offered 
in August, in compensation for the cancellation of the convoys 
and the six R. A. F. squadrons, 
1Stalin had indicated that the oper- 
ation would be valuable. 
2 
Moreover, his subordinate, Marshal 
Voroshilov, had accepted at the August meeting in Moscow the need 
for preliminary reconnaissance and a liaison mission in Moscow. 
The Russians, however, made it clear on this occasion that they 
would not welcome any offer which did not specify the size, com- 
position and date of arrival of the air forces in the Soviet Union; 
3 
and even when such an offer was made, Stalin proved slow to respond. 
Churchill on 8 October, when breaking the news of the new interrup- 
tion in the convoys, offered 5 bomber and 9 fighter squadrons from 
the R. A. F. and one transport and one heavy bombardment squadron 
from the U. S. A. A. F. 'early in the New Year'. 
4 
He got no reply 
from Stalin accepting this offer until 5 November. 
5 And then, 
when the crisis on the southern Russian front receded with the Red 
Army's counterstroke against the Axis armies on 19-20 November, 
the Russians' 'almost fanatical urge to keep foreigners out of the 
Caucasus' revived. 
6 
Air Marshal Drummond, sent to Moscow at the 
head of an Anglo-American mission to discuss 'Velvet' late in Nov- 
ember, found the Chief Air Staff Officer, Lieutenant-General Fedor 
Falalaev, in complete ignorance of the plan. Even when Falalaev 
had consulted his superiors, the Russians asked not for the squad- 
rons but for the planes alone, for to send the squadrons, the Rus- 
sians knew, would jeopardize the flow of supplies through Iran.? 
London and Washington would not consider this proposal though. 
It would amount simply to another gift of aircraft and would deny 
the whole political value of the combined operation. As Portal 
cabled to Drummond on 1 December, 'the whole raison d'etre of the 
plan' had been not only the development of 'practical co-operation 
of a considerable scale' but also the encouragement of 'a genuine 
spirit of comradeship in arms which would have opened up consider- 
able possibilities in the political and military fields. '8 
1 JP(42)703(0), 29 July 1942, CAB 84/47. 
2 Sherwood, II, p. 617- 
3 Howard, p. 36. 
4 Howard, p. 37- 
5 Matloff and Snell, p. 333; Stalin to PM, T. 1470/2, AIR-9/313- 
6 Air Marshal Sir R. M. Drummond, quoted in Lukas, -p" 350n- 
7 Howard, p. 38. 
8 CAS to Drummond, OZ. 2077,1 Dec. 1942, AIR 9/313; Howard, 
pp. 38-39. 
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Consequently the Anglo-American mission left Moscow on 26 December 
with 'Velvet' moribund. The Allied successes in north Africa and 
the Russian victory at Stalingrad in the following month destroyed 
it completely. Not only was almost 70 per cent of the Luftwaffe's 
single-engine fighters diverted to the Western and Mediterranean 
theatres by February 1943,1but the German threat to the Caucasus 




While the discussions about 'Velvet' had been going on, the Rus- 
sians had continued to press their claims for aircraft through other 
channels. Maisky, on the scent of the prized Spitfires, asked less 
than three weeks after the 150 had been offered in October, for a 
regular commitment of 100 Spitfires a month. This would have brou- 
ght the British monthly commitment of fighters after December 1942 
to 300, the number Stalin had requested earlier. In addition, the 
ambassador pressed for the number of Albemarles to be increased 
from the 100 offered to 500, and for the R. A. F. to ferry the first 
50 to the Soviet Union. 3 The British turned down these requests, 
however; 
4for 
at this stage they had not even decided whether they 
could afford to maintain the current protocol commitment of 200 
fighters a month after the end of 1942. They had no commitment to 
do so, but under Russian pressure they had agreed to include in 
the second protocol agreement a promise that they would give fur- 
ther consideration 'before the termination of their present comm- 
itment ... to the question of continuing or 
increasing supplies 
of aircraft after the end of 1942'. They had not given any under- 
taking in the matter. 
5 
Naturally, though, since Russian pressure for help was so great 
at this time and the conflict on the Eastern front so critically 
balanced, the British found themselves forced to maintain the comm- 
itment - at least at its existing level. Lyttelton, on a visit to 
Washington in November and December, arranged for 150 fighters a 
month to be provided from the United States over the next twelve 
months as part of the British commitment to the Russians. In Dec- 
ember 1942 all of these planes would be Airacobras, of which the 
Russians were now inordinately fond, while from January to March 
1 Lukas, p. 347- 
2 JP(42)703(0) loc. cit. 
3 FO to Moscow, no. 301,26 Oct. 1942, FO 371 32936 N5568/178/388" 
4 FO to Moscow, no. 1531,9 Nov. 1942, ibid; FO to_Moscow, no. 
389 DEDIP, 12 Dec. 1942, F0 371 32937 N6287/178/38- 
5 ASE(42)184, annex III, 1 Oct. 1942, CAB 92/4. m 
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1943 there would be 300 Kittyhawks, a less popular aircraft, and 
150 Airacobras. In return for this, the British would provide 
600 Spitfires for the U. S. A. A. F. squadrons operating in the Uni- 
ted Kingdom, and would meet the balance of their commitment to 
the Russians by supplying 50 Hurricanes a month. This arrange- 
ment was possible only because Roosevelt, with the invasion of 
north Africa on 8 November, felt that he had placated domestic 
opinion; he could now relax his rule of American planes for Amer- 
ican pilots in favour of the idea of 'impact'. 
1 Furthermore, 
American aircraft production was rapidly accelerating at last, 
and even though Roosevelt had admitted on 24 October that his 
'Arcadia' target of 100,000 -aircraft in 1943 was unattainable, 
even his reduced target of 82,000 aircraft presented boundless 
possibilities. 
2 
The British were promised 7,412 aircraft in 1943: 
in addition to the 1,800 fighters for the Russians there would be 
4,611 aircraft for the R. A. F., 2,201 for the Fleet Air Arm and 600 
transport aircraft. 
3 
Despite this, the Air Ministry did not agree to actually incr- 
ease the offer of aircraft to the Russians after 1942. It suspec- 
ted that any further offer above 200 fighters monthly would have 
to include Spitfires, and these it was not prepared to sacrifice. 
Moreover, it was already plagued with the problems of trying to 
clear the backlog of aircraft which had resulted from the shipping 
difficulties earlier in the year. Since this amounted to hundreds, 
it seemed unrealistic to make larger promises for 1943- Further- 
more, there was still the strong feeling in the Air Ministry that 
the Russians had yet to present a convincing case to: show that 
their need for the aircraft was greater than Britain's. Slessor, 
Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Policy), wrote to Portal on 15 
December: 
At present both we and the Americans tremble when a Russian 
arrives on the doorstep, and immediately give him all he 
wants on first priority. No wonder they keep the screw (sic) 
on - it's a glorious arrangement from their point of view. 
I think we are now in a position - especially after their 
rejection of Velvet - to put them through something of the 
same sort of 'third degree' that I have been going through 
during November in Washington. 4 
And three days later: 
1 WP(42)568,9 Dec. 1942, CAB 66/31- 
2 Pres Roosevelt to PM, T. 1370/2,24 Oct. 1942, BT 87/12- 
3 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 392- 
4 AIR 20/3904. 
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I would advise very strongly against any increase in our 
fighter allocations, anyway until mid-1943 when the Typhoon 
may be fit for export and when it will have adequate spares 
to satisfy the Russians. The. -present situation 
is that we 
cannot meet our existing obligations and this gives rise to 
continual trouble with the Russians. At the-same time cont- 
inuous pressure is being brought upon us still further to 
increase our obligations when we should know perfectly well 
that any advantage from making further promises is entirely 
evanescent and there is the immediate sequel of still further 
and indeed well justified suspicion and mistrust on the part 
of the Russians. We are in fact being constantly urged to 
issue dud cheques. 
... D. W. O. agrees. 
l 
Slessor's remarks were prompted by the appalling backlog in 
both American and British deliveries to the Soviet Union at the 
end of the year. Thanks to problems of the supply routes Ameri- 
can supplies were 'far behind' schedule and by the end of November. 
- the critical days at Stalingrad - only 840,000 short tons had 
been shipped against a scheduled 1,608,000 tons. 
2 Meanwhile the 
British anticipated being 545 tanks and 949 aircraft short of 
their commitments by 31 December, and though 429 of the aircraft 
were Airacobras to be supplied from the United States via Alaska, 
the Air Ministry still anticipated being 120 planes behind sched- 
ule when the convoy situation became uncertain in the spring of 
1943.3 Likewise the War Office expected to have cleared by March 
only its backlog of-545 tanks and to be faced with the task of 
shipping 910 tanks in the last three perilous months of the pro- 
tocol. This performance stung one Foreign Office official to 
comment: 
The War Office and the Air Ministry seem to be going on the 
principle of supplying to the Russians whatever can be made 
a#ailable from our surplus production. They seem to ignore 
entirely the fact that we have entered into certain definite 
commitments to the Russians and that the fulfilment of those 
commitments is one of our strongest political cards, and I 
cannot understand why these Service departments were prepared 
to enter these commitments if there was so little chance of 
carrying them out. They can scarcely give the North African 
campaign as an excuse, since we must suppose that they cont- 
emplated offensive action being taken somewhere in 
the period 
from June 1942 to June 1443 and they must have agreed to their 
commitments accordingly. 
1 Minute, 18 Dec. 1942, AIR 20/3906. D. W. O. = Director of War 
Organisation. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 586. 
3 wp(42)602,24 Dec. 1942, FO 371 32878 N6606/1/38. 
4 Minutes discussing draft of ASE(42)207,21 Dec. 1942, FO'371 
32937 N6576/178/38. 
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In their defence, however, the Service department's could answer 
that, when they had agreed to the second protocol, they had been 
loath to give any assurances about their ability to ship the sup- 
plies; and since then PQ 17 had wrought havoc with all their 
calculations. 
Indeed the cancellation of the northern convoys had hit ship- 
ments from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union very severely, 
for in the wake of PQ 17 the U. S. and British governments had 
agreed that the former should have almost exclusive use of the 
Persian Gulf route and the latter 'absolute priority' in any fut- 
ure Arctic convoys. 
1 
The Americans assumed control in August of 
the railways and ports of Iran, 
2leaving 
the-overall strategic res- 
ponsibility for the area and the right to decide 'priority of tra- 
ffic and the allocation of freight' in the hands of the British 
General Officer Commanding Persia and Iraq Command. 
3 The Russians 
agreed to use the Persian Gulf route for American supplies alone 
(with the exception of raw materials from the Indian Ocean area), 
4 
and a new target of 200,000 tons of Soviet supplies a month was 
set for the route. 
5 To make this possible, supplies for the Russ- 
ians by the southern route were given equal shipping priority with 
the Middle East and 'Torch'. The northern convoys meanwhile were 
relegated to third place after the movement of U. S. air forces to 
the United Kingdom. 
6 
There were obvious political disadvantages 
for the British in this arrangement - during breaks in the convoys 
it would appear that aid from the United Kingdom had ceased - but 
the A. S. E. accepted this for the sake of economy of shipping. The 
routes from the United States to the Persian Gulf and from Britain 
to north Russia were approximately equal in length. It was irrat- 
ional to send supplies from Britain to Iran when so many of their 
components had already been imported from the United States. In 
any case, supplies held in Britain for shipment to north Russia 
in the autumn of 1942 were likely, the British thought in July, 
to reach their destination sooner than those sent via the southern 
route, in view of the shorter sailing time. Moreover, these sup- 
plies would arrive at the port of discharge the Russians preferred.? 
1 ASE(42)164,23 July 1942; CAB 92/4. 
2 Matloff and Snell, p. 337- 
3 Leighton and Coakley, p. 577- 
4 FRUS, 1942, III1 p. 718. 
5 Leighton and Coakley, p. 575- 
6 COS(42)235th mtg, min. 2,13 Aug. 1942, CAB 79/22. 
7 ASE(42)16th mtg, min. 1,24 July 1942, CAB 92/2. 
157 
Unfortunately for the British, however, it proved impossible 
to run as many Arctic convoys as they anticipated in the summer 
they would. In August the Ministry of War Transport had plans 
for three convoys in September and October, which would have 
brought protocol shipments up to date; 
1but in the event only one 
of these sailed. Convoys in August were ruled out by the vital 
operation to supply the besieged Malta. This absorbed an air- 
craft carrier, a battleship, three cruisers and eleven destroyers 
from the Home Fleet. 
2 
Sailings to north Russia at this time were 
limited to two Russian merchantmen3and an American task force of 
the heavy cruiser, the Tuscaloosa, and two destroyers. Neither 
of these operations suffered loss, for the American ships, carry- 
ing general cargo and R. A. F. squadrons for convoy defence in north 
Russia, were covered by fog; 
4the 
Russian vessels meanwhile travel- 
led slowly and independently. 
5 
The large convoys planned for September and October, however, 
posed far greater problems. The German aircraft, submarines and 
surface vessels which had caused the Admiralty such anxiety in 
the spring were still in northern Norway posing the same threat - 
until the winter darkness came - to the convoys and their escorts. 
The Tirpitz, Scheer, and Hipper had moved from Trondheim to Narvik, 
and there were now 92 German torpedo bombers and 133 long-range 
and dive bombers in northern Norway. 
6 
Consequently the one convoy 
which did sail in September, PQ 18, was a formidable enterprise. 
It involved, for the protection of 40 merchantmen, 77 warships, 
and included for the first time, an aircraft carrier.? It was 
in fact the most heavily armed convoy the British mounted for the 
Arctic route, 
8and 
to protect it further they sent Hampden torpedo 
bombers, photographic reconnaissance Spitfires and long-range 
reconnaissance Catalinas to north Russia. 
9 The Russians too, 
stung into action by an eleventh-hour appeal from Churchill, 
10 
provided 48 long-range bombers, 10 torpedo bombers and 200 fight- 
ers to supplement the 104 Russian aircraft already in the north. 
11 
1 ASE(42)170,4 Aug. 1942, FO 371 32935 N4036/178/38- 
2 Roskill, The War at Sea, II, p. 278. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations ..., I, 
p. 359. 
5 Roskill, p. 278. 
6 Roskill, II, pp. 277,282. 
7 Howard, p. 42. 
8 Morison, Is p. 364. 
9 Roskill, II, pp. 278-9- 
10 PM to Premier Stalin, T. 1190/2,6 Sept. 1942, PREM 3 393/4-- 
11 30 MM to AM, AIR 840,10 Sept. 1942, AIR 20/4896. 
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In addition they provided four destroyers which joined the con- 
voy as it entered the Barents Sea and gave it great assistance 
against air attack. 
1 
Despite this powerful defence, PQ 18 suffered heavy, though not 
prohibitive, casualties. Thirteen of its merchantmen were lost, 
ten of them to intense air attack. 
2 Although the Luftwaffe itself 
lost forty aircraft and was never to employ such strength again in 
the north, 
3the 
conclusions the British drew from this convoy were 
not entirely comforting. PQ 18 had had the protection of an air- 
craft carrier and a balanced shore-based air force. It had sailed 
also at the furthest northern limit to which the Arctic ice reced- 
ed. 
4 
Still its merchantmen had been vulnerable to air attack 450 
miles from the Norwegian coast. Obviously those of future convoys, 
would be similarly threatened, as long as the enemy chose to re- 
main in northern Norway. His airfields there could not be neut- 
ralized effectively, for air bombardment, no matter how sustained, 
was a weapon of limited value. (Malta's sustained defence through- 
out the year had shown the enemy this in the Mediterranean. ) Am- 
phibious operations to clear the Luftwaffe from northern Norway, 
meanwhile, were not a practical proposition. Churchill's nagging 
and grandiose schemes for 'rolling up the map of Europe' notwith- 
standing, the Chiefs of Staff insisted a landing in Norway would 
only court disaster. 
5 
Consequently the danger to the convoys continued to be great 
and their demands on the Royal Navy remained large. This meant, 
since the production of escorts in the United States had failed 
to meet expectations in 1942,6that PQ convoys could not be run 
simultaneously with 'Torch', the invasion of north Africa. This 
the Cabinet had known since August at least, 
7but the blow to its 
calculations came in September when the date for 'Torch' was set. 
The Commanding Officer, General D. D. Eisenhower, proposed 
8 Nov- 
ember, a date which for fear of deteriorating weather or a 
breach 
in security the Chiefs of Staff were eager to accept. This 
date 
however, meant no more northern convoys could be run, as had been 
planned, in October; as the First Sea Lord told 
Churchill on 21 
1 Morison, I, p. 363. 
2 Roskill, II, p. 285- 
3 Ibid., pp. 285,288. 
4 Ibid., p. 283- 
5 Howard, p. 34. 
6 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p" 398- 
7 WM(42)110th concl., min. 2, conf. annex, CAB 65/31. 
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September, a convoy after PQ 18 would mean postponing 'Torch' 
for seventeen to twenty days. 
1 With great reluctance, therefore, 
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet were forced to conclude that 
day that convoys should be cancelled until the end of 1942.2 
Churchill took this decision with great trepidation. It was 
known that the Russian nation was under almost unendurable press- 
ure and that only a few weeks earlier morale had almost cracked 
with the serious reverses in the south. 
3 
In his message to Roose- 
velt, informing him of the decision, Churchill said, 
To sum up my persistent anxiety is Russia, and I do not see 
how we can reconcile it with our consciences or with our 
interests to have no more PQs till 1943, no offers to make 
joint plans for 'Jupiter', and no signs of a spring, summer 
or even autumn offensive in Europe. 
The President for his part shared the dismay. Only one month ear- 
lier he had stressed to Admiral Cunningham in Washington the 'ab- 
solute necessity' of continuing the northern convoys. Fearing 
that the Kremlin might now make a separate peace, he urged the 
British to maintain the convoys in small groups sailing at one- 
5 
or two-day intervals rather than abandon them completely. This 
the Admiralty had already considered and rejected; 
6but 
in view of 
the President's wishes and the deep concern in Moscow at the delay 
in shipments, particularly of trucks, it agreed to allow ships to 
sail for north Russia independently. From the end of October on- 
wards, therefore, thirteen British and American merchantmen set 
sail at intervals of about 200 miles. Their only protection was 
a few trawlers along the route for life-saving and some submarines 
patrolling north-of Bear Island. 
8 
Not surprisingly, the operat- 
ion, in the words of the U. S. naval historian S. E. Morison, was 
'not considered a success'. Only five of the ships arrived in 
north Russia; three of the others turned back, four were sunk and 
one was wrecked. 
9 
Twenty-eight ships returning in November after 
some months in north Russia, enjoyed greater success, thanks to 
the darkness and the bad weather which prevented the German surface 
1 cos(42)125th mtg(O), CAB 79/87- 
2 Howard, p. 42. 
3 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 121,4 Sept. 1942, FO 371 32913 N4566/ 
30/38. 
4 Howard, pp. 42-3. 'Jupiter' = operation to clear the. Germans 
from northern Norway. 
5 1st SL to PM, TULIP no. 233,21 Aug. 1942, PREM 3 393/5- 
6 Howard, p. 43- 
7 FRUS, 1942, III9 pp. 726-7,737- 
8 Roskill, II9 pp. 288-9. 
9 Morison, It p. 365. 
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ships putting to sea. 
1 
Obviously such efforts could in no way compensate for the can- 
cellation of the convoys, and Britain's commitments fell further 
into arrears during November. Maisky, who had been grateful for 
the independent sailings, 
2pressed 
the British to fly aircraft 
across Africa or, alternatively, from thq Shetlands to Kandelas 
in north Russia; 
3but the British refused. The route across Africa 
was already congested with their own needs, 
4and 
the navigational 
hazards on the other route were extreme. 
5 It was therefore a 
sorry situation which Eden had to report to the Cabinet on 13 
November, and he confessed; that the 'present failure to maintain 
the flow of supplies has contributed to the difficulty of keeping 
on good terms with Russia'. 
6 
Almost immediately on his saying 
this, relations with the Kremlin did improve; Stalin broke the 
ominous silence he had maintained since being told of the convoy 
cancellation, and on 14 November congratulated Churchill on the 
victory at El Alamein .7 But the reprieve was short-lived, for 
the Russians were expecting a rapid exploitation of this victory 
and the resumption of a normal convoy cycle in December - and 
neither of these they received. 
For when the convoys resumed in December they were smaller and 
less frequent than hoped, and they in no way cleared the mounting 
backlog of supplies. The reason for this was again the shortage 
of escorts, for although the air threat to the convoys declined 
in November with the diversion of the Luftwaffe to north Africa, 
in the same month Allied shipping losses soared; 863,000 tons of 
merchant shipping were lost in November, the highest total of any 
month in the war. 
8 
The Admiralty, fearing a break in the merchant 
navy's morale, was forced to reinforce the Atlantic convoys. 
9 
As 
a result it could not resume the Arctic convoys at the old rate of 
three railings every two months as it had promised the Russians* 
1Q 
1 Roskill, II, p. 289. 
2 Minute Eden to PM, 23 Oct. 1942, PREM 3 393/14. 
3 ASE(42) 21st mtg, min. 4,3 Nov. 1942, CAB 92/2. 
4 Ibid. 
5 ASE(42) 22nd mtg, min. 2,27 Nov. 1942, CAB 92/2. 
6 Howard, p. 42. 
7 See Howard, p. 43. On 13 November Stalin had sent a second 
letter - this time complimentary to the Allies - to Cassidy 
(Werth, p. 450). 
8 Morison, I, p. 412. 
9 Minute by First Sea Lord for PM, 22 Nov. 1942, PREM 3 393/7- 
10 Ibid; COS(42) 187th mtg (0), 23 Nov. 1942, CAB 79/58" 
161 
There were more German U-boats than ever in the northern watersl 
and the Americans could not provide further destroyers to help 
the Royal Navy meet this threat, though they were asked to do so 
on 18 November. 
2 
Consequently Churchill could promise Stalin on 
24 November only a convoy of 30 ships to sail from Iceland on 22 
December, an offer which the Russian leader actually accepted with 
unaccustomed grace. In a telegram which reflected his pleasure 
at the change of fortunes in Stalingrad and Africa, Stalin declar- 
ed himself 'grateful' for the new convoy and said, 'I realize that 
in view of the considerable naval operations in the Mediterranean 
sea this constitutes great difficulty for you. '4 
In fact the December convoy, which sailed in two parts owing 
to the difficulty of controlling it in dark and stormy conditions, 
5 
lost none of its thirty ships. It even engaged and damaged the 
Hipper, which never saw active service agaifr. 
6 
The January convoy, 
however, was disappointingly small. Churchill had promised Stalin 
on 29 December that this would contain thirty or more ships; but, 
in view of the shortage of escorts, the Prime Minister, in consul- 
tation with the Admiralty, the Ministry of War Transport and Harr- 
iman, was forced to conclude on 5 January 1943 that only twenty 
ships could sail in that month. The February and March convoys 
meanwhile the meeting set at 28 to 30 ships and 30 ships respect- 
ively. 7 
The Anglo-American conference at Casablanca later in the month 
confirmed this retrenchment. The Americans declared on this occa- 
sion that they could not provide destroyers for protection of the 
northern convoys. Already, Admiral King declared, they were sixty- 
five escorts short on the Atlantic convoy route, and this shortage 
would be aggravated with the invasion of Sicily, now planned for 
the spring. 
8 
The twelve destroyers which the First Sea Lord had 
asked for9were simply 'not available'. 
10 Admiral Pound, in these 
circumstances, proscribed an Arctic convoy cycle of twenty-seven 
days. The Home Fleet, he said, with its present resources, was 
1 Roskill, II, p. 290. 
2 FNP to Pres, 17 Nov. 1942, Pres to FNP, 19 Nov. 1942, PREIS 3 
393/7- 
3 PM to Premier Stalin, T. 1584/2,24 Nov. 1942, ADM 205/14. 
4 Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill, T. 1608/2,27 Nov. 1942, 
PREM 3 393/5- 
5 Admy (1st. SL) to N. X. C. F., 481,29 Nov. 1942, AIR 20/4986. 
6 Roskill, II, p. 398. 
7 GEN/l/1st mtg, 5 Jan. 1943, PREM 3 353/8. 
8 ANFA 3rd mtg, 23 Jan. 1943, CAB 99/24. 
9 CGS 58th mtg, min. 3,16 Jan. 1943, CAB"99/24. 
10 ANFA 3rd mtg, loc. cit. 
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simply inadequate for the hazardous task. 
l Reluctantly his coll- 
eagues - both British and American - endorsed his conclusion. 
Despite their agreement that 'The Soviet forces must be sustained 
by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Rus- 
sia without a prohibitive cost of shipping', 
2they 
were bound by 
the necessity to conserve their own resources. Allied shipping 
losses had reached 7,790,697 tons in 1942, and the rate of new 
shipbuilding -7 million tons - had not kept pace with this. Ger- 
man U-boats meanwhile had increased from 91 to 212 in the past year 
and were still appearing more quickly than the Allies could destroy 
them. 3 In these circumstances it was agreed that the heavy losses 
of the northern route in 1942 could not be repeated. As General 
Marshall said, they would cripple the Allies' offensive in 1943.4 
The suggestion was made - by Harry Hopkins - that the convoys be 
abandoned altogether in favour of the Persian Gulf and a larger 
offer of aircraft; but this was rejected by Churchill and Roosevelt. 
Instead it was agreed to set the convoy cycle at thirty ships every 
5 40-42 days. This, it was calculated, would bring protocol ship- 
ments up to date by the end of 1943,6but the proviso was added that 
losses on the northern route must not be 'prohibitive' and shipping 
losses generally must not exceed 2.4 per cent.? 
Even with this decision the difficulties on the northern route 
continued. Owing to a combination of accidents, labour disputes 
and engine failures, the January convoy was reduced from twenty 
ships to fourteen. 
8 
Even then the British encountered problems 
in finding enough high priority cargo for the ships allotted to 
them. All but two of the British and American ships which had 
been waiting in Iceland during the autumn had sailed in the Decem- 
ber convoy, 
9and the British, in accordance with an A. S. E. decision 
of the 9 October 1942, had kept no more than one month's stock of 
1 CAS 58th mtg, loc. cit. 
2 Howard, appendix III (D), p. 621. 
3 Ibid., p. 259- 
4 CcS 60th mtg, min. 3,18 Jan. 1943, CAB 99/24. 
5 ANFA 3rd mtg, loc. cit; KNT to CSAB W'ton, SABLO 161 MOSSY, 
3 Feb. 1943, MT 59/1120. 
6 R. M. Leighton and P. W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 
1943-1945 (Washington, 1968), p. 673. 
7 Howard, appendix III (F), p. 625. If losses were higher than 
this, the protocol could only be fulfilled by diversions of 
shipping from 'Bolero' (ibid., pp. 260-1). 
8 Howard, p. 331. 
9 WM(42) 169th concl., min. 3, confidential annex, 15 Dec. 1942, 
CAB 65/32. 
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protocol supplies in reserve. 
1 
The backlog which had accumulated 
in theory, therefore, was not readily available for shipment, and 
the search for high priority cargoes was complicated by the Russ- 
ians refusing to accept either British artillery, British anti- 
tank rifles or British tanks with 2-pounder guns. 
2 
The anti-tank 
guns, the Soviet Military Mission and Trade Delegation told the 
War Office on 23 November, 'did not prove to be from the point of 
view of their ballistic properties, penetration and constructive 
qualities, in line with up-to-date requirements as it is expected 
from a t, i tank guns at the Soviet-German front. '3 The situation 
therefore arose, when the convoy cycle was lengthened to forty 
days, of the filar Office being unable to provide enough cargo to 
fill the number of ships which for political reasons it had been 
desirable to promise. In February in fact the Ministry of War 
Transport had to ask the Americans to provide an extra five ships 
for, the March convoy at short notice. 
4 
To these problems were soon added others, less technical but 
far more serious. The January convoy had an uneventful sailing, 
but in February the hours of daylight began to increase rapidly 
and the threat of surface, air and submarine attack on the scale 
of the previous spring became real. To meet this threat the 
Admiralty began making plans, amongst them the sending of air 
squadrons to north Russia again, but their preparations brought 
them into conflict with the Russians. So serious was the crisis 
which then developed that it, rather than any dangers on the route, 
almost brought the convoy cycle to an end. 
It did this largely because this crisis between the British and 
the Russians, although the most serious, was certainly not the 
first of its kind. Rather it was the climax to twelve months of 
Anglo-Soviet friction in the ports of north Russia, and even longer 
dissension over the question of the number of British units in the 
Soviet Union. The Russians, as mentioned earlier, had made it clear 
throughout 1941 and 1942 that they resented the presence of large 
numbers of British servicemen-win their country. Early in 1942 they 
started raising objections to renewing or granting visas for any 
1 ASE(42) 20th mtg, min. 2,9 Oct. 1942, CAB 92/2. 
2 WP(43) 475,25 Oct. 1943, CAB 66/42; WM(42) 169th concl., loc. cit. 
3 ASE to W'ton, no. 9 MOSSY, 23 Nov. 1942, FO 371 32878 N5888/1/38. ` 
4 MIT to Br Merchant Shipping Mission, WJ'ton, LIMIT BULGE no. 2603, 
9 Feb. 1943, MT 59/80. 
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replacements. They argued that there were enough Britons in the 
Soviet Union already1and implied that it was their prerogative 
to determine the size of any future admissions. The British 
disagreed strongly. -To their mind the Russians were not prov- 
iding adequate protection for the convoys in the north and con- 
sequently it was not their place to limit the number of Britons 
sent to do so. Obviously this argument did not flatter the Rus- 
sians and it impressed them even less when the convoys ceased in 
July 1942. 
From then on their attitude hardened perceptibly. 
2 
It relaxed 
only at times of political accord3or military success; 
4 
at other 
times many vexatious formalities were introduced in the ports of 
Archangel and Murmansk. The Russian authorities restricted the 
movement of British personnel from ship to shore and even from 
ship to ship; they obstructed the landing of stores; and censored 
personal mail rigidly and slowly. In a particularly callous in- 
cident, which drove the British to fury, they even refused permis- 
sion to land to a hospital unit sent to treat convoy casualties. 
5 
Undoubtedly in some of these incidents the British were not ent- 
irely without blame - the American charge d'affaires thought the 
friction was 'in large measure causedby the failure of British 
personnel to study to avoid (sic) unnecessarily injuring Soviet 
susceptibilities'6- but attitudes in London soured nonetheless. 
The C. I. G. S. (never the most enthusiastic about the Russian com- 
mitment) complained at Casablanca of Russian secrecy and suspic- 
ion. 'One unsatisfactory feature of the whole business of sup- 
plying Russia', he said, 'was their refusal to put their cards on 
the table. It might well be that we were straining ourselves un- 
duly and taking great risks when there was no real necessity to 
do so. '? Churchill, too, was increasingly provoked by the Russ- 
ians' hostile attitude and declared when Maisky agitatedly comp- 
lained to Eden at the small size of the January convoy: 
1 FO to Kuibyshev, no. 276,27 Feb. 1942, FO 371 32898 N1107/ 
23/38. 
2 30 Mission to AM, AIR 454,5 Aug. 1942, AIR 19/291. 
3 A. Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter (London, 1967), p. 93. 
4 War Diary entry by 30 MM, 17 Nov. 1942, WO 178/26. 
5 C0S(43)204,21 July 1943, CAB 80/41; Roskill, II, p. 279. 
Admiral Geoffrey Miles, head of number 30 Military Mission 
at this time, still recalled this incident with considerable 
annoyance in an interview with the author in December 1972. 
6 FRUS, 1942, III, pp. 756-7. 
7 CCS 58th mtg, min. 3,16 Jan. 1943, CAB 99/24. 
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(Maisky) is not telling the truth when he says I promised 
Stalin convoys of thirty ships in January and February ... 
Maisky should be told that I am getting to the end of my 
tether with these repeated Russian naggings and that there 
is not the slightest use trying to knock me about any more. 
1 
The breaking-point came in the crisis of February 1943. Fear- 
ing the dangers of the summer convoys, the Admiralty and Air Min- 
istry decided to send two squadrons of Hampden torpedo bombers to 
" north Russia as they had for PQ 18.2 The Russians accepted this 
offer, and personnel for the force was already on its way, when 
the Soviet Deputy Chief of Naval Staff announced on 20 February 
that the squadrons would have to be under Soviet operational con- 
trol. 3 The Chiefs of Staff refused to accept this. The head of 
number 30 Mission, Miles, believed that the Russians would not 
concentrate the planes on the German surface forces, 
4for 
when the 
Admiralty had called on them in January to attack the Lützow and 
the Scheer with the bombers remaining from the PQ 18 force, 
5the 
Russians had not responded. 
6 
On this score, therefore, the Brit- 
ish had reservations. These soon turned to fury wheh with amaz- 
ing irrationality and peremptoriness, the Russian authorities in 
Murmansk closed down special radio equipment used for interfering 
with enemy signals giving the position of Allied convoys. Further- 
more they insisted that two of the four wireless transmitters at 
Polyarnoe and three wireless transmitters at Archangel should also 
be closed down.? With these actions, Miles said, the Russians 
had 
'passed the bounds of mere irritation and are prejudicing the safe- 
ty and operational control of our convoys', 
8 
Such meaningless obstruction the Chiefs of Staff would not tol- 
erate. Pound called it 'another example of the unjustifiable sus- 
picion, lack of co-operation and intolerable interference on the 
part of the Russians', and his colleagues were 'firmly 
in agreement 
that the time had come for strong representations to the Russians 
regarding their general lack of co-operation and mistrust of or 
interference with actions taken by us for the sole purpose of 
,1 
Minute PM to FS, 1st L and 1st SL, M. 20/3,9 Jan. 1943, ADM 
205/27. 
2 ACAS(Ops) to SOS, 11 Jan. 1943, AIR 20/4987. 
3 Telegram from Air Mission, AIR 277,20 Feb. 1943, AIR 8/672. 
4 Telegram from Miles no. 201,23 Feb. 1943, F0 371 36989 
N1209/408/38- 
5 Since the return flight of these planes was considered too 
hazardous, it had been decided to hand them over to the Russ- 
ians (COS(42) 283rd mtg, min. 5,8 Oct. 1942,190 193/669). 
6 CCS 59th mtg, min. 3,17 Jan. 1943, CAB 99/24. 
7 SBNO, N Rä, to Admy and Miles, 770,23 Feb. 1943, AIR 8/672. 
8 Adm. Miles to Admy, 205,24 Feb. 1943, MT 59/80. 
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assisting them. '1 The Chiefs of Staff had been exasperated with 
the Russians many times before, but this time the Cabinet supp- 
orted them. On 24 February Maisky proposed that the. whole oper- 
ation be abandoned and the aircraft given to the Soviet forces 
instead; 2the Cabinet instructed Eden the next day to tell the 
Russian representatives that the British government would be for- 
ced to review the whole question of continuing convoys if facil- 
ities for the British air force, 'Grenadine', were withheld. 
3 
When the Foreign Secretary told Maisky this, and the British 
ambassador in Moscow approached Molotov also, the Russians gave 
way a little. Perhaps they were impressed by the statistics 
Eden gave Maisky of the losses the Allies had suffered so far 
on the northern convoys - 1,000 officers and men of the Royal 
Navy; over 500 officers and men of the merchant navy; 2 cruisers; 
10 destroyers; 6 other warships; and 74 merchant ships. In a 
written answer of 4 March the Soviet government admitted there 
were grounds for change on the question of the radio equipment 
and transmitters; but it maintained its objections to the 'Gren- 
adine' force and entered a long argument about the minor'acts of 
obstruction in the northern ports. 
4 
The Russians had given enough 
ground, however, for the British to relent. Churchill's idea of 
cancelling the March convoy and giving the Russians ten ships, 
without crews but with escorts to Bear Island, to carry the supp- 
lies themselves, was abandoned. The Chiefs of Staff, who felt 
some obligation to the Soviet Union in view of the regrettable 
shipping clause in the second protocol, agreed to let JW 54 sail. 
It had never been intended that 'Grenadine' should protect this 
convoy, and there would be time enough, they argued, to make a 
stand before the summer convoys sailed. 
5 
They soon changed their minds however. On 11 March the Tir- 
pitz moved from Trondheim to Altenfjord north of Narvik and the 
Lützow, the Scharnhorst, a cruiser and eight destroyers joined 
it there. This was the most powerful enemy concentration yet 
seen in the far north, 
6and 
it threatened the convoys in a way 
I COS(43) 46th mtg, min. 2,22 Feb. 1943, WO 193/669. 
2 AM to 30 MM, OZ 584,26 Feb. 1943, ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Woodward, II, pP. 566-7. 
5 COS comments on PM's draft telegram to Stalin, 5 Mar. 1943, 
FO 371 39689, V1359/408/38- 
6 Roskill, II, p. 400. 
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that allied friction had not. The Admiralty believed that the 
German vessels would be used offensively by Admiral Doenitz who 
had replaced Grand Admiral Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the 
German Navy in January. 
1 
If they were, convoys with escorts 
even on the scale of the previous spring and summer would be 
powerless. Only the battle fleet could offer protection in the 
Barents Sea; 
2but 
the Admiralty had always opposed sending the 
fleet east of Bear Island in the past, and in March 1943 it had 
additional reasons for resisting this. This was the month that 
Doenitz's U-boat campaign in the Atlantic reached its peak. 
The losses of allied merchant shipping were more than double 
those of January. 
3 
The fear of a German breakout into the Atl- 
antic loomed large. The First Sea Lord told the First Lord of 
the Admiralty on 15 March that, even if the Tirpitz moved to the 
Baltic, he would support a northern convoy only 
if the political reasons for doing so are so great that it 
is justifiable to accept the possibility of losing a batt- 
leship of the K. G. V. Class when the latter was being used 
in an unsound manner, e. g. in range of shore-based air 
attack, and in face of a U-boat concentration, without 
fighter protection and after a time without A/S (sic) 
escort. 4 
The next day Pound advised the Defence Committee to cancel the 
Arctic convoy planned for March. Already, he said, the Navy had 
run twenty-three convoys 'in circumstances which had never just- 
ified their sailing'. Not unexpectedly Churchill protested. JW 54 
should sail, he argued, 'as a bait to draw out the enemy fleet'; 
it should 'tease the enemy and keep them in suspense' and return 
to Iceland if it failed to entice the enemy into action by the 
time it reached Bear Island. The Defence Committee agreed, 
5but 
soon came news that changed this decision. In the next two days 
approximately twenty ships were sunk; on 18 March the Cabinet was 
forced to agree that 'the advantage would lie in discontinuing 
convoys to North Russia for the present, and concentrating all 
available escort forces on protecting the Atlantic convoys. '6 
This was a painful decision. Not only did it mean the cancell- 
ation of this one convoy, but also the cessation of all supplies 
1 Mtg in 1st SL's room, 5 Feb. 1942, ADM 205/32. 
2 Roskill, II, p. 400. 
3 Morison, I, appendix 1/3. 
4 C0S(43) 46th mtg, annex, CAB 79/59- 
5 DO(43) 3rd mtg, 16 Mar. 1943, CAB 69/5. 
6 WM(43) 42nd concl., conf. annex, 18 Mar. 1942, CAB 65/37" 
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via the northern route until September; for the invasion of 
, Sicily was planned for early summer 1943 and, like 'Torch', had 
prior claim on all available escorts. The time could scarcely 
have been worse to break the news to Stalin, since on 15 March 
the Soviet army, exhausted by its victorious advance from Stalin- 
grad, had lost Kharkov again to the Wehrmacht. On the same day 
Stalin, anxious-since the Casablanca meeting about his allies' 
plans for 1943, wrote to Churchill saying; 'I deem it my duty to 
warn you in the strongest possible manner how dangerous would be 
from the view-point of our common cause further delay in the open- 
ing of the Second Front in France. '1 Such delay, however, the 
Allies had known for months, was inevitable after their decision 
to launch 'Torch', 2and now they were forced to cancel the convoys 
as well. Churchill broke the news to Stalin on 30 March. He ass- 
ured him that the convoys would be re-started early in September 
if enemy dispositions and the Atlantic situation allowed. Stalin 
answered on 6 April. 
I understand this unexpected action as a catastrophic dimin- 
ution of supplies of arms and military raw materials to the 
U. S. S. R. on the part of Great Britain and the United States 
of America, as transport via Pacific is limited by the tonn- 
age and not reliable and the Southern route has a small tran- 
sit capacity. ...... the circumstances cannot 
fail to 
affect the position of the Soviet troops. 
3 
This was a 'bleak' answer, 
4but 
Churchill was relieved. 'In the 
circumstances', he thought it 'courageous and not unsatisfactory'. 
5 
In fact, as Cadogan recorded in his diary, the Prime Minister was 
'delighted with it'. 
6 
Fortunately for the British relations with the Kremlin were 
about to enter an unusually congenial time, and this perhaps cond- 
itioned Stalin's repponse. From March onwards the Russians made 
a conspicuous effort to meet the charge made publicly by the U. S. 
ambassador on the 8th of that month that they were ungrateful for 
and silent about Lend-Lease supplies.? The Soviet press published 
statistics of Allied aid8and on the 20 April Maisky bestowed Soviet 







Churchill, IV, p. 672. 
See Howard. A. xxiii. ch. XI. 
Churchill, pp. 675-7" 
Woodward, II, p. 569. 
WM(43) 48th concl., min. 2, 
Cadogan, Diaries, p. 518. 
ForeiKn Relations of the Un 
5 Apr. 1943, CAB 65/38. 
ted States, 1943, III (Washington, 
.. uý 
1963), " pp. 631-2. 
8 Ibid., pp. 638n, 639" 
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words: 
These northern convoys played, and are playing, a very imp- 
ortant part in the history of the war. They helped the Sov- 
iet Union in the most difficult moments of the past, they 
greatly contributed to the recent events in the East. Let 
me, on behalf of the Soviet Government, the Red Army and the 
whole-Soviet people express our most sincere gratitude to 
your Royal Navy, to your Merchant Navy, to your gallant 
seamen .. .1 
Politically too, despite the furore over the discovery of the bod- 
ies of 4,510 Polish officers and men near Katyn, and the resulting 
breach in Russo-Polish relations, 
2the 
Kremlin showed signs of being 
more forthcoming. Stalin's speech on May 1 was full of glowing 
praise for 'the victorious troops of our Allies' in Tunisia and 
'the valiant Anglo-American air forces' who were striking 'crush- 
ing blows at the military-industrial centres of Germany and Italy'. 
3 
This was in startling contrast to his Red Army Day Order of 23 Feb- 
ruary, which had not even mentioned the Allies. 
4 
Later in May and 
June the Soviet press gave unprecedented coverage to the anniver- 
saries of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and the U. S. -U. S. S. R. Master 
Lend-Lease Agreement. 5 Then, on 22 May, the Kremlin made a unique 
gesture to the West; it abolished the Communist International. 
Whatever the reasons for this change of heart - anticipation of a 
second front, confidence from the Red Army's victories, or pleas- 6 
ure at the West's overtures on questions of post-war co-operation 
- doubtless it conditioned Stalin's response. The bitterness of 
July 1942 was lacking in his reply of 9 April - as indeed was the 
crisis in production and on the battlefield which had inspired it. 
But if the political ramifications of cancelling the convoys 
were not serious, the effects on the fulfilment of the protocol 
were. Thirty-four ships had been loaded to sail for north Russia 
in March7and there was no means of re-shipping all their cargoes. 
1 , Soviet War News (published by Soviet embassy, London), FO 371 
36989 N2497/408/38. 
2 See Woodward, II, pp. 625-7; Werth, Russia at War, pp. 598-604 
(for discussion of the evidence suggesting Soviet responsibil- 
ity for these murders). 
3 FRUS, 1942, III, p. 519. 
4 Vojtech, Mastny, 'Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace', 
American Historical Review, vol. 77, no. 5 (Dec. 1972), p. 1373. 
5 Werth, p. 610. 
6 Woodward, II, pp. 550-3. Maisky expressed gratitude to Eden 
for being taken into the British confidence about the Foreign 
Secretary's talks in Washington in March (Eden to Sir. A. Clark 
Kerr, no. 168,19 Apr. 1943, FO 371 36955 N2456/66/38). 
7 Donaldson to FS, 8 Apr. 1943, F0 371 36933 N2344/45/38. 
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Naturally Maisky suggested that all ships be re-routed, the 
twenty-four American vessels to Vladivostock and the ten British 
to the Persian Gulf; 
1but 
this proved impossible. The Persian Gulf 
was congested through the flooding of roads and the railway near 
Khorramshahr, and was fully occupied with supplies from the United 
States. 2 It could take only seven of JW 54's ships, those carry- 
ing high priority aircraft, tanks and explosives. 
3 The Pacific 
route took a further eight shipments of sisal rope, R. A. F. spare 
parts and machinery made to Russian specifications. 
4 
Two addit- 
ional shipments to assembly plants in Gibraltar and Egypt cleared 
the 435 aircraft on Britain's account in this and the succeeding 
convoy. 
5 The remaining cargoes, however, were unloaded onto Brit- 
ish docks .6 
The effects of this were predictable. Arrears in protocol ship- 
ments had already been large and with this crisis they naturally 
grew larger. By the end of the protocol period, 30 June 1943, 
only 2,972,000 short tons of supplies had been shipped. Of these 
a mere 307,100 short tons were from the United Kingdom and the Em- 
pire, while 2,664,900 short tons were from the United States. The 
combined total was far less than the 4.4 million short tons prom- 
ised in June 1942.7 In the case of the United States the shortfall 
was most serious in lorries - 94,047 were shipped instead of 
120,000 - and in items of signals equipment like radar. 
8 
U. S. air- 
craft deliveries also, though met in terms of the number despatched 
by sea and by the Atlantic-and Alaskan ferry routes, 
9were 
cut by 
the delays in assembly at Iran. (Backlogs at Abadan were more than 
600 by August 1943. )10 
Britain for her part sent 2,195 fighters towards her commitment 
of 2,400, and a further 249 aircraft in addition to this. 
11 Many 
1 Donaldson to FS, 8 Apr. 1943, BT 28/144, SEC/12/1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Donaldson to Cadogan, 4 June 1943, FO 371 36989 N3346/498/38" 
4 ASE(43)46,9 May 1943, CAB 92/6. 
5 AM Whitehall to RAFDEL, W'ton, WEBBER. 744,30 Apr. 1943, AIR 
8/1061. 
6 Donaldson to FS, 8 Apr. 1943, BT 28/144. This included an extra 
sixty 40-mm cannon Hurricanes which Churchill offered 
Stalin, 
presumably in compensation for cancellation of the convoys, on 
10 April (PM to Stalin, T. 491/3, PREM 3 401/16). 
7 WP(43)475,25 Oct. 1943, CAB 66/42. 
8 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 595-6. The lorry situation was aggr- 
avated by a disastrous fire at Khorramshahr in May 1943 which 
destroyed hundreds of vehicles awaiting assembly (Motter, p. 152)- 
9 Leighton and Coakley, p. 596. 
10 Matter, p. 269. 
I1 WP(43)475, loc. cit. Howard gives the figure of 2,184 aircraft 
(p. 332). The figure of 2,195 is taken from a report by the chair- 
man of the A. S. E. which post-dates the references used 
by Howard. 
The 249 extra-protocol aircraft were made up of 150 Spitfires 
(Oct. 1942), 25 Hampdens (PQ 18 protection force), 14 Albemarles 
and 60 Hurricane II. D's (April 1943). 
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of the protocol offerings, however, were obsolescent Hurricanes 
and Kittyhawks, 
1and 285 of them were caught in the congestion at 
Abadan. 
2 In tanks and Bren carriers also Britain disappointed 
the Russians. Committed to supply 3,000 of the former and 2,400 
of the latter, she shipped only 1,719 and 146 respectively. In 
naval supplies and general ammunition her performance was better, 
and there was also her contribution of some thirteen items of raw 
materials, including 12,000 tons of aluminium. To set against this, 
though, was the Russian refusal to accept British artillery. 
3 
Not all of Britain's failures were due to the interruptions in 
the northern convoys. Some were failures of production and design, 
some the reflection of increasing Russian discrimination. British 
tank production, for instance, declined at the end of 19424 at the 
very time that the Russians began to be more critical. As their 
attitude to British artillery showed, the Russians were no longer 
impressed with two-pounder tanks, 
5and two-pounder Matildas partic- 
ularly, which were obsolescent in 1941,6no longer met their needs. 
Nor did the Crusader, which the War office, despite the tank's rep- 
utation for vulnerability, unreliability and 'rather weak armour- 
ing' hopefully offered the Russians in March 1943.7 With their own 
production of superior tanks, the T-34 and the KV-1, expanding, the 
Russians could afford to be selective. From late in 1942 they wan- 
ted six-pounder tanks from Britain, 
8and 
after February 1943, few 
tanks at all from the Americans, 
9whose 
rate of spare parts they 
thought less generous than the British. 
10 This change of mind, 
understandable though it was, disrupted Allied planning. 
1 ASE(43)41,1 May 1943, CAB 92/6. 
2 Motter, p. 265- 
3 WP(43)475, loc. cit. 
4 They were converting to production of Cromwell, Centaur and 
Cavalier tanks (such 'change-overs' usually disrupted production 
for approximately six months), and were re-working other models 
of British tanks (minute by Minister for Supply, 9 Nov. 
1942, 
PREM 3 426/15; paper by DCIGS, 16 Dec. 1942, WO 32/10521). 
5 Memorandum by Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles(DAFV) on 
the tank situation, 7 Feb. 1943, WO 193/540. 
6 C. Ellis and P. Chamberlain, Fighting Vehicles (England, 1972), 
p. 95. 
7 Letter from Borisenko (head of the Soviet Trade Delegation) to 
Brigadier Firebrace (in charge of the War Office's Russian 
Liaison Group), 22 Mar. 1943, WO 32/10521. 
8 Letter Grigg to Eden, 8 Dec. 1942, WO 32/10521. Britain prod- 
uced 353 six-pounder tanks in December 1942, of which 115 were 
despatched in PQ 20 (ASE(42)204,12 Dec. 1942, CAB 92/4). 
9 ASE(43)53,26 May 1943, CAB 92/6. 
10 Extract from 23rd mtg of British Supply Council (W'ton), 9 
June 1943, WO 193/669. 
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Notwithstanding this, it cannot be denied that what confounded 
Allied expectations most was the failure of the northern route. 
The statistics show this clearly. Relied upon to handle 3.3 mil- 
lion short tons of second protocol supplies, the northern convoys 
carried little more than one-tenth of this, 344,200 short' tons. 
1 
Only 36 of the 64 ships proposed for the northern route from the 
United States in the first six months of 1943 in fact sailed. 
Twenty-nine more U. S. ships discharged their cargo in the British 
Isles. 2 This failure could not be rectified by the other routes. 
The Persian Gulf carried only 1,068,000 short tons, which together 
with the 42,200 short tons conveyed on the overland route from 
India, 3exceeded the 1.1 million short tons at first assigned to 
it. But this fell far short of the 200,000 tons per month aimed 
at in the crisis-ridden days of July 1942. Such a target was still, 
despite the efforts of the Americans under Major General Donald H. 
Connally, out of Allied reach. Although Roosevelt in October 1942 
had diverted men, rolling stock and shipping - even from-'Bolero' 
- to the Persian Gulf project, 
41nland 
clearance there had not kept 
pace with the capacity of the ports. Equipment and troops to dev- 
elop the route had not arrived on schedule5and congestion in the 
Persian ports had grown formidably. 
6 
Late in 1942 it had even 
proved necessary to divert cargoes from the Persian ports to Kara- 
chi. Not until the spring of 1943 did a rapid expansion in cap- 
acity occur, and the objective of 200,000 tons was not attained 
until the following September. 
8 
In 1942 meanwhile the total tonn- 
age carried for the Soviet army amounted to a meagre 350,000 tons. 
9 
The Pacific route also had its limitations, particularly as far 
as the British were concerned. Admit. ted1y it confounded Allied ex- 
pectations which had deemed it unreliable in May 1942, and carried 
in this protocol period the largest volume of supplies, 1,517,000 
short tons. 
10 Much of this tonnage moreover was petroleum and 
1 WP(43)475, loc. cit. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 590. These supplies were treated as 
Britain's on ordinary Lend-Lease terms (letter P. Reed (of Harr- 
iman mission)to W. G. Fergusson of MOP, 4 June 1943, BT 28/144, 
SEC/12/16). 
3 WP(43)475, loc. cit. 4 Leighton and Coakley, p. 578. 
5 Ibid., pp. 579-81. 
6 Motter, The Persian Corridor, pp. 407-8- 
7 MWT to British Merchant Shipping Mission, W'ton, MASTA 4240, 
22 Nov. 1942, MT 59/79. 
8 Howard, p. 47. 
9 Motter, p. 183- 
10 WP(43)475, loc. cit. This was made possible by the transfer of 
53 cargo ships and'6 tankers from U. S. to Soviet fla from Oct- 
over 1942 to June 1943 (Leighton and Coakley, p. 15915" 
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food to which the Russians gave increasing priority. 
1 But the 
route was still restricted by the Russians' slow rate of turn- 
around, 
2and 
was limited also, through fear of Japanese protests, 
to 'civil' supplies only (though in time of total war these were 
difficult to define). Obviously also from the British point of 
view the Pacific route could not fill the void left by the nor- 
thern convoys. The supplies which came from Canada for the Rus- 
sians were assigned to the United States' western seaboard; while 
the major item the Americans provided on the United Kingdom's 
account - aircraft - was delivered not by the Pacific route but 
through Alaska, Iran and the ill-fated convoys to the north. 
3 
Consequently the British found themselves unable to meet their 
commitments under the second protocol programme. As they had sus- 
pected in May and June 1942, the problems of delivery and their 
own demands on shipping had conflicted irreconcilably with the 
Russian demands. Unfortunately this meant that much of the pol- 
itical and military value of what the British - and Americans - 
did achieve was diminished. For, considerable though their ach- 
ievements and sacrifices were, they seemed poor in contrast to the 
promises which had been made. Furthermore, the irregularity with 
which they delivered the munitions to the Soviet Union must have 
disrupted Soviet planning, particularly in the critical months 
of late 1942. At this time, when the Russians' need was greatest, 
the assistance froi'the'Allies, thanks to the problems of the 
supply routes, was at its most uncertain. Not until the end of 
the second protocol period, when the Russian crisis had ebbed, 
did those promises of massive aid, made so optimistically in 
1942, become at all attainable. 
1 Leighton and Coakley, p. 586. 
2 Ibid. 
3 ASE(43)41, loc. cit. 
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MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM - THE SECOND PROTOCOL* 
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197 Valentines un- 
shipped but book- 
ed from Canada. 
10 Canadian Valen- 
tines off-loaded 
in United Kingdom 
await shipment to 
U. S. S. R. Backlog 
of 1,074 cancell- 
ed as superseded 
by Third Protocol 
offer. 
Bren Carriers 2,400 2,385 146 On 14th June, 1943 
2,233 carriers 
awaited shipment 
from Canada. U. S. 
S. R. have agreed 
that all should be 
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exception of a 
pool of 400.6 
carriers off- 
loaded in United 
Kingdom. 
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spare barrels Kingdom. 
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om towards making 
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* Source: 'Report on the Implementation of the Second Soviet Protocol .. . ', by 0. Lyttelton, 'WP(43)475,25'October 1943, CAB 66/42. 
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6 
The third Soviet supply protocol, covering the year from 1 
July 1943 to 30 June 1944, was the culmination of all that had 
preceded it. In this period the many efforts of 1941 and 1942 
finally came to fruition. The supply routes at last reached the 
targets which had been set for them; the agencies of procurement 
worked with efficiency and ease; the supply of munitions became 
increasingly abundant; and the Kremlin at last responded to the 
overtures of the West. As a result the Allies provided aid that 
was generous and uninterrupted and these years saw the greatest 
amity of the wartime coalition. 
Only the fact that the anomalies of the past protocols contin- 
ued made this achievement possible; for even though the Russians' 
need for munitions was far less in this period than before, in 
accordance with past policy the Kremlin was not asked to justify 
its needs. The Allies continued to give the Soviet Union the max- 
imum quantity of supplies they could provide and ship. Motivated 
again by political considerations and the changing character of 
Soviet needs, they ignored the change of fortunes on the Eastern 
front and made no attempt to base the protocols on rational, stat- 
istical planning. 
This is not surprising, given the central place Russian resist- 
ance occupied in Allied strategy for 1943. At the Casablanca con- 
ference in January it was universally agreed that the Soviet war 
effort was vital to Allied planning both for Europe and for Asia. 
There was no one who disputed, despite the Anglo-American victor- 
ies in north Africa, that the Red Army was 'the greatest single 
drain on the power and hope of Germany'. 
1 It still in mid-1943 
contained 216 Axis divisions compared to 103 in southern Europe 
and 71 north of the Alps. 
2 This in moral terms alone gave the 
Russians a compelling claim on Allied munitions and resources. 
To add to this there were strong arguments, military and political, 
for continuing to offer aid to the Russians. The Red Army, despite 
its great resurgence, was still in need of certain kinds of assist- 
ance which the United States could provide. It had shed its in- 
competent generals and had replaced them with dynamic young 
1 COS(42)466(0), 31 Dec. 1942, quoted in Howard, p'. '602. 
2 J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. V, August 1943 - September 
1944 (London: HMSO, 1956), p" 53" 
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leadership; it had dispensed with its dual command system of 
officers and commissars and showed growing innovation in tactics; 
1 
it was increasingly superior to the Wehrmacht in armaments as well 
as men. 
2 
But it was still quite clearly inferior to the Germans 
in mobility and technical skills. The fact that General Erich von 
Manstein had been able to stabilize the German line even after 
Stalingrad3with divisions well below establishment showed this 
clearly. In February 1943 the British Chiefs of Staff would not 
predict 'with confidence' what the outcome of the summer fighting 
on the Eastern front would be. 
4 
In a purely military sense, there- 
fore, there was still a place for Allied aid. 
Politically also, it was of cardinal importance to prevent the 
Russians from feeling abandoned by the West. They still had the 
option open to them of negotiating a peace with Germany on reach- 
ing their former boundaries, and the signs that they might be temp- 
ted to do so were not encouraging wheh the third protocol was being 
considered. Stalin conspicuously failed to associate himself with 
Churchill and Roosevelt's demand at Casablanca for Germany's 'un- 
conditional surrender'. 
5 He made it clear in the following months 
that the consequences of the Allies postponing their invasion of 
the Continent until 1944 - as in fact they had decided to do --- 
would be dire. 
6 
In these circumstances it seemed provocative to 
reduce or even attach rigorous conditions to the aid which it cost 
the Allies comparatively little to send. Russian demands, more- 
over, seemed generally reasonable in 1943 and 1944, in that they 
concentrated on the need for mobility and on reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of liberated territories. The necessity for these 
supplies was as obviöus in these years as the want of munitions 
had been earlier. Consequently, there was little opposition, even 
from previous critics in Washington and London, to the continuance 
of military aid within the limitations imposed by shipping. 
Such opposition as-there was during the preparation of the third 
protocol, moreover, was not fundamental or influential. In the 
United States where, because of the size of the commitment, there 
1 Report by Colonel Pika, 11 Mar. 1943, FO 371 36958 N1539/? 5/38. 
British intelligence sources confirmed Col. Pika's information. 
2 JIC(43) 171(Revise), 28 Apr. 1943, CAB 79/60. 
3 B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 510. 
4 COS(43)55,22 Feb. 1943, CAB 80/39" X1 
5 VOJtech Mastny, 'Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate peace', 
p. 1374. 
6 See Howard, Grand Strategy, pp. 327-30, for Russian agitation 
after Casablanca about the second front. 
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was mote disquiet about the policy than in Great Britain, criti- 
cism tended to be limited to circles with little control over 
policy making and to be concerned with unrealistic conditions to 
be attached to the protocol. The most common argument, for inst- 
ance, was that supplies should be made conditional on greater 
Russian co-operation in the exchange of military and technical 
information. Americans, both in Washington and Moscow, had fin- 
ally come to share the annoyance of the British military mission 
at the Russians' refusal to take them into their confidence. The 
Operations Division's Policy Committee of the War Department arg- 
ued when the issue of the third protocol was first raised in Jan- 
uary 1943 that 
the United States should continue to furnish Lend-Lease sup- 
plies to the extent of our capacity, provided - and only 
provided --that Russia cooperates with us and takes us into 
her confidence. As we grow more powerful ... we can aff- 
ord to, and in simple self-interest must start exercising 
the dominant influence to which such power properly entitles 
us. The time is appropriate for us to start some straight- 
from-the-shoulder talk to a Mr. Joseph Stalin-1 
The White House, however, 
-was not sympathetic 
to this approach. 
The President still took the view that uncritical generosity was 
the wiser policy and in his directive of 6 January on the future 
of Soviet supplies, he said: 
I understand that both the Army and Navy are definitely of 
the opinion that Russian resistance as a major factor in 
the war is of cardinal importance and therefore it must be 
a basic factor of our strategy to provide her with the maximum 
dmountöf supplies that can be delivered to her ports. I 
fully endorse this concept. 2 
Roosevelt would not consider the War Department's suggestion or 
any other which introduced an element of bargaining into the pro- 
tocol. The Chief of Staff, Marshall, agreed with the President 
this year, and told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 May that he 
felt it would be unwise to press the Russians to abandon the res- 
erve which characterized their relations with their allies. The 
insistence on reciprocal facilities was therefore quietly dropped 
from the draft agreement for the third protocol presented to the 
3 
Russians. 
1 M. Matloff and E. M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition 
Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington, 1959), p. 282. 
2 Ibid., p. 281. 
3 Ibid., pp. 282-3. 
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In the same way the argument that the United States should use 
its largesse to wrest political concessions from the Russians was 
never seriously entertained. There were undoubtedly some who 
thought it should, in view of the fact that before the end of the 
war the Red Army would in all likelihood have occupied much of 
Eastern Europe. Its potential power in these countries would be 
great and could well be used in ways incompatible with Western 
democratic aspirations. Already on the question of Poland, for 
instance, the Kremlin was taking an apparently sinister line, 
declaring on 16 January 1943 that henceforward all persons of Pol- 
ish race who had been resident in the territory occupied by the 
Red Army in 1939 were Soviet citizens. 
1 This implied pre-judgement 
of the question of post-war boundaries and, together with other 
manifestations of Soviet hostility to representatives of pre-war 
Poland, 2caused disquiet in the West. Admittedly the extent and 
depth of this concern was unclear, but it was certainly signifi- 
cant. enough at the time of the Congressional debates on the exten- 
sion of Lend-Lease aid to cause the U. S. administration anxiety. 
Hull confided in Eden during the Foreign Secretary's visit to 
Washington in March 1943 that 
Many people here are stating that Russia is saying almost 
nothing about her future plans and purposes, and that, at 
the end of the war, Russia will do as she pleases, take 
what she pleases, and confer with nobody. The same people 
add that this Government is spending many billions of doll- 
ars in supplying Russia and Britain with immense military 
supplies ... 
He confessed that he feared it might prove 'difficult, if hostil- 
ities continue for some time, to prevail upon the American people 
to continue to furnish supplies to Russia' unless 'Russia shows 
some appreciation and speaks out in a spirit of teamwork and co- 
operation more fully both now and especially after the war'. 
3 
The same kind of anxiety in the War Department prompted the 
U. S. ambassador's outburst in Moscow at this time. 
4 
At a press 
conference on 8 March Admiral Standley complained that 
'The Soviet 
authorities seem to be endeavoring, --(sic) to create the 
impression 
1 Woodward, British Foreign PolicX, II, p. 618. Until this date 
the Soviet government had claimed as Soviet citizens only per- 
sons of other races resident in eastern Poland in 1939 (ibid., 
p. 616). 
2 Ibid., p. 619. 
3 Hull, Memoirs, p. 1248. 
4 Standley and Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, p. 333" 
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at home as well as abroad that they are fighting the war alone 
... Congress is-rather sensitive; it is generous and big- 
hearted so long as it feels that it is helping someone. But give 
it the idea that it is not - there might be an entirely differ- 
ent story. '1 Two days later he elaborated on this in a message 
to the President: 
I am becoming convinced that we can only deal with them (the 
Russians) on a bargaining basis, for our continuing to accede 
freely to their requests while agreeing to pay an additional 
price for every small request we make seems to arouse suspic- 
ion of our motives in the Oriental mind rather than to build 
confidence. 2 
Standley's convictions were shared by many Allied officers who 
served with him in Moscow, but Roosevelt was apparently more in 
sympathy with the uncritical approach of Harry Hopkins and his 
protege, the Lend-Lease representative in the Soviet Union, General 
Faymonville. They assumed that the Russians must be granted un- 
conditionally whatever information or assistance was necessary for 
the waging of the war; 
3and though this meant that Standley and the 
U. S. military attach e, Colonel Michaela, were often by-passed in 
Moscow, 
4the 
White House deemed this the more rational approach. 
Obviously concessions made by the Soviet government under duress 
would be ephemeral, and there was little evidence that an uncom- 
promising approach - attaching conditions to protocol supplies - 
would gain the sympathy of more than a small minority in either 
the United States or Great Britain. In the latter country, enth- 
usiasm for the Red Army was still boundless and the day in its 
honour was 'celebrated throughout Britain ... with long parades 
and fulsome speeches'. 
5 Home Office intelligence reports decl- 
ared on 19 January that 'People are beginning to run out of ad- 
jectives to express their admiration for the Russian offensive'. 
6 
In the United States meanwhile, although, according to Foster Rhea 
Dulles, opinion fluctuated in 1943 between admiration for Soviet 
1 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, III, p. 
631. 
2 Ibid., p. 510- 
3 J. R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of American Efforts 
at Wartime Cooperation with Russia (London, 1947), p. 91. 
The White House, according to Sherwood, believed that the com- 
ments Standley made at the press conference were callous and 
in poor taste. Harriman, however, admitted a sneaking sympathy 
for Standley's view-point amongst himself and his colleagues 
- both British and American - in 
London (Standley and Ageton, 
p. 347)" 
4 Lukas, Air Force Aspects ..., p. 186; Standley and 
Ageton, 
p. 314. 
5 Calder, The People's War, p. 347. For details, see pp. 347-9. 
6 HIWR, no. 120,12-19 Jan. 1943, INFO 1/292C. 
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victories and misgivings as to how these victories would be used, 
l 
public opinion polls showed overwhelming support for undiminished 
aid to the Soviet Union. 
2 
Not surprisingly Washington did not 
give its ambassador permission to approach Stalin to complain about 
the lack of 'friendly relations', as he,: Standley, had suggested 
he might. 
3 
Furthermore, no stipulations about either military or 
political co-operation were included in the third protocol. In 
fact, throughout the spring of 1943, regardless of any reservations 
in Washington and Moscow, planning for the protocol continued in 
the United States on 'substantially the same procedure and princi- 
ples as were used in the formulation of the second Protocol'. 
4 
In Britain, not unexpectedly, there were some objections to this. 
But they were no more fundamental or effective than those voiced 
in the United States. The argument in favour of reducing supplies 
from Great Britain to the Soviet Union had spent itself completely 
by this time. It had ceased to have any relevance in Britain's 
case with the passing of her own military crisis, the expansion 
of U. S. industry and, not the least, the reduction of Britain's 
role in the protocol programme. Even though there was a similar 
debate in the United Kingdom about the tactics to be used with the 
Russians - the Foreign Office generally favouring the White House's 
approach and the Service departments taking the harder line -5 
this did not affect the formulation of the protocol. The Chiefs 
of Staff were not prepared, whatever their frustrations with their 
ally, to take action which would jeopardize the Soviet Union's con- 
duct of the war; 
6and 
no one, with even the most active imagination, 
could imagine Britain's small offering of munitions being effect- 
ive in political blackmail. Consequently, her supply obligations 
continued with little change. The only reservations in London 
about this were concerned with the lack of Russian co-operation in 
the delivery of the supplies, and the practice of Great Britain 
and the United States presenting their offerings in separate lists. 
1 Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran: The Story of Russia 
and America 1781-1943 (Princeton, 1944), p. 252. 
2 Cantril (ed. ), Public Opinion, p. 1162. A National Operation 
Research Center poll on 18 June 1943 showed 70per cent in 
favour of continuing aid to the Soviet Union, 15 per cent 
against, 15 per cent 'Don't know'. 
3 FRUS, 1943, III, pp. 511,514. 
4 ASE(43)13,9 Feb. 1943, CAB 92/6. 
5 See Beaumont, 'A Question of Diplomacy', RUSI Journal, Sept. 1973- 
6 Letter from Ismay to Sargent, 22 Feb. 1943, FO 371 36954 N1057/ 
66/38. 
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In the latter case, the A. S. E. 's reservations stemmed from the 
fact that it believed that the existing system of separate lists 
had severe practical disabilities. It 'enables the Russians', 
the committee telegraphed its representatives in Washington on 
7 May, 'to play one (donor) off against another and to apply sep- 
arate pressure to each to make good deficits, when  in fact, the- 
re may be an overall surplus in any given commodity. ' A combined 
protocol offering, on the other hand, which the A. S. E. advocated, 
would allow a more rational allocation of supplies and would fac- 
ilitate shipping problems. Since the source of supply would not 
be disclosed to the Russians, a combined schedule could be deter- 
mined by convenience rather than by the need to make political 
capital. 
1 
The flexibility the Allies would thus gain, Lyttelton 
estimated, would allow them to save a whole convoy over the third 
protocol period. 
2 
Not surprisingly the Americans did not see the advantages of 
this proposal. They wanted the credit, naturally enough, for the 
supplies which they were giving the Soviet Union, since their con- 
tribution to the third protocol was by far the largest of the three 
nations involved. Moreover, they believed that only separate lists 
would win the support of Congress and procurement agencies like the 
War Production Board. 3 Churchill, therefore, never one to deny the 
Americans any credit in the war effort, agreed that the suggestion 
of a combined schedule should be dropped. 
4 
In its place a compro- 
mise clause was inserted which laid down that the three countries, 
the United States, Great Britain and Canada - now an independent 
signatory - could reallocate the supplies in the schedules 'as 
they may decide between themselves in order to meet strategic, 
supply or shipping exigencies. '5 
The American view also prevailed on the question of whether the 
protocol should be made dependent on Russian co-operation in the 
delivery of supplies. This was a precondition which the Service 
departments were keen to include. After their unhappy experiences 
over 'Grenadine', they attached 'considerable importance'6to im- 
posing on the Russians the obligation to provide facilities for 
1 ASE to W'ton, no. 100 MOSSY, FO 371 36933 N2849/45/38 (draft 
in ASE(43)43, CAB 92/6. 
2 ASE(43) 7th mtg, min. 3A, 10 May 1943, CAB 92/5. 
3 British missions in W'ton to ASE, MOSSY 65,11 May 1943, 
PREM 3 4o1/6. 
4 ASE(43)52,26 May 1943, CAB 92/6. 
5 ASE(43)92,21 Oct. 1943, CAB 92/7. 
6 ASE to British missions in W'ton, MOSSY 116,20 May 1943, 
PREM 3 401/6. 
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shore-based aircraft in north Russia. Furthermore, they wanted - 
somewhat perversely, it seems, since by now this was almost sole- 
ly the responsibility of the United States: --assistance from the 
Russians in the development of the Persian Gulf. 
l 
However, the 
President's Soviet Protocol Committee - chaired by Hopkins and 
composed of representatives of the War, Navy, State, Treasury 
and Agriculture departments, as well as the War Production Board, 
the Foreign Economic Administration, the War Shipping Administra- 
tion and the Petroleum Administrator for War - opposed this. It 
felt sure that the Russians would resist this clause as much as 
one demanding reciprocal facilities for the allied military 
missions. 
In the experience of these engaged in the execution of prev- 
ious Protocols (the committee ruled in May), the Soviets are 
very difficult to deal with on a bargaining basis, but res- 
pond most satisfactorily in performing their share of an 
understanding when a generous offer is made, and which does 
not force the Soviets into a bargaining position. 2 
It was the beginning of a long debate - still unresolved - about 
how to negotiate with the Kremlin. At this stage the more sang- 
uine view that trust breeds trust prevailed, for Churchill supp- 
orted the Americans. Realizing that Britain lacked the authority, 
while the convoys were suspended in the summer of 1943, to press 
the issue with the Russians, he agreed to leave it until the con- 
voys resumed in the autumn. 
3 
Consequently the third protocol, presented to the Russians for 
discussion on 9 June 19434and signed in London on 19 October 1943, 
contained few more restrictive clauses than the Moscow and Wash- 
ington protocols which had preceded it. Only in the 'escape clause' 
did the Allies protect themselves more carefully than before. As 
had been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca, it 
was stipulated that the protocol commitments would be reduced if 
shipping losses or the necessities of other operations rendered 
their fulfilment prohibitive. 
5 
The relevant clause in the agree- 
ment stated: 
1 Letter from F. R. Hoyer Millar, W'ton, 18 May 1943, ibid. 
2 Leighton 
_and 




3 Llewellin for chairman, A. S. E., 22 May 1943s PREM 3 401/6. 
4 Woodward, II, p. 569. 
5 Howard, p. 626. 
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The list of supplies ... shall ... be liable to varia- tion to meet unforeseen developments in the war situation. 
If shipping losses, production failures, or the necessities 
of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive, it 
may be necessary to reduce them. On the other hand, if con- 
ditions permit, the Governments of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Canada will be glad to review the sched- 
ules from time to time for the purpose of increasing the 
quantities to be provided and delivered:! 
Even with the promise of increased supplies at the end, this clause 
annoyed the Russians, which indicates what the fate of a more res- 
trictive clause would have been. Borisenko, of the Soviet Trade 
Delegation, declared that the clause even as it stood did 'not 
strengthen the spirit of the Protocol,, on the contrary it (made) 
the commitment vague and doubtful'. 
2 Despite the obvious truth in 
this, the Allies, with the broken promises of the second protocol 
fresh in their minds, insisted that the clause remain. 
3 
It was not in this clause, however, that the real difference 
between the second and third protocols lay. It resided rather in 
the type and quantity of supplies which the Western powers offer- 
ed. The Americans, given the improvement of the supply routes, 
delivered in the third protocol period far more than ever before, 
while the British, given their acute manpower shortages 
4and 
the 
levelling-off of their production, offered far less. In addition, 
although the British Secretary of State for War, Grigg, could rec- 
ord quite accurately in his memoirs that 'So far as equipment is 
concerned, I believe it to be broadly true that, from the time of 
the fall of Tunis in May 1943, we had solved our problems .. 0'95 
the British could not supply the type of commodities the Russians 
needed. Given that in 1943 only 63 per cent of Soviet territory 
under cultivation before the war was actually in Soviet hands, 
6 
it was food, trucks and equipment for reconstruction, that the 
Russians wanted from the West. But the British offer of indust- 
rial equipment, though much greater than previously, 
7was 
dwarfed 
1 ASE(43)56,11 June 1943, CAB 92/6. 
2 ASE(43)63,10 July 1943, CAB 92/7- 
3 ASE(43)69,27 July 1943, CAB 92/7; for American support of the 
British position, tel. from Halifax, no. 141 MOSSY, 21 July, 
1943, WO 193/669. 
4 See Postan, British War Production, pp. 304-5- 
5 P. J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgment (Great Britain, 1948), p. 363- 6 Werth, Russia at War, p. 566. 
7 Outstanding orders of civil equipment stood at ¬13,110,600 on 30 June 1943. Shipments under the first and second protocols had been £773,000 and £7,500,000 respectively (WP(43)475,25 
Oct. 1943, CAB 66/42). 
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by the Americans'. Their offer of motorized transport and roll- 
ing stock meanwhile, which the Joint Intelligence Committee esti- 
mated on 28 April 1943 was the Russians' greatest need, 
1was 
not 
renewed. The British did maintain their aircraft commitment of 
200 fighters a month, which was undoubtedly of value to the Russ- 
ians - both Stalin2and the Czechoslovak military attache, 
3one 
of 
the War Office's most reliable sources of information in Moscow, 
stressed the need for planes during the 1943 summer offensive - 
but the value of this offer was reduced by the sending of obsol- 
escent aircraft not much to the Russians' liking. 
For the British protocol commitment until the end of 1943 was 
50 Hurricanes a month, supplemented as before by 150 Airacobras 
from the United States. 
4 
Popular as the Airacobra was with the 
Russians, the Hurricane had long been an object of criticism and 
disdain. Stalin had attacked it in his outburst at the banquet 
for Willkie in September 1942, and R. A. F. officers in the Soviet 
Union had found themselves criticized that autumn for sending 
obsolescent aircraft. Even Russian passengers on trains complain- 
ed to them on this score, 
5and 
the immensely influential journalist 
and writer, Ilya Ehrenburg, attacked the Allies in the Moscow 
press in October 1942 for sending 'very few aircraft, and not the 
best they have either'. 
6 
Moreover, from July 1942 onwards there 
were recurring complaints from the Russians about the fact that 
they were being sent reconditioned Hurricanes and Spitfires rather 
than new ones. 
7 Although the proportion of these was small - only 
8 
121 of the 765 fighters provided between January and June 1943 - 
and although the Air Ministry assured the Russians that such planes 
had as long a useful life ahead of them after their overhaul as any 
1 COS(43)89th mtg (0), CAB 79/60. 
2 FRUS, 1943, III, p. 759. 
3 Report from Col. Pika, 11 Mar. 1943, FO 371 36958 N1539/75/38. 
4 ASE(43)92,21 Oct. 1943, CAB 92/7. In October 1943 Arnold in 
fact asked the British to reduce their demand for Airacobras 
on the Russians' behalf. Production of these was changing from 
the P-39 to the P-63 model, and there was to be a temporary 
shortage. Portal, however, objected, pleading the shortage of 
Spitfires, and Arnold did not persist. (Letters Arnold to Portal 
14 Oct. 1943, Portal to Arnold, 7 Nov. 1943, AIR 8/1061. ) 
5 30 MM to AM, AIR 883,14 Sept, 1942, AIR 20/3904. 
6 FO 371 32937 N5525/178/38. 
7 War diary of air section of mission, 19 July 1942, AIR 2/7861. 
The subsequent complaints are numerous; for one, see ASE(43) 
2nd mtg, min. 2,28 Jan. 1943, CAB 92/5. 
8 War diary of air section, 10 July 1943, AIR 2/7861. 
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directly off the production line. 
1Russian 
comnlaintr rrit --+ 
be silenced. They insisted on seeing it as a matter of prestige. 
They believed they were being given second-rate aircraft2and even 
suspected, so Maisky told Beaverbrook on 7 January 1943, that the 
Red Army was being given Hurricanes through Britain's fear of 
Soviet post-war influence. 3 
Despite this history of complaints, the Air Ministry still off- 
ered the Russians Hurricanes in the third protocol period. It 
knew that its- ally coveted other fighters - particularly the Spit- 
fire and the 'supremely versatile' 
4Mosquito 
-5but these, after 
'relentless' investigation of its resources, 
6it 
did not feel able 
to offer. Targets for fighter production in 1943 had had to be 
lowered because of manpower shortages and the need to give prefer- 
ence to heavy bombers for the intensifying air offensive over Ger- 
many. Output of fighters therefore remained fairly level through- 
out the year.? But at the same time Britain's demand for fighters 
actually increased with the growth of the Mediterranean campaign 
and the need to prepare for the invasion of Europe, 'Overlord', 
in 1944. The bulk of enemy aircraft was now concentrated in thea- 
tres of Allied operations. The Italian air force had a strength 
of 1,300 aircraft in July 1943, while of the Luftwaffe's 6,300 
machines 1,700 were in Germany; 1,200 in Italy and south-east 
Europe; 800 in France and the Low Countries; 200 in Norway and 
Denmark - and 2,400 in the Soviet Union. 
8 
Confronted with this, 
and with unexpected difficulties in the production of engines for 
the Spitfire9and the Typhoon, the Air Ministry declared on 28 July, 
'Between now and the end of the year our fighter position is crit- 
ical and virtually no expansion in Fighter Squadrons is planned, 
except a small increase in India'. 
10 As a result the A. S. E. would 
not improve the protocol offer of aircraft for the period until 
the end of 1943. Furthermore, it would not even guarantee, when 
the protocol was being negotiated in July, to give the Russians 
a more definite offer for the first six months of 1944 than fifty 
1 Letter Eden to Maisky, 18 Nov. 1942, FO 371 32936 N5445/178/38- 
2 ASE(43) 2nd mtg, min. 2,28 Jan. 1943, CAB 92/5. 
3 BB papers, box 20/1. 
4 Munson, Aircraft of World War II, p. 51- 
5 ASE(43)63,9 July 1943, CAB 92/7- 
6 ASE(43)70,28 July 1943, CAB 92/7. 
7 Postan, Pp. 308-9. 
8 J. Ehrman, p. 53. 
9 ASE(43)10th mtg, min. 2(b), 29 July 1943, CAB 92/5- 
10 ASE(43)70, loc. cit. 
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fighters a month (to supplement the U. S. Airacobras). It would 
not specify the type of fighter it would offer then, and in fact 
stated categorically in August that 'since the resources avail- 
able for our own operational wants were not even adequate for 
operations begun or in prospect', the Russians would not be given 
Spitfires or Mosquitoes at any time during the third protocol. 
1 
To mitigate this somewhat, the Russians were offered models and 
plans for the Mosquito, so that they could manufacture the fighter 
-bomber themselves, 
2but 
this, as will be seen, in no way eased 
their disappointment. 
No doubt this was partly because the third protocol offer of 
aircraft was also unsatisfactory - from the Russians' point of 
view - in spare parts. The Soviet Military Mission had contended 
throughout the winter and spring of 1943 that the Red Army needed 
an increase of 30 per cent on the rate of spare parts agreed upon 
in June 1942. Kharmalov stated in January 1943 that the supply 
position for Hurricanes in the Soviet Union was 'catastrophic' 
and that 600 of the machines were grounded awaiting spare parts. 
3 
The Air Ministry, however, would not consider any increase. It 
thought the existing rate of spare parts adequate, assuming it were 
delivered in full, which had not been possible in the autumn of 
1942. It thought also that Russian demands were excessive and un- 
reasonable. The quantity of spare parts Kharmalov requested in 
February over and above the existing supplies, was equivalent to 
600 new aircraft. Obviously these were not needed simply, as the 
Russians claimed, to make 600 aircraft serviceable. 
4 
The Air Min- 
istry and number 30 Military Mission therefore concluded that Rus- 
sian supply and maintenance was at fault, and they would not con- 
sider increasing the rate of spare parts until Soviet practice was 
brought into line with British. 
5 
As the Air Ministry said on 28 
January, 'in view of the shortage of engine spares for this type 
of aircraft it would be wrong to despatch spare parts on a scale 
so far exceeding that required by our own operational units, with- 
out being satisfied of what was really required by the Soviet Air 
Force. '6 Predictably, however, the Russians did not respond to 
1 ASE(43)10th mtg, loc. cit; ASE(43)75,11 Aug. 1943, CAB 92/7. 
2 WM(43) 86th concl., min. 4,16 June 1943, CAB 65/34. 
3 ASE(43)7,20 Jan. 1943, CAB 92/6. 
4 Mtg at MAP, 2 Feb. 1943, AVIA 15/1865- 
5 30 Mission to AM, AIR 844,29 Apr. 1943, AIR 19/293. 
6 ASE(43)2nd mtg, min. 1, CAB 92/5" 
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the A. S. E. 's suggestions that R. A. F. maintenance experts should 
be attached to the military mission in Moscow. 
1 
Hence, with the 
A. S. E. 's support 
2the 
Air Ministry continued to resist, and fin- 
ally in September, rejected completely the Russian demands for 
more spare parts. 
3 
In several respects, therefore, the British promise of air- 
craft in the third protocol period, though numerically the same 
as previous years, was disappointing to the Russians. The same 
was true of the offer of tanks. The Red Army requested three 
thousand of these for the third protocol, all from the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, it specified that these tanks, as far as 
possible, should be of the'same type as those provided during the 
second protocol. 
4 
Presumably the Russians set great store on 
standardization, since this request, given the cessation of Mat- 
ilda production5and their own dislike of the Churchill and Cent- 
aur tanks, 
6limited 
the offer to the obsolete Valentine. The War 
Office was embarrassed: and astonished by this request; embarrassed 
because it had intended terminating Valentine production during 
the third protocol period; astonished because the Russians, after 
criticizing obsolescent weapons, preferred this type of tank. 
'It is not known', the'War Office said in a note for the A. S. E. 
on 24 April, 'why the Russians appear so eager to get Valentines, 
even when armed only with a two-pounderigun. It is of course- a 
very reliable tank but cannot be considered a modern weapon'. 
" 
The Diredtor of Armoured Fighting Vehicles was even more mystif- 
ied. He had said of the Valentine three months earlier, 
though it has done good work, (it) is now definitely obsolete. 
Everything that shoots goes through his (sic) armour, and his 
two-pounder is effective, neither as an anti-tank nor as anti- 
personnel weapon. The six-pounder Valentine is a bastard, 
having no machine-gun. 
$ 
Nonetheless the Russians reiterated their preference for the Val- 
entine tank of any mark. The Red Army apparently preferred the 
tank of which it already had large holdings, which its troops knew 
1 ASE(43)49,17 May 1943, CAB 92/6. 
2 ASE(43)8th mtg, min. 3,28 May 1943, CAB 92/5. 
3 War diary entry, 5 Sept. 1943, AIR 2/7861. 
4 ASE(43)39,24 Apr. 1943, CAB 92/6. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Minute from Donaldson to Lyttelton, 24 May 1943, FO 371 36934 
N3233/45/38" These tanks were said to be unsuitable for 
winter conditions. 
7 ASE(43)39, loc. cit. 
8 The U. K. Tank Programme, 25 Jan. 1943, WO 193/540. 
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well and which served the purpose of mopping up pockets of res- 
istance. l The Valentine's armament was obviously inferior but 
the Russians were prepared in some cases to replace the British 
gun with their own 76.2 mm guns. 
2 
Consequently the Ministry of 
Supply and the War Office agreed to maintain Valentine production 
in 1943 solely for the Russians' benefit. 
3 
However, even doing 
this, they were unable to offer more than one thousand tanks over 
the twelve-month period. The Russians had to accept in lieu of 
British tanks two thousand Sherman (M4A2) tanks4from the surplus 
production in the United States. 
5 
They were also obliged to 
accept the logical reduction in spare parts from Britain which 
followed on this. The past system of automatic shipments of 
spare parts to maintain all tanks sent to the Soviet Union, reg- 
ardless of casualties suffered in the interim, was replaced by an 
offer of twelve months' spare parts for each Valentine in the 
third protocol offering. 
6 
The limitations of the offer of tanks and aircraft were high- 
lighted by the fact that there were only two other military items 
on the British third protocol schedule. These were propellant and 
aviation fuel; and-the latter of these was really to the credit of 
the United States. Britain was to provide 10,000 tons a month of 
aviation fuel (later increased in November 1943 to 25,000 tons) 
from its-plants in Abadan, while the Americans were to deliver 
equivalent quantities to the United Kingdom .8 None of the military 
items the British had previously provided in the protocols was rep- 
eated. The Red Army continued to spurn British anti-tank guns and- 
anti-tank rifles, and although the War office, in a fit of self- 
denying pique, tried late in 1942 to convince the Soviet Military 
Mission of the value of the six-pounder gun, 
9the Russians were not 
impressed. Their own artillery production was immense in 1943 - 
they produced no less than 130,000 guns of different calibres10- 
1 Minute MOP for PM, no. 221,20 July 1943, BT 28/94B, MISC 203. 
2 B. Perrett, The Valentine in North Africa (London, 1972), p. 68. 
3 Discussion Sir Andrew Duncan, Minister of Supply, and PM, 23 
July 1943, BT 28/94B, MISC 203- 
4 ASE(43)10th mtg, min, 2,29 July 1943, CAB 92/5. 
5 ASE(43)39, loc. cit. 
6 ASE(43)39, loc. cit.; ASE(43)92,21 Oct. 1943, CAB 92/7. 
7 ASE(43)92, loc. cit. 
8 Motter, The Persian Corridor, p. 306. 
9 ASE(42)23rd mtgr,. min. 4,14 Dec. 1942, FO 371 32937 N6430/178/38"_. 
10 Werth, p. 565. There was also a vast improvement in the fire 
power of the infantry: the number of sub-machine guns was-three 
times that of 1942 in 1943, while that of light and heavy mach- 
ine guns was two and a half times that of 1942. 
190 
and they rightly enough remained convinced of the superiority of 
their own artillery, such as the 76 mm anti-tank gun. 
1 
In some cases the British improved their protocol offering by 
shipping the backlogs from the second protocol. The A. S. E. agreed 
that these supplies which were not repeated in the third protocol 
should be sent until the previous commitment had been met. Bren 
carriers, however, were an exception to this, and the large major- 
ity of the 2,233 awaiting shipment in Canada were repossessed with 
the agreement of the Russians. In return aircraft were treated as 
a special case and the second protocol backlog of fifty-one sent 
to the Russians. 
2 
The backlog of tanks, however, was cancelled. 
Since tanks were to be sent in the third protocol, 1,074 outstand- 
ing from the second protocol were cancelled, 
3despite the Russians' 
dismay at this move. 
4 
Given the overstraining of the British economy by the end of 
1943,5the British contribution to the third protocol had, despite 
its limitations, considerable merit. Apart from the military sup- 
plies listed, it included raw materials - some of which were not 
provided by the United States - industrial equipment and machine 
tools. 
6 
Nonetheless, when set against the U. S. offer as a whole, 
the British schedule of supplies seemed almost insignificant. For 
the American third protocol commitment included not only food, clo- 
thing and $827 million worth of industrial equipment, but at the 
same time offered substantial military supplies.? These, moreover, 
were the supplies which met the Red Army's pressing need for mob- 
ility. Twenty thousand jeeps, 3,000 artillery prime movers, 10,000 
railroad flat cars and 100,000 field telephones were to be provided 
as requested; 132,000 trucks were offered against a demand for 
144,000 - and these were only a few of the numerous military items 
the U. S. agreed to provide. The War Department, in fact, 'substan- 
tially met Soviet requests in almost all categories except aircraft'. 
8 
In this category the Russians had requested 8,160 machines - 6,000 
fighters (P-39), 1,200 light bombers (A-20), 600 medium bombers 
1 COS(43)265,27 Sept, 1943, CAB 80/41. 
2 WP(43)475,25 Oct. 1943, CAB 66/42. 
3 ASE(43)76,20 Aug. 1943, CAB 92/7.207 Valentines unshipped at 
the end of the second protocol were sent, however, in view of 
the phasing out of Valentine production (ibid. ). 
4 ASE(43)llth mtg, min. 2,26 Aug. 1943, CAB 92/5. 
5 Postan, p. 309- 
6 ASE(43)92,21 Oct. 1943, CAB 92/7. 
7 Soviet Supply Protocols, pp. 66-75. 
8 Leighton and Coakley, p. 675. 
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(B-25) and 360 transport planes (C-46, C-47)1 - but this was an 
unrealistic request. Even though U. S. aircraft production rapid- 
ly accelerated in 1943,2General Arnold could not be prevailed 
upon to increase the protocol commitment to any substantial degree. 
He had agreed in January 1943 to offer the Russians some two hun- 
dred transport planes, 
3a 
commitment which continued in the new 
supply agreement, but generally the third protocol offer remained 
close to the second. An additional 600 Kittyhawks (P-40-N) and 
78 medium bombers (B-25) were included, but the overall total 
(excluding the Airacobras on Britain's account) was 3,462.4 The 
second protocol offering had been 2,544 aircraft. 
The American offer was limited to some degree by the availab- 
ility of shipping. Though with the small quantity of Canadian 
supplies it totalled 7,080,000 short tons (excluding planes to be 
flown to the Soviet Union and ships to be transferred to the Sov- 
iet flag), the W. S. A. agreed to ship only 4,500,000 short tons of 
this; 150,000 short tons a month via the Persian Gulf, and 225,000 
short tons a month via the Pacific. The northern route, not un- 
expectedly, was considered too unreliable to be taken into consid- 
eration in the spring of 1943- In fact the W. S. A. eventually rai- 
sed these targets a little when the Russian representatives, on 
being asked to select 4,500,000 short tons of high priority cargo, 
insisted that the United States should ship six million tons. They 
were confident that the northern route would be able to carry 1.4 
million tons during the autumn and winter months, and they set a 
more optimistic target for the Persian Gulf of 2.6 million tons 
instead of the W. S. A. 's 1.8 million tons. They were, however, less 
confident about the Pacific route's capacity and thought that, giv- 
en the slow turnaround, a more realistic target was 2 million rath- 
er than 2.7 million tons. 
5 
Eventually the Soviet representatives 
won a compromise from the Americans. The shipping position improv- 
ed in May 1943 when the struggle with Doenitz's U-boats turned de- 
cisively in the Allies' favour. At the same time the political 
situation deteriorated markedly when Stalin learnt of the post- 
ponement of the continental invasion until 1944.6 In July the 
1 ASE(43)92, loc. cit. 
2 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces ..., p. 
409" 
3 RAFDEL, W'ton to AM, TROON 89,11 Jan. 1943, AIR 19/292; 
Leighton and Coakley, p. 585- 
4 Leighton and Coakley, p. 675- 
5 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 673-4. 
6 See Woodward, II, pp. 553-64. 
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Americans agreed to increase their shipping commitment. The 
President's Soviet Protocol Committee raised its estimate for 
Atlantic shipments to 200,000 tons a month, by either the Arctic 
or Persian Gulf, 'whichever in the light of changing circumstan- 
ces proves from time to time to be more efficient'. The committ- 
ee continued to insist the Pacific route should carry 225,000 
tons a month, since this was its present capacity; but it includ- 
ed in the final draft of the protocol a provision that Soviet flag 
ships should be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic, 
should Japanese interference lower the capacity of the former rou- 
te. Thus, the total offering from the Western Hemisphere was fin- 
ally set at 5,100,000 tons, 2,700,000 via the Pacific and 2,400,000 
via the Atlantic. 
1 
In the event the Americans managed to deliver this quantity of 
supplies and more over the third protocol period. The capacity of 
the supply routes and the escort position improved so much that 
even the northern route exceeded expectations. Priority planning 
was not disrupted by sudden military crises on the Eastern front. 
Inter-allied liaison became easier with practice and the Russians 
carefully gave priority to those supplies, like food, metals, che- 
micals and petroleum products, which could be easily supplied, 
should the need arise without disrupting U. S. production. 
2 
. In 
many ways in fact this was the least crisis-ridden protocol of all. 
Nonetheless the British still found themselves involved in long 
and at times acrimonious disputes with the Russians. The first of 
these, not surprisingly, concerned the quality of the aircraft they 
were supplying to their ally. On 21 June 1943 the military mission 
cabled from Moscow that the Russians were 'furious'3at the fact 
that 40 per cent of the Spitfires, promised them in the previous 
October but only recently delivered in their entirety, were re- 
conditioned. 
5 The Chiefs of Staff were not impressed. On the fol- 
lowing day they confirmed their policy of not differentiating bet- 
ween old and new aircraft and agreed that there should be no change 
in the practice of sending the Russians some reconditioned aircraft. 
6 
The Russians therefore took matters into their own hands. On 20 
August they refused to accept any aircraft from the British with 
1 Leighton and Coakley, p. 674. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Martel to CIGS, MIL 9365,20 June 1943, WO 193/669. 
4 Minute Eden to PM, 3 May 1943, PREM 3 401/21. 
5 COS to Martel, OZ. 1748,22 June 1943, WO 193/669. 
6 COS(43)107th mtg, min. 3,22 June 1943, CAB 79/27. 
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more than forty hours flying time to its credit. 
1 A month later 
they asked that the fifty planes they had thus rejected should 
be replaced by more modern Hurricanes IID's and that henceforward 
all other protocol offerings from the United Kingdom should be 
Spitfires, Mosquitoes and Typhoons. The Hurricane, they said, 
was obsolescent and should no longer be supplied. 
2 
The British treated these requests without sympathy at first. 
They were piqued that the Russians would not admit that some of 
the flying time on the Hurricanes they rejected resulted from the 
aircraft being delivered part of the way by air in an effort to 
get them more quickly to the Soviet Union. 
3 The Russians also 
seemed singularly ungrateful for earlier efforts which the Air 
Ministry had made on their behalf. Only 14 of the 200 Albemarles 
(the original offer of one hundred had been doubled in January 
1943) had been taken delivery of by autumn 1943; this was despite 
British assistance in training Soviet crews to fly them and in 
securing rights of passage through the various countries en route 
to the Soviet Union. 
4 
The Red Army had apparently lost interest 
in these aircraft with the American offer of transport aircraft 
in the third protocol. In September the Soviet representatives 
agreed to the British expropriating one hundred of the Albemarles 
for their own use and refused to accept the remaining eighty-six 
until they were modified. 
5 
At the same time they showed consider- 
able indifference to taking delivery of the sample Mosquito. ° 
This was not an atmosphere to encourage greater sacrifices from 
the Air Ministry. It refused to change its policy on reconditioned 
aircraft; it vetoed the supply of Spitfires, Mosquitoes and Typh- 
oons? and declared it out of the question to replace the rejected 
Hurricanes. If the Russians did not want these aircraft, it said 
on 24 September, then they should be diverted to India. 
Within four months, however, the Air Ministry was forced to re- 
consider its position. It became increasingly obvious that Brit- 
ish prestige in the Soviet Union was suffering from the sending of 
reconditioned aircraft and that Hurricanes of older marks were 
completely unsuited to the Red Army's needs. 
9 
The Hurricane IIB 
1 Entry in war diary of air mission, AIR 2/7861. 
2 30 MM to AM, AIR 989,20 Sept. 1943, quoted in annex B, ASE(43) 
89; CAB 92/7- 
3 ASE(43)12th mtg, min. 13,15 Oct. 1943, CAB 92/5. 
4 ASE(43)79,23 Aug. 1943, CAB 92/7. 
5 ASE(44)10,3 Mar. 1944, CAB 92/8. 
6 Entry in war diary of air mission, 17 Dec. 1943, AIR 2/7861. 
7 AM to 30 MM, AX. 914,18 Oct. 1943, AIR 8/1061. 
8 AM to HQ, RAF Middle East, AX, 89, ibid. 
9 Note by DWO, 2 Dec. 1943, AIR 19/293" 
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and IIC, for instance, 410 of which had been provided so far in 
the third protocol, 
1had limited operational uses. One of them 
- of all things for the Russians - was convoy protection! 
2 On 
3 January 1944 the Air Member for Supply and Organization adm- 
itted to the Secretary of State for Air, 
I think it is generally agreed that we ought no longer to 
send Hurricanes to Russia - the telegrams from No. 30 
Mission have made it clear that Hurricanes have become a 
laughing stock in Russia, if one can regard the epithet 
'flying coffin' as a laughing matter ... As a matter 
of broad judgement I think we could manage to send 50 
Spitfires a month to Russia. I cannot support this by 
figures because there are too many uncertain factors in 
the situation such as the probable wastage rate of figh- 
ters during the first two months of Overlord. 3 
Before the Air Ministry could act, however, the Russians took 
the initiative themselves. On 11 January P. Soloviev of the Sov- 
iet Trade Delegation informed the Air Ministry that the Soviet 
authorities would not accept any more Hurricanes, either new or 
reconditioned. As a result the British three days later finally 
offered the Soviet Union 190 of the coveted Spitfires. These 
would meet the outstanding commitment under the third protocol 
and would all be new Spitfires IX's, although, as the Air Minis- 
try hastened to assure the Russians, later shipments of this figh- 
ter might well be reconditioned. 
4 
In return for this offer the 
Russians agreed to accept new Hurricanes rather than Spitfires in 
place of the aircraft previously rejected at Basra. 
5 
Thus the 
protracted and acrimonious dispute was laid to rest. The unfort- 
unate episode of the Albemarles was also brought to a close a few 
weeks later when the Air Ministry repossessed the eighty-six planes 
which the Russians had continually refused to approve as fit for 
delivery. 
6 
Undoubtedly this recrimination over aircraft diminished the 
value, politically and militarily, of Britain's supply agreement 
with the Soviet Union; but the main source of contention between 
the two countries in this third protocol period was the resumption 
of the northern convoys. At the start of the third protocol the 
Russians wanted the British to commit themselves to shipping two- 
1 AM to HQ, RAF Middle East, AX. 417,22 Jan. 1944, AIR 8/1061. 
2 Anonymous note for AMSO, 5 Dec. 1943, ibid. 
33 Jan. 1944, AIR 8/1061. 
4 ASE(44)5,20 Jan. 1944, CAB 92/8. 
5 ASE(44)7,21 Feb. 1944, CAB 92/8. 
6 ASE(44)10, loc. cit. 
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thirds of their supply programme in their own ships by the nor- 
thern route. 
1 Airacobras from the United States and lead and 
wool from the Dominions, it was recognized, would be sent via 
Alaska in the former case, and via the Pacific in the latter. 
2 
The British, however, would give no such undertaking. Shipping 
losses. were by June 1943 well below the 2.4 per cent limit set 
at Casablanca3and the whole of the British protocol commitment 
of approximately half a million tons 
4required 
only two convoys 
to north Russia to clear it; 
5but 
the British were wary of their 
broken promises of the past. Moreover, as Churchill said on 11 
August, 'There is of course no question of our being able to res- 
ume these convoys in the near future on account of the manner in 
which the operations in the Mediterranean have broadened out. '6 
The Ministry of War Transport and the Admiralty therefore would 
undertake only to supplement Soviet shipping to the degree nece- 
ssary to ensure the delivery of British supplies.? This was a 
considerable improvement on their undertakings of previous years, 
but Borisenko declared it 'insulting'. It was, he said on 14 
August, another reflection of the unsympathetic attitude of the 
Admiralty, and in particular Admiral Pound who dictated caution 
to the Cabinet. 
8 
From this time on, Soviet pressure for the resumption of con- 
voys to north Russia intensified. On 25 August the Soviet Charge 
d'Affaires delivered to the Foreign office a letter asking for 
convoys to restart, as had been promised, in September-9 The Per- 
sian Gulf had failed to reach the capacity of 240,000 tons a month 
that Churchill had rashly predicted when he had cancelled the con- 
voys in March. 
10 Furthermore, the letter claimed, the Pacific 
route had disappointed expectations because of constant Japanese 
interference. 11 In fact the capacity of the various routes was 
1 Note by head of Marine Branch Intelligence, 26 July 1943, ADM 
116/5087. 
2 Soviet Supply Protocols, p. 53- 
3 Leighton and Coakley, p. 592. 
4 ASE to W'ton, no. 23 MOSSY, 10 June 1943, FO 371 36937 N1532/ 
46/38. 
5 ASE(43)86,18 Sept, 1943, CAB 92/7- 
6 PM to SOS FA, WELFARE no. 29,11 Aug. 1943, FO 371 36990 
N4724/408/38. 
7 ASE(43)86, loc. cit. 8 Letter Firebrace to Warner (northern dept. ), 14 Aug. 1943, 
F0 371 36956 N4631/66/38- 
9 FO to Moscow, no. 1199 DEDIP, 28 Aug. 1943, FO 371 36931 
N4851/45/38. 
10 Churchill, IV, p. 676. 
11 FO to Moscow, no. 1199, loc. cit. 
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not as low as the Russians claimed, 
1although 
they were certainly 
below target, and the British replied that operational consider- 
ations made it impossible for them to restart convoys in Septem- 
ber. This, naturally, infuriated the Kremlin. As the Commerc- 
ial Secretary at the embassy in Moscow observed, 
The Soviet Government realise that our decision to suspend 
Northern convoys (a) preserves both merchant and naval ships 
from being sunk, and (b) makes them available for other work. 
They will not however accept the decision with good grace 
until they are convinced that good use has been and is being 
made of these ships. They will only be convinced of this 
when a Second Front - as they interpret the phrase - has been 
established. Until then the suspension of convoys will cont- 
inue to embitter the general relations between the two Govern- 
ments. 3 
He was right. On 21 September Molotov sent for the British 
ambassador in Moscow and 'insisted upon the urgent resumption of 
convoys'. He emphasized that his government attached 'very great 
importance' to the matter in view of the fact that it had so far 
received via the northern route less than one third of the previous 
year's supplies. On the Allies' own admission, Molotov said, the 
shipping position had improved. Roosevelt and Churchill had said 
on 19 August that Germany's submarines had abandoned the north 
Atlantic in favour of the southern route, and since then Italy and 
its battle fleet had surrendered unconditionally. In such circum- 
stances the continued postponement of the northern convoys was 
'quite unjustifiable'. 5 
This provoked a response in London, for it was obvious that, 
though Britain could physically meet its commitments to the Russ- 
ians by the Persian route alone, 
6politically 
it would be unwise to 
do so. The Soviet government persisted in seeing the northern con- 
voys 'as having an important bearing on (the United Kingdom's) in- 
tentions to help them'.? Consequently Prime Minister Churchill 
1 FO to Moscow, no. 1198 DEDIP, 27 Aug. 1943, FO 371 36931 N4851/ 
45/38. 
2 FO to Moscow, no. 1197,27 Aug. 1943, FO 371 36990 N4724/408/38. 
3 21 Aug. 1943, FO 371 36941 N4791/46/38. 
4 Tel. Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 1005,23 Sept. 1943, FO 371 36990 
N5568/408/38. 
5 FNP to Pres. Roosevelt, T. 1463/3,1 Oct. 1943, PREM 3 393/10. 
6 Draft memorandum by Minister of Production, 31 Aug. 1943, FO 
371 36990 N4713/408/38. This was excluding industrial equip- 
ment which for technical reasons could not be sent via the 
Pacific or Persian routes. 
7 ASE(43)86, loc. cit. 
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ruled on 25 September, 'It is our duty if humanly possible to 
reopen these Arctic convoys, beginning in the latter part of 
November ... We should try to run a November, December, Jan- 
uary, February and March convoy - total, five. '1 The Defence 
Committee agreed. Despite the reservations of the Admiralty, 
it was encouraged by the damaging of the Tirpitz by midget sub- 
marines on 22 September to plan four Arctic convoys in the win- 
ter. These, however, it made conditional on one thing - the 
'settlement, satisfactory to us, of outstanding grievances regard- 
ing the treatment of our personnel in North Russia. '2 
It did this because the Soviet attitude to the Britons in Arch- 
angel and Murmansk had worsened since the crisis of spring 1943" 
As in the year before, the Kremlin had become more intolerant of 
the presence of British personnel when the northern convoys were 
not running. It seemed that they were intent on exacting veng- 
eance for the cancellation of the convoys, for American service- 
men in the Soviet Union were consistently treated better. 
3 Poss- 
ibly also the Russians were influenced in this summer of 1943 by 
the presence in Moscow from April onwards of a new and controver- 
sial head of number 30 Military Mission. This was Lieut-General 
Giffard Martel who was unrepentedly of the school which believed 
that 'plain speaking is the only thing which a Russian can under- 
stand'. He had been chosen more for his reputation as a tank 
expert5than as a diplomat, and at first the Russians did seem to 
appreciate his expertise. They offered him samples of the KIT-1 
and T-34 tanks for shipment back to the United Kingdom 
6and 
extend- 
ed to him the opportunity to visit the battle-front - something 
that a head of the military mission had not done since June of the 
previous year.? Soon, however, Martel began to antagonize every- 
one, members of his own mission included, 
8by 
his condescending 
and rather Blimpish manner. He patronizingly offered the Soviet 
1 CoS(43)583(0), CAB 80/75- 
2 DO(43)9th mtg, min. 1,28 Sept. 1943, CAB 69/5. 
3 Report by J. Balfour (embassy staff), 10 Sept. 1943, FO 181/979. 
4 War Diary entry for 25 Sept. 1943, WO 178/27. 
5 In the 1920s he built a prototype of a small, cheap armoured 
vehicle utilizing rubber tracks with a car-type chassis, 
for 
the purpose of carrying an infantryman and his machine gun 
across open country (Ellis and Chamberlain, 
Fighting Vehicles, 
p. 40). 
6 War diary entry, 23 Apr. 1943, WO 178/27- 
7 Ibid. 
8 For a full account of these quarrels within the mission, see 
F0 371 36970 N4598/163/38" 
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High Command advice as to how to hold a German armoured attack, 
and then, after the Russian victory at Kursk in the summer, boas- 
ted about the value of the advice he had given. 
1 Even more unwise- 
ly, he showed a relentless curiosity about the details of Red Army 
organization and dispositions. 2 His behaviour during his visit to 
the operational front was typical. Confronted with the Soviet gen- 
eral's refusal to disclose the position of the Red Army units in 
the district, Martel pompously asserted his authority. 
This ... was the moment for the tough stuff! Trying to look 
very angry I spoke out strongly and said: 'Do you imagine that I have come all the way out from England to put up with tom- foolery of that sort. I have never been so insulted before in 
my life. I certainly do not propose to put up with that kind 
of treatment for a moment. 3 
Not surprisingly, he soon found out he had to put up with far worse. 
When he visited the northern ports in June, soon after the news of 
the delay in the continental invasion had been broken to Stalin, 
he was soundly snubbed by the Soviet authorities. Only three of 
the thirty Russians invited to a reception in his honour actually 
attended and none of these were service or civilian authorities. 
4 
Within weeks of this incident, moreover, the Soviet embassy in 
London announced that no more visas or special passes would be 
granted for British personnel to serve in northern Russia. 
5 
The 
Russians reiterated their argument that there should be equality 
of numbers or 'reciprocity' between British servicemen in the 
Soviet Union and Russian repressntatives in the United Kingdom. 
6 
This posed considerable problems. One hundred and fifty-two of 
the British shore establishment in north Russia were due for relief, 
but they could not return unless the Russians agreed to provide 
visas for their replacements. Some of them had served more than 
eighteen months in the Arctic when the desired period of duty was 
recognized to be only nine months. Their morale was noticeably 
declining under the impact of ill-health, the poor weather, mono- 
tonous tinned food and Soviet restrictions. 
7 
There was the occas- 
1 Notes for History, 5 Mar. 1944, Liddell Hart papers 11/1944/8. 
2 Ibid.; war diary entries, 22 Apr. 1943 et seq., WO 178/27. 
3 Lieut-General Sir Giffard Martel, An Outspoken Soldier - his 
views and memoirs (London, 1949), p. 221. 
4 Private letter from Adm. Fisher to DNI, 24 June 1943, ADM 199/ 
W. 
5 Chronology of difficulties in northern ports, 28 Sept. 1943, 
ADM 199/606. 
6 COS(43)187,3 July 1943, CAB 80/40. 
7 Minute for VCNS, n. d., ADM 199/606. 
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ional breakdown, a suicide and a murder. 
1 There was also unlimi- 
ted potential for friction between the visitors and the local 
authorities, and early in August two members of the merchant navy 
were arrested for smoking in a prohibited area and assaulting the 
official who apprehended them. They were not subject to British 
jurisdiction, being members of the merchant navy, and were there- 
fore sentenced by a Soviet court to five and two years' imprison- 
ment respectively. 
2 The sentences they would have received for 
the same offences in Britain, a Foreign Office legal expert esti- 
mated, were fourteen days' imprisonment or a £1O-15 fine. 
3 
The intolerable situation provoked much debate in London. The 
Prime Minister was inclined, since it had been shown that diplo- 
matic approaches had little effect, 
4to 
withdraw the servicemen in 
the north ostentatiously. 'Experience has taught me', he cabled 
from Quebec where he was meeting Roosevelt, 'that it is not worth- 
while arguing with Soviet people. One simply has to confront them 
with a new fact and await their reactions. '5 The ambassador in 
Moscow, however, thought it would be politic to meet Soviet demands 
part way and halve the northern establishment when the convoys were 
not running. If the British personnel numbered only 160 in the 
idle months, Clark Kerr argued, the Russians might prove more co- 
operative when the convoys restarted. 
6 
The Chiefs of Staff app- 
rdved of neither suggestion. Each of them would have involved a 
considerable diplomatic defeat since the British had never admitted. 
the right of the Kremlin to dictate the number of men needed for 
duties in north Russia.? Each proposal furthermore would have left 
unsolved the question of the twenty-four merchant ships and their 
700 crew stranded in the northern ports since the cancellation of 
the convoys in the spring. Without the service establishment 
these men would be left without hospital services or communicat- 
ions with Great Britain. 
8 
Finally there was the argument of the 
Admiralty that there were no months which could be described as 
idle. 
9 Unbeknown to the Foreign office, it was about to launch 
1 Minute by H. M. Hollyer, 25 Aug. 1943, MT 59/1121. 
2 Chronology of difficulties ..., ADM 199/606. 
3 Minute by Mr. Dean, FO 371 37040 N4853/4013/38" 
4 Clark Kerr had already approached Molotov without success on 
9 June (COS(43)187, annex 1, CAB 80/40). 
5 C0S(43)214,25 July 1943, CAB 8o/4i. 
6 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 751 DEDIP, ADM 199/606. 
7 Extract from COS(43)118th mtg, 26 July 1943, ADM 199/606. 
8 Woodward, II, p. 570- 
9 Letter from Waldock (head of Marine Intelligence) to Mr. Dew 
of FO, 19 Aug. 1943, ADM 199/606. 
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an operation against the German surface vessels in the north, 
and for this the naval personnel in the Arctic were essential. 
1 
Consequently the British could at first only agree to make another, 
ineffectual approach to the Soviet government in August, 
2and 
to 
withdraw a small number of servicemen in September. These were 
the number 126 base unit who had been sent in the early days of 
the protocols to assist in the arrival of supplies and whose use- 
fulness had long since passed. 
3 
The larger issue of the size of 
the naval establishment was deferred until the Prime Minister 
returned from North America. 
4 
This was the situation when Molotov made his peremptory demand 
on 21 September for the immediate resumption of the northern con- 
voys. Churchill, who had returned to London two days earlier, 
was sufficiently impressed by this to agree that the Soviet demand 
must be met; but, in accordance with the Defence Committee's dec- 
ision of 28 September, he coupled his agreement with a request for 
better treatment of British personnel. On 1 October he told Sta- 
lin that the convoys would be resumed. There would be one each 
month, he hoped, from November to February, each of thirty-five 
British and American ships. But, he added, this was not 'a cont- 
ract-or a bargain, but rather a declaration of our solemn and ear- 
nest resolve'. The Royal Navy was still strained by the Mediterr- 
anean campaign, the Far Eastern war and the Battle of the Atlantic. 
In the latter the Germans were now using a new and effective acous- 
tic torpedo. Furthermore, Churchill said, the British government 
must raise with the Soviet government the question of its repres- 
entatives in north Russia. It could not accept, he said, the 
Soviet demand for 'reciprocity' in personnel and must claim the 
right to be the sole judge of its own operational needs. The many 
restrictions placed on British servicemen were unnecessary and 
'inappropriate for men sent out by an ally to carry out operations 
of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union'. He requested imm- 
ediate agreement to new visas and asked for an assurance that vis- 
as would no longer be withheld in the future. In addition 
he re- 
quested that a small medical unit should be allowed to operate in 
the north and that British seamen committing offences should be 
1 Woodward, 'II, p. 571. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Martel to DMI, MIL 9953,18 Sept. 1943, ADM 199/606. The unit 
left the Soviet Union on 5 October (WO 178/27). 
4 Woodward, II, p. 571. 
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handed over to their own superiors for discipline. The Russian 
attitude at present 'makes an impression upon officers and men 
alike which is bad for Anglo-Soviet relations, and would be 
deeply injurious if Parliament got to hear of it. ' 
Planning for the convoys went ahead on the assumption that 
this high-level appeal would improve the situation in north 
Russia. But after almost two weeks delay, Stalin replied in an 
'offensive'2manner. He clearly resented Churchill's refusal to 
make a binding commitment to run four convoys, for in his view 
Supplies from the British Government to the U. S. S. R., arm- 
aments and other military goods, cannot be considered other- 
wise than as an obligation ... delivery of armaments and 
military supplies to the U. S. S. R. through Persian ports can- 
not compensate in any way for those supplies which were not 
delivered by the Northern route ... Therefore, at the 
present time, when the forces of the Soviet Union are strai- 
ned to the utmost to secure the needs of the front in the 
interests of success of the struggle against the main forces 
of our common enemy, it would be inadmissable to have the 
supplies of the Soviet armies depend on the arbitrary judgment 
of the British side. It is impossible to consider this posing 
of the question to be other than a refusal of the British Gov- 
ernment to fulfil the obligations it undertook and as a kind 
of threat addressed to the U. S. S. R. 
On the question of British servicemen Stalin defended the idea of 
'reciprocity' between them and the numbers of Russians in the 
United Kingdom. There were far too many Britons in the Soviet 
Union, he claimed, and the withdrawal of number 126 base unit had 
only proved that most officers were 'for many months ... doomed 
to idleness'. In these circumstances they resorted to bribing 
Soviet officials for information, and, he assured Churchill, 'your 
mention of many formalities and restrictions in the northern ports 
is based on inaccurate information'. 
3 
Churchill's reaction to this telegram was a characteristic mix- 
ture of aggression and generous impulse. 'He snorted as he read 
it', Cadogan recalls, 'and, at the end, said "I'll stop convoys. " 
But I suggested another reply and he calmed down. '4 Churchill 
told Roosevelt on 16 October, 
I think, or at least I hope, this message came from the mach- 
ine rather than from Stalin, as it took twelve days to prep- 
are. The Soviet machine is quite convinced it can get every- 
1 Sir Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. V (Sydney, 
1952), pp. 234-6. 
2 Woodward, II, p. 573- 
3 Churchill, pp. 238-9. 
4 Cadogan, Diaries ..., p. 568. 
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thing by bullying, and I am sure it is a matter of some 
importance to show that this is not always necessarily 
true. l 
Two days later he summoned F. Gusev, who had replaced Maisky as 
Soviet ambassador in September. He handed Stalin's message back 
to the ambassador saying, 'I am not prepared to receive it'. 
However, he made a point of assuring Gusev that he desired to 
meet the Soviet leader and to work with the Soviet Union both 
then and after the war. 
2 
Later, he made a further conciliatory 
gesture and agreed to let the first of the convoys sail --, this 
was partly because it included U. S. ships allocated to this route 
expressly at the request of the British. But Churchill also with- 
drew his earlier instructions to Eden, who was on his way to a 
meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, to propose the abandonment 
of the convoys. He left it to Eden's discretion in the coming 
meeting with the Soviet authorities to resolve the issue of Brit- 
ish personnel in north Russia. 
3 
Fortunately this conference in Moscow from 19 to 30 October 
proved to be an 'unqualified success'. 
4 
The Russians made it 
clear that, whatever their attitude to the convoys might be, they 
wished general relations with the West to be established on 'a 
footing of permanent friendship'. As evidence of this, they con- 
ceded ground on a number of points so that they could meet British 
and American views. 
5 This resulted in the establishment of the 
European Advisory Committee in London for the discussion of post- 
war European questions, the creation of an Allied Advisory Comm- 
ittee to include the Russians in the control of Italy, and the 
publication of documents agreeing on the future of Austria, Italy, 
and captured German war criminals. More important"?, the confer- 
ence issued a four-Power declaration which stated the determinat- 
ion of the Powers 'to continue hostilities against those Axis 
Powers with which they respectively are at war until such Powers 
have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender'. 
This laid the spectre of a separate Soviet-German peace to rest 
permanently and showed the Kremlin's eagerness for allied unity; 
1 Churchill, p. 240. 
2 Ibid., pp. 241-2. 
3 Ibid., pp. 240-1. 
4 Political Review of Events in the Soviet Union during 1943, 
FO 371 43336 N6534/183/38. 
5 Woodward, II9 p. 594, Woodward gives a full coverage of the 
discussion at this conference in pp. 581-94. 
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it signed the declaration even though, with China the fourth 
signatory at the United States' wish, such an action might have 
been provocative to the Japanese. 
It was obvious that the Russians were eager for the conference 
to be a success. They seemed gratified at its being held in their 
capital and they were flattered also by the frankness with which 
Allied representatives took them into their confidence. The Brit- 
ish and American generals, Ismay and Deane, particularly won their 
approval with their descriptions of the Allies' plans for a cont- 
inental invasion in 1944. Their meeting with their Soviet coun- 
terparts Eden later called 'a diplomatic triumph'1as Ismay ingen- 
uously told his audience, 
at every single Anglo-American Conference since we have been 
in the war together, the thought uppermost in all our minds 
has been to so arrange our affairs as to ensure the maximum 
possible diversion of enemy land and air forces from the 
Russian front. I do not for a moment suggest that in so 
doing we have thought'only of Soviet interests. On the con- 
trarylit has been unanimously and invariably recognized as 
the soundest strategy in the interests of the Allies as a 
whole. 2 
With such assurances and with the situation on the Eastern front 
exhilarating, even the icy Molotov began to thaw. He 'seemed to 
have a new victory to report every time we met', Ismay recalled, 
3 
and as the Red Army exploited its forcing of the Dnieper River in 
October, the conference was increasingly conducted with 'tact and 
skill and growing good humour'. 
4 
The Soviet press gave the proc- 
eedings a warm coverage5and Molotov paid the Allies the unique 
compliment of dining at the British embassy. 
6 
In this atmosphere of goodwill, the problem of the servicemen 
in north Russia was amicably resolved. Both parties were willing 
to compromise a little, the Russians, it seemed, realizing soon 
after sending Stalin's telegram of 13 October that they had over- 
stepped the mark. They seemed deeply impressed by Churchill's 
gesture of returning the message. 
7 
Molotov went out of his way 
in his first meeting with Eden on 19 October to stress how greatly 
the Soviet Union valued the convoys, and Stalin two days later 
1 The Reckoning, p. 411. 
2 Mtg of 20 Oct., in COS(43)704(0), CAB 80/76. 
3 Memoirs of Lord Ismay, p. 326. 
4 Eden, quoted in Woodward, II9 p. 594- 
5 Werth, p. 678. 
6 Churchill, V, pp. 261-2. 
7 Eden, quoted in Woodward, p. 594; Churchill, pp. 242. 
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told the Foreign Secretary that his message had not been meant 
to cause offence. His differences with the Prime Minister, he 
said, were not about the character of the operation of the con- 
voys but about whether these were a 'gift' or an obligation. 
' 
Eden for his part apparently had enough sympathy with the Soviet 
complaints to respond to these overtures. Although he claims to 
the contrary in his memoirs, 
2one 
suspects that he could see some 
basis for the Russians' argument that if only the British in north 
Russia had treated their people as equals, none of these diffic- 
ulties would have arisen; 
3for 
Eden himself quarrelled bitterly 
with Martel on 28 October over the question of approach to the 
Russians. The general's passion for reprisals against the unco- 
operative 'Bolshevik Government' infuriated Eden 
4and 
convinced 
him that Martel was 'something of a calamity'5for Anglo-Soviet 
relations - 'an unfortunate choice', as he said later, who 'would 
not have been made if CIGS had not also been a trifle exasperated 
- to put it mildly - with the Russians'. 
6 
In consultation with Molotov, Eden eventually hammered out an 
arrangement satisfactory to both British and Soviet governments. 
It was agreed that the 320 servicemen7in the northern ports should 
not be increased by more than 10, per cent without the knowledge of 
the Soviet government. Eden conceded that the size of the estab- 
lishment should be reduced when the convoys were interrupted in 
the spring. Molotov in turn agreed that visas should be provided 
within these limits and that accommodation should be made available 
in an Archangel hospital to allow British casualties to be treated 
by their own medical personnel. The Kremlin also accepted that 
there would be less rigorous censorship of mails and that British 
personnel committing offences should be handed over to its own 
authorities. 
8 
In token of this, Stalin granted a pardon to the 
two sailors already serving sentences in Soviet prisons. 
9 
This agreement provided the basis for considerably improved 
1 Woodward, p. 574. 
2 The Reckoning, p. 413- 
3 Woodward, p. 574. 
4 Appendix N to war diary, Oct. 1943, WO 178/27. Major Birse 
testifies to the intensity of Eden and Martel's argument. 
5 Minute, 19 Nov. 1943, FO 371 36970 N6997/163/38. 
6 Minute, 21 Jan. 1944, FO 371 36970 N7241/163/38- 
7 There was also a hospital unit which brought the total estab- 
lishment to 383- 
8 30 Mission to Admy, cable 061652C, 7 Nov. 1943, ADM 199/606. 
9 Churchill, V, p. 261. 
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relations in the northern ports. 
1 
Consequently, as the strat- 
egic situation in the northern waters also improved, the British 
found themselves able to run convoys throughout the winter with 
an ease which surprised them and their allies. The German sur- 
face vessels no longer posed a dire threat. The Tirpitz was dam- 
aged, the Lützow had returned to the Baltic and the Scharnhorst 
was sunk in an engagement during the passage of the northern con- 
voy late in December 1943- With the perpetual darkness and the 
growing preoccupations of the Luftwaffe elsewhere, the air threat 
to the convoys was also minimized. The result was that only 3 of 
the 191 vessels which sailed in this series of convoys failed to 
arrive. The British suffered naval losses of two destroyers and 
one fighter in defence of these convoys, but the enemy suffered 
far worse - he lost the Scharnhorst, eight U-boats and five 
aircraft. 
2 
The only problems which perplexed the British during these con- 
voys were the temporary inability of the Russian authorities in 
the north to handle the sudden increase in cargo, and their own 
failure to find sufficient cargo of high priority to fill their 
convoy quota. The former problem was soon resolved. The British 
and Americans, who found themselves unloading some of the ships 
of the November convoy for lack of skilled Russian labour in Mur- 
mansk, suggested that the convoy planned for January might have 
to be postponed. 
3 The Russians soon responded! By March the 
rate of discharge in the northern ports showed a considerable 
improvement. 
4 
The problem of suitable cargo, however, was more intractaole. 
Churchill's promise to send 140 ships by the northern route dur- 
ing the winter had been largely politically motivated. It bore 
little relation to the size of the contribution Britain had to 
ship, which had been calculated to be 47 cargoes and proved to 
be only 34.5 The Ministry of War Transport thought the promise 
to run four convoys was 'a gross mistake'. 
6 
Because much of the 
1 27th monthly report by RrrAdm Archer, 22 Nov. -26 Dec. 1943, 
FO 371 43344 N666/232/38- 
2 PM to Premier Stalin, T. 1028/4,3 May 1944, PREM 3 393/12. 
3 ASE to Moscow, no. 13 MOSSY, 17 Jan. 1944, FO 371 43270 N154/ 
25/38- 
4 ASE to Moscow, no. 67 MOSSY, 14 Mar. 1944, FO 371 43271 N2045/ 
25/38. 
5 Note for Lyttelton, 19 Oct. 1943, PREM 3 393/10. 
6 Minute by D. E. O'Neill, 19 Oct. 1943, MT 59/1121. 
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equipment for the Russians would not be produced until the end 
of the convoy period, the supply departments were confronted 
with the choice of either filling the early ships with food and 
other non-protocol items, bringing forward military supplies at 
their own expense or calling on the Americans. In fact it did 
all of these. 
1 
The War Office agreed in November to divert sup- 
plies from its own troops to enable the full total of one thous- 
and Valentine tanks and one hundred G. L. II sets to be shipped 
in the winter period. 
2 
The Air Ministry, however, could not 
make a similar effort3and since much of industrial production 
for the Russians could not be accelerated beyond a certain limit, 
4 
the Ministry of War Transport had to lean increasingly on the 
United States. The Americans did not entirely welcome this. 
They had planned to meet their commitments entirely. through the 
Pacific and Persian routes5(the latter of which now had surplus 
capacity), and it disrupted their planning to have to divert so 
much cargo to the northern route. They were also concerned at 
the possibility that their ships might be marooned in north 
Russia in the summer. Nonetheless they responded to the Brit- 
ish appeal. Otherwise, as Churchill admitted on 3 November, 'we 
shall be accused of a breach of faith'.? He did little to rel- 
ieve the situation though, since in January 1944 when it was dec- 
ided to postpone 'Overlord' by a month, he promised the Russians 
a further half convoy 'as a sweetener to U. J. '8 This meant that 
the Americans had finally to provide 123 of the 172 cargoes sent 
by the northern route over the whole winter period. 
9 The Mini- 
stry of War Transport recorded its sincere hope in March 1944 
that this would be the 'last effort to provide gratuitous assist- 
ante', 
10but 
undoubtedly the use of the northern route had consid- 
erable practical as well as political advantages. It allowed 
1 See ASE progress reports in CAB 92/8 and 92/9. 
2 Grigg to Lyttelton, 19 Nov. 1943, BT 28/144. 
3 Lyttelton to Grigg, 1 Nov. 1943, ibid. 
4 Final draft of minute for PM, 27 Oct. 1943, MT 59/1121. 
5 Memo by H. W. Hollyer(MNT), 18 Oct. 1943; Br Merchant Shipp- 
ing Mission, W'ton to Shipminder, London, BILGE MOSSY 2820, 
9 Nov. 1943, MT 59/1121. 
6 Memo by Hollyer, 20 Dec. 1943, MT 59/1122. 
7 Minute PM to MOP and M'WVT, no. 775/3, BT 28/144. 
8 PM to deputy PM and Defence Committee, FROZEN no. 1138,6 
Jan. 1944, PREM 3 393/11. 
9 PM to Premier Stalin, T. 1028/4,3 May 1944, PREM 3 393/12. 
10 Letter Hollyer to British Merchant Shipping Mission, 1 Mar. 
1944, MT 59/1123. 
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1,259,600 tons of supplies - 830,000 of them American - to be 
carried to the port of discharge the Russians still preferred. 
1 
It was a performance much better than previous years and one 
which helped the Allies in no small way to meet their commit- 
ments under the third protocol. 
For the Pacific route in contrast had disappointed expectat- 
ions over the winter of 1943-4. Ships under Soviet flag were 
forced through fear of Japanese interference to take a circuit- 
ous route to Vladivostock. This was by way of Kamachatka, Petro- 
pavlovsk and the Strait of Tartary rather than directly through 
the La Perouse Strait near the northern-most Japanese island of 
Hokkaido. This re-routing involved many vessels in heavy Arctic 
ice from which not even ice-breakers could free them. Several 
Liberty vessels broke up in these circumstances. Naturally the 
Russians pressed for further transfers of shipping to replace 
these, but since they were not prepared to honour the earlier 
agreement to transfer shipping under Soviet flag to other supply 
routes, the Americans resisted this pressure. As a result the 
rate of loadings on the western American seaboard dropped notice- 
ably over the winter months. The nadir was reached in January 
1944 when 102,000 short tons were shipped instead of the planned 
225,000.2 The December quarter as a whole saw shipments of only 
669,674.3 tons while the March quarter was even lower at 367,590.3 
tons. 3 Had not the northern route been re-opened at this time, 
the Americans might well have had to entertain seriously the plans 
put forward by General Connolly of the Persian Gulf Command in 
September 1943 for raising the capacity of that route even further 
to 260,000 long tons a month. 
4 
The Persian Gulf route indeed had a capacity of this figure 
in sight, assuming its personnel establishment and its develop- 
ment projects continued to be increased, for during 1943 all the 
efforts of the previous two years had begun to bear fruit. By 
the end of the year few of the major construction programmes in 
Iran remained to be completed. 
5 
The curse of divided respons- 
ibility had finally been eliminated with the British, less con- 
cerned about Middle Eastern security after Stalingrad and El 
Alamein, surrendering the control of movements to the Americans 
1 T. 1028/4, loc. cit. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 676. 
3 Minute by L. Pott, 26 May 1944, FO 371 43274 N3064/25/38- 
4 Leighton and Coakley, p. 676. 
5 Motter, p. 247. 
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in May 1943.1 Civilian control of trucking and assembly opera- 
tions was progressively replaced by U. S. Army control. 
2 New 
records of cargo clearance began to be achieved. Aircraft ass- 
embly rose from an average of 75 planes a month in the last five 
months of Douglas operation of the assembly plants to an average 
of 182.9 planes a month in the twenty-one months of army control. 
3 
October 1943 was the peak month with a record 395 aircraft being 
assembled.. Ship turnaround was also accelerated to an average 
of 18 days in December 1943 compared with an appalling 55 days 
twelve months earlier. 
5 
Turnaround of railroad cars in the Soviet 
-controlled sector of the railway meanwhile was shortened by len- 
ding the Russians locomotives and by threatening to curtail sup- 
plies if their performance did not improve. 
6 
Naturally some problems remained intractable. The aircraft 
assembly plant at Abadan never managed to clear its backlog comp- 
letely, particularly after it had been flooded with British planes 
from the convoy crisis of spring 1943.7 Pilferage of supplies 
by native and American staff and maintenance of vehicles also 
remained ineradicable difficulties. 
8 
Nonetheless with 289,070 
long tons being shipped to its ports in May 1944 alone, 
9the 
Per- 
sian Gulf route provided the firm basis on which the achievement 
of the third protocol was built. It dealt with more than half of 
the 5,735 aircraft sent by all supply routes in this period, 
10 
and, as mentioned above, always offered the prospect of taking 
an even greater proportion of supplies should the other supply 
routes fail. 
Thanks to this, and the resumption of the northern convoys 
and the resurgence of the Pacific route with the arctic thaw in 
spring 1944, protocol commitments from the United States were 
more than fulfilled. Although, because of the problems of find- 
ing suitable shipping and port facilities, some items of heavy 
equipment, such as tanks, trucks and locomotives, fell into arr- 
ears, 
11the total tonnage shipped was more than promised. Ship- 
1 Motter, p. 202. 
2 Ibid., p. 264. 
3 Ibid., p. 264. 
4 Ibid., p. 270. 
5 Ibid., pp. 507-8. 
6 Ibid., pp. 356-9. 
7 Ibid., p. 270. 
8 Ibid., pp. 325-6. 
9 Ibid., appendix A. 
10 Ibid., p. 264. 
31 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 682-3. 
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ments in 1943 as a whole were nearly 200 per cent. of those of 
the previous year1and the third protocol schedule of 5,100,000 
short tons was exceeded by almost 25 per cent by 30 June 1944.2 
The British also exceeded their commitments - at least in 
terms of military supplies. The sent an extra 36 Valentine 
tanks and 25 bridge layers to be used with these vehicles. 
They shipped 159 lorries, 955 motor cycles and 4 anti-aircraft 
guns in addition to the original protocol commitment. Like the 
Americans, the British fulfilled their aircraft commitment too, 
even though the Russian rejection of the Hurricanes had disrup- 
ted their planning. There was, however, a shortfall of 110 Air- 
acobras despatched from the United States on the United Kingdom's 
account. 
3 
Britain's programme of industrial equipment for the 
Soviet Union also fell behind schedule because of manpower short- 
ages, interference from operational requirements and a certain 
amount of design and inspection difficulties. 
4 
There is no doubt that the Allied performance impressed the 
Russians. From late 1943 onwards they were prodigal by previous 
standards with their praise of the British and American effort. 
Stalin's speech on the anniversary of the revolution in November 
1943 declared: 
Taking together the blows struck at the Germans and their 
allies in North Africa and Southern Italy, the intensive 
bombing of Germany ... and the regular supplies of arm- 
aments and raw materials that we are receiving from our 
Allies, we must say that all this has greatly helped our 
summer campaign. 5 
Further, at his meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran 
in November and December 1943, Stalin praised American production, 
saying that without it the war would have been lost. 
6 
There were 
regular publications in the Soviet press in the first months of 
1944 describing the Lend-Lease aid given to the U. S. S. R. The 
statistics released by the Foreign Economic Administration of the 
United States in January and February were given considerable cov- 
erage. This included the claim that three and a half billion 
1 Foreiirn Relations of the United States, 1944, IV (Washington, 
1966), p. 1056. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 678. 
3 ASE(45)4,20 Jan. 1945, CAB 92/9. (See appendix A at the 
conclusion of the chapter). - 
4 Letter from G. W. Turner (M/Supply) to Sir. Robert Sinclair 
(MOP), 8 May 1944, BT 28/113A, PP/31. 
5 Werth, pp. 678-9. 
6 Sherwood, The White House Papers, vol. 2, p. 787. 
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dollars worth of supplies had been provided under Lend-Lease 
from the United States - 7,800 aircraft, 4,700 tanks, 170,000 
trucks and automobiles and 25,000 other military machines made 
up part of this. 
1 
Britain's contribution was also acknowledged 
in the Soviet Union with the publication of Churchill's state- 
ment to the House of Commons in May 1944 which detailed the mil- 
itary, civil and medical supplies made available to the Russians 
from 1 October 1941 to 31 March 1944 (see appendix C at conclusion 
of chapter). Great Britain had supplied, the Soviet press ad- 
mitted, 
25,031 
tanks (1,223 of which were built in Canada), 4,020 
lorries, 2,463 armoured carriers (1,348 from Canada), 6,778 air- 
craft, £77,185,000 worth of civil stores and £3,047,725 worth of 
medical supplies raised by charitable organizations. 
Soviet praise reached a crescendo at the time of the Allied 
invasion of France in June 1944. Stalin's May 1 Order of the Day 
praised Britain and America not only for 'deflecting from us a 
considerable proportion of the German troops' but also for 'supp- 
lying us with most valuable strategic raw materials and armaments' .3 
On the anniversary of the Anglo-Soviet treaty on 26 May 1944 Allied 
aid was further praised and actually given editorial comment in 
the Soviet press. 
4 
Previously the newspapers had confined them- 
selves simply to reporting statistics of aid published by the Wes- 
tern nations. In June Molotov gave a banquet in honour of the Mas- 
ter Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and the U. S. S. R., 
and details of Allied aid occupied three-quarters of the front page 
space on Moscow papers on 11 June. 
5 'The Soviet people value this 
assistance highly', the authoritative Pravda said, 
6and 
Soviet radio 
also- broadcast statistics of Allied aid. 
7 This, as Clark Kerr 
said, was 'the most generous publicity ever given' and showed 'how 
far we have moved since Standley's outburst of last year'. 
8 
Even 
on the anniversary of the Soviet-German war the official press 
found time to congratulate its allies. The United States of America 
1 FRUS, 1943, III, p. 798; FRUS, 1944, IV, p. 1056. 
2 Summary of Moscow daily press, collected by British embassy, 
Moscow (in possession of Dr G. Bolsover, School of Slavonic 
and Eastern European Studies, University of London). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 FRUS, 1944, Iv, pp. 884-5- 
6 Summary of Moscow press. 
7 Text of Soviet Monitor, 11 June 1944, FO 371 43275 N3613/25/38. 
8 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 1584,13 June 1944, FO 371 43726 N3659/ 
25/38. 
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and Great Britain, the Soviet Monitor, issued by Tass Agency, 
said on 22 June, 
have considerably contributed-to the successes of the Red 
Army by supplying us with very valuable strategic raw 
materials and armaments, systematically bombing military 
objectives in Germany and thereby undermining the latter's 
military might. 
The bulletin went on to praise 'the brilliantly executed invasion 
of Northern France' and 'the successful offensive of the Allied 
troops in Italy'. 1 
In the same period the Soviet government liberally bestowed 
awards on Allied military leaders and many of the personnel invol- 
ved in the production and delivery of protocol supplies. Beaver- 
brook, Lyttelton, Admiral Tovey, Generals Brooke, Marshall, Eisen- 
hower and Alexander - to name but some - were given the highest 
Soviet honour of the Order of Suvorov, First Class. 
2 
Officers 
and crews of both the American and the British navies were given 
lesser awards 'for valour and fortitude displayed in bringing arm- 
aments from the United States to the Soviet Union'. 
3 
Further hon- 
ours were showered on Connolly and his subordinates 'for the suc- 
cessful fulfilment of the instructions of the American Command in 
the Persian Gulf in transporting munitions supplies and foodstuffs 
to the Soviet Union which have provided great assistance to the 
Red Army'. 
4 
Hopkins and other officials in Washington would also 
have been honoured by the Soviet government had not the Russians 
been restrained by a regulation of Congress forbidding the accep- 
tance of medals by U. S. civilian authorities. 
5 Harriman, since 
October 1943 U. S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, judged this 
spate of awards to be 'official concrete recognition of the Sov- 
iet Government's appreciation of the value they have placed on 
Lend-Lease shipments', 
6and 
certainly the Soviet actions exonerate 
them from the indiscriminate post-war charge that they never exp- 
ressed thanks for Allied supplies. 
Indeed the gratitude of the Kremlin for Allied help at this 
time was so obvious that it vindicated the assumption on which 
Allied supply policy had been based for nearly three years. 
1 FO 371 43362 N3934/477/38" 
2 Stalin to PM, T. 1517/4,26 July 1944, PREM 3 393/12. FRUST 
1944, IV, p. 834; summary of Moscow press. 
3 Summary of Moscow press, 19 Feb. 1944. 
4 FRUS, 1944, IV,, p. 861. 
5 FRUS, 1944, Iv, p. 835. 
6 Ibid., p. 828. 
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Washington and to a lesser degree London had calculated that their 
adhering to a generous commitment regardless of Russian. reserve 
and at times abuse would bring both military and political returns. 
The easing of restraint and suspicion during the third protocol 
period justified this hope. Not only did the Soviet government 
publicly admit its indebtedness to the West, but it agreed to all- 
ow the United States, to operate shuttle-bombing against European 
targets from its own territory. 
1 Undoubtedly there were reasons 
other than the flow of Allied supplies for this Soviet cordiality. 
The Russians were more self-assured with spectacular victories to 
their credit; they were being taken into Allied counsels on ques- 
tions of post-war European organization; and they were anticipat- 
ing the long-desired invasion of France. Nonetheless the role of 
the protocol must not be ignored. For there were many issues 
still tending to divide the governments of the three Powers. The 
euphoria of the meeting at Teheran did not last for long and was 
soon dimmed by some suspicion and unease, particularly over East- 
ern Europe. On 17 January 1944 the Soviet government attacked the 
British through the official organ, Pravda, claiming that it had 
evidence of secret Anglo-German negotiations. 
2 Soon after, the 
American, Wendell Willkie, was also attacked savagely in Pravda 
for questioning the intentions of the Soviet Union towards 
the 
countries adjoining her. 
3 Britons and Americans alike began to 
question Soviet ambitions. Even though the Kremlin was co-operating 
wholeheartedly in preparations for post-war organizations, 
its sup- 
port for communist movements in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia was 
disquieting. 
5 
So also was its unilateral recognition of the Ital- 
ian government on 13 March 19446and the steady deterioration 
thr- 
oughout that year in Russo-Polish relations. Except 
for a brief 
respite in May and June the Kremlin was unrelenting 
in this period 
in its pressure on the London-based Polish government 
to recognize 
publicly the Curzon line as the Soviet-Polish 
border and to recon- 
stitute itself in a form more sympathetic to the 
Soviet Union. 
7 
'T confess to a growing apprehension', Foreign Secretary 
Eden said 
1 For a full account of this see, Deane, The Stranp'e Alliance, 
passim-. -. 
2 Sir Llewellin Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second 
World War, vol. III, pp. 106-8. 
3 Werth, pp. 690-1; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 1437. 
4 Hull, p. 1436. 
5 Woodward, III, p. 119. 
6 Hull, p. 1449. 
7 Woodward, III, pp. 154-202. 
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on 4 April 1944, 'that Russia has vast aims, and that these inc- 
lude the domination of Eastern Europe and even the Mediterranean 
and the communizing of much that remains'. 
1 Churchill, too, con- 
cerned at the situation developing in Eastern Europe in the middle 
of 1944, declared on 4 May, 
Broadly speaking the issue is: are we going to acquiesce in 
the Communisation of the Balkans and perhaps of Italy? I 
am of the opinion on the whole that we ought to come to a 
definite conclusion about it, and that if our conclusion is 
that we resist the Communist infusion and invasion we should 
put it to them pretty plainly at the best moment that milit- 
ary events permit. 2 
Nonetheless the differences between East and West had by no 
means hardened into the direct clash of interests of the Cold War 
years, and there was still much confidence that the Soviet Union 
and its allies could find a modus vivendi. 
3 There were also many 
indications in the early part of 1944 that the Kremlin attached 
great importance to co-operation with its allies. 
4 
In these cir- 
cumstances the continuation of Allied supplies was of considerable 
value. It provided continuity when the whole balance of political 
relations and the future of the wartime alliance was uncertain. 
It was a gage of Allied goodwill when the points of contention 
between East and West were manifold. Perhaps its greatest merit 
was that, in concentrating increasingly on supplies for reconst- 
ruction and rehabilitation, it assured the Russians that its allies 
cared not only for its power to destroy the German army but for 
its 
future recovery from devastation and war. The significance which 
the Kremlin attached to this became clear when, in the negotiations 
for the fourth protocol, the Allies' generosity began to pall. 
1 Woodward, III, p-ý; 
r"109. 2 Ibid., pp. 115-6. 
3 Ibid., p. 119; Hull, p. 1459. 
4 For instance, when the British ambassador approached MM. 
Litvinov, 
Maisky and Dekanosov (Assistant Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs) 
about the Pravda report, -the Russians expressed complete satis- 
faction with the state of Anglo-Soviet relations 
('Noodward, III9 
p. 109). Harriman also remained confident 
throughout 1944 that 
the Kremlin, although it expected to be able to dictate condi- 
tions from its position of political and military strength, plac- 
ed the highest importance on its new association with 
the West 
(Hull, p. 1460). 
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Appendix A to 
THE FULFILMENT 
chapter six 
OF THE THIRD PROTOCOL: MILITARY SUPPLIES (TO 30 JUNE 1944)* 
Item Commitment Despatched In Lost Arrived Remarks 
in third transit at sea 
protocol 
Tanks 
UK Valentine 1,000 1,036 - 26 1,010 
Canadian 
Valentine - 175 - 10 165 part of sec- 
and protocol 
backlog 
Cromwell IV -66-- requested by 
Russians in 
April 1944** 
Valentine - 25 -- 25 
bridge 
layer 






lorries - 83 8- 75 extra-protocol 
3-ton Ford 
lorries - 64 -- 
64 
30-ton Ford 
lorries - 12 -- 
12 
motor cycles - 955 10 10 
935 
A /A guns 
4.5 in. - 4 --4 
3.7 in. - 4 --4 
4o mm - 4 --4 
Aircraft 
Hurricanes 651 (incl. 51 including 71 
from second rejected by 
protocol) 461 - 20 
441 Russians 
Spitfires 190 154 - 36 
Hurricanes - 82 30 - 52 replacements for rejected 
Hurricanes 




* Source: CAB 92/9, ASE(45)4, 20 Jan. 1945. 
** Grigg to Lyttelton, n. d., FO 371 43273 N2502/25/38; Foy to MO P, 2 May, 1944, 
ibid., N2809/25/28. 
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FULFILMENT OF THIRD PROTOCOL: MILITARY-SUPPLIES* 
Item Commitment Despatched In Lost Arrived Remarks 
in third transit at sea 
protocol 
Airacobras 1,800 1,690 78 33 1,579 
Mosquito -11 extra-protocol 
* Shipments of raw materials proceeded satisfactorily except in the case of 
wool which, because of the Russian failure to ship it from the western sea- 
board of the United States, ground to a standstill over the winter of 1943- 
1944. The W. S. A. provided shipping for wool from the Dominions to the 
United States, but the Russians then chose to give priority to other supp- 
lies (CAB 92/8, ASE(44)2,10 Jan. 1944; minute by Mr. Foy, 6 Apr. 1944, FO 
371 43272 N2287/25/38). 
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Appendix B to chapter six 
During the period covered by the third protocol (July 1943 
to June 1944), the British contribution to the Soviet war effort 
was augmented by the loan of several warships and submarines. 
This came about because of the Russian desire to be allocated, as 
one of the principal members of the anti-Axis coalition, a propor- 
tion of the Italian fleet. This surrendered to the British at 
Malta early in September 1943, and Stalin asked at the Foreign Min- 
isters' conference in the following month for 1 battleship, 1 crui- 
ser, 8 destroyers and 4 submarines for use in north RAssia; he also 
requested 40,000 tons of merchant shipping for the Black Sea. 
1 
The Chiefs of Staff had considerable reservations about this pro- 
posal. Although they accepted in principle the Soviet claim for 
compensation, 
2the 
Italian vessels in question were assisting Allied 
operations in the Mediterranean. Italian personnel were also doing 
valuable work at the Taranto dockyards and it was feared they might 
scuttle or sabotage ships needed for 'Overlord"and the invasion of 
southern France, 'Anvil', if faced with a unilateral transfer of 
ships to the Soviet Union. The naval vessels were unsuited to Arc- 
tic conditions without substantial modification, and the merchant 
vessels were unable to use the Black Sea since it was still closed 
to shipping. Furthermore the British feared that, if the Russians 
were granted some portion of the Italian fleet, there might be other 
claims from French, Yugoslav and the Greek representatives, all of 
whom had suffered at the hands of the Italians. The British also 
felt that their own claim for the more modern Italian battleships 
was superior to the Russians' because of the 'overwhelming contrib- 
ution' of the British armed forces to the Mediterranean campaign. 
3 
Nonetheless the Cabinet did agree in principle during the Moscow 




It hoped, in view of operational considerations and 
the inaccessibility of the Black Sea, to defer the transfer of 
these ships until after the invasion of northern and southern 
France. 
President Roosevelt, however, promised Stalin at the Teheran confer- 
ence in December one third of the Italian fleet, and this as soon 
5 
as possible after 1 February 1944. One third was a considerably 
1 Churchill, V, p. 402. 
2 COS(43)261st mtg (0), min. 9,27 Oct. 1943, CAB 79/67- 
3 Churchill, V, pp. 262-3- 
4 Ibid., p. 263. 
5 Ibid., p. 402; CAB 80/77, COS(43)785(0), 22 Dec. 1943" 
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larger proportion than the Russians had previously requested - 
1 or 2 battleships, 2 or 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, 
6 corvettes and 10 submarines, in fact 
1- but the President's prom- 
ise put the British under considerable pressure to agree to the 
immediate transfer of some vessels. They therefore offered on 23 
January 1944 to lend the Russians one battleship, the Royal Sover- 
eign, a cruiser and 20,000 tons of merchant shipping, with the hope 
that the United States would provide a further 20,000 tons of ship- 
ping on loan. This offer was in lieu of the Italian ships which 
would be transferred as soon as operational and political consider- 
ations allowed. 
2 
Stalin, however, made it clear on 29 January that he would con- 
sider such an offer a breach of the Teheran agreement. He accepted 
the Allied offer, but requested as well that the British and Amer- 
icans should lend the Soviet Union destroyers and submarines in 
place of similar Italian vessels. 
3 Churchill therefore went the 
further mile, despite the reluctance of the Chiefs of Staff to im- 
prove on the original offer. 
4 
I was vexed by the harsh tone of Stalin's message about the 
Italian ships (the Prime Minister cabled Clark Kerr on 5 
February). Nevertheless I have tried my utmost to comply 
with his demands and make good what was promised at Teheran. 
I could not get anything more from the Americans who say 
their forces are all needed in the Pacific. I have therefore 
persuaded the Admiralty to provide eight British destroyers 
and four British submarines on loan until the Italian sub- 
stitutes can be procured. It was very difficult. 
5 
This arrangement satisfied the Russians, even though the vessels 
the British offered were old. The transfer was duly carried out 
with some delay in the hand-over of the destroyers caused by the 
invasion of France. 
6 
Regrettably one of the submarines was sunk 
en route to north Russia by an over-zealous Coastal Command.? 
After the war the Russians returned the ships as arranged, 
while the Italian vessels were transferred to them 'in a manner 
acceptable to all concerned'. 
8 
1 COS(43)785(0), loc. cit. 
2 Churchill, V, pp. 404-5- 
3 Ibid., pp. 405-6. 
4 COS(44)31st mtg(0), 2 Feb. 1944, CAB 79/70- 
5 PM to Ambassador Clark Kerr, no number, 5 Feb. 1944, ADM 205/35- 
6 Churchill, V, p. 406. 
7 Letter to Sinclair from A. V. Alexander, 20 Ott. 1944, FO 371 
43281 N6566/25/38- 
8 Churchill, V, p. 407. 
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Appendix C to chapter six 
SUPPLIES TO U. S. S. R. DESPATCHED BETWEEN 
1ST OCTOBER, 1941, TO 31ST MARCH, 1944. * 
1. MILITARY SUPPLIES 
(a) Armaments and Military Stores 
Tanks. Since October, 1941,5,031 tanks have been supplied, 
of which 1,223 were Canadian built. 
Vehicles. (includes lorries and ambulances) 4,020. 
Machinery lorries. 216. 
Bren Carriers and Starters and Chargers. 2,463 (including 
1,348 from Canada). 
Motor Cycles. 1,706 
Weapons. 800 P. I. A. T., with ammunition. 
103 Thompson sub-machine guns. 
636 2-pdr. anti-tank guns. 
96 6-pdr. anti-tank guns. 
3,200 Boys anti-tank rifles. 
2,487 Bren guns. 
581 7.92 m. m. Besa guns. 
Ammunition. 85,000 rounds P. I. A. T. 
19,346,000 . 45-in. machine gun. 
2,591,000 2-pdr. anti-tank gun. 
409,000 6-pdr. It It it 
1,761,000 11 . 55" Boys anti-tank rifle. 
75,13+, 000 It . 303-in. rifle. 
51,211,000 It 7.92 mm. tank gun, Besa. 
G. L. Equipment. (a) Mark II; 302 sets. 
(b) Mark III; 15 sets British. 
29 sets Canadian. 
Cable. 30,227 miles telephone cable. 
(b) Naval Supplies. 
9 Mine-sweeping trawlers. 
3 Motor mine-sweepers. 
102 Asdics. 
3,006 Mines. 
50 Vickers 130 mm. guns. 
603 Anti-aircraft machine guns. 
40 Submarine Batteries. 
(c) Aircraft (Fighters) 
Total despatched 6,778 aircraft, including 2,672 aircraft 
sent from U. S. A. These were sent on United States Lend/ 
Lease to U. S. S. R., as part of the British commitment, in 
exchange for a supply of British aircraft to U. S. forces 
in the European theatre. 
219 
2. RAW MATERIALS, FOODSTUFFS, MACHINERY AND INDUSTRIAL PLANT. 
(a) Raw Materials. 
The greater part of these supplies have been bought from Empire 
sources. Over the last 21 years we have sent: - 
30,000 tons of aluminium from Canada (23,038,000) 
2,000 " it it to United Kingdom . 
(¬720,000) 
27,000 " Of copper it Canada (zl, 431,000) 
10,000 " it It it United Kingdom (ä, 620, O00) 
$4,672,000 worth of Industrial Diamonds, mainly from 
African production (Ll, 168,000) 
80,924 tons of jute from India (03,687,000) 
81,423 "" rubber from the Far East and 
Ceylon (, ¬9,911,000) 
8,550 "" sisal from British East Africa (:, 194,000) 
3,300 "" graphite from Ceylon (¬160,000) 
28,050 tin from Malaya and United King- 
dom (17,774,000) 
29,610 wool from Australia and New 
Zealand (15,521,000) 
TOTAL VALUE of these and other raw materials: ¬39,115,000. 
(b) Foodstuffs. These include: 
Tea from Ceylon and India; Cocoa beans, palm oil and palm 
kernels from West Africa; groundnuts from India; cocoanut 
oil from Ceylon; pepper and spices from India, Ceylon and 
British West Indies. 
TOTAL VALUE of all foodstuffs supplied: £7,223,000. 
(c) Machine Tools, Industrial Plant and Machinery. 
These form the principal direct contribution from United Kingdom 
production to civil supplies for the U. S. S. R. Since the entry 
of Russia into the war, the following have been provided: - 
Machine Tools ; u, elo, uuu 
Power Plant £4,250,000 
Electrical Equipment £3,314,000 
Miscellaneous Industrial Equipment £1,980,000 
Various types of machinery £3,019,000 
(e. g. Telephone equipment, food processing 
plant, textile machinery, port and salvage 
equipment) 
TOTAL VALUE OF (c) X20,781,000. 
GRAND TOTAL OF CIVIL STORES MADE AVAILABLE TO 
U. S. S. R. BY THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM ALL SOURCES £77,185,000 
3. IME; DICAL SUPPLIES AND COMFORTS. 
The public have contributed some of the funds for these supplies. 
Since October, 1941, £3,047,725 has been spent through charitable 
organisations on surgical and medical items and clothing. In 
addition, His Majesty's Government have made a grant of £2,500,000 
for clothing, nearly all of which has been spent. 
* Source: PREM 3 401/21. 
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7 
The amity which characterized the last months of the third 
supply protocol regrettably did not last for long. For in the 
ten months of the fourth protocol the questions about the future 
of the wartime alliance which were already dominating the polit- 
ical scene early in 1944 encroached onto the programme of Allied 
supplies. On the one hand, Soviet actions in Europe led some in 
the West to question the legitimacy of Russian claims for aid, 
particularly after the tragedy of the Warsaw uprising in August 
and September 1944. On the other, the approaching end of the war 
in Europe challenged the whole raison d'etre of the supply proto- 
cols. Their original intention had been to assist in the defeat 
of Germany, and as far as the fourth protocol served this purpose, 
the Allied governments accepted the need for it without question. 
The Red Army's support was obviously essential during the Allies' 
battle to establish themselves on the Continent of Europe in the 
second half of 1944, and Stalin had agreed at Teheran that once 
the conflict in Europe was over, Soviet troops would enter the 
war against Japan. The United States' government in particular 
therefore could see continuing merit in providing military supp- 
lies under the Lend-Lease terms of the past. 
Civil supplies, however, were another matter. These now formed 
the major part of the Soviet Union's demands on the West and tow- 
ards these the governments of Great Britain, the United States and 
Canada adopted an increasingly critical stance. The supplies the 
Russians requested for reconstruction and rehabilitation made no 
direct contribution to the waging of the war; many of them could 
not be produced until a date well after even the most pessimistic 
estimates for the end of the war in Europe; furthermore civil sup- 
plies occupied industrial resources which Britain 
in particular 
wished to divert to her own peacetime recovery. The 
feeling there- 
fore grew in the West that the civil side of the supply programme 
should be normalized in anticipation of post-war commerce. 
This, 
however, the Soviet government resisted. Understandably, it wish- 
ed to perpetuate the disinterestedness of the supply protocols 
in- 
to trading relations after the war. While the military struggle 
continued, it sought to secure unprecedentedly generous terms of 
repayment and credit for post-war supplies. These the Nestern 
governments for their own domestic and financial reasons refused 
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to supply, with the result that deadlock ensued. The signing of 
the fourth protocol was delayed from the normal date in October 
to less than one month before the surrender of the German armed 
forces in May 1945- In consequence the protocol series ended 
not with the consensus that the Western nations had always sought 
and recently won, but with the more familiar recrimination, dis- 
appointment and dissent. 
The spectre of the imminent end to the war in Europe haunted 
the fourth protocol negotiations from the very start. At first 
the British and Americans themselves disagreed about the form the 
final protocol should take and the length of the period it should 
cover. In January 1944 the Americans wished simply to ask the 
Soviet representatives to state their needs over the period 1 
July 1944 to 30 June 1945 in the same categories used in previous 
supply agreements; but the British government, believing the war 
in Europe would be over before the end of the year, objected. It 
argued that it would be misleading to imply a similarity between 
the fourth and third protocols, when the circumstances were likely 
to change drastically. It shied from any approach which might 
leave it in the position of subsidising the Soviet Union's peace- 
time reconstruction when the war in Europe had ended. Washington, 
however, intent on enticing the Red Army into the Japanese conflict, 
thought London's anxiety premature. For administrative and polit- 
ical reasons it pressed for immediate action. Already by February 
the protocol negotiations were lagging in comparison with those of 
previous years, and it was regrettable, the Americans thought, to 
give the Russians the impression that the West had no use for them 
after the end of the European conflict. 
1 The British authorities 
therefore, as so often before, had to bow to the wishes of Washing- 
ton. On 2 February they agreed to the despatch of letters from the 
three protocol suppliers to the Soviet representatives, although 
they specifically excluded from their own letter any suggestion 
that the Russians use the procedures of previous years. 
2 
Later too 
they prevailed upon Washington to include in the introductory para- 
graph to the fourth protocol the assurance that civil and military 
supplies were intended to assist the Russians 'in meeting their 
1 Minutes of the 4th mtg (1944) of the British Supply Council, 
26 Jan. 1944, NAS (44) 11, CAB 92/34. 
2 Minutes of 5th mtg of British Supply Council, 2 Feb. 1944, 




The 'escape clause', however, the A. S. E. agreed to 
leave without any reference to the possibility of the surrender 
of Germany. Though eager to safeguard its own position in such 
circumstances, it feared conveying to the Kremlin the impression 
that Britain did not expect Soviet participation in the war against 
Japan. 2 
The Soviet government, however, was obviously aware that the 
supply programme and the circumstances which governed it would 
have to change in the coming twelve months. In May it moved to 
safeguard it own position with the result that the decision on the 
fourth protocol was further delayed. The feature of the protocol 
which the Kremlin chose to challenge was the terms under which it 
paid the United Kingdom for civil supplies and raw materials. Un- 
like the majority of military supplies these had never been prov- 
ided free of charge. The Anglo-Soviet Financial Agreement for Mil- 
itary Assistance of 27 June 1942 had demanded payment from the Rus- 
sians in dollars only for those military supplies for which the Bri- 
tish had themselves paid dollars, while those goods which the United 
Kingdom had secured under Lend-Lease terms from the United States 
were transferred to the Soviet Union in such a manner as would bring 
'neither profit nor loss to the British Government'. 
3 
Civil supp- 
lies and raw materials on the other hand were governed by the fin- 
ancial agreement negotiated by Sir Stafford Cripps and the People's 
Commissar for Foreign Trade, Mikoyan, on 16 August 1941. This 
bound the Soviet government to pay 40 per cent of the cost of raw 
materials and civil equipment from Great Britain in cash. The rem- 
aining 60 per cent was covered by a three to seven year credit from 
the British government. This was originally set at a limit of £10 
million sterling but when this ceiling was reached, was increased 
by two further offers of £25 million sterling, one in June 1942,5 
the other nearly two years later early in 1944. 
This latter offer, in the midst of discussions about the fourth 
protocol and post-war trade, provoked the Russians to protest. On 
8 May the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs accepted the £25 
1 ASE(44)2nd mtg, 15 June 1944, ASE(44)45,4 Aug. 1944, CAB 92/8. 
2 ASE(44)2nd mtg, loc. cit. 
3 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 164,11 July 1942, FO 371 32951 N3976/ 
295/38. 
4 Appendix III to WP(42)417, PREM 3 401/7. 
5 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 43,30 June 1942, FO 371 32951 N3399/ 
295/38" 
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million credit but informed the Commercial Secretary in Moscow 
that the terms of the 1941 agreement were too onerous for the 
future. He requested instead that post-war trade be covered by 
more generous credit over a longer period. 
1 
By this, it soon 
emerged, he meant a period of ten to thirty years, 
2during 
which 
the interest which the Soviet government would pay on both prot- 
ocol and post-war supplies would be reduced to a percentage even 
lower than the 3 per cent presently paid. 
3 
Even had it wished to, the British government was in no posi- 
tion to provide such credit. In the middle of 1944 it was already 
feeling the strain of its own immense financial difficulties which 
had resulted from the enforced profligacy of the war. It was fac- 
ing the consequences of the past five years in which, in the words 
of J. Maynard Keynes, it had thrown 'good house-keeping to the 
winds' and indulged in 'financial imprudence which has no parallel 
in history'. 
4 
By 30 June 1944 the United Kingdom had parted with 
overseas assets to the extent of 11,000,000,000 and had undischar- 
ged liabilities of ¬2,000,000,000.5 To meet these debts and to 
provide for the future Britain had to quintuple her current level 
of exports and raise her 1938 level by 150 per cent. 
6 
Yet in 1944, 
given the diversion of manpower and productive resources to the 
war effort, British exports were less than one third of their pre- 
war level. 
7 
Her foreign currency reserves had in fact improved in 
1943 and 1944 with the stationing of U. S. troops in the United 
Kingdom8but this had been offset by the obligation to provide rec- 
iprocal aid for these troops in support of the principle of a 
'common pool' of Allied resources-9 Moreover, the British govern- 
ment had no guarantee in mid-1944 that the United States would con- 
tinue to adopt a generous approach to its economic problems when 
the war had ended. Washington had been increasingly rigorous in 
its examination of Lend-Lease requests since the beginning of 
1 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 1224,10 May 1944, FO 371 43351 N2843/ 
302/38. 
2 FO to W'ton, no. 157 MOSSY, 11 Oct. 1944, FO 371 43279 N5255/ 
25/38. 
3 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 1716,28 June 1944, FO 371 43352 N4000/ 
302/38- 
4 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 445- 
5 Chancellor of the Exchequer in Budget speech, quoted in FO to 
Moscow, no. 1937,30 June 1944, FO 371 43352 N3428/302/38" 
6 R. S. Sayers, Financial Policy 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 1956), 
p. 469. 
7 Duncan Hall, p. 445. 
8 Sayers, p. 470n. 
9 Duncan Hall, p. 446. 
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1943,1and London feared that this would worsen in the period bet- 
ween the surrender of Germany and the collapse of Japan - the per- 
iod called in financial discussions, Stage II. In mid-1944 furth- 
ermore the British could not be sure that the United States would 
continue to supply munitions and civil goods on a scale which would 
allow them to convert some of their own industry to reconstruction 
during the Japanese war. 
2 
Nor were they confident that the U. S. 
Treasury would adopt a sympathetic attitude to its ally's financial 
liabilities. 
Consequently when the Soviet government asked for long-term cred- 
it in May 1944 the United Kingdom was unable to respond. It could 
not perpetuate any longer the generosity of the protocols which had 
been inspired by an unprecedented military crisis and which, as 
Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office astutely recognized, had been 
the last and somewhat heroic gesture of a 'rich man's complex', 
made anachronistic by the war: 
in future (Sargent wrote on 1 June) we shall have to adapt our 
diplomacy to the requirements and capacity of a debtor country. 
In fact, the instruments at the disposal of a creditor country, 
such as loans, credits and subsidies, will no longer be at our 
disposal. This will mean in many cases that we shall have to 
find a new approach to our international problems and develop 
a new technique in keeping with the vastly different economic 
and financial role which we shall from now onwards have to 
play in world affairs as compared with the role which we had 
so successfully elaborated during the Victorian era and still 
tried, though with increasing difficulty, to fill up to the 
present war. 3 
Nonetheless for the very reason that their economic propects were 
so dire, the British felt obliged to make some response to the Sov- 
iet request for credit. With their need for receipts from exports 
one of 'life and death', 
4they 
had at all costs to avoid letting 
their trade with the Soviet Union in heavy electrical and engineer- 
ing goods lapse. The Treasury therefore, even though the Foreign 
Secretary argued strongly that the 'Russians can afford to pay. Why 
shouldn't they? ', 
5offered the Soviet Union a further short-term cre- 
dit. This was made available by the diversion of 50 per cent of 
1 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, 
p. 630. After the autumn of 1942 the Munitions Assignment Board 
and the Combined Production and Resources Board exercised decr- 
easing influence on the U. S. military requirements programme 
which became almost exclusively the responsibility of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the U. S. Service departments (p. 632). 
2 Sayers, p. 465. 
3 Minute, FO 371 43351 N2996/302/38- 
4 Chancellor of the Exchequer's Budget speech, loc. cit. 
_, 5 Minute, 19 June 1944, FO 371 43352 N4213/302/38. 
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Russian repayments under the civil supplies agreement of 1941 to 
the furnishing of the new loan 
1- 
£30 million over a six-year per- 
iod. The interest rate on this, in deference to Russian sensitiv- 
ity about prestige, was reduced to 2+ per cent. 
2 
However, the Soviet government, when offered this new loan on 
11 September 1944, rejected it immediately. It insisted that, con- 
trary to opinion in the West, it did not have large gold reserves 
and could not continue to bear the onerous financial terms of the 
3 
past. Three days later, the Soviet authorities went further and 
started to withhold payments for some £7.5 million worth of goods 
already delivered, declaring at the same time that they would place 
future orders only if these were financed wholly by long-term cre- 
dit. 
4 
On 12 October the Soviet Trade Delegation made this official. 
It told the A. S. E. that it had been authorized to withdraw all non- 
protocol requests submitted during the third protocol for which 
arrangements for delivery and placement of orders were still tenta- 
tive, and, more important:., to discontinue all discussions relating 
to the provision of industrial equipment and raw materials under the 
fourth protocol. 
5 
The British could not meet this ultimatum. Despite the fact that 
at the Anglo-American meeting in Quebec in September, Roosevelt had 
accepted the need to maintain Lend-Lease in Stage II at a level which 
would allow some easement of the plight of the British civilian, 
6 
the 
United Kingdom's financial situation remained serious. There were 
1 FO to Moscow, no. 1937,30 June 1944, FO 371 43352 N3428/302/38" 
2 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 2413 «REST, 13 Sept. 1944, FO 371 43353 
N5590/302/38; minute by Mr. Wilson (FO), 19 Aug. 1944,43353 
N4975/302/38- 
3 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 2413 WREST, loc. cit. The United States 
believed that the Soviet Union had $4 billion in gold in June 
1944 and an annual production of $300-400 million of gold. 
Russian reticence to admit this was apparently partly attribut- 
able to their reluctance to acknowledge how many prisoners-of- 
war had been working the Soviet gold mines (Blum, From the 
Morgenthau Diaries, p. 263,263n). 
4 Draft paper for submission to Cabinet by F. S., Chancellor, Pres- 
ident of the Board of Trade and Minister of Production, 26 Jan. 
1945, FO 371 47835 N1025/1/38. This cites figure of £17 million 
for the payments outstanding, but as a letter from the Treasury 
to the Ministry of Production of 1 Feb. 1945 pointed out, invoices 
had been presented to Moscow for only £7.5 million (N1414/l/38). 
5 ASE to W'ton, no. 155 MOSSY, 11 Oct. 1944, FO 371 43279 N5255/ 
25/38- 
6 Sayers, p. 469. 
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signs, that Washington might finally be beginning to realize this 
thanks largely to the brilliance of John Maynard Keynes in neg- 
otiation -1but there were still no formal undertakings about Stage 
II of the kind London wished. 
2 
After three months of deadlock the 
British government had no choice but to accept the decision of the 
Russians, communicated formally on 9 January 1945, to cancel all 
orders for civil equipment in the fourth protocol. This left only 
munitions and medical supplies, which were free of charge, and raw 
materials which Soviet industry particularly needed, in the Brit- 
ish protocol schedule. 
3 
Disappointing though, -this was both politically and commercially, 
the A. S. E. welcomed it; for by January 1945 when the Russians made 
their decision final, the signature of the fourth protocol was al- 
ready much delayed. Nine months had passed, since the Soviet gov- 
ernment had submitted its requirements for the fourth protocol 
from the United Kingdom, and it was three months after the custom- 
ary date for the public announcement of the supply agreement. More- 
over the Soviet government had apparently completed negotiations 
with the United States, and the A. S. E. feared that Britain might be 
conspicuously isolated as the Americans, Canadians and Russians 
independently ratified their parts of the supply programme. 
5 
In fact this was an unfounded fear; for the United States had 
by no means resolved the problems it too had met in the protocol 
negotiations. In May 1944 it had approached the Soviet authorit- 
ies on the question of what was to happen to some categories of 
civil supplies in the protocol when war ended. 
6 
These included 
the $481,807,000 worth of oil refineries, power plants and other 
capital equipment which would take at least eighteen months to 
produce or which had 
'a long period of useful life.? Even though 
the United States was prepared, as in the past, to provide civil 
equipment for the Soviet war effort under the terms of the Master 
Lend-Lease Agreement of 11 June 1942, the State Department wanted 
a Soviet undertaking to purchase those items obviously intended 
1 Sayers, p. 470n. 
2 Ibid. 
3 War Cab. Offices to W'ton, no. 7 MOSSY, 17 Jan. 1945, FO 371 
47834 N106/1/38. 
4 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 86 MOSSY, 21 Apr. 1944, FO 371 43271 
N2046/25/38- 
5 ASE(45)lst mtg, min. 2,2 Jan. 1945, CAB 92/9. 
6 FRUS, 1944, IV, p. 1088. 
7 Financial clauses of fourth protocol, 18 Apr. 1945, FO 371 
47839 N4787/l/38" 
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for post-war reconstruction. 
1 
It wished also for the Soviet Union 
to agree to procure on credit any supplies covered by the fourth 
protocol and under contract but not delivered before the end of 
the war. 
2 
The Soviet government in fact accepted in principle 
that it should pay for such goods; but it disputed for some time 
what interest it should pay on the credit provided for this purpose. 
The Americans would not offer an interest rate lower than 21 per 
cent on a thirty-year loan; 
3the 
Russians wanted 2 per cent, 
4 
which 
was lower even than the rate at which the U. S. government borrowed. 
5 
The dispute continued until September 1944 when the Russian repres- 
entatives returned to Moscow with what the United States 'flatly 
stated' was its final offer. 'Silence descended on the matter'until 
January 1945.6 
Then on 4 January the Soviet ambassador in Washington, A. Gromyko, 
announced to the Secretary of State that his government accepted the 
proposals of the United States 'concerning the signature of the Four- 
th Protocol'". 7 But the appearance of consensus was deceptive. The 
ambassador also requested in the same letter that the United States 
should accept Soviet orders for industrial equipment 
8even 
though 
agreement on the terms of payment for these had not yet been reached. 
Furthermore on 3 January Molotov submitted to Harriman in Moscow a 
proposal for a large post-war loan. This, the Foreign Commissar su- 
ggested, should amount to credit of $6 billion over a thirty year 
period at an interest rate of 2 per cent. He also requested a 20 
per cent discount on goods ordered by the Soviet Union before the 
end of the war. 
9 From this it was clear that the Kremlin was seek- 
ing to extend the uniquely favourable credit terms offered as part 
of the fourth protocol to all post-war trade and credit. 
10 is 
the United States could not countenance. Although there was cons- 
iderable eagerness, particularly within the Treasury, 
11to 
offer the 
Soviet Union a generous post-war loan, there was also universal 
agreement that this must be kept distinct from the fourth protocol. 
12 
1 Leighton and Coakley, p. 680. 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. V (Washington, 
1967), p. 954" 
3 FRUS, 1945, V, P-955- 
4 FýRUS 1944, IV, p. 1135. 
5 FRUS, 1945, V, p. 958. 
6 Ibid., p. 955- 
7 Ibid., p. 941. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., pp. 942-3- 
10 Ibid., p. 949. 
11 Ibid., p. 948; Blum, pp. 304-6. 
12 FRUS, 1945 , V, p. 953. 
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For one thing the U. S. administration lacked the legal authority 
at that time to grant post-war credit. The Congress alone posse- 
ssed this power, and, it was thought, might favour using agencies 
such as the Export and Import Bank or the bank established at the 
Bretton Woods conference of June-July 1944 rather than specific 
credits for individual countries. 
1 
To add to this there was con- 
siderable uncertainty about the size of the loan the Soviet Union 
could service. The most optimistic estimate, Morgenthau's, put 
the figure at $10 billion over thirty-five years at a2 per cent 
interest rate; 
2the 
pessimists, like George Kennan, minister- 
counsellor at the embassy in Moscow, felt confident about lending 
the Soviet Union only 1f-2 billion dollars. 
3 The embassy also 
argued, through Ambassador Harriman, that any loan should be used 
as a bargaining lever in political and economic negotiations with 
the Russians in the future. 
4 
As a result the question of credit, even for protocol supplies, 
remained contentious. 
5 
Not until 17 April 1945 was the United 
States able to sign the protocol, and even then all precise refer- 
ence to the terms of payment for the goods in dispute was dropped. 
The final draft, with the agreement of the Soviet Union, 
6stated 
simply that such items 'will not be financed under the Lend-Lease 
Act, but may be purchased by the U. S. S. R. if it so elects. 
7 This 
was similar to the agreement which the Canadians had reached with 
the Soviet government some two months earlier which had stated that 
equipment undelivered at the cessation of hostilities would be pur- 
chased by the Soviet Union at a price and under terms yet to be 
1 FRUS, 1945, V, p" 958. Because of these legal restrictions an, 
earlier suggestion made by Mikoyan on 1 February 1944 for a 
billion dollar credit at I per cent interest had been met with 
a low-keyed American response. H. Feiss Churchill Roosevelt 
Stalin The War They Wpged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 
1957), pp. 643-4. 
2 FRUS, " 19451' V, p. 
948. 
3 G. F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), p. 267. 
4 FRUS, 1945, V, p. 946. 
5 Ibid., pp. 993-4. 
6 The American attitude was hardened by the discovery in spring 
1945 that the Soviet government was transferring Lend-Lease 
goods to other countries without U. S. consent. According to 
Feiss Washington was also annoyed in March and April by the 
'highhanded' way in which Soviet forces dealt with Romanian 
and Hungarian oil properties and shipping in their control 
(p. 647). 
7 FRUS, 1945, V, p. 993" 
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decided. 1 In the event little of the U. S. equipment was purchased 
by the Russians in the post-war years because agreement on inter- 
est rates continued to be elusive. 
2 
The fourth protocol was finally signed in Ottawa on 17 April 
1945 to the considerable relief of all concerned'in the three Wes- 
tern capitals. A member of the Foreign Office staff had said in 
February, 'we shall all be greatly relieved when this particular 
body is buried', 3and indeed the protocol had raised far-reaching 
and intricate financial issues in a way which had proved politic- 
ally awkward and diplomatically embarrassing. Fortunately, though, 
the constant setbacks which the protocol suffered were not as emb- 
arrassing as they might have been, for despite the long financial 
wranglings, the actual flow of munitions and equipment to the Sov- 
iet Union continued unchecked. There were large enough backlogs 
of industrial equipment ordered during the third protocol to fill 
shipments in the fourth protocol period. (Delivery dates for much 
of it had been set originally for March 1945 and production in the 
United Kingdom had fallen behind these schedules. ) 
4 
Military sup- 
plies meanwhile, being unaffected by questions of payment, were 
made available to the Red Army in 1944 in much the same uncritical 
manner as before. 
Not surprisingly there were some who objected to this. Even 
before the financial difficulties had become significant, the old 
argument had reappeared that the Soviet government should be ased 
to justify its demands. This time the advocates of this policy 
were the U. S. ambassador to Moscow, Harriman, and the head of the 
U. S. military mission, Deane. After only two months in the Soviet 
Union these two men, one of whom was publicly identified in the 
Russian mind as the father of Lend-Lease, 
5urged Washington to adopt 
a more critical approach to its supply programme. There were indic- 
ations early in 1944 that the Soviet authorities were over-ordering 
on Lend-Lease and were actually accumulating valuable commodities 
for use after the war. Deane, for instance, found in January that 
diesel engines essential to the manufacture of landing craft were 
1 Earl:: of Halifax, no. 19 MOSSY, 9 Feb. 1945, F0 371 
47834 
N107/1/38- 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 680. 
3 Minute by Mr. Galsworthy, 5 Feb. 1945, FO 371 47835 N1146/ 
1/38. 
4 Letter from Ministry of Supply to Sir Robert Sinclair, MOP, 
8 May 1944, BT 28/113A, PP/31; Memo by H. W. Hollyer (MWJT), 
29 Mar. 1945, MT 59/1126. 
5 Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 36. 
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rusting in considerable quantities on Soviet docks. 
1 
Such dis- 
coveries, combined with the fact that supplies for reconstruct- 
ion purposes formed an increasing part of the protocol, caused 
Harriman to urge a change in the United States' policy. The 
'time has now come', he cabled the Secretary of State on 9 January 
1944, 'when we should know more about the real need for some of 
the Soviet requests that are being presented and unless they can 
be reasonably justified for the war, they should not be granted 
under Lend-Lease terms'. 
2 
A month later, with Deane's support, 
he suggested that the military mission in Moscow be allowed to 
check or screen Soviet Lend-Lease requests. 
3 
There was considerable sympathy for this point of view in Wash- 
ington, particularly within the War Department and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff; but the new approach was not adopted. As the American 
historians R. M. Leighton and P. W. Coakley have said, 'it proved 
impossible to overcome the pronounced fear of wounding Soviet sen- 
sibilities that prevailed in circles close to the President'. 
4 
On 
14 February Roosevelt issued a directive stating that 
Russia continues to be a major factor in achieving the defeat 
of Germany. We must therefore continue to support the U. S. S. R. 
by providing the maximum amount of supplies which can be del- 
ivered to her ports. This is a matter of paramount importance -5 
Military reservations about the fourth protocol were therefore over- 
ruled by Hopkins, Leo Crowley, head of the Foreign Economic Admin- 
istration, and Edward Stettinius, Acting Secretary of State. The 
President's Soviet Protocol Committee told Harriman on 25 February 
1944 that it would be 'inadvisable' to subject Russian requests to 
screening in Moscow, since the limitations on shipping still forced 
the Soviet government to give priority to those supplies which it 
badly needed. Harriman disagreed, 
6but 
his and Deane's protests 
were in vain. For one thing they lacked the support of General 
Marshall who, as he told Roosevelt late in March, believed that 
An important factor enabling the Soviets to seize the initia- 
tive and retain it is Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease food and trans- 
port particularly have been vital factors in Soviet success. 
Combat aircraft, upon which the Soviet Air Forces relied so 
greatly, have been furnished in relatively great numbers ... 
Should there be a full stoppage it is extremely doubtful whe- 
ther Russia could retain sufficiently her all-out offensive 
1 Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 96. 
2 FRUS+, IV, pp. 1035-6. 
3 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning ... 194344, p. 497- 8b. 4 Leighton and Coakley, p. 6 
5 FRUS, 1944, IV, p. 1053- 
6 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 686-7. 
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capability. ... If Russia 
Germany could probably still 
is our trump card in dealing 
trol is probably the most of 
the Soviets on the offensive 
front. l 
were deprived of (Lend-Lease), 
defeat the U. S. S. R. Lend-Lease 
with the U. S. S. R. and its con- 
fective means we have to keep 
in connection with the second 
Consequently Washington's attitude did not change, even when the 
callous indifference of the Kremlin to the August 1944 uprising 
by the Polish underground army in Warsaw soured the attitude of 
U. S. representatives in Moscow further. 
2 
Munitions continued to 
be provided uncritically to the Soviet Union and Deane could only 
complain bitterly to Marshall late in 1944, 'The situation has 
changed but our policy has not. We still meet their requests to 
the limit of our ability and they meet ours to the minimum that 
will keep us sweet. '3 
In London meanwhile there had been a similar debate to the Ame- 
rican throughout 1944 about the approach to adopt with the Soviet 
government; but again the impact of this on the fourth protocol 
was limited. Martel recommended late in January 1944 that his 
mission should be given the opportunity to report on the validity 
of new Soviet requests for munitions, 
4but 
the Chiefs of Staff did 
not agree. Although they shared his disenchantment with Russian 
secrecy and unco-operativeness, 
5they 
confined their reprisals 
throughout 1944 to the reduction of the information and facilities 
offered to Soviet representatives in London and Moscow. 
6 
Like the 
Americans, they did not press the Russians to justify their dem- 
ands for munitions. Instead they continued as before to provide 
the maximum quantity of munitions consistent with their own oper- 
ational requirements and production capacity. 
1 Matloff and Snell, p. 497- 
2 See, for example, -George Kennan, American Diplomacy 
1900-1950 
(London, 1953), p" 86. 
3 Leighton and Coakley-, p. 687- 
4 Martel to COS, MIL 805,25 Jan. 1944, ADM 199/606. ' 
5 Brooke, for instance, was eager to press the Russians for infor- 
mation (COS(44)52nd mtg (0), 18 Feb. 1944, FO 371 
43288 N1196/ 
28/38), but was apparently not prepared to go as far as Martel 
in doing this. For this reason Martel held the C. I. G. S. to some 
degree responsible for the failure of his mission in Moscow. 
He wrote to Basil Liddell Hart on 3 Feb. 1944, '... I am sure 
I did not upset the Russians. They were very upset when I left 
them and I would never have had to do so if Brookie had backed 
me up. I am not sure Archie Nye (Vice C. I. G. S. ) did not serve 
things up with a twist to Brookie. Anyway the final result was 
Brookies (sic) fault and not Edens (sic). ' (Liddell Hart cor- 
respondence). 
6 COS(44)50th mtg, 9 Mar. 1944, FO 371 43288 N1742/28/38. 
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In the circumstances of 1944 this in fact meant that the Bri- 
tish offered the Soviet Union far fewer munitions in the fourth 
protocol than ever before. The combination of reduced production 
through manpower shortages and increased demand from the invasion 
of France forced them to be less generous. In aircraft, for in- 
stance, although the Russians requested only 20 per cent more air- 
craft than in previous protocols, the Air Ministry felt unable to 
supply these; 1,200 Spitfires and 1,200 Mosquitoes was the quan- 
tity requested, 
1but 
production of the former during the fourth 
protocol period was expected to be only 5,237.2 Of this only 300 
were the type (IX H. F. ) the Russians wanted, 
3while 
production of 
Mosquitoes was a meagre 2,631.4 Meeting Soviet demands therefore 
would have meant surrendering approximately a quarter of Spitfire 
production and almost a half of Mosquito production. Not surpris- 
ingly the Air Ministry resisted this. The Secretary of State for 
Air argued to the A. S. E. on 22 June 1944, 
I suggest that we are not justified in maintaining the scäle 
of our previous burdensome efforts to meet Soviet demands, 
in view of the relief which allied re-entry into Western 
Europe will, undoubtedly bring to the Eastern front and the 
increased obligations of supply which we must face as a 
result. 5 
The A. S. E. agreed. 
6 
On intelligence estimates of six months ear- 
lier the Red Army had at least 5,000 aircraft of improving quali- 
ty against 2,100 Axis aircraft, many of which were obsolete. The 
Russians, with 7 to 84- million men against 
4 million Germans, held 
'the initiative everywhere' and had 'marked superiority on land 
and in the air'. 
7 Therefore the A. S. E. offered the Soviet Union 
only 600 Spitfires in July 1944 towards the fourth protocol with 
the promise that the offer would be reviewed in November 
1944.8 
It also offered the Russians continued supplies of Airacobras 
from the United States, but the Soviet Trade Delegation refused 
these, reiterating its preference for Spitfires and Mosquitoes. 
9 
1 ASE(44)12,22 Apr. 1944, ASE(44)13,1 May 1944, CAB 92/8. 
2 Memorandum by Mr. Monck (WCO) to Admy, WO, AM, 29 Apr. 1944, 
WO 193/669. 
3 ASE(44)33,22 June 1944, CAB 92/8. 
4 Monck memorandum, loc. cit. 
5 ASE(44)33, loc. cit. 
6 ASE(44)3rd mtg, min. 3,7 July 1944, CAB 92/8. 
7 JIC(44)21 (Final), 20 Jan. 1944, PREI 3 396/10. 
8 ASE(44)33, loc. cit.; ASE(44)3rd mtg, loc. cit. 
9 Letter from Borisenko to Brig. Firebrace, 26 July 1944, 
FO 371 43278 N4728/25/38. 
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Faced with this refusal, and with the fact that the campaign 
in France progressed more rapidly than anticipated, the Air Min- 
istry re-examined its offer of aircraft almost immediately. The 
Foreign Office considered this bad tactics, in that it gave the 
Russian representatives the impression that pressure produced 
results, 
1but 
the A. S. E. still made a new offer in August 1944. 
It increased the number of Spitfires in the fourth protocol from 
600 to, 1,050 - 50 a month until the end of September, 100 a month 
from then onwards -2with the same rate of spare parts as in the 
third protocol. 
3 
This, as had been feared, did lead the Russians 
to press for more aircraft, 
1but 
1,050 Spitfires was the limit of 
the British offer. Even this, as the A. S. E. warned the Soviet 
representatives in view of past experiences, included recondit- 
ioned aircraft. 
5 
The situation with other British munitions in the fourth pro- 
tocol was similar. There was no attempt to force the Russians to 
justify their requests, but the quantity the A. S. E. offered was 
reduced by Britain's own pressing needs. Russian radar and anti- 
submarine vessel requirements could have been met in full only if 
allocations to the Service departments had been cut 'drastically'. 
Similarly tanks could not have been provided on the scales of ear- 
lier years without almost halving the numbers of certain types 
supplied to the army. Production of Cromwells, for instance, which 
the Russians tested at the start of the fourth protocol, was to be 
only 3,000 in the following twelve months. Production of Churchill 
tanks meanwhile, the other possible tank for the Red Army, was to 
be a mere 19100.7 The A. S. E. therefore reserved only 1,000 tanks 
for the Soviet Union. 
8 
In fact the Red Army did not take up this offer. Presumably 
this was because it already had an overwhelming preponderance in 
1 Minute by Mr. Wilson, 8 Aug. 1944, N4953/25/38, ibid; see also 
interview between a member of the northern department and a 
representative of the Air Ministry, described in a minute of 
9 May 1944 for the SOS, AIR 19/294. 
2 ASE(44)50,4 Sept. 1944, CAB 92/8. 
3 ASE(45)25,25 June 1945, CAB 92/9. 
4 Letter Soloviev to Lyttelton, 15 Sept. 1944, FO 371 43280 N5932/ 
25/38; Letter R. C. Foy (VICO) to Wing-Commander Horne, AM, 12 
Dec. 1944, FO 371 43282 N7805/25/38- 
5 AM to HQ, RAF Middle East, AX. 417,22 Jan. 1944, AIR 19/294. 
6 Monck memorandum, loc. cit. 
7 Monck memorandum, loc. cit. 
8 ASE(44)37,10 July 1944, CAB 92/8. 
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June 1944 of 9,300 tanks to 3,500 German. 
1 
Furthermore the United 
States provided it in the fourth protocol with 3,173 Sherman (M4A2) 
tanks of which it already had experience in past years. 
2 
The Bri- 
tish protocol offer, therefore, for the first time did not include 
tanks. This proved a considerable advantage for them later in 
1944'when their own supplies of tanks from the United States bec- 
ame unreliable. The Americans, already anxious in 1944 about the 
possibility that they might over-produce munitions, 
3misjudged the 
size of the armoured reserve needed for the fighting in Europe. 
4 
The shortage which resulted meant that the British army received 
only 60 per cent of the Sherman tanks it had anticipated in 1944, 
and from October onwards actually had to surrender its allocation 
of this tank and even transfer some from British to American for- 
ces in the field. 
5 
Without tanks the British fourth protocol offer was limited to 
aircraft, 3,000 tons of propellant, 240,000 short tons of aviation 
spirit, 60,000 tons of motor spirit, radar equipment, medical 
supplies, submarine detecting devices and six raw materials. These 
last included the valuable nickel and rubber, 
6but 
excluded alumin- 
ium which since 1943 had been provided from North America. Later 
in the protocol period the British did agree to supply some canned 
meat from their stocks when the Americans faltered on shipments of 
this, 7but their usual generosity in considering extra-protocol 
requests was blunted by the Russian attitude to payment for civil 
supplies. 
8 
Naturally the British offer was again outshone by that of the 
United States., This originally stood at 7,383,000 short tons, of 
which the Americans estimated that they could ship 5,400,000 short 
tons (including Canada's 491,371 short tons9of Valentine spare parts, 
aluminium ingots, railway, radar and industrial equipment); 
10 half 
1 Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, 'The Development of the Red 
Army', in B. H. L. Hart, The Soviet Army (London, 1956), p. 148. 
The figure for early 1945 was 13,400 tanks. 
2 ASE(45)25, loc. cit. 
3 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 437- 
4 Leighton and Coakley, p. 643- 
5 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 416. 
6 ASE(45)25, loc. cit. 
7 ASE to W'ton, no. 162 MOSSY, 4 Nov. 1944, MT 59/1125- 
8 The A. S. E. ruled on 15 June 1944 that contracts should not be 
placed for the manufacture of Russian supplies until the Soviet 
authorities had accepted the prices (ASE(44)2nd mtg, min. 
4, - 
FO 371 43276 N3832/25/38)" 
9 Leighton and Coakley, p. 678. 
10 ASE(45)25, loc. cit. 
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of this was to be sent via the Atlantic, half via the Pacific. The 
Russians, however, pressed for a shipping commitment of 7 million 
short tons and the W. S. A. eventually raised its offer by 300,000 
short tons to 5,700,000 short tons, 2,700,000 by the Pacific and 
3,000,000 by the Atlantic. In view of the demands of 'Overlord' 
the W. S. A. refused to make any greater commitment, although it 
undertook to ship more if the circumstances allowed. The Russians 
were given the opportunity, in accordance with past practice, to 
maintain a stockpile, this time of 600,000 tons, for shipment in 
such circumstances. 
l 
Included in the American offer, in addition to a staggering 
$1,132,453,000 worth of machinery and equipment, were large quan- 
tities of railway material and transport vehicles. There were 
9,300 jeeps and some 146,000 trucks of varying weights. Petroleum 
products were provided at approximately twice the rate of the prot- 
ocol, while artillery tractors were also offered in larger quanti- 
ties than before. There were new offerings of mobile construction 
equipment for roads and airports, unprecedented quantities of naval 
equipment, 3,173 tanks and 3,020 aircraft. Of the latter, 2,450 
were fighters (P-39 and P-63) - an increase on the previous prot- 
ocol of 650 - 300 were medium bombers (B-25), 240 were transport 
planes, (C-47) and 30 were flying boats. Light bombers for the first 
time were eliminated from the schedule and the Russians' request for 
heavy bombers and larger transport planes was again refused. 
2 Food 
was maintained at approximately previous levels, 1.9 million tons 
from the United States, 0.3 million tons from Canada. 
3 
These were only some of the many items the United States offered, 
and far from their rationale being more critically examined than in 
the past, their volume was actually increased as the protocol prog- 
ressed. This was because from late in 1944 onwards the United 
States began to build up a stockpile of munitions in Siberia in 
anticipation of Soviet intervention in the war against Japan. These 
supplies had not been included in the original protocol offer because, 
although Stalin had promised at the Teheran conference to enter the 
Japanese war after VE-day, Soviet officials had stalled all efforts 
to start planning for this early in 1944.4 It was only during Chur- 
chill's visit to Moscow in October 1944 that Stalin stated 
definitely 
1 Leighton and Coakley, p. 679. 
2 Soviet Supply Protocols, pp. 95-146; note on Fourth Protocol, 
1 May 1944, BT 28/113A, PP/31. 
3 Note on Fourth Protocol, 1 May 1944, BT 28/113A, PP/31. 
4 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 688-9. 
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that the Red Army would take the offensive three months after Ger- 
many's defeat and that combined planning for air and naval bases 
in Siberia should proceed. It was then he stated also that the Red 
Army needed additional assistance 'in building up necessary reserve 
supplies'. This, it soon emerged, meant 860,410 short tons of dry 
cargo and 206,000 tons of liquid petroleum products over and above, 
the existing commitments made under the fourth protocol. 
1 
The United States government accepted the need for these supplies 
since Soviet intervention still played a large role in its strategy 
for the defeat of Japan. Nonetheless because of the United States's 
own operational requirements and the strain on shipping, the admin- 
instration at first undertook to supply only 46 per cent - about 
400,000 tons - of the dry cargo and all of the petroleum requirement. 
This excluded the locomotives, naval vessels, rolling stock, heavy 
trucks and the 500 transport aircraft the Russians had requested. 
Later, however, it was found possible to amend plans to allow the 
shipment of 840,000 short tons of dry cargo by the end of 1945; and 
at the Yalta conference of February 1945 it was also agreed that 
150 transport planes should be supplied to supplement the limited 
rail facilities in Siberia. The whole offering, code-named 'Mile- 
post', was added to the fourth protocol on 3 April 1945 as Annex 111.2 
Naturally this new commitment made the problem of delivering pro- 
tocol supplies more difficult than it might have been; but despite 
this the Allies' original supply programme did continue uninterrup- 
ted. This was in the face of an acute shortage of cargo shipping 
which developed at the very time the 'Milepost' programme was under- 
taken. In the autumn of 1944 the rate of shipping construction in 
the United States declined as construction workers moved to employ- 
ment more suited to peace-time. At the same time the Allied armies 
in Europe and Asia quickly outstripped the limited facilities of 
the ports they had captured. The result was that 
the rate of unload- 
ing and ship turnaround slowed down to such an extent 
by October 
1944 the U. S. Army Service Forces had to consider reducing protocol 
shipments and the United Kingdom import programme. 
3 'Milepost' 
threatened to make the crisis more acute, particularly as 
President 
Roosevelt gave it'a high priority without authorizing any corres- 
ponding cuts in protocol shipments. 
4 
The Russians too seemed loath 
1 Leighton and Coakley, p. 690. 
2 Ibid., p. 691. 
3 Ibid., pp. 553-4. 
4 Ibid., p. 692. 
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to give one supply programme precedence over the other. 
1 In the 
event however, the limitations of the Pacific route intervened 
to bring 'Milepost' within reasonable proportions. Ice conditions 
in Tartary and La Perouse Straits and congestion at Vladivostock 
during the winter ensured that only thirty-seven ships were trans- 
ferred to the programme instead of the anticipated eighty-five. 
Since at the same time the shipping crisis in Europe was overcome 
by renewed efforts and the capture of established Channel ports, 
there was only one appreciable setback in protocol shipments. This 
was in January 1945, and was soon offset by larger shipments in the 
following months. By V-E day protocol shipments were well ahead of 
schedule, while 'Milepost', thanks to regular use of the thirty- 
seven ships which had been transferred to the programme, was only 
slightly in arrears. This backlog was more than made up in May 
and June 1945.2 
This achievement owed much to the fact that, despite the shortage 
of shipping in the autumn, the supply routes to the Soviet Union 
operated smoothly. The Pacific route, its problems of the winter 
notwithstanding, carried the largest proportion of supplies from 
the Western Hemisphere in any protocol period yet -- 2,079,320 tons 
or 56.6 per cent of the total in 1945 alone. 
3 The air route from 
Alaska to Siberia meanwhile handled almost all the aircraft from 
the United States with unprecedented ease. 
4 
From January 1945 
onwards also the Black Sea was open to shipments from the United 
States. Although this came about only after some delay resulting 
from Soviet organization and reticence to accept U. S. personnel in 
Odessa, this route soon supplanted the Persian Gulf. 
5 
More important;;., from the British point of view, convoys to 
north Russia were run regularly from August 1944 to May 1945. The 
problems of this route in the past, though still occasionally trou- 
blesome, were by now generally insignificant. The Soviet Trade 
Delegation showed an unprecedented eagerness to co-operate with 
London. 'They appear', said a member of the Ministry of War Trans- 
port in January 1945, to have come to the conclusion that their 
interests are better served by working in co-operation with us and 
the happy happy (sic) position is un-likely to be disturbed except 
1 Leighton and Coakley, p. 691. 
2 Ibid., pp. 692-3- 
3 Motter, The Persian Corridor, appendix A. 
4 Leighton and Coakley, p. 679. 
5 Ibid., pp. 680-1. 
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by the intervention of RToscow'. 
l 
At the same time relations in 
the northern ports of the Soviet Union remained reasonably amicable. 
Though there were still cases of British seamen being arrested and 
imprisoned for'minor offences, 
2the 
British government no longer made 
a major issue of these. Its attitude was perhaps best summarized by 
Churchill in March 1944 when Eden suggested sending a forthright 
telegram on the matter to Stalin. 
Alas, I cannot send such a telegram. It would only embroil me 
with Bruin on a small point when so many large ones are looming 
up. He would only send an insulting, argumentative answer. In 
my opinion questions should be asked in Parliament about this 
In these cirdümstances the only obstacles remaining to impede the 
northern convoys in 1944 and 1945 were the savage Arctic weather 
and the continuing strain on escorts. 
For even at this relatively late stage of the war, the Arctic 
convoys clashed with other operational requirements. The presence 
of the Tirpitz at Altenfjord until its sinking in November 1944 and 
the activity of two German submarine flotillas in northern Norway 
necessitated strong escorts for the convoys to north Russia. 
4 
The 
Admiralty therefore would not run them at the same time as 'Overlord' 
5 
Under pressure from the Americans and Russians it agreed to resume 
sailings in August 1944,6but it then resisted later pressure for a 
shortening of the convoy cycle. In November the U. S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, who provided the majority of the vessels for the northern 
convoys (approximately 27 per convoy to 3 from the British), 
7sugg- 
ested that the cycle be reduced from 35 to 21 days. This, they 
rightly believed, would economize on shipping. 
8 
The Admiralty, 
however, though eager to conserve shipping, was concerned also with 
the developing threat from U-boats in Home Waters. It would agree 
9 
1 Notes by F. H. Keenlyside on British Shipping Policy and the 
U. S. S. R. 22 Jan. 1945, MT 59/1669. 
2 Minute by FS to PM, PM(44)l07,28 Feb. 1944, ADM 205/35; SBNO, 
Murmansk, to SBNO, N. Russia, repeated, Admy, 221245A/Feb., 22 
Feb. 1945, FO 371 47926 N2148/652/38. 
3 PM-to FS, M. 207/4,2 Mar. 1944, ADM 205/35. In fact questions 
were later asked in Parliament about a seaman serving a sentence 
in the Soviet Union: see Parliamentary Debates, vol. 410, columns 
413,2437-8. 
4 S. W. Roskill, A Merchant Fleet at War (London, 1962), p. 305; 
C-in-C Home Fleet to Admy, 13215B/July, 14 July 1944, MT 59/1123. 
5 COS(44)175th mtg(0), min. 10,30 May 1944, CAB 79/75- 
6 Leighton and Coakley, p. 679- 
7 ASE(44)2nd mtg, 15 June 1944, FO 371 43276 N3523/25/38- 
8 Tel. -from JSM, W'ton, JSM 473,28 Dec. 1944, MT 59/1125. 
9 Note for COS mtg of 22 Jan. 1945, WO 193/669. 
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only to a convoy cycle of thirty days after January 1945; 
1and in 
fact, soon after this, it argued for the cessation of the northern 
convoys altogether in favour of the Black Sea route. 
2 This the 
United States opposed, fearing Japanese interference in the future 
with the supply route across the Pacific. 
3 The Foreign Office also 
favoured continuing with the northern convoys as a bargaining coun- 
ter in the financial negotiations with the Kremlin. 
4 
Sailings to 
north Russia therefore continued until the cessation of all trade 
convoys late in 'May--: 1945.5 The northern route carried 23.4 per 
cent of supplies from the Western Hemisphere in 1944 and 19.8 per 
cent in 1945.6 
Through this the northern convoys contributed to the situation 
where it proved possible late in 1944 to run down the route through 
Iran. This the Western governments were eager to do for a variety 
of reasons - to conserve shipping, 
7to 
redeploy the large number 
of U. S. personnel operating the route and to deprive the Soviet 
Union of any pretext for keeping its troops in the northern zone 
of occupation in Iran. 
9 From the earliest days of intervention 
in that country the Russians had shown their intention of making 
political- capital of their presence there. 
10 They had encouraged 
separatist movements, 
11 disseminated propaganda 
12 
and undermined the 
authority of the central government. 
13 Although this campaign had 
been subdued for most of 1942 and 1943, it had become more 
intense 
in 1944, possibly, the British Consul-General at Meshed 
believed, 
because Stalin, on visiting Teheran for the three-power conference 
late in 1943, had realized with alarm the extent of U. S. influence 
there. 14 By autumn 1944 the Soviet Union's interference in Iranian 
1 COS(45)59(0), 20 Jan. 1945, CAB 80/91. 
2 COS(45)79th mtg, min. 14,28 Mar. 1945, WO 193/669. 
3 Earl of Halifax, no. 44 MOSSY, 24 Apr. 1945, FO 371 
47834 
N107/1/38. 
4 Note on COS(45)343(0) mtg, 17 May 1945, WO 193/669. 
5 Minute, 26 May 1945, MT 59/1127- 
6 Motter, appendix A. 
7 COS(44)34oth mtg(O), 11 Oct. 1944, CAB 79/81. 
8 Ibid. 
9 ASE(44)60,15 Dec. 1944, CAB 92/8. 
10 Tel. from Sir R. Bullard (ambassador, Teheran), no. 923,5 Oct. 
1941, FO 371 27233 E6355/3444/34. 
il See A. Fontaine History of the Cold War (New York, 1968-9), pp. 
279 ff; H. Feis, From Trust to Terror The Onset of the Cold War 
1945-1950 (New York, 1970), p. 64. 
12 Tel. from British Consul, Meshed, 12638/G, 7 Sept. 1941, WO 
193/662; C-in-C India to WO, VVY/1057/Cipiier, 17 Jan. 1942, 
w0 193/159.80/90. 
13 Memorandum by FO, 19 Jan. 1945, annex to COS(45)25(0), CAB 
14 Skrine, World War in Iran, pp. 149,1$5. 
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politics had reached alarming proportions. From September to 
November it sought to secure for itself exclusive rights to pet- 
roleum and mineral exploration in northern Iran, using such a 
forceful press campaign in pursuit of this that the Iranian gov- 
ernment was forced to resign. 
1 
In these circumstances the West 
became concerned to minimize the use of the Persian Corridor; for 
then it could suggest to the Soviet government mutual withdrawal 
of troops engaged in the defence of the supply routes. 
2 
The Nokkundi-Meshed and Basra-Kanaquin routes, being long and 
uneconomical, were the first to be discontinued - in July3 and 
September 1944.4 Then in November the vehicle assembly plants 
were closed, dismantled and eventually sent to the Soviet Union. 
5 
The American Command also terminated aircraft assembly operations 
in February 1945 in view of the almost total dependence of the 
United States on the Alaskan ferry route. 
6 
From that time onwards 
the Persian Corridor's role was reduced to that of clearing back- 
logs, supplying aviation fuel, 
7transporting 
raw materials from 
India8and dismantling the assembly facilities. The latter of these act- 
ivities proceeded slowly, since all concerned were reluctant to 
relinquish the insurance of this route against the failure of 
others; 
9but in 1945 the Persian Gulf carried only 1.2 per cent of 
all supplies from the Western Hemisphere. The totals for 1943 and 
1944 had been 33.5 per cent and 28.8 per cent respectively. 
10 No 
sooner had the Persian Corridor reached its peak capacity in fact 
than it was rendered redundant by the other supply routes. These 
on their own could carry the fourth protocol commitments and more. 
For by the time of Germany's defeat, the British had almost comp- 
leted their protocol shipments 
11and the United States was ahead of 
schedule not only in flight deliveries of aircraft but also in 
shipments on all other routes. The target of 5,700,000 short tons, 
1 Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 1509-10; G. Lenczowski, Russia and the 
West in Iran 1918-1948: a study in big-power rivalry (Cornell 
University Press, 1949), p. 221. 
2 ASE(44)60,15 Dec. 1944, CAB 92/8. 
3 ASE to W'ton, no. 116 MOSSY, 29 July 1944, FO 371 
43276 N4125/ 
25/38. 
4 Memo by Foy to secretary, COS committee, 
6 Sept. 1944, BT 28/144, 
SEC/12/17. 
5 Motter, pp. 281-2,328. 
6 Ibid, p. 270. 
7 Ibid., p. 375- 
8 Memo by Hollyer (MWT), 26 Jan. 1945, MT 59/1125. 
9 Leighton and Coakley, p. 681. 
10- Motter, appendix A. 
31 Annex to COS(45)308(0), 3 May 1945, CAB 
80/94. 
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set with some trepidation in 1944, had been easily surpassed. 
' 
This achievement did much to compensate during the fourth prot- 
ocol period for the lack of consensus on financial questions. None- 
theless the fundamental disagreement between East and Wes ton the 
future of Allied aid remained, and it soon emerged - only shortly 
after the formal signing of the fourth protocol - with the defeat 
of Germany. For with V-E day, -8 May 1945, the Western governments 
could no longer ignore the question of post-war assistance to the 
Soviet Union. They were forced to resolve, in some cases unilater- 
ally, the issues which for so long had delayed the signing of the 
last supply programme. 
In the United States no decision on these questions had been 
taken by the time President Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945. None- 
theless, the President had indicated that aid to the Soviet Union 
should continue uninterrupted after V-E day, despite the fact that 
the Red Army would not then be at war with Japan. On 30 September 
1944, for instance, Roosevelt had informed the Secretary of State 
that the instructions issued three weeks earlier suspending all 
planning for Lend-Lease after V-E day should not apply to 'lend- 
lease negotiations current with the Government of the USSR'. 
2 
Then 
on 5 January 1945 he had issued his familiar directive on aid to 
the Soviet Union: 
Russia continues to be a major factor in achieving the defeat 
of Germany. We must, therefore, continue to support the 
U. S. S. R. by providing the maximum amount of supplies which 
can be delivered to her ports. I consider this a matter of 
utmost importance, second only to the operational requirements 
in the Pacific and the Atlantic. 
The U. S. S. R. has been requested to state requirements for 
a Fifth Protocol, to cover the period from July 1,1945 to 
June 30,1946. It is desired that, within the limitations of 
available resources, every effort be made to meet these 
requirements. 3 
There was a distinct lack of reality in this directive, since not 
even the most pessimistic estimates anticipated the continuation 
of the European war until mid-1946.4 Congress, moreover, was inc- 
reasingly opposed to using Lend-Lease for any purpose otier than 
the waging of the war. In fact in its March 1945 review of the 
Lend-Lease appropriation, an amendment specifying that the act 
should not be used for post-war relief or rehabilitation had been 
1 Leighton and Coakley, p. 681. 
2 Ibid., p. 694. 
3 FRUS, 1945, V, p. 944. 
4 Leighton and Coakley, p. 694. 
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only narrowly defeated. 
1 
These obvious anomalies, however, were 
not resolved by the time Harry Truman became President and the war 
in Europe came to an end. 
2 
Then the question was solved dramatically. Only three days after 
V-E day Truman, on the advice of the Acting Secretary of State Jos- 
eph Grew and Leo Crowley of the Foreign Economic Administration, 
ordered that aid to the Soviet*Union should be immediately and dras- 
tically curtailed. The only exceptions to this rule were to be 
those supplies in Annex III of the fourth protocol which could be- 
justified as being for use in the war against Japan, and those sup- 
plies needed to complete industrial plants of which shipment had 
already begun. All other supplies were to be subject to strict 
scrutiny. There would be no fifth protocol; supplies outstanding 
from the fourth would be shipped only when necessary for operations 
against Japan; all future offerings would be determined 'on the basis 
of reasonably adequate information regarding the essentiality of 
Soviet military supply requirements and in the light of all compet- 
ing demands for supplies in the changing military situation'. 
3 
Rehabilitation needs, President Truman hoped, would be handled thr- 
ough the Export and Import Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
4 
As first interpreted by the zealous President's Soviet Protocol 
Committee, this order meant recalling even ships at sea to remove 
cargoes which were not intended for use in Europe. 
5 Almost immed- 
iately, however, the impracticality of this was clear. The reaction 
from the Soviet Union, and also from Britain who was more severely 
affected, was extremely adverse. 
6 
Stalin told Harry Hopkins who 
visited Moscow in May in an effort to resolve the deadlock resulting 
from the April conference in San Francisco on post-war organization, 
of his disappointment. He fully understood the right of the United 
States to adjust the supply programme in changed circumstances, but, 
he said, 'what was, after all, an agreement between the two Govern- 
ments had been ended in a scornful and abrupt manner. ' 
1 H. S. Truman, Memoirs; Year of Decisions, vol. 1, p. 98. 
2 Leighton and Coakley, p. 694. 
3 Ibid., p. 695. 
4 Truman, p. 98. 
5 Leighton and Coakley, p. 695- 
6 The British Commonwealth received during the war $30,073 million 
worth of Lend-Lease supplies from the United States out of a 
total $43,615 million. The Soviet Union received $10,670 
million (W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy, 
London: HMSO, 1949, p. 375)" 
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He said that if proper warning had been given to the Soviet 
Government there would have been no feeling of the kind he 
had spoken of; that this warning was important to them, 
since their economy was based on plans ... they had int- 
ended to make a suitable expression of gratitude to the 
United States for the Lend-Lease assistance during the war, 
but the way in which this programme had been halted now 
made that impossible to do. 1 
Truman, who claimed later not to have read Grew's memorandum 
before signing it, quickly rescinded the order terminating Lend- 
Lease. 
2 
In the following days, U. S. policy was revised to allow 
all Pacific shipments of protocol supplies to the Soviet Union to 
continue; 90 per cent of these in any case were approved programmes 
of supplies for the war against Japan. Atlantic, Black Sea and 
Persian Gulf shipments, however, still remained suspended. Despite 
this, the immediate impact of the new policy on supplies to the 
Soviet Union was limited. Given the size of the Pacific supply 
programme, shipments in May 1945 were in fact the largest of any 
month in the war. 
3 
On 12 May, moreover, the Charge of the Soviet 
Union in Washington was assured by the Acting Secretary of State 
that 
It is the desire of this Government to continue to provide 
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
with assistance in meeting its military needs for such 
supplies as are required in the light of war conditions ... 
It is urgent that you furnish this Government ... a state- 
ment of (your) military requirements ... for all categories 
of lend-lease supplies for the remainder of the calendar year 
1945 and adequate information regarding the essentiality of 
these requirements in the light of the new military situation. 
4 
In response to this the Soviet Union submitted new requests for 
military aid on 28 May for the period 1 July to 31 December 1945. 
Although, as Grew's letter to the Soviet authorities shows, the 
United States intended to subject these demands to closer scrutiny 
than in the past, many of them were eventually approved. It proved 
impossible for either General Deane in Moscow or the administration 
in Washington to extract detailed justification from the Russians. 
Those requests which were considered reasonable for the war against 
Japan were therefore supplied-in quantities sufficient to fill the 
Soviet Pacific fleet in July and August. 
By early August these supplies and-most of the 'Milepost' 
1 Sherwood, The White House papers, vol. 2, p. 885. 
2 Truman, p. 228. 
3 Leighton and Coakley, p. 696. 
4 FRUS, 1945, V, pp. 1000-1. 
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programme had been shipped, but the dilemma as to what the United 
States should then do, was resolved by the sudden end to the Jap- 
anese war. On 6 August 1945 the first atomic bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima; on 8 August the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and 
six days after this, the Japanese-government sued for peace. Pres- 
ident Truman therefore announced on 17 August that aid to the Soviet 
Union under Lend-Lease would cease on V-J day. Only those supplies 
which were already on the seas would be allowed to proceed. Thus 
it was that aid to the Soviet Union from the United States of Amer- 
ica finally came to an end. 
1 
In the meantime the two other Western signatories to the fourth 
protocol had been trying with similar lack of success to terminate 
their aid programmes amicably. The Canadiann, like the Americans, 
had asked in February 1945 for the Soviet Union's needs during a 
fifth protocol period, 
2and 
with the arrival of V-E day they too 
suspended all shipments under Mutual Aid. 
3 
Within two months they had 
decided to ship the raw materials, food and military items outstan- 
ding from the fourth protocol, but all industrial equipment they 
made subject to new conditions of payment. 
4 
Britain on the other 
hand had stalled even on the question of a fifth protocol. Hoping 
that this would be made irrelevant by an early end to the war5they 
had discussed the question very little. All that had been decided 
with any clarity by the time of Germany's surrender was that the 
Air Ministry opposed any further allocations of aircraft. Britain 
and the United States had both reduced their aircraft construction 
programmes in anticipation of the end of the war6and this, combined 
with manpower shortages, Sinclair said on 8 April 1945, made it 
impossible to supply new fighters to the Soviet Union. 
7 
The Chiefs 
of Staff sympathized. Discussing the need for shipping in the Far 
Eastern war and the supply of liberated territories, they told the 
Prime Minister on 3 May that there was 'no longer any military need 
to continue supplies to Russia'. 
8 
The end of the war in Europe hardened attitudes in London further. 
1 Leighton and Coakley, pp. 696-9. 
2 Earl of Halifax, no. 19 MOSSY, 9 Feb. 1945, F0 371 47834 N107/1/38. 
3 Canada (H. C. )(High Commission) to D. O., no. 1144,21 May 1945, 
FO 371 47840 N5721/1/38. 
4 ASE(45)28,16 July 1945, FO 371 47842 N876#/1/38. 
5 Minute by Mr. Galsworthy (F0), 17 Feb. 1945, FO 371 47836 N1661/ 
V38- 
6 Duncan Hall, North American Supply, p. 452. 
7 ASE(45)11, CAB 92/9. 
8 COS(45)308(0), annex, CAB 80/94. 
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For one thing the British were shocked themselves at the unilateral 
decision of the U. S. government to terminate Lend-Lease aid. Trum- 
an's intention to supply goods only for the war against Japan cut 
through the Keynes-Morgenthau agreement of late 1944 and the dec- 
isions of the Quebec conference even earlier. 
1 
The Prime Minister 
sought assurances from the President late in May that Britain's 
needs would still be met under Lend-Lease, but no answer to this 
appeal was received until the three-power conference at Potsdam 
some seven weeks later. In the interim the United Kingdom received 
only 20 per cent of the assignments it required for the Far Eastern 
2 
war. 
Inevitably in these circumstances the British attitude to supp- 
lying the Soviet Union was not generous - particularly as the 
Russians continued to be obstructive about payments towards their 
existing debts. Although on 2 June 1945 the Soviet government 
accepted the 2.4 interest rate which the Treasury had offered nine 
months earlier for any post-war credit, it qualified its acceptance 
by asking that this interest rate be extended to all future payments 
on the £60 million credit already advanced. 
3 
Furthermore the Russ- 
ians continued in mid-1945 to delay payment for some millions of 
pounds worth of civil supplies; they disputed as well freight charges 
which had been levied for the transport of these supplies in Brit- 
ish ships. (Under the terms of the 1942 financial agreement the 
Soviet government had undertaken to pay for the carriage of civil 
supplies, but not for military supplies or for empty space in any 
vessel. )4 To add to these problems the Soviet Union objected to 
paying the $33 million owing to the United Kingdom for aircraft 
which it had supplied from the United States. The 1942 agreement 
again had stipulated that such munitions must be paid for in dollars, 
and that this applied retrospectively, but in 1944 and 1945 the 
Russians excluded from their liabilities those Tomahawks fighters 
which had been provided in the earliest days of their military 
crisis in 1941.5 
In face of this Churchill accepted the recommendation of his 
civil and military advisers6that military supplies to the Soviet 
1 Sayers, Financial Polic , p. 
477- 
2 Duncan Hall, p. 456. 
3 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 47 MOSSY, 2 June 1945, FO 371 47840 
N6734/1/38. 
4 ASE(45)15,17 May 1945, CAB 92/9. 
5 Mtg at People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade between the amb- 
assador and Mikoyan, 13 June 1945, F0 371 47841 N7551/1/38- 
6 Draft minute from Minister of Production to PM, 29 May 1945, 
FO 371 47840 N6254/1/38; ASE(45)22,1 June 1945, CAB 92/9. 
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Union should be halted from mid-June onwards. He ruled on 13 
June 1945 that there should be no fifth protocol and that civil 
supplies, even if undelivered against the fourth protocol, should 
be withheld until the Kremlin had settled back payments. 
1 
Clark 
Kerr thought this an 'unduly aggressive move', 
2but 
in reality it 
was tempered by the fact that the Minister of Production requested 
the Soviet Trade Delegation at the same time to state Soviet mili- 
tary needs for the rest of 1945. These needs, he said, would be 
met again under the terms of the 1942 agreement. 
3 Furthermore, 
even though Lyttelton stressed, as had the Americans, that Soviet 
requests must be accompanied by 'adequate information regarding 
the essentiality of these requirements in the light of the changed 
war situation', 
4the 
impact of this on supply procedures was limited. 
Russian requests for the rest of 1945 proved to be little more than 
the remainder of the fourth protocol military supplies and some 
non-protocol requests which had either been under consideration or 
authorized for some time. The A. S. E. therefore did not insist on 
detailed information. 5 
Nonetheless agreement on civil supply disputes remained elusive. 
In August the new Labour government attempted to settle them anew. 
Eager to maintain trade with the Soviet Union, particularly in 
timber6and the equipment ordered to Russian specifications, 
7it 
offered on 7 August to resume shipments of civil supplies if the 
Soviet Trade Delegation settled the terms of contract for goods 
already shipped, those awaiting shipment and those for which invoi- 
ces had been already presented. The Russians were assured that this 
offer was made 'in a spirit of mutual confidence and good will, ' and 
as evidence of this the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade was 
invited to London for discussions. 
8 
The Soviet representatives 
1 War Cabinet offices to W'ton, no. 15 MOSSY NOCOP, 13 June 1945, 
FO 371 47841 N6998/1/38- 
2 Sir A. Clark Kerr, no. 61 MOSSY, 10 Aug. 1945, FO 371 47844 
N12159/1/38" 
3 ASE(45)23,18 June 1945, CAB 92/9. 
4 Ibid. 
5 ASE(45)27,16 July 1945, CAB 92/9. Lyttelton also agreed on 
29 June, at the specific request of Borisenko, to exclude rubber 
from the order suspending shipment of civil supplies (ASE(45)32, 
22 Aug. 1945, FO 371 47843 N10893/1/38)" 
6 Anonymous memo, 6 Sept. 1945, BT 28/144, SEC/12/20. 
7 Letter from J. P. Peek, secretary of A. S. E., to Mr. Davidson, 
Treasury, 11 Aug. 1945, MT 59/1128. 
8 War Cabinet Offices to Moscow, no. 54 MOSSY, 15 Aug. 1945, 
FO 371 47835 N670/1/38. 
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accepted this compromise: 
1but. 
althnii h nAVOrai 4-- 
in the following month, the dispute continued over the prices of 
some C40-60 million worth of goods. 
2 
The A. S. E. therefore decided 
on 18 September, shortly before its dissolution, that the Russians 
should be offered under the 1942 agreement only those supplies for 
which there was no alternative use. No further production would 
be undertaken to meet Soviet requirements under the agreement, no 
equipment would be offered if there were other uses for its compo- 
nents, and no supplies would be transferred if they had substantial 
scrap value. 
3 
In a final effort to extract payment from the S. T. D., 
the British also decided to offer discounts of 5 per cent for goods 
immediately purchased and a further £12-13 million credit at 2* per 
cent interest should the Russians agree to settle promptly. 
4 
The Soviet Union, however, apparently wanted better terms. At 
the end of 1945 British claims for some £11.5 million worth of civil 
supplies were still outstanding, as were those concerning aircraft 
from the United States, most of the freight charges and miscellaneous 
expenses run up on services for the Soviet Union on the Persian Gulf 
route. 
5 
Not until September 1946 was agreement reached which allowed 
the resumption of protocol shipments, and by this time the general 
prospects for trade had faded. The Soviet Union was in need itself 
of the raw materials the United Kingdom desired, and apparently it 
continued to believe that the credit the British had offered in 1944 
was inadequate. The months passed without any approach by the Soviet 
government on this question and eventually the Board of Trade was 
forced to regard the offer as having lapsed. 
6 
This was a disappointing end to an association from which the 
British - and presumably the Russians also - had hoped to . dev-" 
elop a mutually advantageous commercial relationship. Nonetheless 
it was not a surprising end. The four supply protocols had been 
uniquely sacrificial on Britain's part and their generosity had 
sprung from the desperate military crisis of the early years of the 
war. When this crisis had receded and Britain's contribution to the 
Soviet Union had of necessity diminished, the protocols had been 
1 Ibid. 
2 Cabinet Offices to Moscow, no. 18 MOSSY NOCOP, 21 Sept, 1945, 
FO 371 47844 N12703/1/38- 
3 ASE(45)2nd mtg, 18 Sept. 1945, FO 371 47844 N12505/1/38- 
4 no. 18 MOSSY NOCOP, loc. cit. 
5 Note for Foreign Secretary by Board of Trade on Civil Supplies 
to and from Russia, 13 Dec. 1945, MT 59/1128. 
6 Brief for the Foreign Secretary by the Board of Trade for use 
at the Moscow conference, 24 Feb. 1947, MT 59/1128. 
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maintained largely for political reasons. With the end of the 
war in Europe, however, normality was bound to return. For the 
United Kingdom this meant a severe economic crisis in which her 
capacity to help others recover from the ravages of the war was 
limited. Politically and commercially desirable though it was to 
continue aid to the Soviet Union, Britain could not afford to be 
generous. 
Unfortunately, as far as can be seen, the Soviet Union could 
not appreciate this. Its ignorance of the United Kingdom's econ- 
omic situation seemed extensive. The Soviet Trade Delegation 
argued late in 1944 that Britain should default on her obligations 
to India and the Dominions for the sake of the Soviet Union. These 
countries, the Russians argued, were in the dame relation to the 
British government as the Ukraine to the Soviet and should be order- 
ed to do as Britain wished. 
1 
To add to this it seemed that the Sov- 
iet Union saw post-war assistance as its right. With some justice 
it believed it had won the war. Certainly it had destroyed the 
mass of the German army and had, more than any country in the West, 
paid the price for the defeat of Nazism with the lives of its 
people and the devastation of its land. For this, it apparently 
believed in 1945, the supply protocols and the terms of credit it 
demanded for trading relations after the war were simply just and 
adequate recompense. 
2 
1 Memorandum by Mr. Wilson, 9 Nov. 1944, F0 371 43355 N7076/302/38- 
2 See, for example, Harriman's telegram to Hopkins on 10 Sept. 1944 
describing the hardening of the Soviet Union's attitude at that 
time: 'The general attitude seems to be that it is our obligation 
to help Russia and accept her policies because she has won the 
war for us. ' (FRUS, 1944, IV, p. 989). 
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8 
In the years since World War II the story of Allied supplies 
to the Soviet Union has become distorted and surrounded by half- 
truths. Like the map of Europe it has been changed by the hostil- 
ity of the Cold War, and the events of 1941 to 1945 have been 
blurred by the prejudices of later years. The Soviet Union, re- 
treating behind its 'iron curtain', has disparaged the contrib- 
ution of the Western Powers to the winning of the war; it has 
claimed for itself sole credit for the defeat of Germany, and has 
accused the West of deliberately delaying the second front in an 
effort to weaken the Soviet Union. 
1 The Western countries on the 
other hand have charged the Russians with ingratitude for Allied 
help; 2they have stressed the cost to themselves of fulfilling the 
supply protocols, and have even in some cases claimed more credit 
for Soviet recovery than the scale of their assistance warranted. 
Given these conflicting claims, it is a difficult task to assess 
the true value and cost of the Soviet supply programme. Even with 
the hindsight of twenty years, it is not easy to answer the quest- 
ions: What did it cost Great Britain to supply the Soviet Union? 
What did it avail the Soviet Union to receive these supplies? 
The first of these questions is obviously the easier to answer. 
The British government, like the American, published after the war 
statistics of the aid it offered, and these show the cost - at 
least in numbers - of the commitment to the Russians. 
From 1 
October 1941 to 31 March 1946 the British made available the foll- 
owing supplies: 
5,218 tanks (of which 1,388 from Canada) 
7,411 aircraft (of which 3,129 from U. S. A. 
) 
4,932 antitank guns 
4,005 rifles and machine guns 
1,803 sets of radar equipment 
4,338 sets of radio equipment 





Total value 9308,000,000 
1 See, for example, J. Erickson, 'The Soviet Union at War (1941-1945)' 
Soviet Studies, vol. XIV (1962-3), no. 3, p. 268; M. P. Gallagher, 
The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories and Realities 
(New York, 1963), pp. 45ff. 
2 See, for example, General Sir Leslie Hollis, One Marine's Tale 
(London, 1956), p. 78. Hollis was Senior Assistant Secretary 
(Military) to War Cabinet. 
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Raw materials, foodstuffs, machinery, industrial plant, 
medical supplies and hospital equipment to the value of 
£120,000,000 1 
The United States meanwhile provided between 11 March 1941 and 1 
October 1945 the quantities listed below: 
14,795 aircraft (67 per cent fighters, 26 per cent 
bombers, 7 per cent miscellaneous) 





8,218 antiaircraft guns 
131,633 submachine guns 
345,735 tons of explosives 
1,981 locomotives 
11,155 flatcars and wagons 
540,000 tons of rails 
Over 1,050,000 miles of field telephone cable 
Food shipments to the value of $1,312,000,000 
2,670,000 tons of gasoline 
842,000 tons of chemicals 
3,786,000 tires 
49,000 tons of leather 
15,000,000 pairs of boots 
Total value $11,260,343,603 
2 
From a combined war production of 427,447 aircraft and 111,600 
tanks, therefore, 3Britain, Canada and the United States sent a 
total of 22,206 aircraft and 12,755 tanks to the Soviet Union. 
These numbers may not seem large as a proportion of Allied 
resources; but statistics do not reveal the whole picture. In 
Britain's case the cost of supplying the Soviet Union was much 
greater than the figures suggest, since not only did-she sacrifice 
her own munitions, but she lost incalculable quantities of aid from 
the United States. These diversions, moreover, occurred in categ- 
ories, such as light bombers and tanks, where Britain relied greatly 
on American production. 
4 
They were also concentrated - in the case 
of tanks particularly - in the years 1941 and 1942. This was the 
1 Statement by Prime Minister in House of Commons, 16 April 1946, 
and 3rd report on Mutual Aid, 1946, quoted in Mitchell, A 
History of Russian ... Sea Power, p. 
427. 
2 Information. from Lend-Lease reports 19,20,21 and 22 to U. S. 
Congress, quoted ibid. Lend-Lease aid to Britain, by comparison, 
was $30,073 in the years 1941-5 (Duncan Hall, North American 
super, p. 430)- 
3 Duncan Hall, pp. 424-6. The figure for tanks does not include 
Bren carriers, other tracked and armoured carriers, scout cars 
and armoured cars. 
4 Late in 1942 Britain relied on the United States for 68 per cent 
of her light bombers and G. R. planes, 100 per cent of her trans- 
port aircraft, and 50-57 per cent of her tanks (Duncan Hall, 
p. 391)" 
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time when Britain's military crisis was still intense and the out- 
put of U. S. industry was comparatively low. Although Lend-Lease 
assistance to the British empire reached $9,031,000,000 and 
$10,766,000,000 in 1943 and 1944 respectively, in 1941 and 1942 
it was only $1,082,000,000 and $4,757,000,000.1 In these early 
years, too, Britain's offering of tanks, aircraft, aluminium and 
artillery to the Russians were at their highest levels, so the 
implications of the supply protocols were great indeed. The growth 
of the air forces at home and abroad, 
2the 
build-up of armoured 
forces, the development of an army support air force, 
3and the adv- 
ance from a defensive to offensive role were all delayed. 
So too was Britain's recovery from the ravages of the naval war. 
Although the provision of naval supplies to the Russians was not 
difficult (as shown by the exclusion of the Admiralty from the 
disputes of late 1941), the northern convoys remained a constant 
strain. Forty of them sailed in all, 
4and 
this involved (in the 
period to March 1945) some 739 ships; 
5271 
of these were British, 
55 tankers, and 677 arrived -a loss-rate of 8.4 per cent. including 
6 
Added to this were the Royal Navy's casualties of 2 cruisers, 5 
destroyers and 8 escort ships sunk, 7 destroyers and 1 aircraft 
carrier damaged, and 95 officers and 1,561 other ranks killed. 
7 
Although these losses were not great compared to those in other 
theatres, their impact was still keenly felt. Like the flow of 
supplies, the losses were concentrated in the years of weakness, 
1941 and 1942,2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 3, minesweepers and 1 sub- 
marine being lost by October of the latter year. 
8 
This drain, 
together with the demands on U. S. merchant shipping, meant reductions 
1 Duncan Hall, p. 430. 
2 COS(41)246(0), 4 Nov. 1941, CAB 8o/6o. 
3 Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. III, pt. II, p. 531- 
4 B. B. Schofield, The Russian Convoys (London, 1964), p. 212. 
Schofield's figures for the northern convoys sailing and losses 
are, slightly higher than the Admiralty's quoted by Alexander. 
Possibly this discrepancy occurs because Schofield's statistics 
cover the period after March 1945. However, the statistics 
given in E. Bookes, The Gates of Hell (London, 1973) p. 189, 
are, also greater than Alexander's. Nonetheless the First Lord 
was addressing a luncheon in his honour when he quoted the stat- 
istics given above, and it seems reasonable to assume their 
accuracy. ' 
5 Speech by A. V. Alexander, 27 March, 1945, AVAR 12/167, Churchill 
College. 
6 Behrens, Merchant Shipping ..., p. 265. This contains details 
of the number of British ships sailing each year. 
T 
, 
Speech by Alexander, loc. cit. 
,. 8 Notes by 
A. V. Alexander for PM, 12 Oct. 1942, PREM 3 393/14. 
See also Morison, History of U. S. Naval Operations, vol. 1, p. 367. 
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in the import programme. 
l It meant also less escorts in the Atlan- 
tic at a time when the battle there was most finely balanced. 
2 
Without doubt, therefore, the cost to Britain of maintaining the 
commitment to the Soviet Union was considerable. On land, sea and 
in the air the implications of the commitment were far-reaching, 
and the sacrifices the protocols demanded in 1941 and 1942 were 
great. Nonetheless, costly though these diversions of munitions 
were, it is not clear that they precipitated the reverses Britain 
suffered in 1942. It has certainly been claimed they did - Church- 
ill in the parliamentary crisis of early 1942 ranked Soviet supplies 
with the Middle East as a major cause of Britain's humiliation in 
the Far East; 
3and he reiterated these claims in his writings after 
the war: 
In order to make this immense diversion (to the Soviet Union) 
and to forgo the growing flood of American aid without cripp- 
ling our campaign in the 'Vestern Desert, we had to cramp all 
our preparations which prudence urged for the defence of the 
Malay peninsula and our Eastern Empire and possessions against 
the ever-growing menace of Japan .4 
Eden, too, told Crozier on 15 January 1942 that 'the drain of the 
Libyan campaign and still more of the Russian campaign' had to a 
large degree caused the disaster in Malaya. 'The simple truth', 
he said, 'was that we had given to Russia what we ourselves needed 
here now and ... in consequence we had not really got enough 
for 
ourselves'. 5 These claims, however, are difficult to accept uncrit- 
ically, Certainly the demands of the Russians made the task of 
reinforcing the Far East early in 1942 agonising; but by that time 
the British position in Malaya was irretrievable. British forces 
had suffered profound defeats which owed more to their inexperience 
in the jungle6and to the neglect of the Far East in 1941 than to any 
1 See pp. 97,123- 
2 Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, p. 413. Whereas there 
were 8-12 escorts for every Atlantic convoy late in 1941, 
in 
1942 the Russian convoys and the Pacific war had reduced this 
to 4-6. 
3 Parliamentary Debates, vol. 377, col. 606,27 Jan. 1942, col. 
1011,29 Jan. 1942. 
4 Churchill, The Second World War, III, pp. 351-2. 
5 Crozier, Off the Record, pp. 266-7. 
6 Lieut-General A. E. Percival, G. O. C. -in-C., Malaya, rated Japanese 
training, experience, discipline and morale as the main reasons 
for their success when he signalled London two days before the 
capitulation of Singapore. 'Other factors, notably air superior- 
--pity and possession of tanks', he said, 
'contributed to this suc- 
cess, but were not determining factors. ' It was not until 
later 
that Percival considered the lack of munitions to have been 
significant in Britain's defeat 
(Butler, p. 419. ) 
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commitment to the Russians. 
For well before the Soviet Union even entered the war British 
plans for the defence of Malaya had been undermined. Ten months 
earlier, in August 1940, it had been agreed that Malaya would 
receive by the end of 1941 twenty-two R. A. F. squadrons. The Royal 
Navy, previously the foundation of the defence of Singapore, with 
the elimination of the French Fleet from the Mediterranean, was 
preoccupied with duties closer to home. In its absence air power 
was to be the basis of Malaya's defence. 
1 The army, temporarily 
set at a strength of ten brigades, was to be progressively reduced 
to the role of defending airfields, base installations and vulner- 
able points. 
2 
However, this plan was not fully implemented. In January, April 
and May 1941 the Prime Minister and the Defence Committee discounten- 
anced arguments for reinforcing Malaya on the grounds that everything 
was needed for the Middle East. 
3 The Chiefs of Staff were instructed 
to proceed on the assumption that war with Japan was improbable. 
4 
Consequently by June 1941, when the Soviet Union was attacked, the 
army contingent, though up to ten brigades, was weak in artillery, 
anti-aircraft weapons and tanks. 
5 
The air force, meanwhile, consis- 
ted of twelve, not twenty-two, squadrons. 
6 
Even when, in July 1941, the Japanese occupied French Indo-China, 
making the whole Malayan peninsula vulnerable to attack, 
7British 
forces remained weak. This was the time to have acted, were Britain to 
avoidct'he disaster of-, early 1942, for inevitably there were several 
months' delay in the implementation of London's-decisions. But few 
reinforcements were sent. 
8 
Although the Joint Planners recommended 
in August that 1 battleship, 4 old R-class battleships and 1 aircraft 
carrier should be sent to the Far East by the end of the year, only 
2 capital ships and 4 destroyers were despatched. 
9 
Moreover, -only 
one additional squadron of aircraft and five regiments were added 
to the forces in Malaya by the time the Japanese attacked. 
10 
1 J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. II, September 1939- June 
1941 (London: HMSO, 1957), pp. 336,333. 
2 Gwyer, Grand Strategy, p. 275- 
3 Butler, pp. 495,501,505; Gwyer, p. 280. 
4 Gwyer, p. 280. 
5 Ibid., p. 277- 
6 Ibid., p. 19. 
7 Ibid., p. 278. 
8 For discussion in August about sending bomber squadrons and 
light tanks from the Middle East, see ibid., p. 279. 
9 Ibid., p. 268. 
. 10 Gwyer, p. 
280. 
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Possibly Rritain's preoccupation with the Soviet Union at this 
time inspired this neglect. Certainly they were under growing 
pressure to divert aircraft to the Russians and to undertake offen- 
sive action, either in Europe or the Middle East. Furthermore 
they had the new responsibility of the northern convoys, which 
made diversions from the Home Fleet undesirable. But British discus- 
sions late in 1941 suggest that the Soviet demands were not the 
deciding factor. Eden's, Churchill's and even Portal's statements 
show rather an underestimation of their Japanese opponent and a 
misappreciation of his intentions. Eden told Crozier on 18 July 
that he did not anticipate Japan wanting war with either the United 
States or with Britain. Their air force was not at all good, he 
said, and 'was described by people who should know as being "as 
poor as Italy's" 11 An appreciation by the Commanders-in-Chief, 
Far East and China Station, on 1 October reinforced this confidence, 
saying, 'we reiterate that the last thing Japan wants at this junc- 
ture is a campaign in the south .. . '. 
2 Portal, too, told Sir 
Earle Page, special envoy of the Australian government, in Novem- 
ber that '... in the absence of extreme danger in the Far East, 
it was uneconomical to employ there, in a precautionary role, 
bombers now being used to attack targets in Germany and in the 
Middle East. ' Churchill supported him, saying that it would be a 
grave strategical error to send forces to the Far East where they 
might remain inactive for a year. 
3 
These statements, and the long neglect of Malaya, indicate that 
the basis of British policy in the Far East was the assumption that 
Japan would not act with the United States Pacific Fleet out against 
her. 
4 
A pre-emptive strike against Pearl Harbor was never seriously 
considered. 
5 
This miscalculation, together with the British desire 
to protect themselves at home and to reach a decision in the Middle 
East, governed Far Eastern policy. The commitment to the Russians 
late in 1941 reinforced a pattern of neglect already well established. 
Similarly the commitment to the Soviet Union accentuated rather 
than created British weaknesses in the Middle East. Certainly 
in 
this theatre the impact of the supply protocols was great, since 
1 Crozier, pp. 228-9. 
2 Gwyer, p. 281. There was always the possibility that Japan 
would take the opportunity to attack a weakened Soviet Union. 
3 WM(41)112th concl., min. 1, confidential annex, 12 Nov. 1941, 
CAB 65/24. 
4 Gwyer, p. 283- 
5 Gwyer, pp. 282-3. 
255 
tanks and aircraft-already allocated from Britain andvtheý, United 
States were diverted to the Russians., These losses,, moreover, 
were aggravated in 1942 when. further diversions were made to the 
Far East. Because of these two-claims on munitions,, the''Desert. '- 
Air Force found early in 1942 that the losses of, the 'Crusader'.; 
offensive of the previous, year were barely replaced. 
2 Further- 
more, its supply of modern Hurricanes was diminished, 
3as 
over 
1,600 of these were sent-. to the. Red Army under the first>protocol. 
4 
The, flow of American aircraft, such as Kittyhawks and. Bostons, also 
became unreliable. 
5 Consequentlyiby the time General-Rommel attacked 
at Gazala on: 26 May 1942 the Middle East air forces were outnumbered 
, both in the desert and in the theatre. as a whole. 
6 
Qualitatively 
"too they had no fighter to match the German ME. 109F. 
Nonetheless it is far from clear how great was the impact of the 
Soviet commitment'on the outcome of. this desert battle. Without 
question armour was the deciding factor in the desert fighting, not 
aircraft; 
7and in this area the Middle East suffered less as a con- 
sequence of Russian demands. Crusader tanks, for instance, were 
never sent to the Soviet Union, and the diversion of infantry tanks 
late, in 1941 was-quickly offset by the U. S. allocation of 350 crui- 
ser tanks in November. 
8 
Middle East assignments of tanks, moreover, 
were carefully guarded when, in January 1942, it was decided to con- 
tinue supplying the RedýArmy'despite the war in the Pacific. 
9 
Although Auchinleck was-asked to supply one hundred tanks for the 
Far East, by.. the, time Rommel, attacked, , the, 
8th Army ; had. the 3 to 2 
T 
1 See pp. 39,78" See also With Prejudice, The, War. Memoirs of,. 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, G. C. B. (London, 
1966)-, pp. 224-5- 
2 Playfair, The Mediterranean and-Middle East,. vol. III,. p., 205. 
3 Ibid. 
4 WP(42)417, -17 Sept. '1942, CAB 66 28. 
5, Playfair,. P. 205. ý..., z; 
6 Ibid., p. 221. 
-7---Major-General I,. -S. --O. Playfair; The Mediterranean and Middle 
East, vol. II, "The Germans come to the Help of their Ally" 
(1941)+ (London; HMSO, .. 1956), p. -255-' 
8 See pp. 78-9. 
9 See Defence. Committees meeting of- 30. January, at ° which', Attlee-, 




which is so vital', and the committee agreed that 
Russian allocations couldfbe'met without Middle East reductions. 
The United Kingdom was, 'given; lowest, priority, *-, 
' (D0(42)5th mtg, 
PREM 3 150/4). In"July-1942, ',,, too, _ 
Beaverbrook insisted in the 
House, of, Lords that Libya had never suffered a shortage of tanks 
because of the Sovietpcommitment. _ 
(See-. Coates, 'A History of. 
Anklo-Soviet Relations, i p: ",, 724: )_' `ý' >`, 
256 
superiority considered necessary-'for a successful offensive; 
1575 
cruiser, and light"tanks and 276 infantry tanks confronted 320 
German and- 240 'Italian tanks'. 2 
The real source of British' weakness, as events'of June and-'July 
showed, lay not in the quantity but in the quality of their forces. 
Tank warfare in the flät", open Western Desert placed a 'premium on 
tactics, gun. range, reliability and fire-power. In all these"the 
Afrika Corps-was' superior. 'British tanks were ünreliable''and - 
inadequately, armed, and most"lacked, `the capped ämmunition"necessäry 
to-pierce-the-face-hardened, frontal armour bf many-, German tanks. 
3 
The°six-pounder`gun did-, no t'. seeeservice in'äny numbers until'the 
summer of 1942, shortly befdre the `battle- of: 'El Alamein, and' Rommel 
exploited this advantage, using"with imagination the effective 5cm° 
Pak.. 38 anti-tank gun-and the 8.8cm Flak anti-aircraft gün1in-an 
anti-tank, role. 
4''=` 
Furthermore'the 8th Army was-hampered bypoor 
leadership=and inadequate co-ordination at'the command-level'** 
5'"All 
these weaknesses ' combined tö"pröduce the stunning retreat`to'E1 
Alamein-in June 1942. Whether=this disaster would haveSbeen avoided 
if' the`. 8th Army, armed -with"ihose tanks which' 
were sent instead` to 
the Soviet Union, had taken the offensive earlier, is a difficult 
question. 
6 
It is certainly significant'that"Rommel's'forces were'-' 
reinforced during'the. lull in the`fspring'6f"1942 with many tanks 
with face-härdened-armour. 
7 But--on; the'other hand, »the German" 
general's proven ability to defeat-'superior'forces-suggestsl, thät''' 
until the*; Desert Army was equipped "with 'better; qüality equipment, ` 
it would continue to be outmatched: 
'In 'the, '-xfinal -analysis, therefore, the cost to °Br`iiain''-of `supply- 
ing'the'Soviet Union with munitions remains üncle6r: `''"Withöüt~`d6übt, 
as-=a. result-of the Russian commitment°programmes-of"expänsionnin 
almost every. areaIof British operations were restricted, `änd=°risks 
were taken both'on the political8and military'levels. In-, 
1941 and 
1 Playfair, p.. 198. 
2 Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. III, Pt--II , P.. 
601. 
3 Playfair,., III, pp. 214,243. 
4 Ellis `and Chamberlain, Fiphtintr Vehicles, tp.: 
60. 
, , Only -i12 six- 
pounder anti-tänkgiins had arrived in May 1942 (Playfair, 'III, 
p. 215). 
5 Butler, p. 602. ý...,...., _ýý, ý .,. w. z 
6 It-is'7also a''räther hypothetical question. Had the British not 
sent tanks to the Soviet Union, they might have retained them 
in 
the United. Kingdom or sent them to India or the Dominions. 
7 Playfair, ' " III, p. 
8 For instance,, in=the curtailing-of'supplies'to India in 1941, 
and'in the potential alienation of Turkey; _a 
country which loomed 
large in 
, 
British` strategy until late 1943 and which viewed the 
Soviet Union's resurgence with grave suspicion. 
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1942 particularly Britain reduced her own offensive power. But 
such was the complexity of the war and so manifold the choices 
open to the British and American governments that the final effect 
of these sacrifices on British operations must remain a matter of 
conjecture. 
Similarly it is difficult to know with certainty the degree to 
which British munitions assisted the Red Army. The accounts which 
Soviet writers have published in English since the war have been 
confusingly contradictory. Some have admitted the relative import- 
ance of Western munitions, but others, usually those writing in 
earlier years, have scarcely acknowledged Allied aid. In 1946, as 
relations between East and West began to sour, the mention of the 
Allies was dropped from the Victory Day Order of the Day in Moscow. 
In the following year the celebration of the German surrender to 
the Allies on 8 May 1945 was also dropped, leaving only 9 May to be 
commemorated, the day of the surrender in Berlin at which Soviet 
representatives were present. From 1947 onwards the Soviet denig- 
ration of the West intensified, culminating finally in the claim 
that the Allies had prolonged the war in an effort to exhaust the 
Soviet Union. 1 
Inevitably in this campaign Allied aid came to be disparaged too. 
The account in 1948 by the head of the Soviet State Planning Comm- 
ission, N. A. Voznesensky, of the Soviet economy during World War 
II minimized the assistance received from the West. It claimed that 
Allied aid amounted in 1941,1942 and 1943 to only 4 per cent of the 
Soviet Union's total production. This statistic was obviously of 
limited value, since 1941 saw few deliveries and 1944, a year not 
included, saw the peak of Lend-Lease aid. 
2 Furthermore, Voznesensky 
did not state whether his statistics were based on monetary or 
physical indices. 
3 Instead he asserted that it was the virtues of 
the Soviet system which had ensured the Soviet Union's salvation. 
Staunchly and courageously enduring the privations of war, 
the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and 
the 
Soviet intelligentsia built up by their patriotic labor a 
stable war economy and kept our Soviet army and navy ade- 
quately suppli&d with first-class armaments, 
food, equip- 
ment and fuel. 
1 Gallagher, p. 45- 
2 Werth, Russia at War, pp. 568-9. 
3 W. H. MacNeill, America, Britain & Russia. Their Co-operation 
and Conflict, 1941-1946 
(Oxford, 1953), p. 231- 
4 Soviet Economy During the Second World War (U. S. A.: International 
Publishers, 1949 (1948) ), p. 11. 
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Other Soviet accounts have been little more helpful. Vasili 
Chuikov, Marshal of the Red Army and hero of Stalingrad, repeated 
in his reminisences the claim that the Allies had supplied aid 
amounting to only 4 per cent of Soviet production. Moreover, he 
added, the weapons the West had provided had been obsolete and 
'frequently of different varieties'. Scornfully he concluded 
that 
In order to give an inflated impression of the part played by 
the United States in the defeat of the German armies, and to 
belittle the importance of the efforts of the U. S. S. R., the 
political and military leaders of the imperialist countries 
are trying to exaggerate the scale of deliveries of war mater- 
ial and weapond by the United States and Britain during the 
war under lend-lease, and put forward the utterly nonsensical 
idea that without a constant stream of British and American 
deliveries the Russians armies would not have been victorious. 
1 
This tradition of scorning Western aid was continued by Rear- 
Admiral Arseni Golovko, war-time commander of the Soviet Northern 
Fleet. His account in 1965 of the running of the northern convoys 
was particularly partisan, even accusing the British of unnecess- 
arily sinking ships when only the slightest damage had been sust- 
ained. 
2 
Golovko, however, was surpassed in falsification by an 
earlier Soviet publication which incredibly described the tragic 
PQ 17 as follows: 
In June-July., 1942, ... a large number of transport ships 
coming to the U. S. S. R. were sunk. This happened because the 
English naval command intentionally divulged the time of 
departure of the convoy and the route it would follow, making 
this top-secret data available to the German fascists command. 
The ruling circles of the U. S. A. and England used the destruc- 
tion of these transports to 'prove' that dangers connected 
with the shipment of goods to the U. S. S. R. were too great and 
on this pretext curtailed the already miserable supplies. 
3 
Even the official History of the Great Patriotic War of the 
Soviet Union perpetrated such distortions. Written under Party 
surveillance and published in the early 1960s, it admitted grudg- 
ingly that there were some Western aircraft in the Soviet army; 
but, it added, the Hurricanes and Tomahawks were obsolete and 
much inferior to Russian and German fighters. The Airacobras and 
Kittyhawks, on the other hand, were excellent, 'but there weren't 
enough of them'. Of Allied tanks the History was more disparaging: 
1 The Beginning of the Road (London, 1963 (1959) )' pp" 369,368. 
2 With the Red Fleet (London, 1965), p. 90- 
3A publication of 1953, quoted in Gallagher, pp. 50-1. 
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55 per cent of those received in 1942, it claimed, were light tanks, 
while in the following year the proportion of these types was even 
higher. The quantities received were 'mediocre' and the quality 
left much to be desired. 
1 
Only in later years did more complimentary accounts of Allied aid 
emerge from the Soviet Union. In 1971 the reminiscences of Nitkita 
Khrushchev were published in the West, and these, in a predictable 
attempt to denigrate Stalin, praised the aid the West had offered. 
The value of Allied food, steel, aluminium and motorized transport 
was particularly stressed. 'Just imagine how we would have advanced 
from Stalingrad to Berlin without them! ', Khrushchev said, referring 
to American cars and trucks. 'Our losses would have been colossal 
because we would have had no maneuverability. '2 This conclusion 
was supported in 1971 by the great Soviet Marshal G. K. Zhukov. 
In his memoirs he admitted that some 400,000 vehicles and locomotives 
had been received from the West, 
3as 
well as valuable quantities of 
fuel and communications equipment. Furthermore 18,700 aircraft, 
10,800 tanks and 9,600 artillery pieces were supplied under Lend- 
Lease. These munitions, Zhukov stated, amounted to 12 per cent, 
10.4 per cent and 2 per cent respectively of the total supplied to 
the Red Army during the war. Allied assistance, he concluded, was 
of definite, but not decisive, importance to the Soviet war effort. 
4 
This, of the Soviet accounts listed here, is possibly closest to 
the truth. Zhukov's figures are reasonably accurate, and other 
evidence, from Western observers and the Soviet sources, 
5has 
corrob- 
orated his claims. Stalin in his election speech of 1946 admitted 
that the Soviet Union produced some 100,000 tanks, 120,000 planes, 
360,000 guns and over 1.2 million machine-guns in the last three 
years of the war. From these figures Alexander Werth concluded 
that Allied heavy equipment amounted to between 10 and 15 per cent 
of the total available to Soviet forces. 
6 
Personal observation 
also convinced Werth that, as Zhukov said, Allied motorized equipment 
1 Quoted in Werth, pp. 564-5. 
2 Khrushchev Remembers (translated by S. Talbott) (London: Sphere 
Books Ltd, 1971), p. 199- 
3 General Deane in The Strange Alliance gave the figure of 427,284 
trucks (p. 93); but compare with figures shown on p. 250. 
4 The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (London, 1971), p. 684. 
5 Both A. Seaton (The Russo-German War, p. 589) and, G. Kolko (The 
politics of War. The World and United States Foreign Policy -1-9-73- 
19-45, New York, 1968, p. 19) state that Soviet authorities now 
admit a more generous figure - of approximately 10 per cent - 
for Allied aid. 
6 Russia At War, p. 568. 
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- and Western food - played an important part from 1943 onwards 
in the Soviet Union's war effort. 
1 
Other Allied observers have confirmed this. The Canadian mili- 
tary attach cc, Brigadier H. Lefebvre, visiting the Ukrainian front 
in April 1944, saw many Ford, Chevrolet and Dodge lorries, as well 
as 'vYillys jeeps, in Red Army units. Allied equipment, he concluded, 
played 'a most important role in Russian transport'. 
2 
Deane of the 
American military mission agreed. From his observations and trips 
to the Russian front he estimated that lorries and combat vehicles, 
petroleum products, food and railway equipment, in that order, were 
the most valuable of Allied supplies. Like Lefebvre, he testified 
also that American trucks were immensely popular with Soviet troops. 
3 
These conclusions were not Western propaganda. Analysis of the 
fighting on the Eastern front shows that in 1944 the Red Army infan- 
try gained unprecedented mobility in its struggle with the Wehr- 
macht. Since the Soviet motor industry was meagre - only 800,000 
vehicles were present in the whole country at the beginning of the 
wars- such mobility must have been provided by the United States. 
Indeed, according to Seaton, the total holdings of the Soviet armed 
forces in 1945 were 665,000 motor vehicles. 
6 
The United States, 
it will be recalled, provided 51,503 jeeps, 35,170 motorcycles and 
375,883 trucks in the years 1941-1945- 
American food also must have been important to the Soviet war 
effort. By 1942 only 58 per cent of the area under the cultivation 
in the Soviet Union before the war was in Russian hands. Even after 
Stalingrad the percentage rose to a mere 63 per cent, and the number 
of cattle, horses and pigs was even less.? In these circumstances 
the versatile SPAM and other products like it from the United States 
must have been invaluable. 
8 
So too must have been Allied fuel, 
which included blending agents and high octane fuels not available 
in the Soviet Union and vital to the production of aviation gas. 
9 
Food, transport and fuel, however, were essentially American 
supplies. Britain's military contribution consisted more of aircraft, 
1 Ibid., p. 566. 
2 F0 371 43362 N3983/477/38" 
3 The Strange Alliance, pp. 94-5- 
4 Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 607. 
5 Vderth, p. 143- 
6 Seaton, p. 589- 
7 WVerth, p. 566. 
8 For two reports supporting this see Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1943, III, p. 566. 
9 Seaton, p" 5 9. 
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tanks, naval equipment and, in the first year, artillery. The 
value of these supplies is more difficult to assess. There can 
be little doubt that in quantity and at times in quality British 
munitions disappointed the Russians. The number of tanks and air- 
craft was usually less than desired and their delivery was inter- 
rupted at the most critical times of the Eastern campaign. More- 
over, if Soviet complaints are to be believed, the value of these 
supplies was reduced in 1941 and 1942 by the shortage of spare parts. 
The quality of British aircraft and artillery also provoked comp- 
laint.. In later years when Soviet production of guns, tanks and 
aircraft was adequate to meet the Red Army's needs, 
1the 
Matilda 
tank, the two-pounder gun, and the Hurricane fighter failed to 
please the Russians. Indeed, according to Lieutenant-General 
Burrows, head of the no. 30 Military Mission in 1944, the Soviet 
authorities were convinced by that time that Britain gave only 
'stuff which we would otherwise have had to dump in the North Sea'. 
2 
Nonetheless, despite the element of truth in Soviet complaints, 
British munitions had their role to play. Obsolescent they may 
have been in 1943, but in previous years they had been equal or 
superior to their Soviet counterparts. 
3 
Moreover, they filled a 
gaping hole in the Red Army's resources. Soviet losses in the first 
year of the war were immense. In the first five months alone the 
Germans destroyed or captured more than 5,000 aircraft, 
4more 
than 
300 ammunition plants, 
557 
per. cent of Soviet pre-war coal production, 
68 per cent of pig iron capacity, 58 per cent of steel resources, 
and 60 per cent of aluminium production. 
6 
Even in 1945 the Russians 
were producing 10 per cent less electric power, 40 per cent less 
pig iron, 37.7 per cent less petrol and 10 per cent less coal than 
in 1940.7 In these circumstances British munitions and supplies, 
whatever their quantity, must have been a help. 2,974 tanks and 
3,000 aircraft had been despatched by the end of 1942, enough with 
the American contributioi to arm 32 armoured divisions and 400 
1 Werth, -pp. 564-5- 
2 Final Report, 19 Dec. 1944, FO 371 43291 N8050/25/38. 
3 Seaton, 
, p. - 
589. The Valentine and Matilda, though inferior 
to the T-34 were superior to the T-60 and other types of 
Soviet tanks being produced in quantity in the middle years 
of the war. 
4 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 615- 
5 Ibid., p. 616. 
6 Ibid., p. 628. 





contemporary reports confirm that they were rushed 
quickly to the front. 
2 
Like Allied raw materials, they may not 
have been decisive in the struggle in the East; certainly they did 
not, as a recent historian has claimed, 
3turn 
l the tide before 
Moscow in 1941. But without these protocol supplies the Soviet 
defence would have been weakened, and the stunning victories of 
1943 and 1944 would have been delayed. 
Without the Allied commitment also the Kremlin's will to resist 
might have been shaken. Maisky stressed from the earliest days of 
the Eastern campaign the political importance of the British prov- 
iding supplies, and there can be little doubt that the Moscow con- 
ference in 1941 encouraged the Soviet leaders. Certainly Churchill 
and the Cabinet saw the supply programme in political terms. Their 
early gestures, as is clear from their timing, were aimed at streng- 
thening Soviet morale, while later offerings, which could often have 
been made with greater ease from the United States, continued to be 
made from Britain. The northern convoys too were run, when no longer 
strictly necessary, to demonstrate British support for the Soviet 
struggle. 
The importance of this must not be overestimated. Britain's 
supply programme in later years was small, and the political capital 
gained from it was correspondingly diminished.. 
4 
Moreover, as the 
American experience showed, supplies in any quantity were unable to 
compensate the Soviet Union for delays in the second front and to 
resolve the profound differences between East and West on the ques- 
tion of Eastern Europe. But notwithstanding this, the supply prot- 
ocols definitely had a political role to play. They demonstrated 
to the Soviet government the willingness of the West to make sacri- 
fices for the sake of the new alliance. They showed the acutely 
suspicious Russians that the bitterness of the past was forgotten, 
and countered to some degree the dangerous belief that the Red Army 
was fighting alone and bearing the burden of the war unaided. In 
these important ways the supply of munitions to the Soviet Union 
laid the basis for the alliance between East and West which ensured 
the-destruction of Hitler and his immensely powerful Reich. 
1 Speech of Lyttelton at. Newcastle on Red Army Day, 21 Feb. 1943, 
MT"59/1120. These figures were based on the calculations of 
200 tanks per armoured division, 15-16 planes per squadron. 
2 : Collier'to CAS, ARC-674,6 Dec. 1941, AIR 8/1000; 30 MM to WO, 
MIL. 1906, '9 Dec. 1941,470 193/580. 
3, Mitchell, 'p. 381- 
4 See, for example, Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second 
VJorl d War, vol. II, p. 564. 
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